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1988 DIGILAW 7 (HP)

COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION IN STATE OF H. P. v. HAZARA SINGH

1988-03-17

R.S.THAKUR

body1988
JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This suo motu revision petition has been taken up by this Court against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Chamba, on October 30, 1985. The order being a brief one is reproduced hereunder:— "Present.—Complainant in person. Complainant wants to make statement. Be recorded. As per the statement of the complainant, the complaint is dismissed as withdrawn. Be consigned to the record room. Sd/- (Inder Ram) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba." 2. The brief facts of the case are that Sh. Man Mohan Nayyar, Labour Inspector, Chamba Circle in Chamba District of Himachal Pradesh filed a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, on June 13, 1985, with the allegations that the respondent-accused Hazara Singh had employed 44 migrant workmen on a building construction work as sub-contractor in Chamera Project at Chelli (Ranikhet) in District Chamba in violation of the provisions of section 8 and Rule 7 of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, (hereinafter called as the Act 1979f), and the rules framed thereunder. On the registration of this complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ordered the issuance of summons to the respondent/ accused for August 19, 1985. When the case was taken up on that day, the respondent-accused had not been served and the case was then adjourned to September 23, 1985 with the direction to issue fresh summons on correct address to be supplied by the complainant. On the next hearing, as the order-sheet discloses, the correct address as directed, had not been supplied by the complainant but he prayed that summons be given to him ‘dasti’ for service upon the accused/respondent which was accordingly done and the case was fixed for October 30, 1985, when the impugned order was passed, after the complainant made the following statement to the Court on the same day : "Stated that accused Hazara Singh has left the work and his where-abouts are not known. As such the complaint be dismissed as withdrawn." 3. I have heard the learned Deputy Advocate General and after taking into consideration the legal and factual sides of the case in hand feel no doubt whatsoever that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has committed an illegality in passing the impugned order which thus merits interference by this Court. As such the complaint be dismissed as withdrawn." 3. I have heard the learned Deputy Advocate General and after taking into consideration the legal and factual sides of the case in hand feel no doubt whatsoever that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has committed an illegality in passing the impugned order which thus merits interference by this Court. In the first place the learned trial Court has erred in holding in the order-sheet of June 14, 1985, that prima facie offence under sections 12/25 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, was committed by the accused. As a matter of fact the complaint before him was for violating the provisions of section 8 of the Act, 1979 and Rule 7 of the rules framed thereunder which act was punishable under section 25 of the Act, 1979 and the learned trial Court thus cited the wrong statute and the provisions thereof. 4. The second question that arises for determination is whether it was permissible under law to pass the impugned order? The reply to the poser is clearly in the negative. Admittedly, the complaint in question was under the provisions of section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code and since it was a complaint by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, therefore, the learned Court after applying its mind to the accusations in the complaint itself straightway resorted to the provisions of section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code when the summons were ordered to be issued to the respondent/ accused. It is also clear that the case in hand was required to be tried as a summons case under Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code Now having regard to the provisions of sections 200 and 204 and the provisions of the other sections in Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code it becomes clear that once the Magistrate orders the issuance of appropriate process to the accused under section 204, Cr. P. C, there is no provision for withdrawal of the case against the accused except under section 257 thereof which reads as under : — "Section 257. P. C, there is no provision for withdrawal of the case against the accused except under section 257 thereof which reads as under : — "Section 257. Withdrawal of complaint.—If a complainant, at any time before a final order is passed in any case under this Chapter, satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint against the accused, or if there be more than one accused, against all or any of them, the Magistrate may permit him to withdraw the same, and shall thereupon acquit the accused against whom the complaint is so withdrawn." The provisions of this section clearly indicate that resort can be had to them only if the accused has attended the Court in response to the process issued by it and the trial against him has commenced but has not reached the stage of final order. Even in such a situation it is enjoined upon the Court to determine through a speaking order whether the complainant who wishes to withdraw the complaint against all or any of the accused, has shown sufficient grounds to its satisfaction before according permission for such withdrawal. In the instant case, obviously, this stage had not reached. As a matter of fact the accused had not even attended the Court in response to the summons issued by the Court and simply because the complainant in his statement stated that the whereabouts of the respondent-accused were unknown to him, could not be a legal ground to permit him to withdraw the complaint and the impugned order is thus obviously vitiated by an illegality. 5. In view of the above, the revision is allowed. The order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated October 30, 1985 is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba for fresh trial of the case in accordance with law in light of the observations made hereinabove. 6. This Court is at some pains to observe that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has failed to devote the amount of care and attention that the proceedings of this nature deserved. 6. This Court is at some pains to observe that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has failed to devote the amount of care and attention that the proceedings of this nature deserved. The Court was expected to be alive to the fact that the proceedings it was seized of, were under a statute which was meant for the benefit of the lowest strata of the society, namely, labour class and enacted to save it from exploitation at the hands of ruthless employers or contractors. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Courts of law to see that the provisions of such a statute are strictly complied with and the violation thereof should invite deterrent punishment at their hands. It is, therefore, expected that in future the trial Court would not treat the cases of this nature in a casual manner as has been done in the case in hand. Order accordingly.