JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is the tenant of a premises, situate in Allahabad. Mahanarain Mishra, respondent no. 4, is the landlord of the premises in dispute. The landlord has applied for release of the accommodation under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. 2. The sole question which has been convassed in the writ petition is that section 3 (e) of the Act which defines a 'Prescribed Authority' is ultra vires the Constitution of India and hence the application under section 21 of the Act, filed before the Prescribed Authority, cannot proceed and is not maintainable. The Act mentioned above provides for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenant from, certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas and for matters connected therewith. In regard to the release of an accommodation which is in occupation of a tenant the scheme of the Act is that the landlord can file an application under section 21 of the Act before a Prescribed Authority on the grounds mentioned in section 21 of the Act. Against the decision of the Prescribed Authority an appeal can be filed under section 22 of the Act. Once the order becomes final by the order of the appellate authority then the eviction order can be enforced under section 23 of the Act. In the instant petition the challenge is to the constitution of the Prescribed Authority. 3. Section 3 (e) was originally in the following terms :- " "Prescribed Authority" means a Magistrate of the First Class having experience as such of not less than three years authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act, and different - Magistrates may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases or classes of cases, served on the assessee-petitioner for the first time. In view of the aforesaid decision, in my opinion, the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has also got no force. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 11. The interim order dated 22-4-1980 passed in this case is hereby vacated. In view of the aforesaid decision, in my opinion, the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has also got no force. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 11. The interim order dated 22-4-1980 passed in this case is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed. and the District Magistrate may recall any case from any such Magistrate and may either dispose of it himself or transfer it for disposal to any other such Magistrate." This definition was amended by U. P. Act 19 of 1974. After the amendment by U. P. Act No. 19 of 1974 section 3 (e) reads as follows :- " fa) 'Prescribed Authority' means an officer having not less than 3 years experience as Munsif or as Magistrate of the First Class or as Executive Magistrate authorised by general or special order of the State Government to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act, and different officers may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases, or classes of cases." Section 3 (e) was again amended by U. P. Act 28 of 1976. After this amendment section 3 (e) reads as follows :- " "Prescribed Authority" means a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under this Act, and different such officers may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases or classes of cases, and the District Judge may recall any case from any such officer and may transfer it for disposal to any other such officer. " The definition of section 3 (e) after the amendment of U. P. Act 28 of 1976 is still in existence and it is this section 3 (e) of the Act of which the validity has been challenged. 4. Before embarking upon the question which has been urged in this petition it is necessary to examine the competence of the State Legislature to pass this Act itself. List II of the 7th Schedule which is State List, Entry 18 is as follows :- "18. 4. Before embarking upon the question which has been urged in this petition it is necessary to examine the competence of the State Legislature to pass this Act itself. List II of the 7th Schedule which is State List, Entry 18 is as follows :- "18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents ; transfer and alienation of agricultural land ; land improvement and agricultural loans ; colonization." The other relevant entry is Entry 6 in List III of the 7th Schedule which is the concurrent list. Entry 18 clearly lays down that the State Legislature has authority to make law in regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant. Entry 6 of List III gives even a wider jurisdiction to the State Legislature as rights between lessor and lessee are covered within the subject of Transfer of Property. In the circumstances, in my opinion the State Legislature is fully competent to enact the present Act with reference to Entry 18 of List II read with Entry 6 of List III. The U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as 'the old Act' was also challenged in this Court in Raman Das v. The State of U. P., AIR 1952 Alld. 703. The Full Bench of this Court upheld the validity of the old Act and held as follows :- ''Coming back to the Act itself and to the Government of India Act, 1935, though the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act may not have been passed under Item No. 9 of List II relating to compulsory acquisition we see no reason why it cannot come under Item No. 21 of List II which gives the Legislature power to enact laws regulating the relationship of landlords and tenants. It is true that the item begins with the word 'land' that it to say, rights in or over land and land tenures, but learned counsel has not contended that the word 'land' in this item is not wide enough to include bouse or house property. Besides this item, we have also in list III item no. 8 which allows legislation with respect to transfer of property. The Transfer of Property Act contains various sections like section 106 onwards relating to leases of immovable property. Besides this item, we have also in list III item no. 8 which allows legislation with respect to transfer of property. The Transfer of Property Act contains various sections like section 106 onwards relating to leases of immovable property. We are, therefore, not satisfied that the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act of 1947 was not within the legislative competence of the U. P. Legislature." The principle which has been laid down in regard to the old Act would also apply to this Act and consequently the present Act cannot possibly be questioned on the ground of legislative competence. The State Legislature had the competence to pass the present Act. Section 3 (e) of the Act quoted above has been challenged by learned counsel on two main grounds. The first submission is that section 3 (e) of the Act is ultra vires Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The submission in effect is that it is only the High Court which has the power to confer authority on a judicial officer to perform the functions of the Prescribed Authority and the State Legislature does not have that power as Article 245 of the Constitution is subject to Article 235 of the Constitution. 5. The second submission is that the State Legislature has delegated essential Legislative functions to the District Judge giving him power to appoint the Prescribed Authority and since no guideline has been given section 3 (e) is ultra vires. Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List III reads as follows :- ''11-A. Administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts." In view of this Entry the State Legislature is empowered to constitute and organise all courts. Entry 46 of this very list is as follows ;- "Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List." These Entries give power to the State Legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers to all courts. The conferment of the power, therefore, on the Civil Judicial Officers and Judicial Magistrates under section 3 (e) of the Act to exercise the powers of Prescribed Authority is within the competence of the State Legislature and the State Legislature can enact a law in that regard. The conferment of the power, therefore, on the Civil Judicial Officers and Judicial Magistrates under section 3 (e) of the Act to exercise the powers of Prescribed Authority is within the competence of the State Legislature and the State Legislature can enact a law in that regard. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Article 245 is subject to Article 235 cannot be disputed as Article 245 itself provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution the Legislature of a State may make law for the whole or any part of the State. Article 235 relates to the control over subordinate Courts. It reads as follows :- "Control over subordinate courts.-The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right to appeal which he may under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law." 6. Article 235 of the Constitution has come up for interpretation in various cases before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the parties have cited various cases before me on this question. It is not necessary to refer to them in detail, as the principle laid down in all the cases is common. In Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa, AIR 1976 SC 1899 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the scope of the word 'control' in Article 235 of the Constitution. In paragraph 20 it has been opined as follows :- "The word "control" as used in Article 235 includes disciplinary control over District Judges and Judges inferior to the post of District Judge. This control is vested in the High Court to effectuate the purpose of securing independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. The word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. This control is vested in the High Court to effectuate the purpose of securing independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. The word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control is not merely the power to arrange the day-to-day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction on the Presiding Judge. The word 'control" includes something in addition to the mere superintendence of these courts. The control is over the conduct and discipline of Judges. The inclusion of a right of appeal against the orders of the High Court in the conditions of service indicates an order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction. The word "deal" in Article 235 also indicates that the control is over disciplinary and not mere administrative jurisdiction. The control which is vested in the High Court is complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment including initial posting and promotion of District Judges and dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal subject however to the conditions of service to a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by clause (2) of Article 311 unless such an opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause. The High Court alone could make enquiries into disciplinary conduct." From the above analysis of the word "control" made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is clear that the High Court has administrative as well as disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate courts. This Article has no concern with the conferring of jurisdiction and powers on the courts. Since this Article 235 only relates to administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate courts, the conferment of power of the Prescribed Authority by the State Legislature on the Civil Judicial Officers and Judicial Magistrate does not in any manner violate Article 235 of the Constitution. Since this Article 235 only relates to administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate courts, the conferment of power of the Prescribed Authority by the State Legislature on the Civil Judicial Officers and Judicial Magistrate does not in any manner violate Article 235 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited many authorities of this court wherein it has been held that the prescribed authority acts only as a persona designata and not a court and as such it is urged that these powers can only be conferred by the High Court. Under section 3 (e) of the Act powers of Prescribed Authority are conferred on courts already constituted. The State Legislature is competent to confer powers on all courts under Entry 65 List II Seventh Schedule and Entry 46 List III Seventh Schedule. It makes no difference whether the powers so exercised by the court are exercisable as persona designata. The first submission consequently made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not substantiated. It is well settled that if it appears from the provision that power which has been delegated includes powers which can legitimately be regarded as essentially legislative power then the legislation is bad and it introduces a serious infirmity in the provision. On the other hand, if the Legislature lays down its legislative policy in clear and unambiguous terms and leaves it to the delegate to execute that policy then the delegation is not impermissible. See Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 and Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 . It is further well settled that the delegation is valid only when the legislative policy and the guidelines are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the subsidiary policy within the guidelines laid down by the Legislature, See Tata Iron and Steel Company v. Workmen, AIR 1972 SC 1917 . 7. In Khambhalia Municipality v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 1048 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "An essential legislative function consists in the determination of a legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. 7. In Khambhalia Municipality v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 1048 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "An essential legislative function consists in the determination of a legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. Having laid down the legislative policy, the legislature may confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the frame-work of the policy." The above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is to the effect that if an administrative agency works out the details within the frame-work of the policy then the section would not suffer from the vice of excesssive delegation. 8. I have consequently now to examine as to whether the Legislature has formulated the policy with regard to the appointment of the Prescribed Authority or not, whether there are guidelines provided by the Legislature for the said purpose and what is the nature of the power exercisable by the District Judge. I have already quoted above Section 3 (e) as it originally stood in the Principal Act and as it stood after its amendment by U. P. Act 19 of 1974. On a scrutiny of these provisions, it is clear that initially the powers of a Prescribed Authority were conferred on Magistrate First Class only viz. the Executive. Thereafter by the Amendment Act of 1974, powers of the Prescribed Authority were conferred both on the Munsifs as well the Executive Magistrates. The Legislature thereafter by U. P. Act 28 of 1976 again amended Section 3 (e) and conferred the powers of the Prescribed Authority on a Civil Judicial Officer or a Judicial Magistrate. Legislative policy being that the powers of the Prescribed Authority be exercised only by Judicial Officers and not by Executive Officers, Legislative policy was therefore laid down in Section 3 (e) in very clear and unambiguous terms. 9. Once the above policy was laid down it was further provided that the officers who can be authorised to function as Prescribed Authorities can be out of a class only viz. Civil Judicial Officers or Judicial Magistrates. 9. Once the above policy was laid down it was further provided that the officers who can be authorised to function as Prescribed Authorities can be out of a class only viz. Civil Judicial Officers or Judicial Magistrates. Consequently sufficient guidelines were provided in the Section in order to enable the District Judge to authorise only members of the said Class to perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority. It cannot be consequently urged that no guidelines have been provided in the impugned section. 10. It has been urged by learned counsel that in Section 3 (e) as it originally stood and then as amended in 1974, three years' experience was specifically laid down and since this provision is omitted, therefore, sufficient guidelines in the impugned section are missing. There is no substance in the submission. The intention of the Legislature in providing three years experience appears to be because of the fact that members of the Executive could also be authorised to function as Prescribed Authorities, Civil Judicial Officers and Judicial Magistrates decide civil rights and questions of title of the parties from the very first day they are appointed. No exception can consequently be taken by conferring powers of a Prescribed Authority on them. Section 4 (12) of U. P. General Clauses Act defines District Judge. The definition is as follows ;- "(12) "District Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction." By Section 9 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 the District Judge has administrative control over all the civil courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction. 11. The District Judge being the Principal civil court of original jurisdiction and having control over all the civil courts in his jurisdiction, conferment of administrative power on him under Section 3 (e) of the Act to appoint Prescribed Authorities in order to execute the legislative policy cannot amount to delegating essential legislative powers. The power given to the District Judge is in the nature of an administrative power only. 12. The power given to the District Judge is in the nature of an administrative power only. 12. In Constitutional Law of India by H. M. Seervai, Third Edition, Volume II page 1888 paragraph 21-45 it has been stated as follows :- "It is the usual practice of Indian Legislatures to constitute authorities, and leave it to the Provincial Government to appoint persons to man and to perform the duties of those authorities. This practice is not void for excessive delegation of legislative powers." Reference in this connection has been made to the decision in Assam State v. Sristikar, AIR 1957 SC 414 . In view of the above, I do not find any force in the second submission raised by learned counsel. I am consequently of the opinion that Section 3 (e) of the Act is not ultra vires the Constitution. 13. After the filing of the writ petition an amendment application has been filed stating therein that the Prescribed Authority has already allowed the application under Section 21 of the Act by his judgment dated 13th of January, 1987 and that the petitioner has filed an appeal before the appellate authority against the said judgment. The appellate authority shall now dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. 14. In the result the petition fails and is, hereby, dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. The interim order dated 23-1-1987, is, hereby, discharged. Petition dismissed.