JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. This appeal against acquittal is by the State in a trap case involving an offence punishable under S.5 (2) read with S.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and S.161 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegation against the respondent (a Central Excise Inspector) is that he demanded and received Rs. 300/- as gratification other than legal remuneration on 23-5-1985 from PW 1 as a motive for renewal of licence for the Refrigerator and air conditioner appliances of the ice plant belonging to his brother and managed by him. 2. Defence is a total denial of involvement coupled with a contention that he has no authority to renew license and according to the work arrangement the area did not come within his field of operation also. The further case is that the notes were thrust into his pocket against his wishes and inspite of his objections and he was trapped while attempting to take out and return the notes. 3. The prosecution case starts with a visit by PW 4, Superintendent of Central Excise, to the ice plant on 21-5-1985 in the company of the respondent. It was pursuant to the direction given then that PW 1 came on 22-5-1985 and met PW 4. PW 4 directed PW 1 to the respondent and informed that respondent will put him in the correct line. Respondent is said to have demanded Rs. 300/- when PW 1 met him. He promised to come back with money. Next day he gave, information to PW 7 in the C.B.I. office. Case was registered and trap arranged. PW 2 was deputed to go along with PW 1 to witness the demand and payment. PWs 3, 7 and 8 are the other members of the trap party who waited outside. After getting the pre arranged signal all of them went. The amount was recovered from the pocket of the respondent under Ext. P6 recovery mahazar. These facts were spoken to by all these witnesses. It was in the room of PW 4 and in his presence the recovery was effected. He also supported the prosecution, PWs 10 and 11 are the colleagues of the respondent They turned hostile. 4. By an elaborate process of analysis and discussion the trial judge disbelieved PWs 1 to 4 and 7 and 8 on account of various items of improbabilities, discrepancies and contradictions. He also supported the prosecution, PWs 10 and 11 are the colleagues of the respondent They turned hostile. 4. By an elaborate process of analysis and discussion the trial judge disbelieved PWs 1 to 4 and 7 and 8 on account of various items of improbabilities, discrepancies and contradictions. The discussion reminded me of the warning given by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao ( AIR 1984 SC 63 ). When in a trap case the judge magnified every minor detail or emission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence, then, it would be the very antithesis of a correct judicial approach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed if such a harsh touchstone is presented to prove such a case it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish any case at all. 5. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. (1977) 2 SCC 394 ( AIR 1984 SC 1453 ) in appropriate cases it may be safe to accept the evidence of the complainant and the police officers even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. It is all the more safe when besides such evidence there is some circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not with his innocence. Though the decision in Panalal D. Rathi v. State of Maharashtra ( 1979 (4) SCC 526 ) said that after introduction of S.165A in the Indian Penal Code making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery, the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime must be insisted, this decision took a different note. That my be because a person who does not yield to the illegal demand for bribe but only aids the concerned police officers in bringing an offender to justice is not committing a crime under S.165A but is only doing a service to eradicate a social menace. For various reasons enumerated in that decision it is said that by and large a citizen is somewhat reluctant rather than anxious, to complain to the vigilance department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded from him. For various reasons enumerated in that decision it is said that by and large a citizen is somewhat reluctant rather than anxious, to complain to the vigilance department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded from him. No one would be too anxious to face such a cumbersome ordeal having serious after effects on him unless he feels oppressed by being wronged and finds the solution to be beyond endurance. His evidence cannot therefore be easily and lightly brushed aside. But that should not mean that court should be oblivious of the need for caution and circumspection bearing in mind that one can conceive of cases where an honest or strict government officer may be falsely implicated by a vindictive person to whose demand, for showing favours, or for according a special treatment by giving a go - by to the rules, the official refused to yield. 6. That should be the approach to the police officers also as laid down in the same decision and many other decisions including Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn) ( AIR 1980 SC 873 ). They cannot be said to be interested witnesses. Even the remotest interest that could be attributed are only two fold and apply only in a limited sense. They may be interested in the success of the trap to ensure that a citizen who complains is legitimately protected and the role of their department in such projection is vindicated. So also they maybe interested in the success of the prosecution so that their ego is satisfied or that they earn a feather to their cap. Therefore depending upon circumstances of cases the court may feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of the evidence of the police officers supported by that of the complainant alone. There may be different cases also. There can be instances or mala fide investigations also. Everything depends upon the satisfaction that at the court feels. 7. As held in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1975 SC 1432 ), in a bribe case the main ingredients to be proved by the prosecution are (1). There may be different cases also. There can be instances or mala fide investigations also. Everything depends upon the satisfaction that at the court feels. 7. As held in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1975 SC 1432 ), in a bribe case the main ingredients to be proved by the prosecution are (1). The accused was a public servant (2) He obtained any gratification from any person, and (3) It was other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of official functions, favour or disfavour to the persons. When the first two ingredients are proved by evidence then a rebuttable presumption arises in respect of the third ingredient. In the absence of proof of the first two facts, the presumption does not arise. Any how the approach to the evidence of the complainant and trap witnesses made in Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1961 SC 1762 ) and similar decisions underwent a radical change. Now the position as laid down in Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Admin) ( AIR 1976 SC 449 ) and later decisions is that association in a trap by itself is not sufficient to dub a witness as an accomplice per se or even as an interested witness in total absence of materials justifying such an inference. 8. When there is conclusive evidence of recovery of, currency notes from the pocket of the accused difficulty of evidence of corroboration with regard to the negotiation of the accused with the complainant is considered now as paled into insignificance, more so when no material prejudice resulted to the accused A defence plea of planting any incriminating object, in answer to a charge, to be successful now in the above situation, must be or at any rate, should reasonably appear to have been, made without the knowledge or acquiescence of the accused. Conduct of the accused in such a situation is relevant under S.8 of the Evidence Act. Conduct of the accused in such a situation is relevant under S.8 of the Evidence Act. As held in S. K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra ( 1977 (2) SCC 394 ) in order to justify an inference of the accused having been animated by a dishonest intention, the standard of proof required may be much safe and superior when there is evidence to show that as a public servant he was really an honest and sincere officer and his antecedents were good. As observed in Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn) ( AIR 1980 SC 873 ), if the events which followed in quick succession in a given case may lead to the only inference that the money was obtained as bribe by the accused, it raises a rebuttable presumption and it is not necessary that passing of money should be proved even by circumstantial evidence. 9. I adverted to these legal positions because of the evidence available in the case. The identical notes entrusted to PW 1 after being smeared with phenolphthalein powder were seized from the pocket of the respondent. His hand and pocket were positive to the test also. Recovery was made immediately after the payment when the respondent was forcibly taken to the room of PW 4 by the trap party. These facts were spoken to by PWs 1 to 4, 7 and 8. Actual payment was spoken to by PWs 1 and 2. The previous demand was proved only by the evidence of PW 1 because nobody else was present there. In the normal course in the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the plea of the respondent unsupported by any evidence or circumstance that the money was thrust into his pocket against his wishes and inspite of his protest may not be accepted. But the learned counsel for the respondent reminded me of the limitations in an appeal against acquittal and pointed out various decisions including K. Lakshmana Rao v. Public prosecutor ( 1979 (4) SCC 638 ) and C. V. Chandran v. L. V. Krishnamoorthy ( 1988 (2) KLT 775 ). 10. I was not very much impressed by the way in which the trial judge proceeded to discard the evidence on the basis of the minutest discrepancies and contradictions on trivial aspects. 10. I was not very much impressed by the way in which the trial judge proceeded to discard the evidence on the basis of the minutest discrepancies and contradictions on trivial aspects. But even after ignoring those aspects there remain some further points on which the trial judge, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses in action and watching their demeanour, expressed against acceptability of the evidence. Sitting as a trial judge I would have come to different conclusions on these points. But sitting in appeal against acquittal I doubt whether I will be justified in substituting my conclusions on those aspects. 11. In support of the demand made by the respondent on 22-5-1985, which is supported only by the evidence of PW 1, he made two different versions, one in the first information statement and the other in the box-One is that it was inside the room and the other is that it was in the Veranda. The malayalam version of the demand spoken to by PW 1 is Respondent is admittedly not the person competent to renew licence. The competent person is PW 4 Even if PW 1 is believed there is at least the possibility of a contention that (as suggested by the defence) the respondent was only pointing out on behalf of PW 4 that if Rs. 300/- is paid to him licence could be obtained. Left to myself I am of the view that the word is often used as a substitute for at least by some persons. PW 1 said that he was very much interested in seeing that somehow or other the trap succeeded and he did not even take his lunch because he was more interested in the success of the trap than his lunch. Even though that attitude could be on account of his moral indignation alone, the contrary view taken by the trial judge that he was prepared to go to any extent is also possible. 12. On the question of payment of amount on 23-5-1985 also there is discrepancy between PW 1 on the one side and PWs 2, 3, 7 and 8 on the other. Respondent was arrested when he was coming out of the bath room in the veranda. 12. On the question of payment of amount on 23-5-1985 also there is discrepancy between PW 1 on the one side and PWs 2, 3, 7 and 8 on the other. Respondent was arrested when he was coming out of the bath room in the veranda. Though PWs 2, 3, 7 and 8 said that PW 1 was also present in the veranda at that time, PW 1 denied his presence and said that he was inside the room and he did not see the arrest. The evidence of PWs 2. 3, 7 and 8 that it was PW 1 who pointed out the respondent was denied by him Defence version is that this attitude of PW 1 was to avoid questions based on the plea of the respondent that the notes were put into his pocket near the bathroom and he was arrested when he was attempting to return the notes to PW 1. 13. Ext. P12 work order along with Exts. P10 and P11 tour diaries of the respondent and PW 4 are capable of creating at least a suspicion that respondent was not in charge of Vypeen area where the disputed ice plant is situate and there was no possibility of the respondent accompanying PW 4 on 21-5-1985 when he visited the ice plant. It is an admitted fact that on 22-5-1985 PW 1 came and met PW 4 first and he met the respondent only as directed by PW 4 that he will put him in the correct line. There is the possibility that the 'correct line' indicated by PW 4 to PW 1 may by an 'advise' to make the payment which PW 4 was hesitant to make by himself. The word spoken to by PW 1 as having said by the respondent becomes significant in such a situation. When in these circumstances the trial judge has chosen to reject the evidence especially in view of the admission of PW 1 that he was aware of the fact that the respondent was not competent to renew the licence and PW 4 alone was competent, I cannot reject the approach as totally unreasonable. 14. When these items of evidence are rejected for the above reasons what remain is only the recovery coupled with the contention of the respondent and the "suspicious" payment. 14. When these items of evidence are rejected for the above reasons what remain is only the recovery coupled with the contention of the respondent and the "suspicious" payment. As held in Banshi Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar ( 1981 (3) SCC 69 ) mere recovery of the notes alleged by the accused to be thrust into his pocket, without anything more, may not be sufficient to raise a presumption under S.4(1). 15. There is also the contention of the respondent based on the decision in Nirpal Singh v. State of Haryana ( 1977 (2) SCC 131 ) that it is not proper to associate eye witnesses with the recovery memos, because that partakes of an attempt to make the witnesses omnibus. But that argument becomes relevant only when the memo or mahazar signed by them contain any information given by them coming under S.161 CrPC and hit by S.162 thereof. On the other hand if those records are only contemporaneous records of what the witnesses saw and heard and no element of communication to the police officer is involved, there is no question of S.161 and 162 being violated. Further, as held in Sreedharan Pillai, v. State ( 1959 KLT 872 ) and State of Kerala v. Samuel ( 1960 KLT 666 (FB), the signature even in violation of S.162 will not render the evidence inadmissible. It is capable of only reducing the value of the evidence to warn the court to be cautious (See Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1956 SC 526) and Abraham v. Supdt. of Police ( 1988 (1) KLT 379 ), Further, it is not necessary to consider those aspects because from what is stated above it follows that this is not a fit case for interference with the acquittal even though there is scope for strong moral conviction that in all probability the accused must have demanded and received the amount. But moral conviction cannot be substitute for legal evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubts and it is so on account of the conclusion of innocence arrived at by the trial judge as well. Criminal appeal is therefore dismissed.