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1988 DIGILAW 7 (GAU)

Management of Muttuck Tea Estate v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Assam at Dibrugarh

1988-01-27

K.N.SAIKIA, R.K.MANISANA SINGH

body1988
By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged an award dated 10.9.76 of the Labour Court of Assam at Dibrugarh. 2. Facts of the case may shortly be stated. The manager of the Muttuck Tea Estate ( hereinafter referred to as the "management" ) charged the workman Panchooram that on 20.12.69 the workman assaulted Head Tea House Babu Manindra Mohon Bose committing thereby an act of gross misconduct under the Standing Orders. The workman was served with the charge and was asked to submit his explanation. The workman submitted explanation denying the charge. A domestic enquiry was held. On 21.1.70 the Enquiry Officer recorded his findings holding that the charges had been proved. Thereafter, the workman was dismissed from his services with effect from 3.4.72. The Union raised an industrial dispute, and the Government referred their industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court of Assam at Dibrugarh. The Labour Court heard on the question whether the domestic enquiry was vitiated or valid, as a preliminary issue. The Labour Court decided the preliminary issue holding that the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer was perverse as he had not given any reason for coming to his conclusion and also for discarding the defence evidence. The Labour Court relied on the decision in Khardah & Co. vs. The Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 719 : 1962-11 LLJ 452, in which the Supreme Court has held that the Enquiry Officer need not write a very long or elaborate report, but, since his findings are likely to lead to the dismissal of the employee, it is his duty to record clearly and precisely his conclusions and to indicate briefly his reasons for reaching the conclusions. After deciding that the domestic enquiry was defective, the Labour Court proceeded with the reference for deciding it on merits. Parties were allowed to adduce evidence. The Labour Court considered the evidence and materials on record and held that the dismissal was not justified and the workman was ordered to be reinstated with the back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement by an award dated 10.9.76. Hence this petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. The Labour Court considered the evidence and materials on record and held that the dismissal was not justified and the workman was ordered to be reinstated with the back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement by an award dated 10.9.76. Hence this petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Horn Choudhury, has contended that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to direct the parties to produce evidence to decide the reference on merits, after the Labour Court has, while deciding the preliminary issue, held that the Enquiry Officer gave reasonable opportunity to the work­ man to cross-examine the witnesses of the management and to adduce" his own evidence ; and the workman participated fully in enquiry and there was no proof of want of good faith on the part of the management; and it was not a case of victimisation. 4. In M/s. Indian Iron & Steel vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 , the Supreme Court has held: "In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is a want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse", 5. In East India Hotels vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1974 SC 696 , the Supreme Court has held : ''When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the enquiry is unair or the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, reappraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, reappraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give on opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action } and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. Once misconduct is proved, either in the enquiry conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh and oppressive." 6. In Cooper Engneering vs. P. P. Mundhe, AIR 1975 SC 1900 : (1975) 2 SCC 66, the Supreme- Court has held : "We are, therefore, clearly, of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour Court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay I in industrial adjudjcation. 7. Keeping the above decisions in view, law for the purpose of disposal of the present case, can be summarised as follows. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay I in industrial adjudjcation. 7. Keeping the above decisions in view, law for the purpose of disposal of the present case, can be summarised as follows. When a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee or a workman is referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether domestic enquiry was valid or vitiated. If the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is perverse, or, if there is any basic error in the approach adopted by him, the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to hold that the domestic enquiry is vitiated or defective and to decide it on merits. 8. In the present case, although the Labour Court has held that the inquiry was not unfair and the management was not guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafide, the Labour Court has held that the enquiry was defective as the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer was perverse for the reason that the Enquiry Officer has not given his reason for coming to the conclusion and for discarding the defence evidence. For our own satisfaction, we have perused the findings of the Enquiry Officer. We are of theview that the Labour Court has rightly held that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer was perverse. The Enquiry Officer only reproduced the evidence of the witnesses in his own words and his observations in connection with the local inspection made by him and then, without giving any reason and without evaluating the evidence of the parties, abruptly came to the conclusion that after having carefully read the recorded proceeding and evidence laid before him, he was satisfied that the charges had been fully proved. Since the domestic enquiry was invalid, we are of the view that the Labour Court was to decide the reference on merits. 9. The learned counsel for the managment has further submitted that in a similar case between the management and its another workman, this Court decided in favour of the management. The learned counsel has referred us to the decision of this Court in CR No. 143 of 1973, Management of Muttuck Tea Estate vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court. We called for the records for our perusal. The learned counsel has referred us to the decision of this Court in CR No. 143 of 1973, Management of Muttuck Tea Estate vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court. We called for the records for our perusal. It appears from the record that, according to the management, the workman in the present case and another workman Ganesh Barhoi assaulre the Head Tea House Babu Monidra Mohan Bose at the same time, at the same place and on the same day viz. 20.12.69, and each of them was charged individually and separate enquiries were held. Ganesh was dismissed from the services with effect from 6.2.70 and the Union raised industrial dispute, and the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. The Labour Court, while deciding preliminary issue as to whether the domestic enquiry was valid or vitiated, entered into the merits of the case and gaveitse decision as an appellate Court by re-appraising the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer and interfered with the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer. In that context, this Court held : "In the instant case, the learned Labour Court has found that the domestic enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thus, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the domestic enquiry. The learned Labour Court has not found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated due to victimisation or unfair labour practice. The learned Labour Court has also not found that the finding of the domestic enquiry is perverse, or, in other words, there is no evidence to that effect. What the learned Labour Court has found is that the evidence is either not sufficient to justify the conclusion arrived at or there may be some other interpre­tation of the evidence contrary to the finding in the domestic enquiry. But this is exactly what is discouraged by the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court. It cannot be said that in the instant case the management had no evidence or material before it in the domestic enqutiry to come to the finding which it has arrived at being so, the finding in the domestic enquiry cannot be said to be perverse. It cannot be said that in the instant case the management had no evidence or material before it in the domestic enqutiry to come to the finding which it has arrived at being so, the finding in the domestic enquiry cannot be said to be perverse. The learned Labour Court has " thus committed an error of law in directing the management to adduce evidence on merits." Emphasis added The above-quoted passage shows that this Court has clearly held that the Labour Court did not find that the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer in the domestic enquiry was perverse, and that the Labour Court re-appraised the evidence an appellate Court. In that case, the Enquiry Officer also rightly or wrongly gave his reasons for his conclusions. But in the present case, the Labour Court did not discuss the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer, and the preliminary issue was decided on the face of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, the decision in that case was on its own facts, and is not applicable to the present case. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. No costs.