Judgment :- 1. Petitioner was a Police Constable in the District Armed Reserve, Trichur. By order dated 26-6-1974 he was dismissed from service by invoking the provisions contained in clause (c) of the 2nd proviso to Art.311 (2) of the constitution of India. That order was set aside by this court in O.P.1033/1980 and directed the Government to conduct an enquiry into the conduct of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. In pursuance to that direction a full-fledged enquiry was held by the 2nd respondent who was appointed Enquiry Officer. The petitioner was served with memo of charges, Ext. P1. The 2nd respondent submitted his report, Ext. P4, to the Government. On the basis of that report the Government issued Ext. P3 show cause notice to the petitioner informing the Government's provisional decision to dismiss him from service and to submit his representation against the same within 15 days of the date of receipt of the notice. Along with that notice, a copy of Ext. P4 report was also served on him. In reply to Ext. P3 the petitioner submitted Ext. P5 representation praying for exoneration from punishment. After considering the entire documents and after consulting the Public service Commission, the Government confirmed their provisional decision and ordered dismissal of the petitioner from service with effect from the date of suspension. The said order of dismissal is under challenge. 2. The main argument advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the report filed by the Enquiry Officer would show that the petitioner has not committed any of the charges levelled against him. In such a situation, it was not possible for the Government to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and to impose a penalty of dismissal. ID support of this argument the learned Counsel relies on R.17 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. Clause (i) (a) of that rule is the one emphasised by the learned counsel. As per that provision it is argued that the disciplinary authority after examining the proceedings of the enquiry can come to a conclusion regarding the penalty to be imposed, except in cases where no charges have been made out. Clause (i) (a) of that rule is the one emphasised by the learned counsel. As per that provision it is argued that the disciplinary authority after examining the proceedings of the enquiry can come to a conclusion regarding the penalty to be imposed, except in cases where no charges have been made out. As per this provision, according to counsel, when the Enquiry Officer comes to a conclusion that charges have not been made out the disciplinary authority has to accept the said finding and drop further proceedings. In case the Enquiry Officer comes to a finding of guilt of the delinquent officer, then the disciplinary authority has got the power to decide on the question of penalty. In other words, it is argued that the disciplinary authority has no power to differ from conclusions, regarding the guilt of the delinquent, arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. I find it difficult to agree with this submission made by the learned Counsel. On facts the enquiry authority, 2nd respondent has found the petitioner to be guilty of some of the charges framed against the petitioner. In paragraph (G) of the findings he has categorically come to the conclusion that Charges 2 to 4 in the memo of charges stand proved in part. On the basis of the findings in paragraphs (A) to (G), entered by the 2nd respondent, he has come to the conclusion that the delinquent officer was guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority as per the rules has got the power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer and can come to its own conclusions. Even if there is some ambiguity in Para.11 of Ext. P4 report of the 2nd respondent, the Government have come to the conclusion that the petitioner had taken part in organising and inciting the AR men to raise the voice of protest vehemently and conducted in an indisciplined manner, most unbecoming of a member of the police force. On the basis of this finding entered by the Government the petitioner was called upon to show cause why a punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed on him. The petitioner gave his written reply to that notice. The reply was properly considered by the Government while passing Ext. P6 order. 3. On the basis of this finding entered by the Government the petitioner was called upon to show cause why a punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed on him. The petitioner gave his written reply to that notice. The reply was properly considered by the Government while passing Ext. P6 order. 3. The power of the Government to differ from the report of the enquiry officer cannot now be questioned. The Government are entitled to consider the report and evidence recorded by the enquiry officer. The Government may agree with the report or may differ either wholly or partly in so far as the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer is concerned. If the Government disagree with the finding arrived at by the enquiry officer and hold that the charges framed against the delinquent officer are prima facie proved, the Government should provisionally decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the public servant. Then a notice must be issued to the delinquent officer regarding the proposed action. Second notice is to enable the public servant to satisfy the Government that he is innocent of the charges framed against him and that even if the charges are held proved against him the proposed punishment is unduly severe. No decision has laid down the proposition that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer conclude the matter and that the Government which ordered the enquiry is bound by the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer. Nor has it been said that the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer are final and cannot be re-opened by the Government. The object of the enquiry is to enable the Government to hold an investigation into the charges framed against a public servant. So, the Government can consider the evidence adduced and decide whether the said charges are proved or not. In this view, it is difficult to hold that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer binds the Government and that the Government cannot deviate from the conclusions recorded by the enquiry officer in the last paragraph of the report. As stated earlier, the report, Ext. P4, has not exonerated the petitioner from guilt. Conceding for arguments sake that the 2nd respondent has exonerated the petitioner from the charges, the Government are legally entitled to differ from the said finding. As stated earlier, the report, Ext. P4, has not exonerated the petitioner from guilt. Conceding for arguments sake that the 2nd respondent has exonerated the petitioner from the charges, the Government are legally entitled to differ from the said finding. In the instant case, the Government informed the petitioner by Ext. P3 notice, their conclusions on the enquiry and requested the petitioner to show cause why a punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed. 4. The records now placed before me show that the conclusions arrived at by the Government are based on evidence recorded by the enquiry officer. Those conclusions are not open to challenge on the ground that the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer is insufficient or inadequate to sustain the finding of guilt. The adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority. Where there is evidence in the enquiry warranting an inference of guilt on the part of the delinquent officer and the disciplinary authority has accepted the same, it is not open to this court to interfere with those conclusions in exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has no case that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Nor has he got a case that the mandates contained in Art.311 of the Constitution have been violated. In these circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the Government. In the result, the Original Petition fails. It is accordingly dismissed. Issue carbon copy of the judgment to the parties on usual terms