JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, J. 1. This is Plaintiff's second appeal under Section 100, Code of Code of Civil Procedure and is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 25-1-1983, passed by the Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa, in Civil Appeal No. 63-A of 83, arising out of Civil Suit No. 34-A of 77 decided by the Civil Judge, Class II, Harsood on 30th June, 1980, dismissing the Appellant's suit for declaration of his title and permanent injunction against interference with his possession over the suit lands. 2. The suit land is khasra No. 19/1, area 20.70 acres situated in Mouza Rajpura Bhak har, Tahsil Harsood appearing in Bhumiswami rights of one Ram Chand son of Deo Chand Gujar, in revenue records. The Respondent No. 3 is the widow of the said Ram Chand and Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 are his daughters. Though they have been joined as Defendants in the suit, they have not filed their written-statement nor have contested the claim. It, however, appears that Respondents 3 to 8 filed their return, purporting to be under Section 9 of the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') including this land in their holding and alleging that the same was also recorded in the name of Ram Chand in revenue records. Based on the aforesaid return, a draft statement, as required under Section 11 of the Act was published in accordance with Rules made thereunder. It is, however, clear that copy of the draft statement was not sent to the Appellant by the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority considered various objections and ultimately, by his order dated 18-8-1975, passed under Section 11(4) of the Act, declared 23.98 acres of land as surplus. The Respondent Parwatibai alone was held entitled to 30 acres, whereas Respondents 4 to 7 were held as not belonging to the family. This order has not been filed before the learned trial Judge but it appears that a certified copy thereof was filed before the learned lower appellate Court. A perusal of the said order indicates that the suit land was held to be belonging to Respondent Parwatibai and was therefore, included in her holdings. It appears that thereafter on 5-4-1976, the Appellant filed his claim over the suit land and prayed for re-opening of the matter. The Respondent Nos. A perusal of the said order indicates that the suit land was held to be belonging to Respondent Parwatibai and was therefore, included in her holdings. It appears that thereafter on 5-4-1976, the Appellant filed his claim over the suit land and prayed for re-opening of the matter. The Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 also filed another objection claiming that they were also the owner. The Appellant's objection was dismissed on 3-11-1976 on the ground that the matter having become final, he had no power of reviewing the same. The objection of the Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 was also dismissed by order, dated 22-12-1975. It may be noticed that though the order, dated 18 8 1975 was not conclusive and could be challenged under Section 11 (5) of the Act, neither the Appellant nor the Respondents 3 to 8 challenged the same. The Appellant, however, filed the present suit on 12-5-1977, claiming the declaration and injunction as aforesaid. This suit, according to the Appellant, was not under Section 11 (5) of the Act but was under the General Law. His case was that he had been in continuous, open, peaceful and exclusive possession of the suit land in his own rights for more than 18 years and has therefore perfected his title by adverse possession much before 1971. On this basis, he claimed ownership and further declaration that the order, dated 18-8-1975 declaring the suit land as surplus or the subsequent order vesting land in Government was not binding on him. The suit, as noticed earlier was contested by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 only who filed their separate but almost identical written-statement. They denied that the Appellant was in continuous, peaceful, adverse possession of the suit land and had become owner thereof. Learned trial Judge on appreciation of evdence on record held that it was not proved that Ram Chand, the recorded owner died about 20 years before. He also held that it was not proved that the Appellant was in possession of the suit land during the life time of Ram Chand. Learned Judge also considered the documentary evidence of Khasras Panchsala, Exs. P-21, 22 and 23 and held that it does not prove possession of 12 years or before the date of vesting. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge found no substance in the claim and dismissed the suit. Learned Judge also considered the documentary evidence of Khasras Panchsala, Exs. P-21, 22 and 23 and held that it does not prove possession of 12 years or before the date of vesting. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge found no substance in the claim and dismissed the suit. Learned lower appellate Court was of the opinion that the documentary evidence on record indicates Appellant's possession for about 20 years. Since this possession was as owner, the learned appellate Judge came to the conclusion that the Appellant had become the owner of the suit land by adverse possession. In spite of it, the learned Judge dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. According to the learned Judge the title over the suit land had already been decided summarily by the Competent Authority under the Act and hence the suit should have been brought within 3 months under Section 11 (5) of the Act. That is how the matter is before this Court in this appeal for consideration. 3. The scheme of the Act has been discussed in detail by a Full Bench of this Court in Vijaya Singh v. Competent Authority 1977 M.P.L.J. 614, and is that a holder of the land who on the appointed day, holds land in excess of the ceiling area is required to file a return in respect of all lands held by him, as provided in Section 9 of the Act. The Competent Authority is also authorised to collect information about the holdings of agriculturists under Section 10 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act requires the Competent Authority to publish a draft statement at such places and in such manner as may be prescribed and also to serve a copy thereof on the holder or holders concerned, the creditors and all other persons interested in the land to which it relates. After the publication of the draft statement, as aforesaid any person is entitled to object to the draft statement within 30 days of the date of publication. If an objection is filed, as aforesaid, and if the Competent Authority finds that any question of title has arisen regarding any particular holder and such question had not already been determined by Court of Competent jurisdiction, the Competent Authority is required to summarily inquire into merits of such question and pass the order as it thinks fit. If an objection is filed, as aforesaid, and if the Competent Authority finds that any question of title has arisen regarding any particular holder and such question had not already been determined by Court of Competent jurisdiction, the Competent Authority is required to summarily inquire into merits of such question and pass the order as it thinks fit. If an order, as aforesaid, has been passed, Sub-section (5) provides that no appeal or revision shall lie against the same. But any party may within 3 months from the date of such order institute a Civil Suit to have the order set-aside by a Civil Court of Competent jurisdiction. The order of Competent Authority passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act is treated as final and conclusive subject only to the result of the suit, as aforesaid. It is, therefore, clear that if a question of title has arisen and is decided by the Competent Authority, the said decision is not final. It however becomes final if approved by the Civil Court of Competent jurisdiction in the suit filed under Section 11 (5) of the Act. It can also be set-aside by the Civil Court in the suit filed under Section 11 (5) of the Act. It would appear that though the order of the Competent Authority deciding title of the land included in the draft statement is not final, the same attains finality if it has not been set aside by the Civil Court in the suit filed under Section 11 (5) of the Act or when it is challenged (sic-not challenged) in the suit, as aforesaid. Vijaya Singh's case (supra) as also Jagat Singh v. State of M.P. 1982 M.P.L.J. 575 bring out the aforesaid fully. The subsequent Full Bench decision in Narbada Prasad V. Slate of M. P. 1981 M.P.L.J. 26, though not directly on the point also brings out the aforesaid scheme and emphasis the purpose of the Act. 4. Whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit independently of Section 11 (5) of the Act has arisen from time to time before this Court. 4. Whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit independently of Section 11 (5) of the Act has arisen from time to time before this Court. As stated earlier that a Civil Suit to set aside the order of Competent Authority passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act can be filed under Section 11 (5) and subject to the decision in such a suit, the order of the Competent Authority is treated as final and conclusive. Section 46 of the Act further provides that no Civil Court shall have any jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Competent Authority except as provided in this Act. It may therefore appear that a suit to set-aside the order of the Competent Authority passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act can be filed only under Section 11 (5) and not otherwise. This also is the view taken by this Court in Vijaya Singh's case (supra) and Jagat Singh's case (supra). Vijaya Singh's case (supra), however, envisages a situation where a Civil Court in spite of Section 11 (5) and 46 of the Act has the jurisdiction to decide questions of title. According to the Full Bench, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction only under two specific circumstances viz. (1) if the Competent Authority has not decided the question of title under Sub-section (4); and (2) if there are no proceedings before the Competent Authority ? According to the Full Bench, "If there are proceedings before the Competent Authority and an order passed under Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act deciding the question of title summarily, then the Civil Court will have jurisdiction only in a suit as contemplated under Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of Ceiling Act." 5. Jagat Singh's case (supra) is decided by a Single Judge and therefore cannot be expected to be taking any different view. In the said case, however, the Appellant was a person not recorded as a holder of the land and therefore, not a party to the proceedings. The Appellant was a person claiming to be in adverse possession and therefore claimed a right to file a suit for declaration of his title over the land in dispute. In the said case, however, the Appellant was a person not recorded as a holder of the land and therefore, not a party to the proceedings. The Appellant was a person claiming to be in adverse possession and therefore claimed a right to file a suit for declaration of his title over the land in dispute. The Appellant was treated to be a stranger, and hence his right to file the suit independently of Section 11 (5) of the Act was recognized. Though the right to file a suit independently as aforesaid was recognized the extent of that right was not explained or demarcated. 6. What would be the right of a stranger in a suit where the order under Section 11 (4) of the Act has become final ? Such a person cannot be granted the right to get the order set aside, as that would be contrary to the clear language of Section 11 (5) of the Act. He can also not disturb the finality and conclusiveness of the order passed under Section 11(4) of the Act for the same reason. It, however appears that a stranger can still enjoy the right available to him because of Jagat Singh's decision (supra) by asking for a declaration of title over the particular land and injunction against the person against whom the order under Section 11 (4) of the Act has been passed, restraining him not to transfer the said land in compliance of the order. In the context of facts of this case, the Appellant cannot seek a declaration against the order dated 18-8-1975 passed by the Respondent Collector under Section 11 (4) as the same has become final or conclusive. Since this order only declares that 23.98 acres of land is surplus and should vest in the Government, he may, at the most, be entitled to an injunction against the Respondent No. 3 restraining her not to hand over the suit land in compliance of the aforesaid order. Learned Counsel, in his anxiety to dispel any doubt about his collusion with Respondent Nos. 3 to 8, emphasised that he would indeed be satisfied if his case is decreed to the extent mentioned above even by upholding the legal validity of the order of Respondents No. 1 and 2 passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act. Learned Counsel, in his anxiety to dispel any doubt about his collusion with Respondent Nos. 3 to 8, emphasised that he would indeed be satisfied if his case is decreed to the extent mentioned above even by upholding the legal validity of the order of Respondents No. 1 and 2 passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act. In this view, the real contest would be between the Appellant and Respondent No. 3 and in case he wins the suit, the said Respondent's possession of 30 acres would be reduced to 9.30 acres only. But for this purpose he has to seek an injunction against the Respondent No. 3, restraining her from offering the suit land in compliance with the order, dated 18-8-1975. 7. A perusal of the plaint would indicate that the Appellant has not made any such prayer. Though he has prayed for an injunction against Respondents from disturbing his possession, he has not prayed for an injunction restraining the Respondent No. 3 from including the suit land in her holding and offering the same to the State in compliance with the order. Can be yet be granted such a relief ? Provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, C. P. C. are, however, wide enough to do complete justice between the parties or deal with the case in any equitable manner in the best interest of all concerned. Wide ambit of the power imposes a corresponding obligation on this Court not to do anything unjust or unfair or in a manner that may cause injustice to any one. If the Respondent No. 3 had been represented and has contested the appeal, this Court would have heard her on this matter. Since she has chosen to remain ex parte throughout the proceedings, she can not be imposed any additional liability than she had incurred strictly in accordance with law by remaining absent. In this view of the matter, this Court would not be justified in remoulding the relief and issuing the injunction against her from passing on the suit lands to the Respondents to complete the vesting process. It is true that refusal to exercise discretion as aforesaid, might create a situation where the Appellant may lose possession of the suit land. If the Appellant had obtained the land by any legal means, this Court's conscience would have been disturbed. It is true that refusal to exercise discretion as aforesaid, might create a situation where the Appellant may lose possession of the suit land. If the Appellant had obtained the land by any legal means, this Court's conscience would have been disturbed. The Appellant, however, has not disclosed the source of authority to possess the suit lands and a parently claims possession by simply remaining into it. In such a situation this Court, by not exercising discretion in his favour, would only be expressing its disapproval of his method of obtaining possession and nothing more. If a person who had forcibly and unauthorisedly obtained possession is required to lose the same, no one should really be distubed. In this view of the matter, this Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant and mould the relief, as prayed for. 8. The entire case of the Appellant really hange on a finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court that he was in adverse possession of the suit lands since last about 20 years. He can not claim adverse possession against the Appellants No. 1 and 2. His claim, if at all, would be against the Respondents No. 3 to 8 Learned trial Judge had given good reasons why the Appellant's possession was not adverse possession. Learned lower appellate Court seems to have relied more on receipts, Exs. P-2 to P-12 and Khasra Nos. Exs. P-21, P-22 and P-23 to hold that the possession of the Appellant was for more than 12 years. It however appears that the learned Judge has not cared to look into these documents. Receipts, Exs. P-1 to P-12 do not relate to any period prior to 5-2-1963. Indeed, receipt, Ex. P-1 is dated 5-2-1963 and claims to be relatable to 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 So is the receipt, Ex. P-7. Khasra, Ex. P-21 is of 1962-63 and is the earliest revenue record showing Appellant's possession. Even if it be assumed that the Appellant has proved his possession from 1962, this, by itself, would not be treated as adverse possession. Every possession is not adverse possession. He will still have to show that he asserted his hostile title against the real owner. There is, however, nothing on record to justify such a conclusion. Even if it be assumed that the Appellant has proved his possession from 1962, this, by itself, would not be treated as adverse possession. Every possession is not adverse possession. He will still have to show that he asserted his hostile title against the real owner. There is, however, nothing on record to justify such a conclusion. Ramlal as P. W. 7 has not stated anything that may amount to asserting his hostile title against Ram Chand or his legal heirs. Indeed, it would appear from para 3 of his statement that he knew that the land was recorded in the name of Ram Chand and did nothing to get his name substituted. If a person not only permits the other person to remain recorded as owner, it would only indicate that he was not willing to pick up quarrel with him. This would not, in the opinion of this Court, amount to asserting hostile title against the recorded owner. In this view of the matter, it would appear that the finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court that the Appellant has acquired title by adverse possession appears to be an illegal finding, unsupportable in law. 9. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per rules.