JUDGMENT V. R Bhatnagar, J.—The short question which requires determination in this civil suit, seeking declaration with consequential relief, is whether it has been correctly valued for the purposes of court fees within the ambit of section 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Court Fees Act, 8 of 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Court Fees Act) or not. 2. Briefly stated, plaintiff Kanwar Partap Singhs case, as made out in the plaint, is that the suit property known as Hira House alongwith the adjoining land situate in Simla was inherited by his father, late Raja Dalip Singh of Dhami, from his (plf.) grand father, late Raja Hira Singh of Dhami. Raja Dalip Singh died on May 8, 1987 leaving behind his son (plaintiff) and three daughters (defendants No. 1 to 3). According to the plaintiff, it was a co-parcenary property and he became owner of half share therein by birth. It is further averred by him that the remaining half share belonging to Raja Dalip Singh was to be inherited equally by the plaintiff and his three sisters with the result that the plaintiffs share in the suit property would come to 5/8th whereas the three defts. would inherit l/8th share each in the aforesaid property. However, on Raja Dalip Singhs death, the property was mutated in equal shares in the names of the plaintiff and the defendants vide mutation No. 1656 sanctioned on September 19, 1987. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed for a declaration regarding the incorrectness of revenue entries in the abovementioned mutation. The plaintiff came to know about these entries on July 4, 1988. 3. It has been fuither alleged by the plaintiff that a few days before filing the present suit, defendants No. 1 to 3 held out threats to the plaintiff that they would dispossess him and transfer/alienate the suit property. 4. On the above allegations, the plaintiff has prayed for a decree of declaration to the effect that the mutation in question showing the plaintiff and defendants as owners of the suit property in equal shares is illegal and without jurisdiction. It has been further prayed by him that the defendants be restrained from interferring with his possession or taking forcible possession of the suit property or transferring or alienating any portion thereof through a decree of prohibitory injunction. 5. It has been further prayed by him that the defendants be restrained from interferring with his possession or taking forcible possession of the suit property or transferring or alienating any portion thereof through a decree of prohibitory injunction. 5. Paragraph 17 of the plaint pertains to the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction. It reads: "17. That the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction in respect of the relief of declaration is Rs. 3 lakhs. As regards court fee, fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 is affixed. As regards the independent relief of injunction, the suit is valued at Rs. 200.00 both for Court Fee and jurisdictional purposes." 6. Alongwith the suit, the plaintiff also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 C. P. C. for the grant of an interim injunction during the pendency of the suit. This application, registered as O.M.P. (C.S) No. 369 of 1988, came up for consideration before the court on September 20, 1988 when the following order, touching the valuation of the suit, was made: "This case is for declaration alongwith consequential relief, but it has been valued for the purpose of fixing court fee at Rs 200. Mr. R. K. Kaushal, learned counsel for the plaintiff, prays for some time to either make up the deficiency or satisfy the court as to how the case has been valued as stated above." Pursuant to the above order, arguments have been heard today. 7. The law pertaining to the computation of fees payable in suits for a declaratory decree and consequential relief is contained in section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. According to the above provision the plaintiff is required to state the amount at which he values the relief sought in all such suits. The court fees have then to be paid in accordance with the amount at which the relief sought has been thus valued in the plaint. However, the second proviso to section 7 (iv) states that in suits for declaratory decree and consequential relief where the relief sought is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by paragraph (v) of this section. However, the second proviso to section 7 (iv) states that in suits for declaratory decree and consequential relief where the relief sought is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by paragraph (v) of this section. The perusal of para (v) shows that such valuation has to be the market value of the property. In a nut-shell, therefore, court fees on a suit praying for a declaratory decree with consequential relief with respect to a house have to be paid on the market value of that house. 8. Shri R. K. Kaushal, learned counsel for the plaintiff, has however, contended, relying upon the law laid down in Karuppayee Ammal and others v. Periasami Goundan, AIR (38) 1951 Madras 604, that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff are based on different causes of action and, therefore, he could fix different values for the lelief of declaratory decree and that of the prohibitory injunction. I am afraid, I cannot agree. This is because the averments made in the plaint have to be looked into for deciding the question of court fees, the governing factor being whether the consequential relief prayed for would flow directly from the declaration ought. In the present case, it is manifest that the shares of the plaintiff and the defendants have first to be determined and a declaration given thereto. The grant of prohibitory injunction would be dependent upon the aforesaid declaration of the shares of the parties. The present case, therefore, squarely falls within the ambit of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and the plaintiff will have to pay the court fee on the market value of the property with respect to which he is seeking relief. 8. In my above conclusion, I am fortified by the law laid down in Rani Birja Raj Kutnari v. Rani Bishwa Nath Kumar AIR 1939 Patna 219 and Ghulam Din v. Mohamad Syed and others, AIR 1973 J & K 56. 8. In my above conclusion, I am fortified by the law laid down in Rani Birja Raj Kutnari v. Rani Bishwa Nath Kumar AIR 1939 Patna 219 and Ghulam Din v. Mohamad Syed and others, AIR 1973 J & K 56. It is also well settled by now, as held in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal and others, AIR 1932 All 485 and Abdul Hamid Shamai v. Abdul Majid and others, AIR 1988 S.C. 1150, that the plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under value the relief in which case it would be open to the courts to reject such a valuation. This is inspite of the fact that ordinarily the courts shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen by the plaintiff. 10. In the light of the observations made above, this plaint is liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. due to the relief claimed having been undervalued. The plaintiff is, therefore, directed to correct the valuation within one month from today and make up the deficiency in the court fees. For the aforesaid purpose the plaintiff may amend the plaint so far as is necessary. The case be now listed after one month. Suit rejected.