(1) SPECIAL leave granted. (2) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High court of Bombay dated 26/02/1988 setting aside the order of the District Judge Latur and restoring the order of the Trial court granting injunction against the appellant. (3) ABDUL Saheb, respondent was employed as a teacher in the Institution maintained by the appellant society. The appellant society issued a notice dated 31/03/1987 to the respondent terminating his services as Head Master of the Institution. The respondent filed a suit before the Trail court for declaration that the order dated 31/03/1987 terminating his services was illegal and void. He claimed further relief for reinstatement. Along with the plaint the respondent also made an application for the grant of temporary injunction restraining the appellant Society from interfering with his function as the Head Master of the Institution. The Trial court after hearing the parties issued temporary injunction in favour of the respondent restraining the appellant Society as prayed by the respondent. On appeal at the instance of the appellant the District Judge Latur by his order dated 5/10/1981 set aside the order of the Trial court and dismissed the respondents application for grant of temporary injunction. The respondent made a revision application under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Higl court against the order of the District Judge. The High Court by its order dated 26/02/1988 set aside the order of the district Judge and restored the order of the Trial court granting temporary injunction in respondents favour. (4) AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High court committed error in interfering with the order of the District Judge. The High court in para 13 of its judgment held that the District Judge had vacated the injunction granted by the Trial court only on the ground of maintainability of the suit and it had failed to consider the prima facie case and bal- ance of convenience. On these findings the High Court-set aside the order of the District Judge, and restored the order of the trial court granting injunction in respondents favour. On these findings the High Court-set aside the order of the District Judge, and restored the order of the trial court granting injunction in respondents favour. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the District Judge and are of the view that the High court over-looked the specific finding recorded by the District Judge to the effect that since the plaintiff respondent was claiming relief under the contract of service he could enforce the contract and claim comi.Jnsation by way of damages in the event of any injury being caused to him for breach of the contract of service. No doubt the District Judge held that there was no prima facie case in the respondents favour but he further recorded a positive finding that even if the plaintiff respondent had prima facie case there was no balance of convenience in his favour and if any injury was caused to him on account of the breach of contract of service he could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money therefore he was not entitled to any injunction. The High court failed to notice that even if a prima facie case was made out, the balance of convenience and the irreparable injury were necessary to exist. The question whether the plaintiff could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money for the injury which may be caused to him on account of the breach of contract of service was not considered by the High court. No temporary injunction should be issued unless the three essential ingredients are made out, namely, (i) prima facie case, ,(ii) balance of convenience, (iii) irreparable injury which could not be compensated in terms of money. If a party fails to make outany of the three ingredients he would not be entitled to the injunction and the court will be justified in declining to issue injunction. In the instance case the respondent plaintiff was claiming to enforce the contract of service against the management of the institution. The refusal of injunction could not cause any irreparable injury to him as he could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money in the event of his success in the suit. The respondent was therefore not entitled to any injunction order. The refusal of injunction could not cause any irreparable injury to him as he could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money in the event of his success in the suit. The respondent was therefore not entitled to any injunction order. The District Judge in our opinion rightly set aside the order of the Trial Court granting injunction in favour of the plain tiff respondent. The High court committed error in interfering with that order. (5) WE allow the appeal set aside the order of the High court dated 26/02/1988 and restore the order of the District Judge dated 5/10/1987 and dismiss the injunction application made by the respondent. There will be no order as to costs.