JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A suit no. 23 of 1981 was filed by Vipin Mehra, respondent no. 3, against the petitioner in the Court of Judge Small Causes Court, Moradabad. The respondent no. 3 is the landlord and the petitioner is alleged to be the tenant of the disputed property. The suit was filed for ejectment and for arrears of rent. The suit was fixed for final hearing on 7-12-1982. On that day the suit was decreed ex parte on the ground that the petitioner did not appear before the Court. On 10-12-1982, just after two days, an application was made for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The ground alleged was that the petitioner was not well on 7th December 1982 and as such he could not appear in the Court on the date fixed for hearing of the suit. 2. After making the application for restoration on 10th December, 1982, the petitioner made an application on 20th December, 1982, under the proviso to section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act for permission to furnish security for the performance of the decree as required by section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The application for permission to furnish security came up for orders on 4th of January, 1983. On that very date the Court granted the petitioner permission to furnish security. The petitioner furnished security on that very date. The security was verified and accepted by the Court on that date. The Judge Small Causes Court, by its order, dated 8th of May, 1984 dismissed the application of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree on two grounds; firstly, on the ground that the petitioner had not made an application for permission to furnish security before moving an application for setting aside the ex parte decree as required by the proviso to section 17 of the Act and secondly on the ground that since no medical certificate was furnished for the alleged illness on 7th December, 1982, no sufficient cause was made out for setting aside the ex parte decree. Against the order dated 8th of May, 1984, a Civil Revision No. 106 of 1984, was filed by the petitioner in the Court of the District Judge, Moradabad. Against the order dated 8th of May, 1984, a Civil Revision No. 106 of 1984, was filed by the petitioner in the Court of the District Judge, Moradabad. The revision came up for hearing before the 1st Addl. District Judge, Moradabad, who by his judgment dated 26th of April, 1985, dismissed the revision. Aggrieved by the above order the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in this Court. 3. I have heard Sri M. A. Qadeer, for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon for the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the making of an application for permission to furnish security under the proviso to section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act prior to the making of an application for setting aside the ex parte decree is only directory and not mandatory. His contention is that if an application for security has been made within limitation then the mere fact that it was made after the making of an application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree would not be thrown out as not maintainable. 4. His second contention is that the petitioner was actually ill on the date when the suit was taken up for hearing. He had obtained a medical certificate but the medical certificate was not filed because of the advice given by the learned counsel, and as such the view taken by the Courts below on the ground whether sufficient cause had been made out or not, is wholly arbitrary and is liable to be set aside. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation IIIrd Edition, page 273 by G. P. Singh, relying on the various decisions of the Supreme Court, the following principle has been culled out to determine whether a particular statute is mandatory or directory The principle culled out is as follows :- " The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other ". The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other ". Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act is as follows :- Sec. 17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure- (1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits, Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex-parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give, such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to subsection (1), the security may be realised in manner provided by section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". Section 17 quoted above provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by the Provincial Small Cause Court Act be the procedure followed in all the suits cognizable by the Judge Small Causes Court as well as all proceedings arising out of the said suits. It would, therefore, be clear that section 17 is a provision laying down the procedure to be followed in a suit which is filed before the Judge Small Causes Court and all proceedings arising thereon. It lays down the rule of procedure. Rules of procedure are intended to advance justice and not to defeat it. 5. The intention of the proviso to Sec. 17 is that when an ex-parte decree is sought to be set aside, the judgment-debtor has to deposit either, in cash, the amount due under the decree or give due security for the performance of the decree. Rules of procedure are intended to advance justice and not to defeat it. 5. The intention of the proviso to Sec. 17 is that when an ex-parte decree is sought to be set aside, the judgment-debtor has to deposit either, in cash, the amount due under the decree or give due security for the performance of the decree. The intention of the proviso is to secure the decree-holder. This provision has been enacted in order that the judgment-debtors, may not, by delaying the proceedings and getting them decided ex-parte, ultimately, adversely affect the decree-holder because of the said delay. The further intent of this proviso is that before an application for setting aside an ex-parte decree is considered either the applicant deposits, in cash, or furnishes security. It is not the intention that even if the judgment-debtor deposits in cash and security then too, his application for setting aside the decree be not considered. In the circumstance, the use of the word 'previous' application in the proviso is not mandatory but only directory. What the court has to see at the time of examining the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, is to ensure that either the decretal amount has been deposited in cash or security has already been furnished. The making of the application for furnishing security before the making of the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree is not a mandatory requirement. 6. This question can be examined in another way. In the instant case, if for instance, the petitioner had withdrawn his application for setting aside the exparte decree which was moved on 10th December, 1982 and filed it again within limitation after 20th December, 1982, when he moved the application for permission to give security and it was within limitation, no objection could have been raised on behalf of the decree-holder as technically the proviso would have been complied with. If the restoration application as well as the application for permission to give security are both moved within limitation, the applicant would be entitled for consideration of his application for restoration. The intention of the legislature was not to dismiss an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree only because an application for permission to furnish security instead of depositing cash is not made prior to the filing of the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The intention of the legislature was not to dismiss an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree only because an application for permission to furnish security instead of depositing cash is not made prior to the filing of the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. In view of the above, I am clearly of the opinion that the proviso to section 17 being only a rule of procedure, the provision for making a previous application for permission to furnish security is only directory and not mandatory. The Court has only to see as to whether the security has been furnished before it considers the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. In the instant case security had been furnished and the said security had been accepted by the court on 4th January, 1983, and as such the court should not have dismissed the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree on the mere ground that the application for furnishing security was not made prior to the filing of the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 7. This question was considered in Bipti v. Kali Din, AIR 1951 Alld. 420, by a Division Bench of this Court and it was held by the Bench as follows : "Where the direction of the Court as to the security to be furnished is taken and the security is furnished within the period of limitation and the application for the setting aside of an ex-parte decree is also made within time, the application for the setting aside of an ex-parte decree, though made before the direction of the Court is obtained or the security is actually furnished, can be treated as having been made when the security bond is filed or the cash is deposited; and in such cases the provisions of section 17 shall be deemed to have been substantially complied with." 8. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that once the permission is granted to the petitioner to furnish security and the security was accepted by the Court by its order dated 4th January, 1983, there was sufficient compliance of the conditions required under section 18 of the Act and consequently the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was clearly maintainable. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. In regard to the second submission, made by the learned counsel in paragraph 12 of the petition, it has been categorically stated by the petitioner that he had obtained a medical certificate regarding his illness since 6-12-1982 on 7-12-1982 and had given the same to his learned counsel, but, the learned counsel did not file the same on the ground that the decree may be restored on the basis of affidavit itself. This averment has not been denied in the counter affidavit. The factual position, therefore, is that the medical certificate was there in existence. I have examined the record. I do not find any malafides on the part of the petitioner or any attempt to delay the suit. In the circumstances, the finding given by the courts below that sufficient cause has not been made out, is not sustainable. Ends of justice require that the petitioner be given a hearing before the suit is decreed against him. The second contention, made by the learned counsel, also, in my opinion is well founded. 9. In the result, ex parte decree dated 7-12-82 is hereby set aside. The orders dated 8th May, 1984 and 26th April, 1985, are quashed. The application for setting aside the ex parte decree is allowed. The case is remanded to the Court of the Judge Small Causes Court, Moradabad with a direction that since the suit was filed in the year 1981, it should be disposed off within four months from the date, a certified copy of this order is produced before the said Court. The petitioner-defendant shall not take any adjournment for the purpose of delaying the suit. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.