JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmad, J. - Jamuna Prasad Shukla, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6759 of 1986 and Shyam Narain Shukla, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3871 of 1986 were named as accused in FIR lodged at P.S. Kamla Pur, District Sitapur on 28.7,1980 at about 9 P.M. on the basis of which a case under section 302 IPC was registered against them and their associates. They were ultimately found guilty and were, consequently, convicted under Section 302 IPC, in Session Trial No. 946 of 1980 and were sentenced to life imprisonment. Both the petitioners have filed Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1985 in this Court which has been admitted and both of them have been released on bail. 2. Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla was placed under suspension by order dated 269.1980 and was dismissed from service by order dated March 28, 1985. The order of dismissal was challenged by him in Writ Petition 1701 of 1985 which was allowed on 12.7.1985 with the following operative order: For the reasons atated above the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 28.3.1985 contained in Annexure6 is hereby quashed. It will be open to the opposite parties to pass a fresh order after taking appropriate disciplinary proceedings in which the petitioner is afforded adequate opportunity of hearing to defend himself. 3. In pursuance of the above order the opposite parties required the petitioner through their letter dated 8.4.1986, to join his duties. The petitioner joined the post on 17.4,1986. He was paid his full salary from 17.4.1986 to 9.7.1986. The petitioner demanded the arrears of salary for the period from 1.8.1980 to 7.2.1985 and again for the period from 8.2.1985 to 17.4.1986 which has not been paid to him inspite of exchange of letters between the petitioner and the opposite party No. 3. The petitioner has been suspended once again by an order dated 10.7.1986 (Annexure 6). It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition in which he has prayed that a writ of mandamus directing the opposite party to pay the arrears of salary to him for the period from 1.8.1980 to 7.2.1985 and full salary from 8.2.1985 to 16.4.1986 together with interest on the arrears withheld by the opposite party, may be issued. 4. 4. Sri Shyam Narain Shukla was suspended by order dated 22.6.198 (Annexure 1) but the order was revoked by subsequent order dated 21.4.1982 (Annexure3). He was, however, placed under suspension again by order dated 23.2.1985 (Annexure 5) with retrospective effect from 8.2.1985, the date on which the judgment in Session Trial No. 946 of 1980 was pronounced, by which he was convicted under section 302 IPC and was sentenced to life imprisonment. By subsequent order dated April 4/8, 1985, contained in Annexure 6, the petitioner was dismissed from service with retrospective effect from 8.2.85, i.e. from the date on which the judgment was pronounced in Session Trial No, 946 of 1980. These orders, i.e. the order of suspension dated 23.2.1985 and the order dated April 4/8, 1985 (Annexure5) are challenged in the present writ petition. 5, The opposite parties have filed counteraffidavit in Writ Petition No. 67 of 1986 and the petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit. They have, however, not filed a counteraffidavit in Writ Petition No. 387 of 1986. 6. The order dated 28.3.1985, by which Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla was dismissed from service, was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition No 1701 of 1985 merely on the ground that the dismissal order was based on the conviction of the petitioner, which was in violation of clause (a) to the proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution under which it was incumbent for the authority concerned to have taken into consideration the petitioner's conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge under section 302 I.P.C. For this purpose reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Trilok Chandra Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & others (1984 (2) LCD 294) rendered by a Division Bench, of which one of us (S.S. Ahmad, J) was a member. In that judgment, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Division Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another v. T.R. Challappan ( 1976 (1) SCR 783 ) which has since been overruled by the Supreme Court itself in its later decision in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel ( 1985 (3) SCC 398 ). The relevant portion of the Supreme Court's judgment in Tulsi Ram Patel's case is quoted below : Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of Second Proviso to Article 311 (2). The relevant portion of the Supreme Court's judgment in Tulsi Ram Patel's case is quoted below : Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of Second Proviso to Article 311 (2). To recapitulate briefly, where a disciplinary authority comes to know that a government servant has been convicted on a criminal charge, it must consider whether his conduct which has led to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. for that purpose it will have to peruse the judgment of the criminal court and consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in Challappan Case, This, however, has to be done by it ex parte and by itself. Once the disciplinary authority reaches to conclusion that the government servant's conduct was such as to require dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank he must decide which of these three penalties should be imposed on him. This too it has to do by itself and without hearing the concerned government servant by reason of the exclusionary effect of the second proviso. The disciplinary authority must, however, bear in mind that a conviction on a criminal charge does not automatically entail dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of the concerned government servant. Having decided which of these three penalties is required to be imposed, he has to pass the requisite order. A government servant who is aggrieved by the penalty imposed can agitate in appeal, revision or review, as the case may be, that the penalty was too severe or excessive and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. If it is his case that he is not the government servant who has been in fact convicted he can also agitate this question in appeal, Revision or review. If he fails in the departmental remedies and still wants, to pursue the matter, he can invoke the court's power of judicial review subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the court finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the. If the court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the court finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the. offence committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the requirements of the particular government service the court will also strike down the impugned order. Thus, in Shanker Dass v. Union of India this Court set aside the impugned order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant was whimsical and ordered his reinstatement in service with full back wages It is, however not necessary that the court should always order reinstatement. The court can instead substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. 7. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that whenever a Government servant is convicted of an offence, he cannot be dismissed from service merely on, the ground of conviction but the appropriate authority has to consider the conduct of such employee leading to his conviction and then to decide what punishment is to be inflicted upon him. In the matter of consideration of conduct as also the quantum of punishment the employee has not to be joined and the decision has to be taken by the appropriate authority independently of the employee who, as laid down by the Supreme Court, is sot to be given an opportunity of hearing at that state. 8. In view of the Supreme Court judgment in Tulsi Ram Patel's case (supra) the decision in Sri Shukla's earlier writ petition no. 8. In view of the Supreme Court judgment in Tulsi Ram Patel's case (supra) the decision in Sri Shukla's earlier writ petition no. 1701 of 1985 that he was entitled to a hearing as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution cannot be said to lay down correct law and the said decision to the extent that it calls upon the opposite parties to hold fullfledged disciplinary enquiry as contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution cannot, therefore, be enforced but to the extent that it sets aside the order of dismissal dated 28.3.1985 can be enforced against the opposite parties by requiring them to pass a fresh order after taking into consideration the conduct of the petitioner, namely, Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla, which had led to his conviction in Sessions Trial No. 946 of 1980 and then to decide the quantum of punishment which is to be inflicted upon him. 9. For the same reasons as have been stated above, the order dated April 4/8, 1985 by which Sri Shyam Narain Shukla has been dismissed from service can also not be upheld as in his case also the order of dismissal has been passed merely on the ground of his conviction in S.T. No. 946 of 1980 and not on a consideration of his conduct which had ultimately led to his conviction which can be done now and a fresh order can be passed without associating the petitioner in the deliberations of his conduct or the quantum of punishment, that may ultimately be inflicted upon him. In both the cases, it will be open to the appropriate authority to pass even an order of as was done earlier but their conduct has to be considered. 10. The question whether on the setting aside of the order of dismissal the earlier order of suspension would revive may now be considered. 11. We have already seen that in the case of Sri Jamuna Prasjad Shukla, the petitioner was earlier suspended by order dated 26.9.1980 which was followed by an order of dismissal passed on 28.3.1985. When the order of dismissal was quashed by this Court on 12.7.1985 in Writ Petition No. 170 of 1985, the petitioner was again suspended by order dated 10.7.1986. 12. When the order of dismissal was quashed by this Court on 12.7.1985 in Writ Petition No. 170 of 1985, the petitioner was again suspended by order dated 10.7.1986. 12. The question of revival of the earlier order of suspension is relevant in the sense that if it is ultimately held that the earlier order would not revive, the petitioner would be entitled to the arrears of salary as claimed by him in the petition till he was placed under suspension a second time, excluding, of course, the amount of salary paid to him on his reinstatement in pursuance of the judgment of this court in Writ Petition No. 1701 of 1985. 13. Rule 49A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as, the Rules) is the Rule under which an order of suspension can be passed in respect of a government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is either contemplated or is pending or against whom an investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending. Such an order of suspension can continue till the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings or till the conclusion of the proceedings relating to the criminal charge. 14. Rule 49 A is quoted below : 49 A (I) A Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry as contemplated, or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority; Provided that in the case of any Government servant or class of government servants not belonging to a State service, the appointing authority may delegate its power under this subrule to the next lower authority: Provided further that any other authority empowered by the Governor by general or special order in this behalf, may place a Government servant under suspension under this subrule; Provided also that in the case of a member of a judicial service (within the meaning of Article 236 of the Constitution), the Governor may delegate his powers under this subrule to the High Court. (1A) A Government servant in respect of or against whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension untill the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge if the charge is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. (2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed, or as the case may be, continued to be placed, under suspension by an order of the appointing authority (a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody whether the detention is on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding fortyeight hours; and (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a tern of imprisonment exceeding fortyeight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed consequent to such conviction. Explanation The period of forty eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this subrule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. Explanation The period of forty eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this subrule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions (a) if he was under suspension, immediately before the penalty was awarded to him, the order of his suspension shall, subject to any such directions as aforesaid, be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal; (b) if he was not under suspension, he shall, if so directed by the appellate or reviewing authority, be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal; Provided that nothing in this subrule shall be construed as affecting the power of the competent authority, in a case where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules on grounds other than the merits of the allegations on which the said penalty was imposed but the case is not remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, to pass an order of suspension pending further inquiry against him on those allegations, so however, that any such suspension shall not have retrospective effect, (4) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the appointing authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decided to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal or removal was originally imposed, whether the allegations remain in their original form or are clarified or their particulars better specified or any part thereof of a minor nature remitted (a) if he was under suspension immediately before the penaltywas awarded to him, the order of his suspension shall, subject to any direction of the appointing authority, be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal; (b) if he was not under such suspension, he shall if so directed by the appointing authority be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the competent authority on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal. (5) (a) Any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by any authority specified in subrule (1). (b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceedings is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension till the termination of all or any of such proceedings. 15. In the instant case we are not concerned with suspension contemplated by subrule (1) of Rule 49 A as the petitioner was placed under suspension under subrule (1A) on account of the pendency of proceedings relating to a criminal charge, 16. The normal rule is that an order of dismissal being passed against the government servant, the order of suspension, if such government servant was under suspension during pendency of the inquiry proceedings, merges into the order of dismissal and on the dismissal order being set aside by Court, the order of suspension would not revive. See Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1955 SC 600 ) and H.L. Mehn v. Union of India ( 1974 (4) SCC 396 : AIR 1974 SC 1281 ). But the above proposition cannot be treated to be conclusive of the controversy raised in this petition as the question can be answered only with reference to the specific provisions of Rule 49 A quoted above. 17. We have already seen above that under Subrule (1A) a government servant against whom investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending can be placed under suspension at the discretion of the appointing authority until the termination of the proceedings relating to that charge. 18. Subrule 2 of Rule 49 A contemplates deemed suspension i.e., if a government servant is detained in custody, whether detention is on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours, he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. 18. Subrule 2 of Rule 49 A contemplates deemed suspension i.e., if a government servant is detained in custody, whether detention is on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours, he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. Similarly, if a government servant is convicted of an offence and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 48 hours and is not immediately dismissed or removed from service, he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from the date of his conviction. 19. Subrule (3) contemplates the continuance of the suspension order as also deemed suspension. Clause (a) of subrule (3) contemplates continuance of the suspension order in a case where the penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon a government servant is set aside in appeal or on review under the C.C.A. Rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action. 20. Clause (b) of subrule (3) contemplates deemed suspension of a government servant who was not under suspension prior to the order of dismissal or removal. It is provided that if the order of dismissal or removal from service imposed on a government servant who was not under suspension prior to such order, is set aside in appeal or on review under the C.C.A. Rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry, such government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension on and from the date of original order of dismissal or removal. 21. Since in the instant case, a departmental appeal was not filed either by Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla or the other petitioner, namely, Sri Shyam Narian Shukla and the order of dismissal passed against them was set aside in such appeal or review, the provisions of subrule (3) would not be attracted. 22. We may now consider the impact of subrule (4). 23. Subrule (4) contemplates identical situations as are contemplated by Subrule (3) with the only difference that the order of dismissal or removal from service should have been set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law and the appointing authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decided to hold a further inquiry. 24. 24. In case of Sri Jamuna Prasad, Shukla, the order of dismissal was, no doubt, set aside by this Court, which in its judgment dated 12.7.1985 provided that it will be open to the opposite parties to pass a fresh order but the appointing authority, it appears, decided to place Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla under suspension once again in view of the pendency of Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1985 in this court against the order of his conviction recorded in. Sessions Trial No. 946 of 1980. In view of the above we are clearly of the opinion that the earlier order of suspension would not revive nor can Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla be deemed to have been placed under suspension; nor can the earlier order of suspension be deemed to have been continued either under subrule (3) or in subrule .(4) of Rule 49 A. 25. In this case of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla we have seen that the order of dismissal was passed against him merely because he was convicted in Sessions Trial No. 946 of 1980 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appointing authority did not take into consideration the conduct of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla which ultimately led to his conviction. For the reasons stated above, the order of dismissal passed against Sri Shyam Narain Shukla can also not be sustained and is hereby quashed. 26. In the case of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla the earlier order of suspension dated 22.6.198I was revoked by a subsequent order dated 21.6.1982 and Sri Shyam Narain Shukla was reinstated. On the date of conviction, Sri Shyam Narain Shukla was not under suspension. He was placed under suspension by subsequent order dated 23.2.1985 with retrospective effect from 8.2.1985. The order of dismissal dated April 4/8, 1985, was also passed with retrospective effect from 8.2.1985 which is the date of conviction. 27. The petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated February 8, 1985 on the ground that it cannot be passed with retrospective effect. Even if the contention is accepted and the order of suspension, passed by the opposite party no. 27. The petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated February 8, 1985 on the ground that it cannot be passed with retrospective effect. Even if the contention is accepted and the order of suspension, passed by the opposite party no. 3 on 23.9.1985, is ignored on the assumption that it is illegal as it could not have been passed with retrospective effect, the petitioner cannot escape from clutches of Rule 49A as he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension under subrule (2) thereof, which provides that a government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from the date of his conviction if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 48 hours. Since Sri Shyam Narain Shukla was sentenced to life imprisonment, he would, therefore, be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from the date of conviction, i.e., with effect from February 8, 1985. 28. It has been contended by the learned counsel for Sri Shyam Narain Shukla that the order of suspension dated February 8, 1985 ultimately merged in the order of dismissal passed on April 4/8, 1985 and since the order of dismissal is being set aside by this Court, the order of suspension shall also be treated to have been set aside and the petitioner (Sri Shyam Narain Shukla) would immediately become entitled to his full salary with effect from February 8, 1985 till date. 29. Standing counsel contended that in view of Fundamental Rule 54, an order for actual payment of salary for the period of suspension be not passed. 30. Fundamental Rule 54 of the Financial Hand Book Volume II provides as under : 54 (1) when a government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the government servant for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) Whether or not the paid period shall be treated as period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority mentioned in Subrule (1) is of Opinion that the government servant has been fully exonerated of, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified the government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be. (3) In other cases, the government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe; Provided that the payment of allowances under clauses (2) and (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances a re admissible. ; (4) In a case falling under clause (2) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In a case falling under clause (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. 31. A perusal of the Fundamental Rule quoted above would indicate that where a government servant, who had been dismissed, removed or suspended, is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement has to consider and make a specific order regarding pay and allowances payable to the government servant for the period of his absence from duties. He has also to decide the question whether or not the said period is to be treated as a period spent on duty. An order under Fundamental Rule 54 can be passed after an opportunity of hearing is given to the government servant concerned. (See M. Copal Krishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1968 SC 240 ). 32. In the case of Jamuna Prasad Shukla, Respondent No. 3 has invoked the provisions of SubRule (1A) and placed him under suspension in view of the pendency of the criminal appeal in this court. What order would ultimately be passed in the case of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla cannot be foreseen by us at this stage. 33. 32. In the case of Jamuna Prasad Shukla, Respondent No. 3 has invoked the provisions of SubRule (1A) and placed him under suspension in view of the pendency of the criminal appeal in this court. What order would ultimately be passed in the case of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla cannot be foreseen by us at this stage. 33. In has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner in both the cases that Fundamental Rule 54 would not applicable to a case where the order of dismissal is set aside by the court and in such a case the government servant would be entitled to full salary for the period during which he remained under suspension. For this purpose reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( AIR 1962 SC 1334 ) wherein it has been observed as under: The High Court in dealing with the appellant's claim to salary during the period of his suspension pending the earlier enquiry observed that there was no justification for not granting the appellant his full pay for the period after the date of the suit. But the counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh asserted that it is open to the State, notwithstanding the direction, to award as remuneration to the appellant for the period for which he was under suspension any amount which on a reconsideration of the matter in the light of the relevant rules and after hearing the appellant the State Government considers just and proper. This power, counsel contends, arises by virtue of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under the authority conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution. Counsel says that it was because of this rule that the High Court directed the State Government to reconsider the matter in the light of the relevant Rules. In our view, this contention is wholly misconceived. 34. Their Lordship thereafter quoted Fundamental Rule 54 and proceeded as under : This rule has no application to cases like the present in which the dismissal of a public servant is declared invalid by a civil court and he is reinstated. This rule, undoubtedly enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant whose dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal. This rule, undoubtedly enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant whose dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal. But in this case the order of dismissal was declared invalid in a civil suit. The effect of the decree of the Civil suit was that the appellant was never to be deemed to have been lawfully dismissed from service and the order of reinstatement was superfluous. The effect of the adjudication of the civil Courts is to declare that the appellant had been wrongfully prevented from attending to his duties as a public servant. It would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have earned had he been permitted to work. 35. This decision was considered by the Supreme Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1963 SC 687 ) and was distinguished. The relevant portion of the judgment in Khem Chand's case may be reproduced below : Mr. Sharma drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Devendra Pratap v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC 1334 where the effect of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of U.P. under Art. 309 was considered. It was held that while Rule 54 undoubtedly enabled the state Government to fix the pay of a public servant where dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal, the Rule has no application to cases in which the dismissal of a public servant is declared invalid by a civil court and he is reinstated and that it would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have earned had he been permitted to work. This decision has however no application to a case like the present, where because of the operation of Rule 12 (4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 the public servant is deemed to be placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal. 36. This decision has however no application to a case like the present, where because of the operation of Rule 12 (4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 the public servant is deemed to be placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal. 36. The case of Devendra Pratap (supra) was considered by the Calcutta High Court in Tarini Kumar v. Chief Commercial Superintendent, Eastern Railway & another (AIR 1965 Calcutta 75) wherein the provisions of Rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code, Volume I which are in identical terms as those of Fundamental Rule 54 were considered and the Supreme Court decision was explained. 37. We may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in H.N. Mehra v. Union of India ( 1974 (4) SCC 396 : AIR 1974 SC 1281 ) wherein a question whether the appellant in that case was entitled to be paid full pay and allowances for the period of suspension was left to be considered and decided by the appropriate authority under the relevant Rules with the observation that the decision of the appropriate authority on the question, when made, was contrary to the Rule ignoring the conditions of service the appellant would be free to challenge such decision. This decision would not be applicable to the facts of the instant case as in that case the order of dismissal was set aside by the appointing authority on the appellant being acquitted of the criminal charge of which he was convicted by the trial Court. 38. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54 would not apply to the case of Sri Jamuna Prasad Shukla as in his case the order of dismissal was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1701 of 1985. That being so, he would be entitled to full salary for the period from 1.8.1980 to 7.2.1985 minus the amount already paid to him by way of subsistence allowances. He would also be entitled to full salary for the period from 8.2.1985 to 16.4.1986, subject to his satisfying the appropriate authority that during the said period, he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. We, however, uphold the second order of suspension dated 10.7.1986 contained in Annexure6 which, in our opinion, was validly passed. 39. He would also be entitled to full salary for the period from 8.2.1985 to 16.4.1986, subject to his satisfying the appropriate authority that during the said period, he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. We, however, uphold the second order of suspension dated 10.7.1986 contained in Annexure6 which, in our opinion, was validly passed. 39. Since the order of dismissal in the case of Sri Shyam Narain Shukla is also being set aside, we direct that he shall also be paid full salary for the period from February 8, 1985 when he was placed under suspension till his reinstatement or, if the appropriate authority considers it necessary to pass a fresh order of suspension, as in the case of Jamuna Prasad Shukla, till the second order of suspension is passed subject, of course, to his satisfying the appropriate authority that during this period he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. 40. There will be no order as to costs.