Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O.S. No. 336 of 1976 on the file of the Court of the Munsiff, Neyyattinkara is the appellant in the Second Appeal. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for redemption. The trial court passed a preliminary decree, but it was not in the form, in which it has to be passed under Order XXXIV R.7, C. P. C. The matter was taken up in appeal to the First Additional District Court, Trivandrum and the appellate court modified the preliminary decree and made it in conformity with Order XXXIV R.7. The appellate court fixed the period of 3 months from the date of the decree for deposit of the mortgage amount. The decree was passed on 9-8-1981. Even before the passing of the preliminary decree, a portion of the mortgage amount had been deposited. The balance was not deposited within. the period. However, the plaintiff filed an application I. A. No. 3016 of 1981, praying to condone the delay in depositing the balance amount and to extend the time originally fixed. It is not disputed that the balance amount was deposited on 5-1-1982. There was also an application for passing a final decree. The learned Munsiff condoned the delay and passed a final decree. The defendant challenged the final judgment. The lower appellate court observed that since modified decree was passed by the appellate court, the application for condonation of delay and extension of time should have been presented to that court, but that will not preclude the court of first instance from passing the final decree 3. In this Second Appeal, Sri. P. Sukumaran Nayar, learned counsel for the appellant challenged the finding of the lower appellate court. According to the learned counsel, the lower appellate court after holding that it is the appellate court which passed the modified preliminary decree and it was in that court the application for extension of time had to be filed, seriously erred in holding that that fact does not preclude the appellate court from passing the final decree. 4. Sri. Balagovindan, learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that the application for extension of time could be entertained only by the appellate court is clearly wrong. 4. Sri. Balagovindan, learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that the application for extension of time could be entertained only by the appellate court is clearly wrong. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent placed before me the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Dharmaraja Iyer & another v. K.G. Sreenivasa Mudaliar & others (AIR 1916 Mad. 694) where the court held that it is court of first instance to which a suit is remitted after the preliminary decree has been passed by an Appellate Court, which has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with an application for extension of time presented under Order XXXIV R.8, Proviso. The court also relied on the decisions in Venkata Krishna Aiyar v. Thiagaraya Chetti (ILR 23 Mad. 521), Sheonarain v. Chunni Lal (ILR 23 All. 88), Ram Dhani Sahu v. Lalit Singh (ILR 31 All. 328), and Shama Dhone Dutt v. Lakhimoni Debi (6 I.C. 323). A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had also occasion to consider this aspect in Beni Prasad and another v. Harnam Dasand & others (AIR 1917 All. 239 (1)). The Division Bench followed the decision in Ram Dhani-Sahu v. Lalil Singh (ILR 31 All. 328) and observed that even though it is true that the case was decided before the present Code came into operation, there has been no change in law. The court said: "Under the provisions of the Code in a suit for redemption of a mortgage there is to be first a preliminary decree, and then a final decree. It is the final decree which has to be made and carried into execution by the Court of first instance. This final decree is made under 0.34, R.8, and, the power to extend the time rests with that Court under that rule." Reference also can be made to Mulla's Commentaries (13th Edition) on Order XXXIV R.7 C. P. C. Dealing with the question of the power to extend time for redemption, the learned commentator has stated at page 1468 that the application for extension of time should be made to the Court of the first instance even if the decree for redemption was passed by the appellate court. Chitaley's Commentaries on Code of Civil Procedure also proceed on the basis that it is the Court of first instance and not the appellate court which has jurisdiction to extend the time. (Volume 4, Page 848, 10th Edition). 5. Sri. Sukumaran Nayar, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that those decisions are based on Proviso to R.8, as then stood, and therefore those decisions have no application to a case governed by sub-rule (2) of R.7 of Order XXXIV, C.P.C. as it stood now. But it has to be noticed that the final decree has to be passed by the Court of first instance and the view taken in those decisions that it is the Court of first instance which has got jurisdiction to extend the time is fully justified by the scheme of the provisions contained in Order XXXIV, C.P.C. 6. In the circumstances, the conclusion arrived at by the courts below that the Court of first instance has jurisdiction to extend time and pass a final decree appears to be correct. The Second Appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.