J.S. VERMA, C. J.—This special appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the appellants writ petition. The questions involved for decision are the validity of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short the Act) and also of the notification No. F. 3(4)(3)H/VUI/70-I( dated July 19, 1976 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated August 15, 1976 issued by the State Government under this provision. 2. The brief facts on the basis of which the points urged in the petition are to be decided are now stated: The appellant is a tenant in a shop at Jaipur of respondent No. 2 Nathdwara Temple Board established and constituted under the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1949. All properties given or endowed for the registration or start of the temple of any service connected with it or for the benefit etc. of the pilgrims visiting the temple shall be treated as endowment within the meaning of section 2(ii) of the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1949. Under section 3 of this Act the ownership of temple and all its endowments shall vest in deity of Shrinathji and the Board constituted under the Temple Act shall be entitled to their possession. Administration of the temple is to be carried on by the Board in the manner provided in the Act The Board so constituted is a body corporate known as Nathdwara Temple Board having perpetual succession and common seal with power to acquire and hold properties and it may sue or be sued in that name. It is in this manner that the appellant is the tenant of respondent No. 2 in a shop at Jaipur. It is in this manner that the appellant is the tenant of respondent No. 2 in a shop at Jaipur. Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act is as under: - "The State Government if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest may, by notification in the official gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of the institution." In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act the State Government issued a notification as under: - "Notification- (No F-3 (4)(3)H/VIII/70-II dated July 19, 1976) S. O. 182. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Rajasthan Act 17 of 1950) the State Govt, being satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest exempts all the premises situated in the areas to which the said Act, applies vesting in the deity of Shri Shrinathji and administration of which vests in the Nathdwara Temple Board established and constituted under the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1949, from all the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. (Pub. in Raj. Gaz. Part-IV dated 15.8.1976 p 145)" It is the validity of sub-section (3) of section 2 as well as the above quoted notification issued thereunder which is challenged herein. 3. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that sub-section (3) of section 2 is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it discriminates between landlords by granting exemption only to the landlords falling within the ambit of sub-section (3) of section 2 while denying that benefit to other landlords. In our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. It is permissible to classify the landlords in this manner for the purpose of granting exemption from the provisions of the Act only in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. In our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. It is permissible to classify the landlords in this manner for the purpose of granting exemption from the provisions of the Act only in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. It is obvious that the income derived from any premises belonging to any educational, religious or charitable institu-tion when utilised wholly for the purpose of the institution is in fact spent for public benefit as distinguished from the income derived from a premises belong-ing to any other person which is utilised for private gain. 4. Classification of premises for the purpose or exemption under a similar enactment in Tamil Nadu giving the benefit of exemption to buildings owned by cooperative societies was upheld as reasonable classification in M/s. S. M. Mahendra and Company etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1). Similarly it has been held that a classification between landlords is permissible to uphold the provision for beneficial procedure for eviction of tenants on the ground of bonafide need of the landlord applicable only to some landlords whose need for expeditious decision of the eviction proceedings was greater (see AIR 1984 SC 458 ). It cannot, therefore, be doubted that such a classification is permissible provided there is a rational nexus of the classification with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case exemption from the provisions of the Act is given in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. We have already indicated that this category stands apart from the other category of landlords who utilise the income derived from the premises wholly for private gain. 5. It is also provided in sub-section (3) of section 2 that the exemption is to be granted only on the State Governments satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest. This expression has a legal connotation which sufficiently provides guidelines to regulate the exercise of this power. There is thus no invalidity in sub-section (3) of section (2) of the Act. 6. This expression has a legal connotation which sufficiently provides guidelines to regulate the exercise of this power. There is thus no invalidity in sub-section (3) of section (2) of the Act. 6. The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it was not necessary to grant exemption in respect of properties at Jaipur when the temple itself is situate at Nathdwara near Udaipur. On this basis it is urged that grant of partial exemption under section 2(3) of the Act only in respect of premises situated at Nathdwara was sufficient for the purpose of this provision and it was unnecessary to grant exemption in respect of properties situate at Jaipur. It is argued that the notification shows non application of mind for this reason and in response to the notice the respondents have also not disclosed the reasons leading to the issue of the notification. On this basis the validity of the notification is assailed. In our opinion, there is no merit even in this contention. 7. Section 2(3) itself indicates that exemption can be given in respect of premises owned by any such institution when the whole of the income derived there from is utilised for the purpose of the institution. It is not the appellants case that the whole of the income derived from the properties situate at Jaipur are not utilised for the purpose of the institution. This being so location of the premises is inconsequential in this context since the relevance is only of utilisation of whole of its income for the purposes of institution and this applies equally to all the properties owned by the institution irrespective of the location of any such property. The argument that issue of partial exemption alone would have been sufficient has, therefore, no application in this matter. 8. It is also a case where no further reasons except those mentioned in the notification were required to be disclosed to support the notification. It is not suggested as to what particular reason in addition was necessary to justify issue of the notification. The appellant himself has stated in the writ petition that he was initially a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- which had been increased to Rs. 30/- since 1979. It is not suggested as to what particular reason in addition was necessary to justify issue of the notification. The appellant himself has stated in the writ petition that he was initially a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- which had been increased to Rs. 30/- since 1979. It is a matter of "common knowledge and judicial notice can also be taken of the escalation of prices as well as considerable increase in rental. The fact that a shop in the city of Jaipur would fetch a much higher rent now also does not need any imagination. Since the whole income derived from the shop is utilised for the purpose of the religious institution it is undoubtedly in public interest that the shop be not continued on such a meagre rent when it can fetch a much higher amount as rent to be utilised for the purpose of the institution. This contention also, therefore, fails. 9. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.