ORDER S.D. Aagarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of the proceedings in Suit No. 897 of 1971, Ram Dass v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi. Lakshmi Devi transferred the property to Ram Dass Sahu during the pendency of the revision. Ram Dass Sahu transferred it to Sita Ram, who has been impleaded as respondent No. 4 in 1 he writ petition after the filing of the writ petition in this Court. 2. The suit was decreed by the trial court on the ground that the petitioner had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damages as well as on the ground that he has materially altered the accommodation. This decree was passed on 17th March, 1978, by the 2nd Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Jhansi. Aggrieved by the decision dated 17th March, 1978, the petitioners filed a revision. The revision came up for hearing before the 1st Additional District Judge, Jhansi. The revision was dismissed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Jhansi, by judgment dated 19th April, 1984. The petitioner has now challenged the judgment dated 17th March, 1978, as well as the judgment dated 19th April, 1984. 3. 1 have heard Sri V. K. S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, as well as Sri Prakash Gupta, learned counsel for the newly added respondent Sita Ram. 4. The petitioners are the tenants in the property in dispute, which is a shop. In the shop in dispute, the petitioners are carrying on their business as well as residing in the same. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended, firstly, that both the courts below acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in decreeing the suit on the basis that the petitioners had made material alterations in the accommodation. This plea was not set up in the plaint at all and, as such, the question of decreeing the suit on the basis which was not set up in the plaint at all does not arise. 6. This plea was not set up in the plaint at all and, as such, the question of decreeing the suit on the basis which was not set up in the plaint at all does not arise. 6. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the finding recorded by the courts below, that the petitioners have caused substantial damages to the accommodation, is a finding perverse, in law, and con- sequently, the ground available to the landlord under section 3(1)(b) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) was not available to the landlord and, as such, no decree' could be passed against the petitioner. 7. The present suit had been filed in the year 1971 when the old Act was in existence. Section 3(1)(6) and (c) of the old Act, which is relevant for the decision of this petition, are quoted below : '"33(1)(b). That the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. (c). That the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction has, in the opinion of the Court, materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to disminish its value." 8. If the tenant is sought to be evicted under Clause (c) of section 3(1) of the old Act, the landlord has to establish that the tenant had materially altered the accommodation or is likely to diminish its value. The question whether the tenant has materially altered the accommodation or has substantially diminished the value of the accommodation is a question based on facts. Unless this plea is specifically raised in the pleadings and the tenant gets an opportunity of controverting the same, the decree cannot be passed on a plea which had not been taken. The plaint of the suit, which was filed in the year 1971, has been attached as Annexure 4' to the writ petition. I have gone through all the paragraphs of the plaint. I do not find at all any mention of the fact in the plaint that the petitioners have materially altered the accommodation. In effect, this plea based on Section 3(1)1 c) of the old Act is missing from the plaint itself. I have gone through all the paragraphs of the plaint. I do not find at all any mention of the fact in the plaint that the petitioners have materially altered the accommodation. In effect, this plea based on Section 3(1)1 c) of the old Act is missing from the plaint itself. A plea, which is not found in the plaint, cannot be the subject of decision by the Judge, Small Cause Court and, consequently. it is clear that both the courts below have acted beyond the pleadings of the parties and have clearly acted with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in decreeing the suit on the basis of the material alteration in the accommodation. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded before me that this plea is not found in the plaint at all and that, in fact, the case, which was set up by the plaintiff, was based on section 3(1)(h) of the old Act. In the circumstances, the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is well founded. 10. In regard to the second submission, Section 3(1)(b) of the old Act specifically lays down that the tenant will be liable for ejectment if he has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. The question which has to be considered is as to what meaning has to be given to the word accommodation . The submission of the learned counsel is that the word 'accommodation' here means accommodation which has been let out and not any other accommodation. In effect; the submission is that if any substantial damage is caused to the accommodation, which has been let out then, no doubt, the tenant would be liable for ejectment under section 3(1)(b) of the old Act. The word 'accommodation' has been defined in Section 2(a) of the old Act, meaning residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building. The words 'landlord' and 'tenant' have also been defined in Sections 2(c) and 2(g) of the old Act. They are as under : "2(c). "landlord" means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir, or assignee of such person." "2(g). "Tenant" means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, express or implied. would be payable for any accommodation." 11. They are as under : "2(c). "landlord" means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir, or assignee of such person." "2(g). "Tenant" means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, express or implied. would be payable for any accommodation." 11. From the definition of the words 'landlord' and 'tenant' read with the definition of the word 'accommodation', it is clear that the accommodation, which is spoken of in section 3(l)(b) of the old Act means the accommodation, which has been let out to the tenant. To make the point clear, if there is a large building and there are many tenements in the said building, the tenement, which has been let out would be an accommodation in respect of a tenant to whom it has been let out and not the entire building. Therefore, in my opinion, the tenant would be liable to ejectment only if he has caused substantial damage to the accommodation which has been let out to him. The tenant would also he liable for eviction under Section 3(11(h) of the old Act if he has caused damage to a portion of the building other than the accommodation, which has been let out if the said damage is connected and has effect on the tenanted accommodation. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in Dalip Singh Snit. Dropadi Devi, 1979 All LJ 478, a decision given by Hon'ble V. K. Mehrotra..1. In that case. the position was that the IcNiant had included the space under the eight steps of the staircase dismantled by him in the shop let out to him by breaking the intervening wall and including the said space in his tenanted accommodation. It was in view of the special facts of that case that Hon'ble V. K. Mehrotra, J. took the view that though the said portion, which was broken, was not a part of the tenancy of the tenant still ts breaking the said staircase, he would be liable for ejectment as having caused substantial damage to the accommodation. This is a case where damage caused has effect on the tenanted accommodation. In the circumstances. in my opinion, this decision does not go against the view which I have already expressed above. 13. This is a case where damage caused has effect on the tenanted accommodation. In the circumstances. in my opinion, this decision does not go against the view which I have already expressed above. 13. In the instant case, the finding of the Judge, Small Cause Court is that one room and a verandah on the first floor, which was, admittedly, not in the tenancy of the petitioner, was broken by the petitioner. This is, no way, connected or has effect on the accommodation let out. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the ground mentioned in Section 3(1)(b) of the said Act is not made out. 14. Even otherwise, I have examined the finding given by the Judge, Small Cause Court. The finding recorded by the Court is that the husband of Lakshmi Devi had demolished the room in the first floor. The case set up in the plaint is that the room had been demolished in August, 197 1. The husband of Smt. Lakshmi Devi had died much before August, 1971, as the notice for ejectment which was given in August 1971 was given to Smt Lakshmi Devi and not to her husband. Even on the basis of the case set up in the plaint, the finding is clearly contrary to the case set up by the plaintiff itself. In my opinion, this finding cannot be sustained and is a perverse finding. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners also, in my opinion, is well founded. 15. In the result, the petition is allowed The judgments dated 17th March, 1978 ant 19th April. 1984, are hereby quashed. Suit No. 879 of 1971 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties art directed to hear their own costs.