Chhogalal v. Bhanwarlal — 1988 DIGILAW 638 (RAJ)

N.C. SHARMA, J.—This second appeal has been filed by Chhogalal defendant-tenant against the decree of the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand dated May 30, 1983 reversing the decree of Munsiff Nathdwara dated November 22, 1976 of dismissal of plaintiff-landlords suit for ejectment of the tenant from a shop with a Medi over it and decreeing the suit of Bhanwarlal plaintiff-landlord for ejectment of the defendant-appellant from the said premises. 2. It is an admitted fact that the defendant had taken on rent a shop along with a Medi over it situated near Mathura Darwaja in the town of Nathdwara from the respondent on April 11, 1966 at a monthly rent of Rs. -21/-. It is also an admitted fact that the plaintiff carries on business in Kirana in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara in a rented shop. The shop in which the plaintiff carries on business belongs to Temple Board Nathdwara and it is on rent with the plaintiff-respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 23/-. According to the averments in the plaint; the plaintiff-respondent is a licensed food-grain dealer. According to him, when he receives food grain from out side through Railway or through trucks, he does not have sufficient accommodation (godown or shop) to store such food grains. His rented shop in Sarafa Bazar, Nathdwara is insufficient for the purpose. He cannot keep the food grains received by him in the shop in Sarafa Bazar and also carry on his food grains business in that shop. On account of the scarcity of the accommodation he has to keep the food-grains on the public road after taking licence from the Municipality and has also taken on rent a Kotha for storing food grain on rent from. Rameshchandra Parakh. He, therefore, needed the suit premises which are on rent with the defendant-appellant for storing food grains and Kirana articles and for carrying on his trade in it. Apart from that the demised premises are said to be in dilapidated condition and he needs these premises to make improvement in the premises. On these grounds, the respondent sued the appellant for his ejectment from the demised premises. 3. The suit was contested by the appellant. He pleaded that the plaintiff was carrying on his Kirana business in Sarafa Bazar for more than 20 years. He is a retail licensee under Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order. On these grounds, the respondent sued the appellant for his ejectment from the demised premises. 3. The suit was contested by the appellant. He pleaded that the plaintiff was carrying on his Kirana business in Sarafa Bazar for more than 20 years. He is a retail licensee under Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order. Looking to the terms and conditions of a retail licence, it is not possible that the plaintiff might receive a huge quantity of goods at a time through Railway or trucks. The plaintiff has sufficient accommodation for storing the quantity of goods which he receives as a retail licensee. The plaintiff was a retail licensee when the suit premises were let out by him to the appellant on April 11, 1966 and continued to be so on the date he filed the present suit on July 23, 1970. It was also alleged that after the plaintiff had let out the suit premises to the appellant, he further let out his another shop which is also situated near Mathura Darwaja on the opposite side of the demised premises to one Gegraj some time in the year 1968. This indicates that the plaintiff had no requirement of additional accomodation for the purpose of carrying on his trade 2 years before the suit. Thereafter no further development or circumstances have arisen making it necessary for the plaintiff to have additional accommodation. The plaintiff has notified before the competent authority some Kotha of his residential house as place of storing his goods. This also goes to show that the plaintiff did not have reasonable and bona fide need for the suit premiss. It was denied that the plaintiff obtained licence from the Municipality to keep his goods on the public road and in any event in order to attract customers, the dealers during day hours usually place food grains on the road. It was denied that the plaintiff had taken any Kotha on rent from Rameshchandra Parakh and in any evrnt, if any such Kotha had been taken on rent recently, it was nothing but -a device to create an evidence in support of his case. It was denied that the two premises required any improvement. 4. The suit was originally decided by Munsif Nathdwara on April 11, 1975. It was denied that the two premises required any improvement. 4. The suit was originally decided by Munsif Nathdwara on April 11, 1975. The Munsif came to the conclusion that the rented shop in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara is not sufficient for the plaintiff to store the goods received by him in connection with his trade and, therefore, he reasonably and bona fide required the demised premises for his trade purpose. The Munsif also came to the conclusion that the suit premises required improvement to be made as his Chabutri had broken down and stones are also coming out in its northern wall. On the basis of these findings, the suit of the plaintiff, for ejectment of the appellant from the demised premises was decreed. Aggrieved by this decree the tenant Chhogalal filed Civil First Appeal No. 146 of 1975 which was decided by the Additional District Judge, Udaipur on May 8, 1976. During the pendency of this first appeal, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short, hereinafter the Act) had been amended by the: Amending Act No. 14 of 1976 on February 13, 1976 and in view of the amendments made, the decree on the ground of reasonable and bona fide need could be passed only after examining the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. Due to this amendment in the Act, the Additional District Judge, Udaipur allowed the appeal of the tenant, set aside the decree of Munsif Nathdwara dated April, 1975 and remanded the case to the Munsif for framing an appropriate issue in the light of the amendment and to give both the parties an opportunity to lead their evidence if they so desired on newly framed issue. The evidence already recorded during the trial was to be treated as evidence during the trial after remand. It was directed that the trial court shall then decide the case afresh. 5. After remand of the case the trial court framed an Additional issue No. 1 A regarding comparative hardship on July 29, 1976 and after recording additional evidence in respect of this issue, decided the case afresh on all issues on November 22, 1976. This time, Munsif Nathdwara decided the issue regarding personal and bona fide necessity against the plaintiff. 5. After remand of the case the trial court framed an Additional issue No. 1 A regarding comparative hardship on July 29, 1976 and after recording additional evidence in respect of this issue, decided the case afresh on all issues on November 22, 1976. This time, Munsif Nathdwara decided the issue regarding personal and bona fide necessity against the plaintiff. With regard to the need of the shop for making repairs or improvement, it was held that it was not a ground for ejectment in the Act. Consequently, Munsif Nathdwara dismissed the suit of the plaintiff regarding ejectment of the defendant, from the dismissed premises. 6. The plaintiff-land-lord then filed Civil First Appeal No. 76 of 1978 (Old) 69 of 1981 (new) in the court of District Judge, Udaipur. This first appeal was decided by the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand on May 30, 1983. The Additional District Judge reversed the findings of the Munsif Nathdwara on issue No. 1 and he held that the plaintiff reasonably and bona fide required the demised premises for his business purpose. He also held that hardship to the plaintiff-landlord will comparatively be more than the tenant. On the basis of his above findings, the Additional District Judge accepted the appeal of the landlord and decreed the suit for ejectment of the defendant tenant from the demised premises. The defendant-tenant has come in second appeal to this Court. 7. It is necessary to briefly narrate the reasonings given by the courts below in arriving at different findings on issue No. 1 relating to reasonable and bona fide need of the demised premises. So far as Munsif Nathdwara is concerned, he held that the plaintiff land-lord received 2 or 3 trucks of food grain in a month. Each truck brought 90 or 100 bags in it. He stated that even according to the plaintiff, the goods received through trucks can be kept in the shop in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara. It was not the case that these 2 or 3 trucks arrived simultaneously. Munsiff referred to his own site inspection and found that 80 or 90 bags of grain were stored in the shop in Sarafa Bazar. There was also a Bukhari measuring 83x 76" in which some more bags were lying and there was place for sitting and trading. It was not the case that these 2 or 3 trucks arrived simultaneously. Munsiff referred to his own site inspection and found that 80 or 90 bags of grain were stored in the shop in Sarafa Bazar. There was also a Bukhari measuring 83x 76" in which some more bags were lying and there was place for sitting and trading. According to him, the shop at Sarafa Bazar could accommodate the goods received in one truck or 1-1/2 times number of bags than the bags brought in the single truck. The grain bags received were also sold and the sale was of 10 to 12 bags per day. The grain bags are received in an instalment of 60 to 80 bags with interval of 10 to 15 days. The plaintiff was a retail licensee in food grain and not a wholesale licensee and as such he did not need more accommodation for storing the food grain bags. The Munsif also observed that when earlier Civil First Appeal No. 146 of 1975 at the instance of the tenant was pending before the Additional District Judge Udaipur, another shop belonging to the plaintiff and which is also situated near Mathura Darwaja opposite to the suit shop and which had been let out by the plaintiff to Gegraj fell vacant. The plaintiff instead of utilising that shop belonging to him for his aforesaid trade purpose, re-let the shop to another tenant. If indeed, it was held, the plaintiff needed additional accommodation for his trade purpose he would not have re-let his another shop which had fallen vacant during the pendency of the aforesaid first appeal. According to the plaintiff, he needed additional accommodation for storing his food grain and he did not want to shift his grain trading shop from Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara. It was also observed that the plaintiff was retail licensee and he has not established that his trade had flourished any more. Compare to the plaintiffs trade, the defendant tenant was a wholesale grain dealer and the trade of the defendant in food-grain is more flourishing than that of plaintiff. On the basis of these reasonings, the Munsif decided issue No. 1 against the plaintiff. 8. Compare to the plaintiffs trade, the defendant tenant was a wholesale grain dealer and the trade of the defendant in food-grain is more flourishing than that of plaintiff. On the basis of these reasonings, the Munsif decided issue No. 1 against the plaintiff. 8. So far as the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand is concerned, he observed, that in earlier Civil First Appeal No. 145 of 1975 decided on May 8, 1976, the case was remanded to the trial court only with the direction to frame Additional issue regarding comparative hardship and, therefore, the Munsif Rajsamand committed an error in re-deciding issue No. 1 and in changing the earlier findings given by the Munsif Rajsamand when the suit was originally decided on April 11, 1975. In this respect the Additional District Judge referred to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti-ven-Kateshwarlu vs. The Motor and General Traders.(1) and that of this Court reported in Bhikamchand vs. Tarachand(2). The Additional District Judge also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-landlord carried on his business in a rented shop and kept his goods in rented Kotha and if he wanted to occupy his own shop let out to the tenant, his requirement was reasonable and bona fide. As regards the reletting by the plaintiff of another shop which had been vacated by Gegraj, the Additional District Judge held that it depended on the wish of the plaintiff as to which shop was suitable or sufficient for his trade-purposes. When the accommodation in the shop in Sarafa Bazar, Nathdwara on the rent with the plaintiff was not sufficient to store the food grains received, the requirement of the plaintiff for the demised premises was reasonable and bona fide. Apart from that the shop which had been vacated by Gegraj was smaller in size than the suit shop. The Additional District Judge was of the view that the first judgment given in the suit by the Munsif on April 11, 1975 was more weighty and reasoned than the differing judgment given by Munsif Nathdwara on November 22, 1976 after the remand of the case. According to the Additional District Judge, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff land-lord was more weighty than that of the defendant. According to the Additional District Judge, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff land-lord was more weighty than that of the defendant. The plaintiff had even taken godown on rent from other person and when the tenant carries on wholesale business in food grain, the plaintiff will suffer more hardship compared with the defendant in case he does not get the suit premises in the carrying of his trade. On the basis of these reasonings the Additional District Judge reversed the findings of the Munsif Nathdwara on issues Nos. 1 and 1A and decreed the suit of the land-lord for ejectment of the defendant appellant from the suit premises. 9. Mr. Rajendra Mehta appearing for the defendant-tenant urged that the plaintiff was a retail licensee. He received about 2 or 3 truck loads goods in a month. The shop run by him in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara can store about 110 bags. He kept on Municipal land out side his shop in Sarafa Bazar only with a view to attract customers and not because of paucity of space in the shop. The plaintiff did not want to shift his shop from Sarafa Bazar in order to carry on his business. He only alleged that he needed the suit premises for using as godown for storing his goods. It was also urged that admittedly the plaintiffs another shop which was in the tenancy of Gegraj had fallen vacant during the pendency of earlier First Appeal No. 146 of 1975 and the plaintiff instead of occupying that shop for storing his goods, re-let that shop on a higher rent. It was urged that in such circumstances the alleged requirement of the plaintiff cannot be said to be reasonable and bona fide. It was also argued that while deciding the earlier Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1975, the Additional District Judge, Udaipur in his remand order not only directed the trial court to frame an appropriate issue on the point of comparative hardship but had also directed the trial court to decide the case afresh after recording evidence on the additional issue. Despite such a direction, the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand was wrong in holding that the Munsif Nathdwara had committed error in giving a different finding on issue No. 1 from that given when the suit was originally decided by the Munsif on April 11, 1975. Despite such a direction, the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand was wrong in holding that the Munsif Nathdwara had committed error in giving a different finding on issue No. 1 from that given when the suit was originally decided by the Munsif on April 11, 1975. It was contended that the Additional District Judge was wrong in allowing the appeal simply on the ground that the earlier judgment given by the Munsif on April 11, 1975 was more wighty and reasoned than the latter judgment of the Munsif dated November 22, 1976 without himself examining the evidence. Lastly, it was urged that the courts below have not examined the question whether no hardship would be caused to either party by passing a decree of partial ejectment only as provided, for in proviso to section 14 (2) of the Act. 10. Mr. B. R. Arora appearing for the plaintiff-landlord urged in reply that it is well established in the case that the plaintiff received 3 trucks load of goods every month; in connection with his trade. The trucks cannot reach the shop in occupation of the plaintiff in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara. They are parked near Nila Kund and the plaintiff has to incur 30 or 35 P. per bag in order to shift the bags of grain from the truck to his house or to the Kotha which he had taken on rent from Rameshchandra Parekh. This costs an additional burden on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff gets the suit shop, he will not have to bear this extra cost. It was argued that the shop in Sarafa Bazar cannot accommodate more than 100 bags and therefore, the plaintiff is in need of a storage godown. His requirement for the suit premises is reasonable and bona fide. With regard to the another shop of the plaintiff vacated by Gegraj, it was urged that shop was. a smaller seized shop than the suit premises. The shop vacated by Gegraj measured 12x8 6" while the suit premises measured 2111 x 197", and the suit shop suits the need of the plaintiff. It was urged that a tenant cannot dictate to a landlord as to which shop he should select for his use out of the two alternative accommodations. These were rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court. 11. It was urged that a tenant cannot dictate to a landlord as to which shop he should select for his use out of the two alternative accommodations. These were rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court. 11. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff carries on Kirana business in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara in a rented shop which he has taken on rent from Temple Board, Nathwara. It is neither the case of the plaintiff nor his evidence that he wants to shift his main business from Sarafa Bazar to the suit premises. Obviously, that cannot be his case because the appropriate place for carrying on his business in Sarafa Bazar. The plaintiffs case really is that he received his goods by railway or trucks and he does not have sufficient accommodation in the form of a shop or godown to keep or store the goods which he received in connection with his trade. The plaintiffs case further is that on account of paucity of accommodation he has during the day to keep some of his goods on the public road after obtaining licence from the Municipality and he has also taken a Kotha on rent from Rameshchandra Parekh-The defendants case, on the other hand, is that the plaintiff land-lord is only a retail licensee under Food Grain Dealer Licensing Order and his trade is limited as retail licensee. The defendants case further is that after the suit shop premises had been let out by the plaintiff to him, the latter had let out his another shop to Gegraj only 2 years before the filing of the suit. The defendant had further pleaded that in his licence, the plaintiff has specified Kothas of his residential house as places for storing the goods. Regarding taking of Kotha on rent from Ramesh Chandra Prakash the defendant had denied this fact and has in the alternative pleaded that it was an act done as a device for this suit. The defendant had further pleaded that in his licence, the plaintiff has specified Kothas of his residential house as places for storing the goods. Regarding taking of Kotha on rent from Ramesh Chandra Prakash the defendant had denied this fact and has in the alternative pleaded that it was an act done as a device for this suit. The defendants further case is that during the pendency of the earlier appeal before the Additional District Judge, Udaipur the shop which was let out by the plaintiff to Gegraj had been vacated by Gegraj and the plaintiff instead of using that shop for storing his goods, re-let it to another person on a higher rent and this fact goes to show that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff is not bona fide. 12. I may first observe that the Additional District Judge, Rajsamand was not justified in observing that Munsif, Nathdwara could not have differed from the findings given by the earlier Munsif on issue No. 1 when the suit was originally decided on April 11, 1975. The Additional District Judge referred to two decisions in this connection. The decision reported in Pasupuleti-ven-katesh-warlus case (supra) laid down that remitting the whole case by appellate court where a finding on a specific point was required was illegal. It may be mentioned that in this Supreme Court decision, the landlord filed a revision to the High Court on the ground that a wholesale remittal as against calling for a finding on a specific point was illegal. In the present case, none of the parties filed any revision against the remand order of the whole case passed by the Additional District Judge, Udaipur on May 7, 1986 in Civil First Appeal No. 146 of 1975. The remand order of the District Judge, Udaipur, therefore, remained intact as it was and in the remand order the Additional District Judge had directed that after taking additional evidence on the additional issues to be framed, the trial court was to decide the case afresh. Thus the whole case was remitted to the trial court by the Additional District Judge and that order of the Additional District Judge was not challenged. 13. In the Rajasthan decision reported in Bhikamchand Vs. Tarachand (supra) also the order of the appellate court of remitting the entire case for decision on merits was challenged before the High Court. Thus the whole case was remitted to the trial court by the Additional District Judge and that order of the Additional District Judge was not challenged. 13. In the Rajasthan decision reported in Bhikamchand Vs. Tarachand (supra) also the order of the appellate court of remitting the entire case for decision on merits was challenged before the High Court. As already stated, in the instant case no such challenge was made and, therefore, Munsif, Nathdwara had to decide all the issues afresh after recording additional evidence, on issue No. 1 A framed after the remand. It appears that the Additional District Judge Rajsamand decided Civil First Appeal No. 69 of 1981 influenced by the fact that Munsif Nathdwara in his latter judgment dated November 22, 1976 had differed from the finding on issue No. 1 given by the earlier Munsif on November 11, 1975. 14. It may be observed that while dealing with issue No. 1, the Additional District, Judge reproduced the reasons given by the Munsif, Nathdwara in his earlier judgment dated April 11, 1975 and in the subsequent judgment given by the Munsif on November 22, 1976 and came to the conclusion that the reasoning given in the earlier judgment was more weighty and reasoned than given in the latter judgment. It is clear from the statement of Bhanwarlal plaintiff in cross-examination that he holds a retail licence and not a whole sale licence in dealing in food grains. He has, however, stated that the retail licensee can carry on retail trade in goods up to 2, 399 quintals. Bhanwarlal plaintiff has also said that he received 2 to 3 trucks load goods every month in connection with his trade. Each truck brings 90 or 100 bags. He further stated that 100 bags of goods can be accommodated in the shop occupied by him in Sarafa Bazar Nathdwara. He has also admitted that in food grain licence, he has notified godowns located in his own residential house. Bhanwarlal(l) has also stated in his cross-examination that he rented out his another shop to Gegraj 2 or 2-1/2 years back. This statement of Bhanwarlal himself gives, a set back to his case regarding his requirement and also his bona fides. He has also admitted that in food grain licence, he has notified godowns located in his own residential house. Bhanwarlal(l) has also stated in his cross-examination that he rented out his another shop to Gegraj 2 or 2-1/2 years back. This statement of Bhanwarlal himself gives, a set back to his case regarding his requirement and also his bona fides. If he was in need of additional accommodation for storing food grain since last 2 or 2-1/2 years he would not have let out his another shop, which is on opposite side of the suit shop, to Gegraj. At that time, the plaintiff had not even instituted the present suit. The additional accommodation for storage of food grain was available with the plaintiff but instead of utilising it for storing good grain, he let it out to Gegraj. The matter did not end here. When defendants First Appeal No. 146 to 1975 was pending before the Additional District Judge, Udaipur, admittedly the plaintiff got the shop occupied by Gegraj vacated and instead of using that shop relet it to another tenant. This conduct of the plaintiff again goes to indicate that he was more interested in letting and reletting his another shop which is its opposite to suit shop rather than using the same for his alleged necessity of additional accommodation for storage of grain. The only explanation given by the plaintiff is that the shop which had been vacated by Gegraj was smaller in size that the suit shop. As has already been stated the plaintiff is a retailer and not a wholesale dealer. He admits that 100 bags of food grain very well can be stored in the shop with him in Sarafa Bazar. It cannot be expected that all 2 or 3 trucks in a month came on the same day for being unloaded by the plaintiff Ramesh Chandra PW. 2, who has been examined by the plaintiff, has stated that 60 or 70 bags and even more than that can be placed in the Kotha which the plaintiff alleges to have taken on rent from him. According to the plaintiff, he only pays Rs. 4/- per month for this Kotha. The Kotha of Rameshchandra is on a very cheaper rate with the plaintiff than the rent of the suit premises. According to the plaintiff, he only pays Rs. 4/- per month for this Kotha. The Kotha of Rameshchandra is on a very cheaper rate with the plaintiff than the rent of the suit premises. Shankerlal P.W. 3 also states that after one truck comes to the plaintiffs house, another truck comes after 10 or 15 days. The plaintiff was cross-examined elaborately regarding his annual sales and profits but instead of giving clear cut answer his only reply to every question was that he does not remember. The plaintiff did not produce copy of his trading khata in order to show as to how much flourishing his business was. He was also unable to tell as to how much goods he had purchased during the year in which his statement was recorded and how much he sold. As a matter of fact; there is no rent note in favour of Ramesh Chandra for the alleged Kotha tated to have been taken on rent by the plaintiff for storing grain. It is also important to note that Ramesh Chandra had stated that the plaintiff took the Kotha from him about 1-1/2 or 2 years back only. The above facts go to show that on the one hand the plaintiff was letting out his own another shop to Gegraj and on the other hand, at or about the same time, he was taking on rent a Kotha from Ramesh Chandra for storing grain. Only two possible and reasonable inferences can be drawn from this conduct of the plaintiff. These inferences are that either the plaintiff did not take on rent any Kotha from Ramesh Chandra or that if he in fact took a Kotha on rent from Ramesh Chandra, he was more interested in taking on rent a cheaper Kotha than occupying his own vacant shop and further that he wanted to earn rent from his own another shop by letting it out and by re-letting when it fell vacant. No receipt from Municipality has been produced to show that the plaintiff paid any licence fee for storing his grain on public road. Even if the plaintiff stores some food grain during day time on the road just in front of his shop, that is obviously for exhibiting his goods for attracting the customers. 15. No receipt from Municipality has been produced to show that the plaintiff paid any licence fee for storing his grain on public road. Even if the plaintiff stores some food grain during day time on the road just in front of his shop, that is obviously for exhibiting his goods for attracting the customers. 15. It is well established in the case that the defendant tenant carries on business in food grain as wholesale dealer and the sales and purchase of the defendant are far greater than that of the plaintiff. The defendant would suffer more hardship comparatively if the decree for ejectment is passed against him rather than the plaintiff for the reason that the plaintiffs own conduct goes to show that he did not require any further accommodation for storing grain and that his intention to eject the defendant is for mala fide and oblique motive of earning higher rent after getting the suit shop vacated from the defendant. The Munsif Nathdwara had taken all these facts into consideration and has appraised the evidence correctly while the Additional District Judge was simply influenced by the fact that the Munsif Nathdwara committed illegality in differing from the findings of the earlier Munsif. He forgot that entire case was remanded by the first appellate court to the Munsif and after remand the Munsif was to give his own finding on every issue. Additional evidence was also adduced on issue No. 1A and the further circumstances had come in evidence after remand that during the pendency of the earlier appeal the shop let out to Gegraj by the plaintiff had fallen vacant and was re-let by the plaintiff to another tenant. In such circumstances, the Additional District Judge was not right in simply deciding the case on the basis that the reasonings given by the Munsif Nathdwara in his earlier judgment dated April 11, 1975 were more weighty than the latter judgment of Munsif dated November 22, 1976. 16. I may also deal with certain decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. Mr. B.R. Arora referred to the decision in Chandra Lekha vs. P.K. Susheela Rani(3). The facts were quite distinguishable in Chandra Lekhas case. The land-lady was a widow who was residing in George Town (Madras) along with her daughter and a son aged 15 years who was school going. Mr. B.R. Arora referred to the decision in Chandra Lekha vs. P.K. Susheela Rani(3). The facts were quite distinguishable in Chandra Lekhas case. The land-lady was a widow who was residing in George Town (Madras) along with her daughter and a son aged 15 years who was school going. On account of insanitary condition prevailing in the locality and for the reason that the locality had become very conjested, the land-lady sought the upstairs portion of premises No. 3 Krishna Iyer Street Madras in the occupation of the petitioner mostly on health grounds. The land-lady, for reasons of health and in the interest of her children intended to shift to a calmer locality. In such circumstances, it was held that it would be too harsh to prescribe mandates to a landlady in the matter of choosing a particular portion in his own building. It was stated that so long as the purpose is not designed or motivated or prompted by an oblique purpose it is unwise to fetter the choice of landlord. In the instant case, the premises are neither needed for residential purpose and nor for running the shop. It has already been found that the purpose of the plaintiff is designed and oblique of earning higher rent. 17. The next decision relied upon is Narayanasa Tejosa Bhandage Vs. Mariappa Mayappa Shalvadi (4). In this case the land-lords were carrying on their business in temporary wooden structure belonging to the Municipality as licensee and the Municipality had issued a notice to the landlords to vacate the premises. The landlords were carrying on the business in selling Chappals. They wanted to shift to their own shop. In this background, it was held that the tenant cannot dectate to the landlords that they should not carry on business in the street where there are no Chappal shop. It was also found that in the abja-cent street there were Chappal shops. In the present case, the plaintiff does not want to shift his business from Sarafa Bazar and his land-lord has also not given him in notice to vacate. 18. The decision in Patthan Khem Vs. Sayed Pasha (5) is also distinguishable. It was also found that in the abja-cent street there were Chappal shops. In the present case, the plaintiff does not want to shift his business from Sarafa Bazar and his land-lord has also not given him in notice to vacate. 18. The decision in Patthan Khem Vs. Sayed Pasha (5) is also distinguishable. The landlord in that case was carrying on business in hides and skins in a house situated in a residential locality and the inhabitants in the locality have been raising objections for the said business and, therefore, the land-lord wanted to shift the same to the building in which the suit premises were situated and that building was suitable for business which the landlord was carrying on. In J. L. Paul Vs. Ranjeet Singh (6) the contention of the tenant was that the landlord ought to have filed eviction application against other three occupants from which he was getting higher rents. It was held that it is the primary right of the land-lord to decide which accommodation was suitable for him and choose the tenant he would like to evict. It was a case where the landlord required the premises for residential purposes and obviously the landlord had the right to choose which portion he would occupy. 19. In Seth Lalchand Vs. Seth Radha Vallabh (7) the plaintiff was a business man and in order to carry on his business, had a number of shops in his possession on rent. In these circumstances, it was held that if the plaintiff wanted the suit shop which he had purchased for his personal use, the probable intention was to give us one of the rented shop and his requirement was bona-fide. In the present case, the plaintiff admittedly does not want to give up the rented shop in Sarafa Bazar. 20. In Pammandas Vs. Mst. Lachmibai(8) his Lordship I.N. Modi J. laid down that if the plaintiff had alternative accommodation which he can occupy, it must be left to him to choose which accommodation he wants and it is not for the defendant to dictate him which he shall choose and which he shall not. Suffice it to state that in the present case, the plaintiff does not want to shift his main trading shop to the suit shop. His case is he needs the suit premises for godown. The other decision in Dr. Saroj Kumar Das Vs. Suffice it to state that in the present case, the plaintiff does not want to shift his main trading shop to the suit shop. His case is he needs the suit premises for godown. The other decision in Dr. Saroj Kumar Das Vs. Arjun Prasad Jogani (9) had its own distinguishable facts. The land-lord who was a retired doctor could not be expected to occupy 13th floor in a flat which he had purchased for carrying his private medical practice specially. when he was an old resident of a particular locality and had practised in that locality for a long time. 21. I may refer to the decision in M. M. Quasim Vs. Manoharlal Sharma (10) wherein his Lordship D. A. Desai J. observed: "This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole Judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison detre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlords claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlords greed the throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of life-shelter-and the way in which one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the globe". Judged from the approach to the matter laid down in M. M. Quasims case, I am of the view that the real motive of the plaintiff was not to use the suit premises but to remove the tenant with expectation to re-et the suit premises on a higher rent. The requirement cannot be said to be bona fide and no question of eviction either from the whole suit premises or part of it arises. 22.. I, therefore, allow this second appeal, set aside the decree of the Additional District Judge Rajasamand dated May 30, 1983 and restore the decree passed by the Munsif, Nathdwara in Civil Suit No. 118 of 1970 on November 22, 1976. The appellant will get costs from the plaintiff-respondent throughout.