P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application is for issuance of writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other writ declaring Sec. 35 as void ultra vires and infringing upon the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 14 21 and 300a of the Constitution of India and to declare the action under Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as illegal and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under the Constitution. ( 2 ) THE short facts of the case for the purpose of disposal of this case are that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission which was established by an Act of 1959 for the development of petroleum resources and the production and sale of petroleum and petroleum products has its Regional Offices at Baroda and Ankleshwar. In order to safeguard the project at Ankleshwar and other places the Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs has sanctioned the creation of temporary posts of 289 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) mainly for the security coverage of the Ankleshwar Project. In order to provide buildings for these people to stay the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Ankleshwar project made a proposal to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for O. N G. C. dated 20/04/1987 for temporary acquisition of land under Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 The area required for this temporary acquisition is 5 hectares 54 acres and 87 Sq. Mts. situated in Ankleshwar. It has been made clear in the accompanying letter to the proposal that the land is required in the first instance for a period of one year. On the basis of this proposal the Land Acquisition Officer after satisfying himself granted permission under Sec. 35 for temporary occupation of this land and fixed the annual rent at Rs. 11 20. 45 ps. to be paid by the acquiring body which is O. N. G. C. Such an Award was declared on 13-7-1987 by the Land Acquisition Officer O. N. G. C. project Ankleshwar and it has been made clear in that award that the acquiring body has to give possession to the person interested after the term is over and that the acquiring body is also liable to pay damages if any done to the land. Thus we find that the award initially granted possession of the land under Sec. 35 of the Act to the O. N. G. G. for a period of one year. Questioning this order the petitioner who is the owner of the said land and who has put this land for the personal use to rear number of buffaloes has filed this Special Civil Application and wants a declaration that Sec. 35 is void ultra vires and infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 14 and 21 and also the right of the petitioner under Art. 300a of the Constitution. ( 3 ) MR. R N. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that Sec. 35 authorises the requisition of the land for limited period only and inasmuch as the affidavit-in-reply spells out that the acquiring body is intending to acquire the land permanently under the Land Acquisition Act the order under Sec. 35 has to be quashed since there is a fraud upon the statute. It is further contended by Mr. Shah that the Land Acquisition Officer has Dot applied his mind in granting the possession under Sec. 35 when especially the acquiring body wants it permanently for housing the security staff. It is the further contention of Mr. Shah that under the guise of Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act the land of the petitioner cannot be taken possession of and subjected to the acquisition under the land acquisition proceedings by invoking Secs. 4 6 etc. Finally Mr. R. N. Shah submits that it offends Art. 300a of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the argument of Mr. R. N. Shah it is necessary for us to state the relevant provisions in the Act whereby these lands have been temporarily allowed to be occupied by the O. N. G. C. Section 35 of the Act reads as follows:"35. Temporary occupation of land. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the argument of Mr. R. N. Shah it is necessary for us to state the relevant provisions in the Act whereby these lands have been temporarily allowed to be occupied by the O. N. G. C. Section 35 of the Act reads as follows:"35. Temporary occupation of land. Procedure when difference as to compensation exist :- 11) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the temporary occupation and use of any land are needed for any public purpose or for a Company the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for such term as it shall think fit not exceeding three years from the commencement of such occupation. (2) The Collector shall thereupon give notice in writing to the persons interested in such land of the purpose for which the same is needed and shall for the occupation and use thereof for such term as aforesaid and for the materials (if any) to be taken therefrom; pay to them such compensation either in a gross sum of money or by monthly or other periodical payments as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively. (3) In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or apportionment thereof the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court. "section 36 of the Act reads as follows:" 36 Power to enter and take possession and compensation on restoration: (1)ON payment of such compensation or on execution of such agreement or on making a reference under Sec. 35 the Collector may enter upon and take possession of the land and use or permit the use thereof in accordance with the terms of the said notice. (2) On the expiration of the term the Collector shall make or tender to the persons interested compensation for the damage (if 2ny) done to the land and not provided for by the agreement and shall restore the land to the persons interested therein;provided that if the land has become permanently unfit to be used for the purpose for which it was used immediately before the commencement of such term and if the persons interested shall so require the appropriate Government shall proceed under this Act to acquire the land as if it was needed permanently for a public purpose or for a Company. " ( 5 ) MR. Hawa the learned Counsel appearing for the Government i. e. respondents Nos. 2 and 3 states that the decisions cited by Mr. R. N. Shah in the case of Siri Chand v. State reported in AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 424 in the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 and in the case of Jiwani Kumar v. Ist Land Acquisition Officer Calcutta reported in AIR 1984 SC 1707 can have no application to the facts of the present case nor can they be cited since the temporary occupation is under Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act in the present case while those cases deal with different statutes. Mr. Rajni Mehta the learned Counsel appearing for the O. N. G. C. in this connection points out the decision in the case of Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State reported in AIR 1957 SC 521 and states that for interpreting Sec. 35 the interpretation rendered by the Courts in different statutes cannot be taken as an analogy to spell out that the acquisition under Sec. 35 for temporary occupation is fraud upon the statute. Mr. R. N. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently argued that the acquiring body i. e. O. N. G. C. has specifically stated in paragraph 5 of its affidavit-in-reply that they are intending to acquire the land permanently by initiating proceeding under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and that preliminary notification under the said section would be punished very soon. The learned Counsel also points out that permanent constructions are being made for housing the security staff and hence the land ought to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and should not have been occupied by invoking the provisions of Sec. 35 of the Act. The learned Counsel also points out the averments in the affidavit-in-reply to the effect that due to the urgency the land was acquired on temporary basis and proceedings are being initiated for acquiring them permanently for the purpose of accommodating the 289 personnel of the Central Industrial Security Force and for constructing dwelling houses for them. It is clear from Sec. 35 if the Land Acquisition Act that the appropriate Government has ample pouter to acquire for temporary occupation any land for public purposes In this case the procedure has been correctly followed and the appropriate Government has temporarily put in occupation the acquiring body for a period of one year and has also fixed the rent as per the provisions of the Act. Section 36 of the Act clearly gives power to enter and take possession and for compensation on restoration. Mr. R. N. Shah cited the decision in the case of Siri Chand v. State reported in AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 424 for his proposition that Sec. 35 ought not to have been invoked since it is one intention of the acquiring body to occupy the land permanently. The decision cited by him cannot have any bearing to the facts of this case. Whatever may be the intention of the acquiring body that cannot be attributed to the Government which his passed orders under Sec. 35. In the said decision the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that in exercise of powers under Secs. 35 and 36 for temporary occupation of the land provisions of Sec. 17 do not apply. Proceeding further the High Court held:"provisions of Part II of the Land Acquisition Act in which Secs. 4 to 17 occur and which deal with permanent acquisition of land are not relevant for cases of temporary occupation of land which are separately and distinctly provided for in Secs 35 and 36 in Part VI of the Act. Section 35 is a self-contained provision applicable to cases of temporary occupation and the procedure for compensation is different from the one prescribed for cases of permanent acquisition. Section 35 is a self-contained provision applicable to cases of temporary occupation and the procedure for compensation is different from the one prescribed for cases of permanent acquisition. While in the former it is primarily based on agreement of the parties failing which the Collector himself refers the difference for decision to the Court under Sec. 35 (3 ). the latter results in an award under Sec. 12 and a reference to the Court under Sec. 18. Proviso to sub-sec. (r) of Sec. 35 which entitles the land owner to compel the State to acquire the land permanently if the land temporarily occupied has been rendered unfit for his purposes further confirms the above. In this case relating to temporary occupation of the land for removing the earth therefrom the Notification invoking and applying provisions of Sec. 17 was held to be unsustainable. " ( 6 ) THUS it is clear that the said decision cannot have any bearing to the facts of the present case and in the present case the occupation is for a temporary period and the order has been made only for a period of one year by respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The next decision cited by Mr. R. N. Shah is the one in the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 . In this case the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the Bombay Land Requisition Act. Another case cited by Mr. R. N. Shah is the one in the case of Jiwani Kumar v. Ist Land Acquisition Officer Calcutta reported in AIR 1984 SC 1707 . In this case the section interpreted is the one that occurred in W. B. Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision) Act (5 of 1947) Both the cases deal with the Requisition Acts passed by the respective states for the purpose of taking possession of a building by the Government for a temporary period. In this case the section interpreted is the one that occurred in W. B. Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision) Act (5 of 1947) Both the cases deal with the Requisition Acts passed by the respective states for the purpose of taking possession of a building by the Government for a temporary period. In that connection the Supreme Court held:" If the public purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises in such a case the order of requisition if passed would be a fraud upon the statute for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when really speaking they want the premises for acquisition the object of taking the 9 premises being not transitory but permanent in character. "it has been further observed by the Supreme Court that:"if requisitioning of property could legitimately continue for an indefinite period of time the distinction between requisition and acquisition would tend to become blurred because in that event for all practical purposes the right to possession and enjoyment of the property which constitutes a major constituent element of the right of ownership would be vested indefinitely without any limitation of time in the requisitioning authority and it would be possible for the authority to substantially take over the property without acquiring it and paying full market value as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1894" ( 7 ) THE facts of those cases clearly establish that the Government which has taken over a building continued for decades in spite of the fact that they did it under the Requisitioning Act. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned it is very clear that the acquiring authority itself wanted the disputed land for a temporary period for housing the Central Industrial Security Force and for that purpose they invoked Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act and has specifically stated that the land is required in the first instance only for a period of one year. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who passed the order under Sec. 35 have made it very clear that taking over the land is only for a temporary period of one year and has also fixed up the rent payable therefor Mr. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who passed the order under Sec. 35 have made it very clear that taking over the land is only for a temporary period of one year and has also fixed up the rent payable therefor Mr. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner puts stress on the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Ist respondent to the effect that they are invoking the land acquisition proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the land permanently. This argument has no substance since the land has been put in possession of the acquiring body by the order of the 2nd and 3rd respondents who have made it very clear that it is only a temporary taking over on a specified rent under Sec. 35 of the Act. Even assuming that there is an averment to the effect that the acquiring body is moving the Government for acquiring these lands under the Land Acquisition Act by making Sec. 4 notification the said proceedings will be independent proceedings de hors the possession taken under Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act. If the petitioner is in any way aggrieved by such permanent acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act he has ample remedy for the purpose of questioning the same if he makes out a case in the proper forum. The fact that the requiring body is intending to have the land permanently cannot in any way make the order passed under Sec. 35 by the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who have genuinely passed the order only for the temporary possession of the land illegal. Such an order passed by the 2rd and 3rd respondents cannot also be termed as a fraud on the statute. ( 8 ) IN this connection we can also mention that the petitioner has also filed Civil Suit No. 298 of 1987 on the file of the Civil Judge (J. D.) Ankleshwar for permanent injunction restraining the 1st respondent from putting up any construction. Originally injunction was granted but as on date it stands vacated and the main Suit is pending. ( 9 ) THE question of vires as if Sec. 35 offends Art. 300a of the Constitution has not been substantiated by Mr. Originally injunction was granted but as on date it stands vacated and the main Suit is pending. ( 9 ) THE question of vires as if Sec. 35 offends Art. 300a of the Constitution has not been substantiated by Mr. R. N. Shah except stating that the intention of the acquiring body is to have the land permanently and to put them in possession of the land under Sec. 35 by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has to be construed as a fraud upon the statute. Section 35 which we have extracted above makes it clear that the land can be put in the temporary occupation for any public purpose. The maximum period for invoking this Section to make the person concerned to occupy the land cannot exceed a period of three years. Section 35 and also Sec. 36 as we have extracted above clearly prescribe the procedure for taking possession of the land and also and prescribe compensation and also damages if any that can be claimed by the owner of the land. Section 36 clearly provides in its proviso that if the land has become permanently unfit to be used for the purpose for which it was used immediately before the commencement of such term and if the persons interested shall so require the appropriate Government shall proceed under this Act to acquire the land as if it was needed permanently for a public purpose or for a Company. Reading the Section as a whole and also the purpose for which the said Section has been introduced it cannot be said that Sec. 35 in any way offends Art. 300a of the Constitution and there is absolutely no substance in this contention. The analogy Mr. R. N. Shah wants us to draw from the decisions cited by him as if there is a fraud on the statute cannot be sustained since Sec. 35 is intra vires the Constitution and has been invoked by the 2nd and 3rd respondents only for a temporary period in order to enable the acquiring authority to house its security staff. R. N. Shah wants us to draw from the decisions cited by him as if there is a fraud on the statute cannot be sustained since Sec. 35 is intra vires the Constitution and has been invoked by the 2nd and 3rd respondents only for a temporary period in order to enable the acquiring authority to house its security staff. It is well settled as laid down in the case of Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State reported in AIR 1957 SC 521 that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be applied with reference to the provisions of another statute which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject-matter of the previous decision The decisions referred by Mr. Shah pertain to the Requisitioning Act of the various states while the Section involved in this case is under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 Thus from the foregoing discussion it is very clear that the order passed by the 2nd and 3rd respondents is genuine one and does not offend any of the Articles of the Constitution. It is clear from the discussions we have made above that Sec. 35 of the Land Acquisition Act is intended for serving a public purpose with sufficient safeguards and it cannot be said that it offends Art. 300a of the Constitution. For all these reasons this Special Civil Application is dismissed. ( 10 ) MR. R. N. Shah wants us to pass an order restraining the 1st respondent from putting up any construction on the disputed land upto 10 of February 1988 in order to enable the petitioner to get appropriate orders from the Supreme Court Taking the representation into consideration there will be an order restraining the 1st respondent from putting up any further construction on the land uptill 8/02/1988 rule discharged. .