J.S. VERMA, C.J.—This writ petition is by an employer against the award (Annexure-13) dated 18. 9. 1982, by which the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kota has decided the reference made to it under Section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by holding that the termination of service of the workman Girraj Prasad by the employer was unjustified and instead of this punishment, the punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed. By the award, the workman Girraj Prasad has consequently been ordered to be reinstated with full back wages. The employer is aggrieved by the interference made in this manner by the award. Hence this petition to quash the award. 2. The material facts are a few only. The aforesaid workman Girraj Prasad whose cause has been exposed by the respondent No. 1 Union, was employed as Maintenance Fitter in the Carbide Plant of the petitioners factory and was lateron transferred in the same capacity to the Ammonia Plant. A charge sheet dated 26 4. 1980 was served on Girraj Prasad alleging that he went to the house of a co-worker P. P. Singh on 23. 4.1980 and threatened his wife with dire consequences on account of P. P Singh not joining other workers in the agitation, and on 25.4.1980 of threatening the said co-worker while on duty in the factory to assault him and his family members for the same reason. A corrigendum to the charge sheet was given to Girraj Prasad, who after reading it refused to accept the same. Consequently, another charge was framed of refusal to accept the corrigendum after reading it on 2.5.1980, which amounted to impertinence or insubordination The enquiry officer held that the charge relating to the incident on 23.4. 1980 was not proved, while the charge of threatening the co-worker in factory premises on 25. 4. 1980 was proved. The enquiry officers report is Annexure-4, dated 26 9.1980. Relating to the incident of 2. 5. 1980, which was subject matter of another charge, the enquiry report. Annexure-5 dated 20.8.1980 held that Girraj Prasad after reading the corrigendum had returned it instead of acknowledging its receipt. This charge was also, therefore, held to be proved. Curiously enough, the employer made the final order much later on 23. 3. 1980 imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. 1980, which was subject matter of another charge, the enquiry report. Annexure-5 dated 20.8.1980 held that Girraj Prasad after reading the corrigendum had returned it instead of acknowledging its receipt. This charge was also, therefore, held to be proved. Curiously enough, the employer made the final order much later on 23. 3. 1980 imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by this action of the employer the union raised a dispute, which was referred for adjudication to the tribunal. 3. The tribunal treated as preliminary issue the question whether the domestic enquiry was fair. By its order (Annexure-9) dated 3.7.1982 it held that the domestic enquiry was fair. Thereafter, by its award (Annexure-13) dated 18.9.1982 it has come to the conclusion that the change relating to the incident on 25.4.1980 of threatening a co-worker P.P. Singh within the factory premises was rightly held proved. The tribunal then proceeded to consider the circumstances of the case including the fact that the decision to terminate his service was taken about six months after getting the enquiry-reports and during the intervening period a fresh charter of demands was submitted by the workmen in January 19, 1981, to which this workman Girraj Prasad was also a signatory. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the punishment of termination of service was too harsh and was incommensurate with the charge found proved. Consequently, the punishment of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect was substituted for the punishment of termination from service, directing reinstatement of the worker with full back wages. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced substantially two arguments. The first argument is, that Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act which confers wide powers on labour courts and tribunals to interfere in such cases, is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in as much as it does not proved sufficient guide lines to exclude arbitrariness. The absence of any provision for appeal or revision against the labour courts decision also indicates that there is no check provided against any arbitrary decision. The other argument is that it was not a fit case for interference by the tribunal with the punishment imposed by the employer. The argument is that there was no occasion to direct reinstatement of the workman in these circumstances and for payment of back wages. The other argument is that it was not a fit case for interference by the tribunal with the punishment imposed by the employer. The argument is that there was no occasion to direct reinstatement of the workman in these circumstances and for payment of back wages. In the alternative, it was contended that compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. We shall consider these arguments in the same order. 5. In our opinion, there is no merit in the first contention that there are no guidelines provided in Section 11-A to exclude arbitrariness. The object of enacting Section l1-A obviously is to provide a remedy of reappraisal of the employers action by an independent authority in order to ensure fairness of the employers action. Sufficient guidelines are indicated by the expression "is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" which enables interference by the labour court or tribunal. The requirement is of satisfaction that the discharge or dismissal was not justified. The words satisfied and justified used in this expression are well known in legal terminology and have also assumed a known meaning and significance. Thus there is clear indication that interference is to be made only on satisfaction that the employers action is not justified. On such satisfaction being reached, the relief to be given is also indicated in wide terms and in doing so the expressions "as it thinks fit" and "as the circumstances of the case may require" have been used. The expressions also are well known in legal terminology and the expression "as it thinks fit" has also been judicially construed in several decisions. For the purpose of granting relief there is a clear indication that the relief which is considered fit in the circumstances of the case is to be given after the conclusion is reached that the impugned discharge or dismissal was not justified. In our opinion, these are sufficient guidelines for any authority discharging such functions and whenever challenge is made to the decision of the labour court or tribunal, correctness of the decision can be tested on the touch-stone of these guidelines. It is significant that the other argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is based actually on these guidelines itself. 6. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of F.T. & R. Co. vs. The Management(l). It is significant that the other argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is based actually on these guidelines itself. 6. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of F.T. & R. Co. vs. The Management(l). Their Lordships after enumerating the principles emerging from the earlier decisions governing the jurisdiction of the tribunal when adjudicating the dispute relating to the dismissal or discharge prior to insertion of Section 11-A have also indicated changes in the legal position resulting from insertion of section 11-A. It has been clearly indicated in this decision that e\en if a proper enquiry is conducted by the employer and a correct finding is reached on the question of misconduct, the tribunal can now under Sec. 11-A differ from the conclusions reached by the management, but in doing so, it will have to given "very cogent reasons for not accepting the view of the employer". It has been reiterated that under Section 1 1-A, the tribunal has been given power to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by the employer as well as the punishment imposed by him. In our opinion, the requirement of giving very cogent reasons for differing with the findings and conclusions reached by the employer, which is implicit in the guidelines contained in Section 11-A as earlier indicated and expressly held by the Supreme Court ensures exclusion of arbitrariness. We may also add that the absence of any provision of appeal against the decision of the tribunal does not support the argument of arbitrariness in view of the requirement of Section 11-A. In a case where the labour court or the tribunal has acted contrary to the mandate in Section 11-A, remedy by writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to the High Court in addition to a remedy of an appeal to the Supreme Court directly under Article 136 of the Constitution is available. The present petition itself is a proof of the availability of this remedy. Accordingly, the first argument has no merit and is rejected. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that in a case like the present where the workmans misconduct of threatening a co-worker within the factory premises was found proved even by the tribunal, interference with the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified. Accordingly, the first argument has no merit and is rejected. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that in a case like the present where the workmans misconduct of threatening a co-worker within the factory premises was found proved even by the tribunal, interference with the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified. It was also urged that at any rate payment of full back wages should not have been directed since the award of full back wages is not a normal rule where the workman has not been found free from blame. It was also contended with considerable vehemence in the alternative, that even if reinstatement could have been granted the proper order to make is the award of compensation of an amount sufficient to provide for the workman taking into account his last drawn salary. The question is, whether any part of this contention can be accepted ? 8. The charge found proved against the workman is that he had threatened a co-worker within the factory premises on account of his not joining the other workers in their agitation. The tribunal has given several reasons for considering the punishment of dismissal to be too harsh and in-commensurate with the misconduct found proved. It cannot be said that the reasons given by the Tribunal are not cogent. In this connection, learned counsel criticized the treatment by the tribunal of the incident relating to 2.5.1980 of refusal to accept corrigendum to the charge sheet after reading the same. In our opinion, treating this incident as the basis of separate charge is difficult to appreciate. Assuming that the workman refused to accept the corrigendum to the charge sheet after reading it when it was tendered to him on 2.5.1980, the only effect thereof was to attribute to the workman the knowledge of contents of that document and no more. In other words, if the workman denied knowledge of the contents of the corrigendum by which a correction was made in the residential address of co-worker P. P.. Singh then this fact was material for proof that he had knowledge of the correct address and the charge sheet dated 26.4.1980 was to be treated as amended in this manner. In other words it was not a separate charge of misconduct, but mere correction of some incorrect particulars given in the original charge sheet. Singh then this fact was material for proof that he had knowledge of the correct address and the charge sheet dated 26.4.1980 was to be treated as amended in this manner. In other words it was not a separate charge of misconduct, but mere correction of some incorrect particulars given in the original charge sheet. The tribunal in rejecting this incident as proved amount-ing to proof of an additional charge did not. therefore, commit any error, which requires to be corrected in this proceedings. On the other hand, the employers conduct of treating the incident of 2.5.1980 also as an act of misconduct in these circumstances indicates that the punishment of dismissal was undoubtedly influenced by this fact also. It may be mentioned that the charge found proved relating to the incident of 2 5 80 was merely of refusing to acknowledge receipt of corrigendum given to him and no more. 9. Taking into account the charge found proved by the tribunal and the reasons given by the tribunal for holding that the punishment of dismissal was too excessive and unduly harsh, it cannot be said that the lesser punishment substituted by the tribunal is inadequate in the circumstances of the case. We are satisfied that the interference made by the tribunal with the employers action in exercise of the powers available under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was within the limits prescribed in the provision. It is no doubt true that the workman was not found wholly free from blame in as much as a misconduct was found proved against him for which the penalty of stoppage of two grade increments cumulatively has been awarded. In such a situation, award of full back wages till the date of reinstatement does not appear to be justified. We are informed that during the period of suspension the workman was paid subsistence allowance initially @ of 50% of the wages and after some time @ of 75% of the wages. In our opinion, the suspension could not be treated as unjustified and, therefore, the wages up to the date of reinstatement should be confined only to the amount of subsistence allowance paid to the workman, instead of full back wages. The workman became entitled to reinstatement as a result of the award of the tribunal. However, by a stay order dated 1. 12. The workman became entitled to reinstatement as a result of the award of the tribunal. However, by a stay order dated 1. 12. 1982 passed in this petition when it was filed in 1982 the workman has not been reinstated and he has been paid only 50% of the wages every month. In our opinion, it is not a fit case where an exception should be made to direct payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The material present in insufficient to indicate that the workman belongs to that category whose presence as an employee is undesirable and is not conducive to maintenance of industrial peace. We do not think it is a fit case for depriving the workman of normal relief or reinstatement and grant him compensation in lieu thereof. 10. Consequently, the petition is partly allowed only to the extent that the workman will be entitled only to the wages already paid for the period of suspension up to the date of award instead of full back wages for the entire period. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.