JUDGMENT K.T. Thomas, J. 1. This appeal is challenge of an order of remand passed by the lower appellate court. This arises from a suit for partition. The lower appellate court allowed the plaint to be amended and then remanded the suit to the trial court with the direction to dispose of the suit afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. The main challenge in this appeal is regarding the propriety in allowing the plaint to be amended at this belated stage. The third defendant is the appellant. He will be referred to as the third defendant. 2. Facts which are necessary for this appeal alone need be stated : Plaintiff and defendants are children of one Mammed. The suit for partition is in respect of a few items of properties which belonged to the said Mammed who died on 3-6-1973. There seems to be not much of dispute except in regard to two items of immovable properties, which are described as items two and three in A schedule to the plaint. The third defendant contended that those items are not now available for partition since Mammad had assigned those items in favour of the third defendant as per Ext. B1 dated 1-5-1973. Plaintiff has advanced a contention in the plaint that the said assignment deed is a sham document as no consideration had been passed to Mammad and also since Mammad did not know the contents of the document which was signed by him under the undue influence exerted on him. The trial court found that Ext. B1 is a genuine document, and hence excluded those items from partition. During the pendency of the appeal, in the lower appellate court, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application for amendment of the plaint for incorporating a relief to set aside Ext. B1. That application was allowed and pursuantly the learned Sub Judge who heard the appeal set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remitted the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit afresh. 3. Learned counsel for the third defendant raised two points in this appeal. B1. That application was allowed and pursuantly the learned Sub Judge who heard the appeal set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remitted the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit afresh. 3. Learned counsel for the third defendant raised two points in this appeal. First is that the amendment ought not have been allowed since the relief now sought to be incorporated would have been barred by limitation if a fresh suit were to be filed for the said relief on the date when the amendment application was filed. The other contention is that the amendment ought not have been granted even otherwise since the plaintiff did not take any step earlier to incorporate the relief in spite of his being alerted by the third defendant through his written statement itself that the suit cannot be maintained in respect of those items without a prayer for setting aside the transaction. According to the learned counsel, since plaintiff persisted in contending that there is no need to set aside Ext. B1 even in the memorandum of appeal, he has no right to move for the amendment at a. later stage. One of the grounds taken up by the plaintiff in the memorandum of appeal filed in the Sub Court is this: The lower court ought to have found that Ext. B1 need not be set aside since it has not taken effect", Learned counsel in support of, the said contention has cited an early decision of the Madras High Court in Narayana v. Shankunni (ILR 15 Madras 255). In that case, plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that a certain document is invalid as against the plaintiffs and that the defendants had no right over the property covered by the document". When the case reached the appellate stage, plaintiffs wanted to amend the plaint by incorporating a prayer for recovery of possession of the property concerned. It was resisted by the defendants on the ground that the right to get possession had been found against by the trial court and the defendants had perfected title by adverse possession, The Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the suit for possession of the property covered by the document was not maintainable and that the plaintiffs cannot be permitted, in appeal, to amend the plaint. 4. 4. Shri. K. T. Sankaran, learned counsel for the plaintiff, who made a forceful plea for sustaining the impugned order, has pointed out that the plaintiff has made out necessary averments in the plaint to have the assignment set aside and therefore, the plaintiff's prayer to incorporate the necessary relief in the plaint may not be disallowed albeit the lapse of time. According to Sri. K. T. Sankaran, the averments already made in the plaint would have given the impression to the counsel who appeared for the plaintiff in the lower appellate court that the relief could be obtained despite the absence of a former prayer for such a relief, but on mature consideration he would have applied for amendment since he did not want to take a risk. 5. Order VI R.17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') empowers the court to allow either party to amend his pleadings "at any stage" of the suit, in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The Rule says that all such amendments shall be made "as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties". Though the Rule is widely worded, some inbuilt limitations have been traced out in it through the case law. One such limitation is that the amendment should not be such as to cause injustice to the other side. Similarly, the court should not allow amendments for converting a suit of one character into a suit of another character except when the interest of justice requires such amendments. As a rule, a plaintiff should not normally be allowed to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which would have become barred by limitation. Amendments should be refused if the applicant has not acted in good faith. Subject to such limitations, the court has wide discretion to allow amendments if they are necessary for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties. However, amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right in all circumstances. No authority need be cited in support of those propositions. So the only point to be determined now is whether a party would have become disentitled to amend his pleadings when the new plea would have been barred by limitation if a fresh suit is to be filed for that purpose. 6. No authority need be cited in support of those propositions. So the only point to be determined now is whether a party would have become disentitled to amend his pleadings when the new plea would have been barred by limitation if a fresh suit is to be filed for that purpose. 6. The Supreme Court has reminded the courts in Leach & Co. v. Jardine Skinner ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ) that while it is true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation, it is only a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered or not, but it does not affect the power of the Court to order amendment. The amendment sought for by the plaintiff in that case was as an alternate relief for damages for breach of a contract. It was pointed out that on the date of amendment, if a new suit were to be filed the plaintiff would not have been entitled to the relief as the same would have been barred by limitation. However, Supreme Court in that case, took note of the fact that all allegations necessary for sustaining the claim for damages for breach of the contract were already in the plaint. In view of those averments already made the Supreme Court allowed the amendment sought for notwithstanding the other factor that the claim would have been barred by limitation if a fresh suit were to be filed for the said relief. 7. It is pertinent to note that almost during the same period a Division Bench of this Court has held in Pouloth Paranchu v. Pappu Francis ( 1957 KLT 3 ) that although the defendant would be deprived of the plea of limitation if the amendment is allowed to be incorporated, there is no inflexible rule that in such cases amendments cannot be allowed. The question was again considered by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation ( AIR 1967 SC 96 ). By the majority judgment, the principle enunciated in Leach & Co. case was maintained. The question was again considered by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation ( AIR 1967 SC 96 ). By the majority judgment, the principle enunciated in Leach & Co. case was maintained. It was observed by Sarkar, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the majority that "the object of the courts and the rules of procedure must be to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes and that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended". The Supreme Court was of the view that the amendments sought for were necessary for decision of the real dispute between the parties in that case and hence treated it as an exceptional circumstance under which the amendment can be allowed despite the consequences due to lapse of time. Almost a decade thereafter, Chief Justice M. H. Beg in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 484) has pointed out that "procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the substantive justice and provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met to enable the courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties ... ........". In that case an amendment sought for by the plaintiff for introducing a new cause of action was allowed. The position remains unchanged in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain ( AIR 1985 SC 817 ). 8. From the above discussion it can be concluded that the position is well settled thus: Though it is the general rule that the amendment for incorporating new causa of action or a new relief, if it would be barred by limitation on the filing of a fresh suit, does not merit acceptance, court can still permit the amendment if it is necessary in the interest of justice or to decide the real controversy between the parties. One of the guidelines which can be gathered from the decisions discussed above is to check up whether the party has already laid factual foundation in his pleadings for such contentions, then the courts should not lightly dismiss the prayer, for amendments, especially when the amendment is to introduce something which is only of a formal character. 9. In paragraph five of the plaint, the plaintiff has made an attack on Ext. B1 from two sides. One by picturing it as a sham document and the other by describing it as vitiated by circumstances such as exertion of undue influence and lack of consideration. Though the plaintiff did not formally pray for a relief to have Ext. B1 set aside, the averments would indicate that the plaintiff really had a case even in the original plaint that the transaction concerned was vitiated by circumstances rendering it void. 10. Though I agree with the conclusion of the lower appellate court allowing the amendment, I am of the view that the plaintiff must be directed to pay costs to this appellant for the delay in asking for the amendment, even after he was alerted by the third defendant by mentioning that fact in the written statement. Plaintiff could have sought for the amendment at the trial stage itself. The remand became necessary only due to the delay in seeking the amendment at this belated stage. I, therefore modify the lower appellate court's order and direct the plaintiff to pay costs of Rs. 250/- to the appellant's counsel, within three weeks from today, to entitle him to carry out the amendment prayed for. Appeal is disposed of in the above terms.