JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The property in dispute is a garrage and a kothari behind the same situate in a portion of house No. 3/232, Krishna Kunj Khwaja Qutub East (Beharipur) Bareilly. The petitioner is the tenant. Respondent No. 2 is the landlord. He is a practising Doctor. He filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for release of the garrage and the kothari on the ground that he requires it for keeping his car which has to be used to attend the patients whenever he is called out. His further case was that the property in dispute was let out to the petitioner, who used to keep straw in the garrage and his servant used to live in the kothari. His further case was that the petitioner was doing dairy business in the nearby open land of Sri Madan Mohan and the petitioner used to keep his tonga and horse in connection with the same. 2. The petition was contested by the petitioner on the ground that he is the tenant of the garrage and the kothari since 1957 when it was allotted to him and since then he is doing the work of sweet-meat shop in this garrage. It was further alleged that respondent-landlord does not own a motor car and he in fact, owns a scooter and, consequently, the need of the landlord-respondent was not bonafide and genuine. 3. The Prescribed Authority by its judgment dated 20.10.1981 came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was not bonafide and genuine and, consequently, the application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was dismissed. Against the said judgment, an appeal was filed by the landlord under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal came up for hearing before the Vth Additional District Judge, Bareilly, who by judgment dated 12th December, 1984 allowed the appeal and released the accommodation in favour of respondent No. 2. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12th December, 1984 by means of the present petition in this Court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12th December, 1984 by means of the present petition in this Court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended, firstly, that the finding in regard to the bonafide need is based on irrelevant consideration and on mere conjectures and as such, the finding is vitiated in law. His second submission is that the petitioner was entitled to compensation under the Second Proviso to Section 21 of the Act and since there was no order to that effect, the order of release cannot be sustained. The third argument which has been set up is in regard to the applicability of Rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act. 5. In regard to the first contention raised by learned counsel, I have gone through the judgment of the Appellate Authority. I do not find that it is based on surmises or conjectures. The Appellate Authority has found that he is paying income-tax and he is otherwise also a flourishing Doctor. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are based on pure conjectures or surmises. The need to keep a car by a leading Doctor cannot be said to be irrelevant. Every Doctor who has got sufficient practice can require a car to visit patients outside. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding, in any manner, is perverse or based on assumption or conjectures. The argument of learned counsel is that the Prescribed Authority had given the finding against the respondent-landlord on the ground that he has not produced the register of patients and in the absence of the same, the Appellate Authority could not have reversed the finding given by the Prescribed Authority. In my opinion, the mere fact that the register of patients was not produced was not a reason to discard the case of the respondent-landlord. The respondent-landlord has produced affidavits of various persons, patients or otherwise, to establish that he requires the car. In the circumstances, there was evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the need of the respondent-landlord was bonafide and genuine. The first submission, therefore, made by learned counsel, in my opinion, is not well-founded. 6. The respondent-landlord has produced affidavits of various persons, patients or otherwise, to establish that he requires the car. In the circumstances, there was evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the need of the respondent-landlord was bonafide and genuine. The first submission, therefore, made by learned counsel, in my opinion, is not well-founded. 6. In regard to the second submission, the Second Proviso to Section 21 of the Act applies only to a case where any building is let out to anybody for non-residential purpose. In the application of release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, it was categorically stated that the garrage was let out along with the kothari to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 5 per mensem. This fact has not been denied. No case has been set up in the written statement that the building has been let out exclusively for non-residential purposes. The Second Proviso would only apply to a specific case where the building is let out exclusively for non-residential purposes and not otherwise. This plea is dependent upon facts. This question having not been raised before the Courts below, cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the mere fact that compensation has not been granted, vitiates the order of release. The second submission, therefore, in my opinion, does not have substance. 7. In regard to the third submission made by learned counsel, this submission has been raised for the first time in this Court. It was not urged either in the pleadings before the Prescribed Authority or before the Appellate Authority. The question of applicability of Rule 16(1)(d) only arises where the Court considers the requirements of the personal occupation for the purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family. Here the requirement of the landlord is for garrage for keeping the car and the kothari behind it for the purpose connected with it. The actual need set up was not such which would come under the purview of Rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act. In the circumstances, this question does not arise in the present case. 8. In the result, I do not find any force in this petition. 9. The actual need set up was not such which would come under the purview of Rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act. In the circumstances, this question does not arise in the present case. 8. In the result, I do not find any force in this petition. 9. It has been stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that during the pendency of the petition in this Court, possession has already been delivered to the petitioner. In the circumstances, the petition is dismissed and it is directed that the parties shall bear their own costs.