JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, Member - This is a second under Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act against the judgment and decree of the Additional Commissioner (Admin) Meerut dated March 4, 1986 through which the appeal filed against the judgment and decree of S.D.O. Nakur dated February 15, 1985 was dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts of this case are as follows:- 3. The plaintiff Jai Singh and the defendants Mamraj both are recorded co-tenureholders of of the land in dispute. Plaintiff brought a suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act claiming ?rd share in the land. 4. The defendant contested the suit alleging that both the parties have half share each in the land in dispute. 5. The trial court accepted the defence version and held that share of the plaintiff and the defendant to be each. The same order was upheld appeal, hence this second appeal. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent is absent inspite of notice. Heard the learned counsel of the appellant. Perused the impugned order and the file. 7. It is borne out from the record that originally this land belonged to plaintiff's father Kala and one Smt. Dhumi who was Kala's Brother's wife. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the share of Dhumi was ?rd and she transferred the same ?rd share to one Tara Chand through a registered sale deed dated January 18, 1968. The Tara Chand again executed a sale deed for the same ?rd share in favour of one Kishan on February 19, 1970. However Kishan while transferring his share to the defendant Mamraj disclosed his share as in the land . On account of the sale deed mutation was effected and name of Mamraj was ordered to be recorded along with Jai Singh, but his share can be only ? and not . 8. The plaintiff has filed copies of sale deeds executed by Smt Dhumi in favour of Tara Chand and by Tarachand in favour of Kishan. Both of these documents clearly indicate the share of the transferor to be only ?rd. It was for the first time that Kishan in his sale deed displayed his share to be . How he could do so is beyond comprehension. Both of these documents clearly indicate the share of the transferor to be only ?rd. It was for the first time that Kishan in his sale deed displayed his share to be . How he could do so is beyond comprehension. A transferee is put into the shoes of the transferor and he cannot get more share than what the transferor originally had in the property, when the earlier two transferor namely Smt. Dhumi and Mam Chand had disposed of their share as ?rd. The third transferor Kishan who was a transferee of Tara Chand also could transfer only ?rd share and eve if the allowed half share in the sale deed that was irrelevant and only ?rd could be passed on to his transferee namely Mam Raj the defendant. As a matter of fact it was the duty of the transferee to prove as to what share he could acquire through the sale deed and, therefor burden lay upon Mamraj to prove that his transferor had acquired and not ?rd share and that is why the same share had passed on to the former. Unfortunately Mamraj did not produce any documentary evidence to that effect and did not produce the original sale deed executed in favour of Tara Chand and Kishan which must have been handed over to him by Kishan at the time of the sale deed since all the title deeds are handed over by the transferor to the transferee at the time of the execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff, therefore, could in no circumstance produce the original sale deed executed in favour of Tarahand and Kishan because those documents must be in the possession defendant and the plaintiff could not have any access to them. He could, therefore, merely file copies of the sale deed obtained from registration department and so he could not be saddled with the burden of pronouncing the original document. He could, therefore, merely file copies of the sale deed obtained from registration department and so he could not be saddled with the burden of pronouncing the original document. It is surprising that both the courts below have taken a perverse view of this legal position and instead of calling upon the defendant to produce the original sale deed they required the plaintiff to have produced such document which as stated above should not be done by him when the plaintiff had filed the copies of the sale deeds it was the duty of the defendant to have rebutted such documentary evidence by filing original sale decision which he miserably failed and did not produce any original sale deed executed in favour of the former transferor namely Tarachand and Kishan. The copies of the sale deed so filed were, therefore, perfectly admissible in evidence and both the courts below have committed error in discarding them which were a valuable piece of evidence. 9. Apart from the copies of sale deed the plaintiff has field entries made during consolidation operation in which too the share of Smt. Dhumi has been decided to be ?rd and that of the plaintiff to be ?rd by the consolidation authorities. These entries also prove the plaintiff's share to be ?rd. 10. Both the courts below have laid great errors in the fact that the plaintiff could have field objection during mutation proceeding and should have contested the claim of the defendant at that very moment when he claimed half share. I do not think that this approach of the courts below can at all be said to be same or legal because mutation courts are not required to determine the share of the co-tenureholder. They merely record the name of the transferee on the basis of the sale deeds and the shares of the parties are determined through regular suits. Consequently the plaintiff could not contract the recording of the name of the defendant as a co-tenureholder alongwith him on the basis of the the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant because the defendant was definitely entitled to some share and, therefore, his name had to be recorded alongwith the plaintiff. The contest by the plaintiff at the state would have been futile since the share of the parties, as observed above, was not to by decided by the mutation courts. The contest by the plaintiff at the state would have been futile since the share of the parties, as observed above, was not to by decided by the mutation courts. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot be penalised in these proceedings, if he did not contest the mutation proceeding. The finding of the courts below on this aspect seems to be wholly illegal and cannot be allowed to sustain. 11. It is also surprising that the learned Additional Commissioner has held that no declaration about the rights can be made during the proceedings for partition which view is also wrong, as a matter of fact a suit for partition is a regular suit and the title of the parties has to be determined by the revenue court has to be determined by the revenue court because of otherwise the shares of the parties cannot legally be at all determined. The plaintiff, therefore, in these proceeding could very well assert his claim to be ?rd share and his case had to be adjudicated upon by the revenue court on merits. The finding recorded by the learned Additional Commissioner on this point is, therefore, against law and cannot be maintained. 12. In view of the above discussion I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had successfully proved his case that he had ? share in the land in dispute, hence his claim deserved to have been allowed. The findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs' share is is against law and fact hence it is liable to be set aside. 13. In such circumstances, this appeal is allowed ex-parte and the plaintiff's suit for ?rd share is decreed. Share of the defendant Mamraj is held to be ?rd.