JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaur dated 10-3-1983 whereby he has upheld the order of the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Nagaur dated 9-9-1983. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under sections, 218 and 465, Indian Penal Code against the accused petitioner Dr. Dalpat Singh. 2. It is alleged that one Ram das was beaten by Jairam and Satya Narayan with Pharsi and Lathi. Injured Ramdas was admitted in PBM, Against order dated 10-3-1983 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaur Hospital, Bikaner in Ward-VIII. His treating Doctor was Dr. Saxena who was incharge of Ward-VIII. On 5-6-1979, on examination of the injured, Dr. P.P. Gandhi found that the injured has received the previous injuries by sharp weapon. It is alleged that on 10-6-1979, accused-petitioner Dr. Dalpat Singh, who at that time was working as Surgeon in PBM, Hospital, Bikaner issued a certificate that injured Ramdas has get no injury with may threaten his life and there is no evidence of any fracture on his person. This certificate was filed on the Court on 11-6-1979 and on that basis, the accused-person who injured Ramdas were bailed out, thereafter, on 12-6-1979, one Mishrilal filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, Nagaur to get the injuries on injured Ramdas examined by a Medical Board. Ultimately, a Medical Board was constituted and it was found that the injuries received by Ramdas on his arm was previous in nature and caused by sharp weapon. Thus, it, came to the notice of the prosecution agency on 20-9-1979 that the certificate issued by Dr. Dalpat Singh is false It has initiated proceedings against him for issuing of a false certificate. After investigation, the Police filed the final Report on 27-12-1980 Against the Final Report, a protest petition was filed by Shri Champalal (complainant) on 5-3-1981 that cognizance should be taken against the accused-petitioner under Sections 217, 218 and 193, Indian Penal Code. How ever, number of adjournments were sought by learned Counsel for the complainant either for the production of law books or for obtaining sanction of the competent authority for prosecution of Dr. Dalpat Singh. How ever, number of adjournments were sought by learned Counsel for the complainant either for the production of law books or for obtaining sanction of the competent authority for prosecution of Dr. Dalpat Singh. Ultimately, on 9-9-1983, the learned lower court came to the conclusion that no sanction is necessary because the issuance of a medical certificate does not fall within the purview of the duty of a Doctor and, therefore, it took cognizance against the accused-petitioner for the offence under Sections 219 & 465, Indian Penal Code. Against this order, a revision was filed before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nagaur, who has upheld the order of the learned Munsif& Judicial Magistrate Nagaur Hence this revision as aforesaid. 3. I have heard Mr. T.S. Champawat, the learned Counsel for the accused-petitioner that the offence under 218, Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisonment for three years or fine or both and the offence under Section 465, Criminal Procedure Code no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of period of limitation. In the case in hand, cognizance has been taken against the accused petitioner for the offence under Sections 218 and 465, Indian Penal Code and these offences fall within the category specified in Sub-section 2(c) of Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code i.e. in such cases, cognizance cannot be taken beyond a period of three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term proceeding one year but not exceeding three years from the date of the offence has been committed. Mr. Champawat has submitted that the offence have been committed on 10-6-1979 and if is held that the prosecution came to know, that the certificate issued by accused-petitioner is false, only on 20-8 1979 then no cognizance of the offence under Sections 213 and 465 Indian Penal Code could have been taken against the accused-petitioner after 19-8-1982-Mr. Mr. Champawat has submitted that the offence have been committed on 10-6-1979 and if is held that the prosecution came to know, that the certificate issued by accused-petitioner is false, only on 20-8 1979 then no cognizance of the offence under Sections 213 and 465 Indian Penal Code could have been taken against the accused-petitioner after 19-8-1982-Mr. Champawat has placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Brown Beveri Ltd v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1981 SC 1054 ) , wherein it has been held that it is of utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or by a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation It was further held that the object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which, material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the Court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consequence with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution 4. Mr. Champawat has also invited my attention to a decision of this Court in Panney Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1980 Cr. L.J 339 . where in it has been observed as follows: "There is legislative interdiction under Section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation for presentation of the charge-sheet. If the court finds that the period of limitation has expired, the court shall set as to whether there are sufficient grounds for condonation of delay or for extension of the period of limitation. It is not necessary that there should be separate application moved by the prosecution under Section 473. The delay may be explained in the chargesheet itself or the grounds for extension of the period of limitation may be stated in the charge-sheet itself. Extension of limitation may is to be sought by a separate application accompanied with an affidavit or papers in support of the same. The delay may be explained in the chargesheet itself or the grounds for extension of the period of limitation may be stated in the charge-sheet itself. Extension of limitation may is to be sought by a separate application accompanied with an affidavit or papers in support of the same. The Court could not subsequent to the passing of the order taking cognizance condone the delay and extend the period of limitation. It may, how ever, be observed that under Section 473, apart from properly explaining the delay, the court is empowered to extend the period even in the interest of justice. Section 473 thus has to be liberally construe in the light of the words in which it is expressed. It was further observed as under: "Before taking cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation, the accused is entitled to be given a notice and he shall be heard on the question of extension of the period of limitation under Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, as far this Court is concerned, this Court has held that delay cannot be condoned after taking cognizance. It can be condoned in suitable cases but those cases the accused is entitled to be given a notice and he shall be heard on the question of extension of the period of limitation under Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Mr. L.R. Kalla, the learned Counsel appearing for the complainant has, how ever, placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in Sulochna v. State Registrar of Chite, Madras 1978 Cr L.j. 116 , wherein it has been held that power to condone the delay can be exercised even after taking cognizance or the offence beyond period of limitation. The condonation of delay is not a pre-condition for taking cognizance of the offence after limitation. The power under Section 473 is an overriding power and it is not limited to time factor of condonation. It was further held that it is not essential that only Police Officials must file an application for condonation of delay. Even other persons (officials) can seek condonation of delay on offering satisfactory explanations. 6. Mr. Kalla further placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Kamal H. Javeri and Anr. v. Chardulal Gulab Chand Kothri and Anr. 1985 Cr. Even other persons (officials) can seek condonation of delay on offering satisfactory explanations. 6. Mr. Kalla further placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Kamal H. Javeri and Anr. v. Chardulal Gulab Chand Kothri and Anr. 1985 Cr. LJ 1215 , where in it was observed: "The proper construction of Sub-section (1) of Section 468 namely that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in subsection (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation, is that a bar is created in taking cognizance of an offence wherein the complaint is barred by limitation. Suppose a complaint is filed on the last day of limitation and en that date the Magistrate is on leave and/or authorised enable to bear the party and/or apply his mind to the complaint on that date or suppose a complaint is filed quite in advance before the expiry of the period of limitation and the Magistrate in his discretion postpones the issue of process by directing an investigation under Section 202, Criminal Procedure Code and that investigation is not completed within the prescribed period of limitation. In such contingencies can the complainant be blamed who has approached the Court quite within limitation but no cognizance could be taken for the valid and good reasons on the part of the Magistrate and should the complainant suffer for no fault on his part. This could not be object of the farmers of the provisions of Section 468. Having regard to the scheme of Ch. XXXVI, Criminal Procedure Code and having regard to the provisions of Section 468, the only proper construction that could be placed on Section 468 in connection with the limitation is that if the complaint is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Sub-section (2) of Section 468, then no court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 468(1) subject how ever to the power vested in court to extend the period of limitation under Section 473. The submission that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation from the date of offence is without any substance. The submission that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation from the date of offence is without any substance. The true construction of Section 468 is that it lays down a bar on Court from taking cognizance of an offence in which a complaint is lodged after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 468, subject how ever to the extension of time as provided under Section 473. Thus, he limitation prescribed Section 468 is to be read with reference to the filing of the complaint and not with reference to the date of cognizance or issuance of process. I have carefully gone through this authority but I am not inclined to subscribe to the view expressed by Bombay High Court in Kamal H. Javeri's case (supra). It is true that if the complaint is filed by the complainant in time and the cases are adjourned because the Magistrate is not present or he embarks upon an enquiry under Sections 200 & 202, Criminal Procedure Code then that may be a suitable ground for condonation of delay and the Court may exercise its powers under Section 473 Criminal Procedure Code to condone the delay. The bar created by Section 468 Criminal Procedure Code is against the taking of cognizance. No cognizance will be taken by a Court of competent jurisdiction after the prescribed period of limitation and if it has taken it is illegal as per the view of this Court in Panney Singh's case (supra). In the case in hand, although the protest petition was filed by the father of the injured but his counsel sought several adjournments either for production of law book or for obtaining sanction for proceeding against the accused and ultimately, the case was argued on 9-9-1983 and the Court has taken cognizance against the accused-petitioner but by that time, the period of three years within which the cognizance could have been taken has expired. The learned Magistrate has given no reasons in his order for condoning the decay. A simple order taking cognizance has been passed by him after the expiry of three years. It cannot be held that it condoned the delay ipso facto. The learned Magistrate has given no reasons in his order for condoning the decay. A simple order taking cognizance has been passed by him after the expiry of three years. It cannot be held that it condoned the delay ipso facto. Before condoning the delay, the Court has to be satisfied on facts and in the circumstance of the case the delay has been properly explained or the Court has to say taking of cognizance is necessary in the interest of justice but in this case, neither the Court while taking cognizance beyond the period of limitation has observed that it was necessary to do so in the interest of justice nor has it held that delay in taking cognizance has been properly explained and, therefore, it is clear case where no powers have been exercised under Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code but cognizance has been taken straight-way against the provisions of Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Hem Chand v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc Revision Petition No. 414 of 1980, decided on July 22, 1988) has held that the Judicial Magistrate was completely barred from taking cognizance of the offence after the expiry of one year from the date of the commission of these offences and, therefore, the order of the Judicial Magistrate deserves to be quashed. That case was covered by the provisions of Section 468(2), Criminal Procedure Code. 8. Mr. Kalla has drawn by attention to a decision of the Patna High Court in Sarkar v. M, R.T. & Special Maintenance 1988 Cr. LJ 948 , where in it has been held that Section 473 does not necessarily require the Magistrate to record any reason for taking cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation nor does it specifically provide that the filing of an application for concentation of delay by the party concerned is necessary. So if the order illegally recalls a judicial order passed earlier having presumption of its having been passed regularly, it cannot be justified by looking to the purpose for which the order of recall was passed particularly when the grievance of the party can be agitated and remedies in other ways in accordance with law. So if the order illegally recalls a judicial order passed earlier having presumption of its having been passed regularly, it cannot be justified by looking to the purpose for which the order of recall was passed particularly when the grievance of the party can be agitated and remedies in other ways in accordance with law. This point has been dealt with in Panney Singh's case (supra) by this Court, where in it has been acid that for extension of limitation, no separate application is necessary. It can be explained in the chargesheet itself and it can also be explained through an application but the Court must record an order exercising its powers under s, 473 Criminal Procedure Code and in doing so, it must give notice to the accused and such an order can be passed in suitable cases only after giving him an opportunity of hearing. Thus, so far this Court is concerned, law on the point can be summarised as follows: For condoning the delay, in taking cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation, no separate application is necessary but the delay must be explained either in the chaman or by filing a separate application supported by affidavit. If cognizance has to be taken after the expiry of the period of limitation, the accused has to be given a notice and it is only after the hearing him, that cognizance can be taken and in doing so, the Court has to record its satisfaction that on the basis of the facts and circumstances of this case, the delay has been properly explained or it has been to record its satisfaction that condo-nation of delay is necessary in the interest of justice. Unless either these two things are done, it cannot be presumed that the Court which has taken cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation has ipso-facto exercised its powers under Section 473 Criminal Procedure Code and has condoned the delay. More ever the Court cannot subsequent to the passing of the order of taking cognizance can condone the delay or extend the period of limitation. 9. No other point was pressed before me in this revision petition. 10. More ever the Court cannot subsequent to the passing of the order of taking cognizance can condone the delay or extend the period of limitation. 9. No other point was pressed before me in this revision petition. 10. In the result, I accept this revision petition, set aside the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge Nagaur dated 10-8-1987 as also the order of the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Nagaur, dated 9-9-1983 taking cognizance against the accused-petitioner Dr. Dalpat Singh for the offences under Sections 218 and 465 Indian Penal Code. 11. Let the record of this case be sent back to the learned lower court forthwith.Revision accepted. *******