JUDGMENT B. Kumar, Member - The revision petition arises out of a judgment and order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi on October 24, 1985 in Sri Mohan etc. v. Chandi etc., Revision No. 25 of 1985 filed against the order dated January 29, 1985 passed by S.D.O. Sardar Mirzapur. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the opposite party Chandi brought a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindar Abolition and Land reforms Act against Brij Mohan and others in the court of the S.D.O. Assistant Collector 1st Class, Mirzapur for declaration of his rights. During the course of proceedings, Chandi Moved an application on August 16, 1984 in the trial court with the allegation that the defendant-revisionists were removing the soil from the land in dispute and thereby making an attempt to change the nature of the land. The trail court passed an injunction order restraining the defendants from removing the soil from the land in dispute and changing the nature of the land. Aggrieved by this order the defendants revisionist went in revision before the Division Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner rejected the revision on October 24, 1985. And, hence this revision. 3. The grounds of revision are that the suit was not maintainable in the revenue court which has no jurisdiction to try the suit and to pass interim injunction order, that the trial cour passed the order behind the back of the revisionists who were not even served with summons. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records. Sri Sankatha Rai, Learned counsel for the revisionist has argued firstly that Section 229-D of the Act is not applicable, Second that the balance of convenience is in favour of the revisionist, thirdly that the order passed by the trial court is ex-parte because the application for injunction was moved on January 22, 1985 and orders were passed on January 29, 1985, fourthly that since the validity of the sale deed is to be adjudicated by the civil court, the suit is not adjudicated by the civil court, the suit is not maintainable. Besides, the opposite party had made a negative prayer so the relief sought by him cannot be granted under Section 9 of the C.P.C. by the court. Besides, the opposite party had made a negative prayer so the relief sought by him cannot be granted under Section 9 of the C.P.C. by the court. In support of the his argument, he has placed reliance on 1970 R.D. 216 and 1981 A.L.J. 396. The last argument by the learned counsel is that under Section 142 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act a Bhumidhar is within his right to use the land for any purpose and the soil can be removed from the land is dispute for its improvement. 5. Sri A.N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the revisionist can argue on the point of jurisdiction and admissibility of the revision only. His second argument is that the opposite party was entitled to the injunction granted by the trial court. 6. The learned trial court granted the temporary injunction restraining the defendants from removing the soil from the plot in dispute. Let us examine how far the injunction granted by the trial court is according to law. Section 229-D of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act provides that if in the course of a suit under the provisions of Section 229-B or 229-C, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise; (a) that any property trees or grove standing on the land in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or (b) that any party to the suit threatens or intends to remove or dispose of the said property, trees or grove in order to meet the ends of justice the court may grant temporary injunction and, where necessary also appoint receiver. 7. It is quite clear from the above provision that the court is empowered to issue temporary injunction which endures for the period the disposal of the case. The plaintiff opposite party had moved an application before the trial court on January 29, 1985 alleging that the defendant revisionists were threatening to did the plot in dispute and to remove soil therefrom the changing the nature of the land in dispute. The application was followed by an affidavit. The trial court was well within its right to grand the injunction it it is no competent of try the suit. Now, the question for consideration is whether the trial court was competent to try the suit. The application was followed by an affidavit. The trial court was well within its right to grand the injunction it it is no competent of try the suit. Now, the question for consideration is whether the trial court was competent to try the suit. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that since the suit was not maintainable before the revenue court, the trial court had no jurisdiction to pass the injunction order. He has place reliance on Purshottam v. Narottam, 1970 R.D. 216. I have respectfully gone through the ruling referred to about. A Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble R.S. Pathak and R.S. Gulati, JJ. of the Allahabad High Court have held that so long as the entries in the revenue papers supporting the claim of the plaintiff and there was no contest from the State Government or Gaon Sabha, the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from cutting the crop standing over the plot in dispute, from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the plot in suit was conizable by the civil court which was competent to entertain and to adjudicate upon all the pleas raised including the plea that the land was joint family property'. It has been further held that 'if the plaintiff had claimed any relief against Gaon Sabha or State Government or he ought of have done so having regard to the facts of case, the suit would lie to the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court. In the instant case, the plaintiff had claimed no relief state Government and he was not obliged to do so because the entries being in his favour, there as no reason why the suit could not be tried by the civil court. It has been further held that if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, the suit will not lie under section 229-B but will be cognizable by a civil court in case the plaintiff's right is disputed by third person. 8. The above ruling cited by the learned counsel is not applicable to the present case, because the facts of the present case are quite different from the present case are quite different from that of the case cited in the ruling. In Purshottam v. Narottam, the defendant set up the plea that the land was a joint family property. 8. The above ruling cited by the learned counsel is not applicable to the present case, because the facts of the present case are quite different from the present case are quite different from that of the case cited in the ruling. In Purshottam v. Narottam, the defendant set up the plea that the land was a joint family property. The village record was also in favour of the plaintiff. But in the instant case, the plaintiff-opposite party Chandi has come forward with the specific allegation that some person had impersonated him and executed a sale deed in respect of the plot belonging to him in favour of the revisionist defendant Sri Mohan etc. On the strength of the alleged sale deed, his name was expunged from the revenue records and the defendants' names were mutated. The plaintiff is no longer Bhumidhar of land in dispute. This necessitated an action for declaration on this part because the entries shall continue to remain on the record if the plaintiff is not declared Bhumidhar by a competent court. 9. As regards the validity of the sale deed, it has been held in Khemani Ram v. District Judge and others, 1983 A.L.J. 1378 by Hon'ble B.D. Agarwal, J. that even if the instrument is not cancelled, there is no bar to the petitioner seeking declaration for himself. The declaration of title will necessarily simply cancellation of the sale deed because the declaration may not be granted for so long as it stands and once it is found that the petitioner continues to be Bhumidhar it would follow necessarily that he has not parted with his rights in favour of any other person. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. of the Alld. High Court in Smt. Rakesh Bala v. John Eric, 1982 R.D. 359 and by Hon'ble K.C. Agarwal, J. in Kamla Singh v. Third Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur, 1984 A.W.C. 984. 10. In view of the above discussion, I come to the conclusion that the revisionist has failed to prove his case. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed.