JUDGMENT S. C. Mathur, J. 1. Through the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners, namely, Ganesh Ganj Consumers Cooperative Store Limited, and Lalman, its alleged authorised Salesman, have prayed for quashing the First Information Report, for short, FIR, lodged at police station Aminabad, Lucknow, by Sri Radhey Shyam Srivastava, Supply Inspector, Wazirganj Division, Lucknow, under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act No. 10 of 1955), for short Act. The allegation is that provisions of U. P. Food Grains and other Essential Articles Distribution Order, 1977 have been violated and thereby offence has been committed under section 3/7 of the Act. 2. The sole ground of challenge is that the Supply Inspector did not have the requisite authorisation under section 11 of the Act, as amended in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. According to the petitioners in view of the Government Order dated 29th April, 1982, Annexure 3, no officer below the rank of a Tahsildar was competent to lodge the report, and the Supply Inspector, who lodged the report, was below the rank of Tahsildar and, therefore, he was incompetent to lodge the report. On behalf of the State competence of the Supply Inspector is pleaded with reference to the order dated 29th December, 1977 passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure B-1 to the counter-affidavit. His competence is asserted also with reference to a circular letter issued by the Secretary to U. P. Government, Food and Civil Supplies Department, on 24th August, 1981, Annexure B-2. 3. Annexure 3 is copy of a circular letter endorsed by the Anu Sachiv to the U. P. Government, Food and Civil Supplies Department, to all the District Magistrates in the State. Its heading is : "Sahkari Kshettra Ki Dookanan Kay Virudh Thane Par Partham Soochna Report Darj Kara Nay Ki Sakchharata Kay Sambandh Main." Rendered in English it would mean regarding competence for lodging First Information Report at Police Station against shops falling in the Cooperative Sector. Its heading is : "Sahkari Kshettra Ki Dookanan Kay Virudh Thane Par Partham Soochna Report Darj Kara Nay Ki Sakchharata Kay Sambandh Main." Rendered in English it would mean regarding competence for lodging First Information Report at Police Station against shops falling in the Cooperative Sector. It reads as follows:- "Uparyukt Vishai Par Mujhey Yebi Kahnay Ka Aadesh Huwa Hai Ki Shashan Nay Yeh Nirnai Liya Hai Ki Sahkari Kshettra Ki Dookanon Kay Virudh Thanay Par Pratham Soochna Report Block Astar Par Sahayak Vikas Adhikari Sahkarita Evam Anya Astaron Par Tahsildar Say Neeche Kay Astar Kay Adhikari Darj Karanany Kay Liye Saksham Na Manay Jayan." This order specifies two authorities and states that the authorities below in rank to these authorities may not be treated as competent to lodge FIR against shops falling in the Cooperative Sector. One authority is Sahayak Vikas Adhikari, Sahkarita (Assistant Development Officer, Cooperative), for short ADO and the other is Tahsildar. ADO has been mentioned in respect of shops at the Block level and Tahsildar covers the remaining shops in the Cooperative Sector. 4. The learned counsel for the State submits that the order deals with shops in the Cooperative Sector which are situated in villages and it has no application to shops situated in cities and since the shop in question is situate in the city, it is irrelevant. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the State. The order does not make any distinction with reference to villages and cities. It makes distinction with reference to shops at the Block Level and the rest of the shops. The petitioners' shop is not situated in an area covered by a Block. Therefore, the first clause is not applicable. Accordingly it is the residuary clause which will be attracted. Under the residuary clause, if this Government Order applies, the FIR should have been lodged by the Tahsilder or by an officer higher in rank to him, but not by an officer lower in rank to him. Supply Inspector is admittedly lower in rank to the Tahsildar. Before taking leave of this order, we may point out that it does not appear to have been issued in exercise of any statutory power. Atleast no statutory power has been referred to in the order. 5. Supply Inspector is admittedly lower in rank to the Tahsildar. Before taking leave of this order, we may point out that it does not appear to have been issued in exercise of any statutory power. Atleast no statutory power has been referred to in the order. 5. District Magistrate, Lucknow, has issued the order dated 29th December, 1977, Annexure B-1, in exercise of the power conferred upon him under clause 2 (c) of the U. P. Foodgrains and other Essential Articles Distribution Order, 1977- for short Control Order. Clause 2 (c) defines the term District Magistrate to "include an officer authorised in writing by the District Magistrate to perform all or any of his functions under this Order." Through the order the District Magistrate has authorised certain officers, including Supply Inspector, to exercise powers under clauses 8, 9, 10 (1), 23 and sub-clause (a), (b) and (c) of clause 25 (1) of the Order. None of these clauses deals with the lodging of FIR. The Order also does not contain specific authorisation for filing FIR. It may, however, be mentioned that the order is statutory in nature as it has been issued in exercise of power conferred under the, statutory Control Order. 6. The Circular Letter dated 24fh August, 1981, Annexure B-2, issued by the Secretary to the U. P. Government is earlier in point of time to the Circular Letter dated 29th April, 1982, Annexure 3, relied upon by the petitioner. It seeks to amend still earlier Orders dated 13th April, 1981 and 7th August, 1981. Clause 1 of the Order says that if during the checking of a fair price shop run by a Co-operative Society it comes to notice that grave irregularities have been committed, the checking authorities will determine whether the Salesman is responsible for the irregularities or the Secretary and if they come to the conclusion that the responsibility lies on the Salesman the Checking Officer may lodge FIR under provisions of the Act. It is further provided that if the Checking Officer is not one of the Officers who have been authorised to lodge a report, he will make his recommendation for lodging the report to the next officer senior to him. It is further provided that if the Checking Officer is not one of the Officers who have been authorised to lodge a report, he will make his recommendation for lodging the report to the next officer senior to him. The argument of the learned counsel for the State was that this order authorised all checking officers to lodge FIR and since the Supply Inspector was also a member of the checking squad, he could validly lodge the report. The argument of the learned counsel for the State is entirely misconceived. This order is net an order of authorisation. It only prescribes the procedure to be followed when on checking only the Salesman is found to have committed irregularities and when the Secretary is also found to be involved, and this becomes clear from the succeeding clauses. In the next clause (2) it is provided that if the Secretary is also responsible, the checking officer shall, before doing anything else, send his report to the District Magistrate. In clause (3) the procedure to be followed by the District Magistrate is mentioned. This order or Circular Letter also does not trace its origin from any statute. In other words it is non-statutory like the order dated 29th April, 1982 Annexure 3, relied upon by the petitioner. 7. From the above discussion it follows that neither of the two orders relied upon by the learned counsel [for the State deals specifically with the authorisation for lodging FIR. The only order dealing specifically with the authority to file FIR is that one filed by the petitioners, namely, the Circular Letter dated 29th April, 1982, Annexure 3. This order eliminates authorities below a certain rank and Supply Inspector is hit by this elimination. 8. Now the State's case in respect of the Circular Letter dated 29th April, 1982, Annexure 3, is that it merely lays down guidelines for day to day working of the Control Order and it cannot over-ride the provisions contained in the statutory order viz., the U. P. Foodgrains and other Essential Articles Distribution Order, 1972. At the time of arguments the learned counsel for the State placed reliance upon sub clauses (a) and (e) of clause 2 of the U. P. Foodgrains Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976, for short Licensing Order, 1976, issued under section 3 of the Act. At the time of arguments the learned counsel for the State placed reliance upon sub clauses (a) and (e) of clause 2 of the U. P. Foodgrains Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976, for short Licensing Order, 1976, issued under section 3 of the Act. Sub-clause (a) defines the term "Approved Dealer" as a "person appointed as agent (Retail) by the District Magistrate for sale of Government Foodgrains." Sub-clause (e) defines the term "Enforcement Officer." Supply Inspector is covered by the definition. Therefore, Supply Inspector is also an Enforcement Officer. Clause 14 of this order confers power of search and seizure upon the Enforcement Officers. These powers are similar to those conferred upon clause 25 of the 1977 Control Order on Food Inspectors, Deputy Town Rationing Officers and Area Rationing Officers. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 14 of the Licensing Order, 1976 and sub-clause (2) of Clause 25 of the 1977 Control Order apply the provisions of section 100 of the CrPC, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) to searches and seizures conducted under these Orders. 9. As a broad proposition of law the learned counsel for the State is correct in submitting that a statutory provision or a statutory order will prevail over a non-statutory Government Order or Circular Letter. The Circular Letter dated 29th April, 1982, Annexure 3, is indeed non-statutory as observed hereinabove. We may now consider whether it conflicts with any statutory provision or Order. 10. Under section 10-A of the; Act offences under the Act are cognizable. UNDER section 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for short Code, "cognizable offence" means an offence in which a police officer may, in accordance with the first schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. Section 41 of the Code provides that any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without warrant, arrest any person who has been concerned with any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made of is having been co-concerned. Under section 154 it is obligatory for the police to receive report of a cognizable offence and then to investigate it under section 156, Now if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the FIR in question will have to be held invalid. Under section 154 it is obligatory for the police to receive report of a cognizable offence and then to investigate it under section 156, Now if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the FIR in question will have to be held invalid. If it is invalid the police will not be bound to accept it under section 154 nor to investigate it under section 156. Thus the government order will come in conflict with the statutory provisions mentioned hereinabove. A non-statutory order of the government cannot override or nullify the statutory provisions. Therefore, the government order dated 29th April, 1982 will have to be held as merely recommendatory breach of which will not render the FIR invalid. If the FIR is not rendered invalid there is no question of quashing it. 11. There is another way of looking at the matter. Suppose the petitioner had not approached this Court at this stage but had come after conviction, could the conviction be set aside solely on the ground that the FIR was lodged by a person who did not possess the requisite authority under the government order ? Defect in the lodging of the FIR may make the investigation defective and the defect in investigation is not fatal to the prosecution in view of section 156 (2) of the Code. Lodging of FIR by a person not authorised under the government order will, therefore, lead merely to an irregularity and an irregularity does not result in either the trial or the conviction being vitiated. Further, the courts enforce law and not administrative directions. In the absence of violation of any statutory provision there will [be no basis for the court to set aside the conviction. In fact, in view of section 465 of the Code, a conviction cannot be "set aside on account of any error, omission or irregularity, in the complaint ......or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any inquiry......unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby." If the conviction on the basis of defective FIR cannot be set aside in view of these statutory provisions there is no occasion to quash the said FIR before conviction at any stage. 12. 12. Section 11 of the Act, as amended in its application to the State of U. P. does lay down that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act "except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by order of, or, under the authority from the District Magistrate or such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government by general or special order in this behalf." Order of the District Magistrate or authorisation by him is essential for taking cognizance. This is a statutory requirement. If this is breached the conviction may be set aside. But report to police is different from report to court contemplated in Section 11. In view of the above the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. Petition dismissed.