JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. 1. The petitioner by means of the present writ petition has challenged the order dated 20th February, 1980 (Annexure 8) passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the order dated 29th June, 1977 (Annexure 7) passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), and the order dated 22nd May, 1961 (Annexure 2) passed by the Consolidation Officer. 2. This writ petition is directed against the aforesaid orders of the consolidation authorities in respect of agricultural holding in village Chandpur, Pargana Baran, district Bulandshahr. In order to appreciate facts the pedigree of the parties is given as under :- The case of the petitioner is that the khata in -dispute formed Joint Hindu Family holding of Jhamman Singh and his three sons and after his death the Joint Hindu Family held the said property consisting of three sons by survivorship. At the time of his death Gajadhar Singh was the only major son and was the Karta of the said family. Thereafter, Kanchhedpal also died issueless on 2 st March, 1926. In 1954 Govindpal Singh filed a suit (Suit No. 56 of 1954) for partition of the Joint Hindu Family including the tenancy holding and impleading Gajadhar Singh, Hulas Kunwar and Reoti Kunwar as defandants. The learned Civil Judge decreed the suit for partition holding Gajadhar Singh, Govindpal Singh and Hulasi Kunwar entided to l/3rd shara each and that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was not entitled to her share. A first appeal was preferred by Smt. Reoti Kunwar against the said judgment. Subsequently, proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act commenced in the said village. A number of objections under section 9 (1) were filed. Hulas Kunwar filed an objection claiming that she is entitled to l/3rd share on partition and praying for a declaration of her right accordingly and for allotment of l/3rd share. On partition of the holding Govindpal Singh (petitioner) filed an objection praying for the deletion of the name of Reoti Kunwar from the revenue records. The Consolidation Officer held that at the time when Kanchhedpal Singh died the tenancy holding was the property of Joint Hindu Family and that on his death the entire interest in the holding belonged by survivorship to his brothers Gajadhar Singh and Govind Pal Singh and no interest to his widow Smt. Reoti Kunwar. The Consolidation Officer held that at the time when Kanchhedpal Singh died the tenancy holding was the property of Joint Hindu Family and that on his death the entire interest in the holding belonged by survivorship to his brothers Gajadhar Singh and Govind Pal Singh and no interest to his widow Smt. Reoti Kunwar. However it was further observed that since Smt. Reoti Kunwar has been admitted as a tenant and her name was added in the revenue records and as she has been tenant of the holding in dispute she could not be denied her right on the ground of adverse possession. In the said proceedings the consolidation authorities held that the tenancy holding could not be held by Joint Hindu Family and as such upon the death of a member his interest divolved in accordance with the provisions of section 22 and did not pass by survivorship. As against that the present petitioner preferred a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ No. 1638 of 1963) before this Court challenging the aforesaid orders. In the said writ petition this Court held that the revising authority adopting the view taken by the Board of Revenue that an occupancy tenancy cannot by held by a Joint Hindu Family was not correct since this Court held in the case of Mahabir Singh v. Bhagwati, 14 ALJ (1916) 278, and in Mendya v. Jhuria, 18 ALJ (1920) 769, that in the case of occupancy holding the interest of a deceased member of the family passed by survivorship and not in accordance with section 22 of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act, 1901. Finally, in the said writ petition this Court held :- "Inasmuch as upon the consideration set out above section 22 of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act, 1901, was not attracted upon the death of Kanchhidpal Singh, I hold that Reoti Kunwar did not inherit any interest in the tenancy holding upon his death." It was further held that on the death of Hulas Kunwar as admitted between the parties in the event of Reoti Kunwar being held not to enjoy any interest in the property the interest of Hulas Kunwar would divolve upon Gajadhar Singh and Govindpal Singh. The Court further held that since Smt. Reoti Kunwar did not enjoy any interest in the tenancy holding the right of Hulas Kunwar to share in the property would pass to her two sons and even if she had no right to a share the interest of Gajadhar Singh and Govindpal Singh would be a half share each. As against the said judgment special appeal was preferred by Smt. Reoti Kunwar, which was numbered as Special Appeal Nos. 162 and 163 of 1987. In that, the finding regarding the right of Smt. Reoti Kunwar by way of inheritence as reported by this Court earlier in the writ petition was upheld. However, the writ petition was allowed only with a direction to the Deputy Director to decide whether Smt Reoti Kunwar had become co-tenant by co-option by her brother-in-laws. It is on this account the case came back to the Deputy Director, who thereafter sent the case before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for deciding the matter after the remand. After remand, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by means of order dated 29th June, 1977 and the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of order 20th February 1980 held that there was co-option of Smt. Reoti Kunwar by her two brother-in- laws, and the present petitioner by means of the present writ petition has challenged these two judgments and order. 3. The remand was made in the special appeal as aforesaid since a finding has been recorded by the Consolidation Officer " I find that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was admitted as tenant by remaining co-tenants and it was never objected prior to partition suit, " and this finding was confirmed by the Settlement Officer and since the Deputy Director did not give any finding on this plea of Smt. Reoti Kunwar the case was remanded. 4. The present writ petition is confined to the point whether there was co-option of Smt. Reoti Kunwar or not by the other two branches as aforesaid and whether the finding recorded by the consolidation authorities in the impugned orders dated 29th June, 1977 and 20th February, 1980, as aforesaid is sustainable on the facts and circumstances of this case. Challenge to the aforesaid orders has been made on behalf of the petitioner on a number of grounds. Challenge to the aforesaid orders has been made on behalf of the petitioner on a number of grounds. Firstly, it was urged at the time when the name of Smt. Reoti Kunwar was recorded at the time of the death of her husband the petitioner was a minor and there was no question of giving any consent and thus finding of co-option cannot be sustained. It was further contended that the consolidation authorities did not apply their mind for recording the finding whether there was any act of other co-tenure-holders to co-opt Smt. Reoti Kunwar and in the absence of any finding the finding that there was actually co-option cannot be sustained. It is also urged that there cannot be any co-option apart from the consent of the other co-tenure-holders without the written consent of the zamindar and in the absence of any such consent the finding of co-option cannot be sustained, and, finally, merely recording of entry cannot create any right in favour of a party and unless it was proved by Smt. Reoti Kunwar that there was positive act by other co- tenure-holders of co-opting her the finding of co-option is not sustainable. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents repelled the contention as raised by the petitioner. It was contended that the finding has been recorded by the authorities on the basis of valid consideration. The statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC made in the earlier suit by the learned counsel for the petitioner which indicates the right of Smt. Reoti Kunwar coupled with continuous entry for more that 26 years on the record and admission of the petitioner of long possession of Smt. Reoti Kunwar was sufficient for the authorities and thus they have rightly arrived at the finding that there was co-option by the other co-sharers. 6. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by virtue of the impugned order dated 29th June, 1977, has recorded a finding that Smt. Reoti Kunwar's name has been recorded in the disputed khata under Act II of 1901 (N.W.P. Tenancy Act) and thereafter after coming into force the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, (U. P. Act III of 1926)' and U. P. Act No. XVII of 1939. Neither Govind Pal Singh (Petitioner) nor by the zamindars any objection was raised regarding the continuous recording of his name in the revenue records and that not having been objected by Govindpal Singh or zamindar it would be treated that she was co-opted as a tenant along with other tenants. Similarly, in revision, the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order dated 20th February, 1980, also recorded a finding of co-option by the other tenants relying on the statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC of the counsel for the petitioner in the earlier suit and on the basis of continuous entry of the name of Smt. Reoti Kunwar which was not objected to. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgment it seems both the courts below recorded a finding of co-option mainly on the basis of long entry and objection not being made of the said entry by the other co-tenants and also relying on the statement of the counsel under Order X, Rule 2, CPC in the aforesaid suit. It is these facts which have to be examined as to whether the finding recorded by the consolidation authorities of co-option was justified or not on the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. It is significant to mention that specific provision of co-option for the first time was introduced under section 23 (2) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the 1926 Act), which was also retained under section 33 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 1939 Act). In the aforesaid two later Acts the language used in the section, referred to above, is almost identical. IT provides that no person shall be deemed to be a co-tenant unless he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy or has become as such by succession or has specifically been recognised as such in writing by the landlord. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even though there is no specific provision under 1901 Act which is relevant for the purpose of the present case the permission of the landlord was necessary even then. It is significant to mention here that Kanchhedpal died on 21-3-1926 i.e. prior to the coming into force of the 1926 Act, and at that time 1901-Act was in force. It is significant to mention here that Kanchhedpal died on 21-3-1926 i.e. prior to the coming into force of the 1926 Act, and at that time 1901-Act was in force. It is not the case of the parties that any written permission was obtained from the zamindars after coming into force of 1926 Act. The argument raised on behalf of the respondent was that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was co-opted after the death of her husband by the other two branches, namely, that of Gajadhar Singh and Govindpal (Petitioner). The question which requires consideration is whether there was a co-option by the other two members in accordance with law or not. IT was argued on behalf of the respondent that since the husband of Smt, Reoti Kunwar died prior to coming into force of the 1926 Act and that Act not being applicable and if there was a co-option prior to that date it was not necessary to obtain any declaration in writing from the landlord. The question to be considered is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and if there was co-option prior to coming into force of 1926 Act even in the absence of any written declaration by the landlord the findings recorded by the consolidation authorities is sustainable or not. 8. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that both the consolidation authorities by means of the impugned orders dated 29th June, 1977 and 20th February, 1980 have held that co-option by the two other branches not on the basis of any positive act of the other co-tenants but merely on the basis of long entry continuing in favour of Smt. Reoti Kunwar and specially taking into consideration that no objection being filed against the said entry for a long time an inference of co-option was drawn. It has been argued that co-option could only be by means of positive act of the party co-opting as a co-tenant and merely inaction on behalf of the branches who is alleged to have co-opted cannot constitute co-option. It has been argued that co-option could only be by means of positive act of the party co-opting as a co-tenant and merely inaction on behalf of the branches who is alleged to have co-opted cannot constitute co-option. Apart from this, it is further argued, even if there is no provision under the 1901 Act similar to one as in 1926 Act and 1939 Act of a written permission from the landlord concerned a person could not be inducted into tenancy without permission of the landlord and thus a party alleging co-option has to prove the essential ingredients which are inherent therein. Firstly, there was a positive act of co-option by the branches who is alleged to have co-opted, and, secondly, there was permission of the landlord of such co-option and since in the present case the authorities could not find any such evidence on the record holding co-option mainly on the negative act of not objecting to the long entry could not constitute an evidence for holding co- option, and thus the finding recorded are not sustainable. On behalf of the respondents it was argued that no consent of the landlord is necessary, not even any permission prior to 1926 Act and since there is no provision under the Acts absence of permission of the landlord could not be a ground for rejecting the case of co-option. For this, learned counsel for the respondents made reliance in the case Dhanka v. Pearey, 1955 RD 326. This decision mainly holds that where co-tenancy started prior to the coming into force of the 1926 Act the principle laid down under section 23 of that Act of obtaining written consent of the landlord is not necessary. This was a case under section 49 of U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The question involved in the present case is not under section 49 and the principle decided in that case is not in doubt. 9. Next, reliance was placed in cases Laxmi Chand v. Jhandu, 1941 RD 33. Phul Kumari v. Ram Dei, 1941 RD 550 and Chabru v. Mahipat, 1944 RD 39. The facts of the aforesaid cases are different from the facts of the present case. 9. Next, reliance was placed in cases Laxmi Chand v. Jhandu, 1941 RD 33. Phul Kumari v. Ram Dei, 1941 RD 550 and Chabru v. Mahipat, 1944 RD 39. The facts of the aforesaid cases are different from the facts of the present case. The case of the petitioner is that there is no question of fresh tenancy as old tenancy was continuing and since there was no co-option the question of fresh tenancy does not arise on the facts of the present case. Learned counsel cited the case Dudh Nath Kori v. Smt. Dhanraji, 1964 RD 324 and Bhagan Ram v. State of U. P., 1967 RD 396. These cases are cited for the proposition that on account of long entry in the revenue records on the principle of estoppel or adverse possession the other co-tenants are estopped from questioning the legality of the person who is entered as co-tenant to be a co-tenant in law. Both of these cases are again cases under the 1926 Act and 1939 Act. However, the facts in the present case are different. In the present case, it is not in dispute, when Kanchhed Pal died the petitioner Govindpal was only a minor of about ten years old, and entry being made immediately after his death and even if it was not objected to till occasion came it cannot be said that the principle of estoppel or adverse possession could arise on these facts. In fact, as early as 22-8-1949 when the written statement was filed in Suit No. 330 of 1949 the petitioner had objected to the claim of Smt. Reoti Kunwar which was entered in the revenue papers. 10. From long entry in the revenue record the existence of right of a party who is alleged to have been opted should be drawn with great caution. The principle that merely recording the entry does not create any right is well settled. Thus, even if the court on the facts on the basis of long entry comes to the conclusion, if other ingredients being satisfied that there was co-option by other co-tenants, such inference should be drawn with great x circumspection and it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, the two authorities cited on behalf of the respondents could not be of any assistance in the present case. Thus, the two authorities cited on behalf of the respondents could not be of any assistance in the present case. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that finding of co-option should be upheld merely on the basis of long entry cannot be sustained. As I have said above, this objection was raised at the earliest as back when the first suit was filed in 1949 while filing the written statement on 22-8-1949 and coupled with the fact that at the time when co-option is being alleged the present petitioner was only a minor. In such circumstances drawing of inference of co-option merely on wrong entry could not be safe nor could be justified. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Bishwanath Pandey v. Badami Kaur, AIR 1980 SC 1329 . This was a case where claim of proprietary right was made and the principle laid down therein could not be applicable as the present is a case where the right of tenancy is being claimed. In this case, it was held that since a statement was made by one Smt. Badami Kaur sometime in 1931 on the basis of which her name was mutated as the widow of her husband and since the Statement was made at the time when neither U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, nor Hindu Succession Act came into force and when the consolidation authorities decided the matter she obtained absolute proprietary right under the aforesaid two Acts. However, as I have said above, in the aforesaid decision the question of occupancy tenancy was involved, and the question involved in the present case is different and thus the principle laid down therein could be inapplicable. 11. An attempt was made initially by the learned counsel for the respondents to justify that Smt. Reoti Kunwar could be entitled by way of inheritence as a widow even under section 22 of (901 Act. Reference was also made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Chotey Lal v. Jhandey Lal, 1972 AWR 225. 11. An attempt was made initially by the learned counsel for the respondents to justify that Smt. Reoti Kunwar could be entitled by way of inheritence as a widow even under section 22 of (901 Act. Reference was also made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Chotey Lal v. Jhandey Lal, 1972 AWR 225. In this present case the question cannot be gone into nor could be examined since the matter has become final between the parties, when this Court earlier in the aforesaid writ petition has decided that Smt. Reoti Kunwar is not entitled to inherit as widow of Khanchhedpal in the Joint Hindu Family of the disputed khata concerned and in fact in the said decision the case was remanded only for adjudicating whether on the facts of the case Smt. Reoti Kunwar was co- opted or not. 12. It is further alleged on behalf of the respondents that where the zamindar (land-holder) does not object the tenant cannot object of inducting in co-tenancy. Reference was made in a case Bachchu v. Sheo Raj, 1944 RD 388. This was a case where one of the tenants wanted to resile from the earlier compromise arrived at on the ground of proviso to section 33 (2) of U. P. Tenancy Act. This was a case wherein it was alleged after a compromise decree was passed that in terms of the proviso of the said section there was no compliance. The court held that the tenant cannot resile from the compromise on the ground of proviso to section 33 (2) of U. P. Tenancy Act. The facts are not applicable in the present case. Reliance was also placed in the case of Sultan v. Dwarka, 1937 RD 15. In this case, the facts were that there was evidence on the record coupled with the written statement of zamindar that he has no objection to the inclusion of name of the descendants of the fourth branch who were not recorded to be the co-tenant over the occupancy holding. The zamindar had further stated that he has been realising rent rateably from them. It was in view of this clear evidence of the Patwari and the zamindar the court held that merely on the basis of possession of the fourth branch he would be treated to be the co-tenants alongwith others. The zamindar had further stated that he has been realising rent rateably from them. It was in view of this clear evidence of the Patwari and the zamindar the court held that merely on the basis of possession of the fourth branch he would be treated to be the co-tenants alongwith others. The facts are entirely different from the facts of the present case. 13. Argument was also raised that in view of the statement of the counsel under Order X, Rule 2, CPC the case of the petitioner admitting the right of Smt. Reoti Kunwar could constitute a positive act of admitting into the tenancy and thus co-opting along with other two branches. It was further urged, that the statement of the counsel under the aforesaid provision is an admission of the party and thus the petitioner is bound. 14. The aforesaid statement under Order X, rule 2, CPC was made jointly by the counsel for the party as would be evident from paragraph 25 (6) of the counter affidavit which reproduces the actual statement made under the said provision. No doubt, a statement was made in that case that in case remarriage of Smt. Reoti Kunwar is accepted then in the disputed khata Gajadhar Singh and Govind Pal would have 1/2 share each and if it is not accepted then would have 1/6 share. It is significant the statement as aforesaid was jointly made for the purpose of that suit. This statement was made on 25th May, 1953 in suit No. 330 of 1949 i.e. to say four years after the filing of the said suit. It is not in dispute that prior to the statement when written statement was filed by the petitioner in 1949 itself the claim of Smt. Reoti Kunwar was specifically denied. Firstly, it is significant that the suit later abated in view of consolidation proceedings and thus any statement made therein could not lend any support to the respondents. However, the fact is that the statement made under Order X, rule 2 CPC is regarding ascertainment whether allegations in the pleadings are admitted or denied. It provides that the court shall ascertain from each party or its pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of' fact as are made in the plaint or written statement. Order X, Rule 2, CPC is regarding oral examination of party or companion of party. It provides that the court shall ascertain from each party or its pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of' fact as are made in the plaint or written statement. Order X, Rule 2, CPC is regarding oral examination of party or companion of party. This has been provided in order to elucidate matters in controversy in the suit and also the court may examine any person, able to answer material questions relating to the suit. It is significant that under Rule 1 the statement is made either by party or its pleader while under Rule 2 it is by such party or by any person or by a pleader who is accompanied. The word "accompanied" is a qualifying word which does not appear in rule 1. A pleader under Order X Rule 1, could make a statement independently even in the absence of the party to whom he represents, while under Rule 2 only when the pleader is accompanied Firstly, there is nothing on the record that the counsel making such statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC in the aforesaid suit was accompanied by the party and a statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC cannot be relied in the absence of such proof. In the present case, nothing has been brought to light that when the statement was made under Order X, Rule 2, the party was accompanied. The party could independently make statement under Order X, Rule 1 and it is not case of the respondent that the statement was made under Order X, Rule 1, CPC. Apart from this, the argument that the statement is an admission and binding between the parties is unsustainable. Before drawing an admission all the circumstances under which admission was made has to be taken into consideration before reliance could be placed by a party in subsequent proceedings and an admission could be made in a given case to terminate a proceeding in order to avoid long litigation and enjoying fruits even by giving up the existing right, but that statement could only be confined to the suit in which it was made. Any statement made in the previous suit or proceeding if it is regarded by a party as an admission he must prove the circumstances under which it was made and to show that such an admission was not confined for the purpose of that suit then only in a subsequent proceeding reliance could be placed to bind such party not to resile from it. Normally, every person making a statement in the earlier proceeding has a right to explain away a statement in subsquent proceedings and merely making such statement cannot bind nor could it apply as an estoppel to explain away such statement. Thus, statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC cannot be said to be such which is an admission on behalf of the petitioner on which reliance has been placed by the respondents to show that it constitutes an act of consent of co-option to admit Smt. Reoti Kunwar as a co-tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner very rightly relied on a passage in "Sarkar on Evidence " Vol. I, Thirteenth Edition at page 198, which is quoted hereunder :- "Statements in pleadings are not evidence against the party pleading in subsequent proceedings Bileas v. Rutlian, 1848, 2 Ex 665 ; Hails. 3rd Ed. Vol. 15, para 540. Pleadings recorded in one cause are admissible in evidence in subsequent proceedings to prove the institution and subject matter of such cause but are generally inadmissible even as against parties or privies as proof of the truth of the facts stated therein. (Hals. 3rd Ed. Vol. 15, para 709). The rule rejecting the pleadings in prior causes as admissions is of considerable antiquity and was based on the theory that the statements were not those of the party, but were merely 'pleader's matter' and consisted largely of 'suggestions of counsel' and 'flourishes of the draftsmen'.'' 15. The case Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341 , repelled the earlier views of the court that admission by a party in plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits in terms of section 17, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court repelling the earlier views held as follows : "Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English Law. The Supreme Court repelling the earlier views held as follows : "Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English Law. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian Law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true." 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on in a case Kailash Chandra v. Ratan Prakash, AIR 1974 Alld. 138. In this case, this Court held that the statement of a counsel of a party can be recorded under rule 1 of Order X and not under rule 2. Reliance was also placed in Muhammad Imam Ali Khan v. Husain Khan, ILR XXVI Cal. 61. In this case certain statement was made in 1878 which was sought to be relied in subsequent proceedings. It was in this light that the court held as follows : "Supposing that in 1878 he believed them to be true and made them spontaneously, why should he not assert the true state of the case after he has learned it ? An Oudh talukh cannot be transferred like an ordinary estate under Mohomedan or Hindu law because the Oudh Estates Act requires special modes of transfer. It is not now contended that the mutation operated as a transfer. It would be absurd to suppose that the plaintiff made any misrepresentation to the defendant; neither was the situation of the defendant altered in any way to his prejudice. No consideration was given by the defendant, nor is there anything in the transaction to create a trust. Possibly it might have given the defendant a possession on which time would run; but, if so, time has not run long enough to create a bar..." It was also held : "...a gratuitous admission may be withdrawn unless there is some obligation not to withdraw it; and there is not here any title on winch such an admission can rest .." 17. As I have held above, the statement made by the counsel in a suit which has abated, where there is nothing on the record to show when the statement was made under Order X, rule 2, CPC the pleader accompanied the party and under what circumstances joint statement was obtained of the parties in that suit specially when the case of the petitioner has been throughout denying the claim of Smt. Reoti Kunwar and that suit having abated it cannot be said that it is an admission binding and any benefit would be derived by the respondents on that account. This finding of the consolidation authorities on the basis of this statement could not be said to be justified on having been accepted as an admission and this finding of co-option based on this is unsustainable. 18. Finally, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that even in the absence of provision of a written consent as provided under 1926 and 1939 Acts consent both of the other tenants and of the landlord is necessary. For this reliance was placed in the cases Mohd. Salim Sheikh v. Maktula Kuari, 1924 RD 177, Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sonjharu Kunwari, 1926 RD 458 and Abdul Bari v. Raghu Kurmi, 1933 RD 134. It is relevant to refer here that in the Special Appeal while remanding the case before the consolidation authorities this Court referred the following finding of the Consolidation Officer : "I find that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was admitted as tenant by remaining co- tenants and it was never objected prior to partition suit." It was further mentioned in the said judgment that the aforesaid finding was impliedly affirmed by the Settlement Officer. However, the Deputy Director did not record any finding on this plea and it is on this account the case was remanded whether the other two branches of Smt. Reoti Kunwar had co-opted her as co-tenant or not. It is true that the Consolidation Officer recorded a finding that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was admitted as tenant by remaining co-tenants, but on perusal of the objections filed by Smt. Reoti Kunwar before Consolidation Officer there is no plea that she has been co-opted by the other two branches in the disputed joint khata. Annexure 1 to the writ petition is objection filed by her. Annexure 1 to the writ petition is objection filed by her. The objection is based on the claim that she is entitled to be recorded and declared as co-tenant by virtue of being widow of Kanchhed Pal Singh as his legal heir. The claim is based on inheritence rather than co-option. Thus, even as late as in the year 1961 she claims her right on the basis of being an heir and not on the basis of co option. In view of this the finding recorded by the Consolidation Officer could not be based on either the pleading or the evidence on the record. Thus, from the aforesaid it is clear that the finding recorded initially by the Consolidation Officer and later by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation, after remand, is not based on any pleading or evidence on the record. The inference of co-option thus drawn by the said authorities is unsustainable. The matter can be looked from another angle. The claim by Smt. Reoti Kunwar is as co-tenant of the occupany holding. For this it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of 1901 Act. Section 4 (5) defines "Landholder" and "tenant". It mentions "landholder" is the person to whom and "tenant" is a person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, would be payable. Similarly, section 4 (9) defines "holding" to mean a parcel or parcels of land held under one tenure or one lease or engagement. Section 6 gives classes of tenants and clause (d) refers to occupancy tenants. Occupancy tenants has been defined in section 16 for tenants having a right of occupancy under section 11 or under the corresponding provisions of Act X of 1859, Act XVIII of 1873 or Act XII of 1881, or under any other enactment for the time being in force, shall be called an occupancy tenant. Section 11 states about acquisition of right of occupancy, according to which, a tenant who has held the same land continuously for a period of twelve years shall have a right of occupancy in such land. Similarly, section 17 defines where the right of occupancy tenancy is changed. Section 11 states about acquisition of right of occupancy, according to which, a tenant who has held the same land continuously for a period of twelve years shall have a right of occupancy in such land. Similarly, section 17 defines where the right of occupancy tenancy is changed. It refers that a tenant who has a right of occupancy in any hand shall have a right of occupancy in any other land which he may receive from the proprietor in exchange therefor, and shall thereupon cease to have a right of occupancy in the land so given by him in exchange. Section 18 defines the extinction of right of occupancy tenant as to cases when the tenant dies leaving no heir entitled under the Act to inherit, or, in land from which the tenant has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court, or, in a case where such tenant has abandoned or surrendered after service upon the land-holder of a notice of surrender, and in land which has been acquired for a public purpose, or a work of public utility. 19. In order to examine under this Act whether Smt. Reoti Kunwar could be treated as occupancy tenant or not she has to qualify under any of the provisions of the Act. It is not in dispute when 1901 Act was in force Sri Kanchhed Pal, husband of Smt. Reoti Kunwar died on 21st March, 1926, and thus it has to be seen whether she could become occupancy tenant under any of the aforesaid provisions. It is significant here to refer to section 22 of the aforesaid 1901 Act, which defines persons who will succeed after the death of an occupancy tenant. I am not considering section 22 deliberately as in case of inheritence and claim of being co-tenant by such inheritence has been rejected by this Court earlier in the aforesaid writ petition, which was confirmed in a special appeal and which has become final inter-se parties. Thus, it has to be seen whether apart from inheritence is there any provision under which she could acquire occupancy tenancy. 20. Section 11 of 1901 Act deals with acquisition of right of occupancy. Under it, a tenant who has held the same land continuously for a period of twelve years shall have right of occupancy in such land. Thus, it has to be seen whether apart from inheritence is there any provision under which she could acquire occupancy tenancy. 20. Section 11 of 1901 Act deals with acquisition of right of occupancy. Under it, a tenant who has held the same land continuously for a period of twelve years shall have right of occupancy in such land. There are two essential ingredients: firstly, such person should be tenant under the Act, and, secondly, he should hold land continuously for a period of twelve years. Admittedly, when her husband died on 21st March, 1926, prior to this date she could not have held the said land and after his death only after few months the aforesaid 1926 Act came into force superseding 1901 Act. Thus, she could not be a person who could be said to have held the land continuously for a period of twelve years under the 1901 Act. Further, there is nothing on the record to show that she was tenant of the holding as defined under the Act to mean a person by whom rent is payable. Apart from the aforesaid no other provision has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent to show that she could become occupancy tenant. In fact, there is no provision under this Act as has been introduced subsequently in 1926 Act and 1939 Act for co-option of a tenant as a co-tenant. Under section 23 (2) of 1926 Act a provision has been made where the interest of an occupancy tenant could be transferred in favour of a co-tenant provided that no person is deemed to be co-tenant unless he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy or has become as such co- tenant by virtue of succession or has been specifically recognised as such in writing by the landholder. In the present case, it cannot be said that Smt. Reoti Kunwar was a co-tenant from the commencement of tenancy as in 1901 Act she has not matured even by acquisition of right of occupancy tenancy, and thus on the commencement of 1926 Act she was not a co-tenant. She has been held not to have succeeded to the occupancy tenant neither there is anything in writing by the landholder that she has been recognised as such. She has been held not to have succeeded to the occupancy tenant neither there is anything in writing by the landholder that she has been recognised as such. Thus, in view of these three factors she could not even urge that she has been co-opted as a co-tenant with other tenants. It is significant even under section 23 (2) there is no power to co-opt a person who is not a tenant to the land in question at the commencement of 1926 Act. What is contemplated under section 23 (2) is that a tenant or occupancy tenant could release or transfer his interest in favour of a co-tenant. It is this right which is spoken as a power of co-option by admitting any other person. Under it, firstly, the tenant releases or transfers his interest only in favour of a co-tenant and the proviso defines that no person could be deemed to be a co-tenant unless the ingredients mentioned therein are fulfilled. In the present case, none of the ingredients mentioned in the proviso is applicable to Smt. Reoti Kunwar as to qualify her for co-option in the sense as it is applicable under section 23 (2) of 1926 Act. This section is not for co-opting a stranger into holding but only the existing co-tenant by releasing the share of the existing tenant. 21. Thus from the aforesaid considerations of the various provisions of the Acts it is clear that if Smt. Reoti Kunwar is not entitled by inheritence she could not under the law be co-opted by the two branches. Thus, I find that the finding of co-option recorded by all the three consolidation authorities is neither based on the evidence on the record nor it is tenable in law under the aforesaid provisions. 22. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders dated 22nd May, 1961 (Annexure 2), 29th June, 1977 (Annexure 7) and 20th February, 1980 (Annexure 8) are hereby quashed. Petition allowed.