JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, Actg. C. J.—Shri S. D. Gulzar was taken on transfer as Personal Asstt.-cum-Judgment Writer in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, with effect from January 1, 1964. He was posted in the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court on May 1, 1967 as a Judgment Writer. The status of a Class II Gazetted Private Secretary was given to him with effect from December 30, 1967 through a Notification of the Delhi High Court dated January 23, 1968. He continued as a Class II Gazetted Private Secretary, after the setting up of the Himachal Pradesh High Court with effect from January 25, 1971, till he retired (on April 30, 1988). The present writ petition was filed by Shri Gulzar on September 12, 1978. In it, he assailed the order dated July 31, 1978, by which selection grade was granted to some of the respondents to the petition, though it was not granted to him. 2. The provision for grant of selection grade to its employees was made by the Government of Himachal Pradesh through an order dated July 31, 1976, with effect from July 7, 1976. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana also made a provision in the High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1973, for grant of selection grade, inter alia, to Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries through a Notification published in the Chandigarh Administration Gazette dated July 1, 1977. On September 19, 1977, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh addressed a letter to the Government of Himachal Pradesh with a request that incumbents of the posts of Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents, both permanent and temporary, which had been in existence for three years, be allowed selection grade to the extent of 20% of the posts. On September 29, 1977, the Government of Himachal Pradesh addressed a letter to the High Court, in reply to the letter aforesaid, seeking a complete proposal for grant of selection grade to all the eligible categories of the staff on the analogy of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and also asking for the total number of posts in each category and number of posts proposed for the grant of selection grade, together with the financial implications involved in the matter, to be communicated to it. The High Court wrote back on December 7, 1977. The High Court wrote back on December 7, 1977. It said that on the pattern of the contemporary staff of the Punjab and Haryana High Court the three distinct classes of the staff, namely, Readers, Private Secretaries and Superintendents were eligible for the grant of selection grade and requested that "selection grade for three posts, namely, Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents, as given below,…………………..be ordered to be released separately for each category and the approval of the Government in this behalf communicated……………….”. In a tabular chart was mentioned in this letter the number of posts and the release of selection grade was requested category-wise on the Punjab pattern in respect of one post each of Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents. Some clarification was sought by the State Government through its letter of February 27, 1978, which was furnished by the High Court to it through its communication of March 28, 1978. In this letter again the High Court made a request that the orders of the Government granting selection grade to each of the categories of Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries with effect from July 7, 1976, on the Punjab pattern be issued, after furnishing the information asked for by the Government in some detail. The State Government then issued an Office Memorandum dated June 16, 1978, which read thus:— "Government of Himachal Pradesh (Finance Department) (Regulation Section) No. 18/3/71-Fin-Reg. II Simla 171002, dated the 16th June, 1978. OFFICE MEMORANDUM Subject: Introduction of Selection Grade in the cadre of Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers of High Court of Himachal Pradesh, The Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to sanction selection grade of Rs. 900-1100 to the Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents of High Court of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 7-7-1976 subject to the condition that the amount of the arrears upto 31-1-1978 will not be paid in cash but credited to the General Provident Fund Account of the individual concerned, on two years non-withdrawal basis. The selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents which have been in existence for 3 years or more. 2. Hindi version of the above is also enclosed. Sd/- (R. C Kushesh) Deputy Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh." 3. It is after the issuance of this office memorandum that the question of grant of selection grade was considered by the High Court. 2. Hindi version of the above is also enclosed. Sd/- (R. C Kushesh) Deputy Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh." 3. It is after the issuance of this office memorandum that the question of grant of selection grade was considered by the High Court. Then followed the order dated July 31, 1978, which is under challenge in this petition. 4. The grievance of petitioner Gulzar is generally founded upon the principles mentioned in the office memorandum dated March 1, 1977, issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in the matter of grant of selection grades. Its copy has been filed by him as Annexure-PH to the petition. In its relevant part this office memorandum says that the Government had decided that while releasing selection grade in respect of all the categories of posts/services (except All India Services, Himachal Administrative Services, Himachal Police Services and Himachal Judicial Services), the principles and procedure to be followed was that: (1) the selection grade shall be released on the basis of seniority-cum- merit subject to rejection of unfit; (2) the minimum service for the release of selection grade 10 years or service equivalent to 2/3rd of span of the pay scale in the service or post concerned whichever is less. For the purpose of calculation of 2/3rd of the span, half or more than half year will be rounded upto one year whereas less than half year will be ignored. 5. What was urged by Shri D. K. Khanna, appearing for petitioner Gulzar, in the main was that both the above principles were ignored by the High Court in releasing selection grade, apart from the fact that the High Court erroneously took the view that Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries constituted separate categories though, in reality, they constituted a single cadre. In other words, what was emphasised on behalf of the petitioner was that the principle of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit should have been the guiding factor for the grant of selection grade and not merit-cum-seniority which was the basis on which the High Court examined the question of the grant of selection grade. In other words, what was emphasised on behalf of the petitioner was that the principle of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit should have been the guiding factor for the grant of selection grade and not merit-cum-seniority which was the basis on which the High Court examined the question of the grant of selection grade. Also, that the High Court committed an error in ignoring the length of service of the various respondents to whom it had granted the selection grade and thus released the selection grade in favour of persons who were not eligible, having regard to their length of service, therefor. It was further emphasised that, inasmuch as, the grant of selection grade involved an increased financial burden, the High Court could not legitimately have treated Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries as distinct categories for purposes of determining the number of posts which would have the benefit of selection grade. Thus construed, three posts came to have the benefit of selection grade though having regard to the total number of permanent and temporary posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries, taking them as forming one cadre, the number of posts in the selection grade could only be two when 20% of these posts were to be treated as entitled to be in the selection grade. 6. Taking up the last contention first, we may recall that in the various letters exchanged between the High Court and the State Government to which a reference has already been made by us, (their copies having been filed as Annexures R-l/A to R-l/F to the reply filed on behalf of the High Court in the writ petition) the consistent stand taken by the High Court was that the posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries were of different categories and that selection grade be released separately for each category. The Government had also specifically required the High Court (through its letter of September 29, 1977, Annexure-R-1/C) to mention the total number of posts in each category and the number of posts proposed for the grant of selection grade. The Government had also specifically required the High Court (through its letter of September 29, 1977, Annexure-R-1/C) to mention the total number of posts in each category and the number of posts proposed for the grant of selection grade. In its later letter of February 27, 1978, the Government had pointed out to the High Court that from the Notifica tion dated June 11, 1977, issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana it appeared that the post of Private Secretaries was not covered and that the provisions of Rules 8, 9 and 10 in that notification were only in respect of Superintendents and Readers. Also, that the particular date from which the Government of India had sanctioned selection grade for the post of Private Secretaries, Superintendents and Readers in the Punjab and Haryana High Court be furnished to it. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh gave this information to the Government of Himachal Pradesh through its letter dated March 28,1978. Then came the office memorandum (Annexure-PG to the petition) of June 16, 1978. 7. A look at the office memorandum of June 16, 1978, would show that the decision conveyed through it was that "selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents which have been in existence for 3 years or more". In terms, therefore, the sanction of selection grade was to 20% posts of the three categories. It was not confined to 20% posts of the combined strength of the three categories as was suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner on account of the use of oblique between the words Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents in the office memorandum. The form in which the office memorandum was issued by the Government, having regard to the earlier correspondence between it and the High Court, makes it clear that it was not intended by the State Government that 20% posts of the combined strength of the three categories will be in the selection grade. If it had that intention, it would have said so in the office memorandum itself. 8. Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the opening part of the office memorandum where it mentions that the subject of the office memorandum was "introduction of selection grade in the cadre of Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers of High Court of Himachal Pradesh". 8. Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the opening part of the office memorandum where it mentions that the subject of the office memorandum was "introduction of selection grade in the cadre of Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers of High Court of Himachal Pradesh". He urged that this indicated that notwithstanding the demand made by the High Court for the grant of selection grade separately in respect of each category, the State Government chose to do so in respect of a combined cadre" of these posts. This submission is not sound. Firstly, the office memorandum does not contain any such indication in its body. Secondly, cadre as defined in Fundamental Rule 9 (4) means "the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit". The High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975, (framed under Article 229 of the Constitution and in force with effect from January 10, 1976), contains a clear indication that the posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries are treated as being in separate cadres. A "Court servant" has been defined in Rule 3 (c) to mean "an officer or servant appointed, or borne on the cadre of the staff of the High Court shown in the First Schedule as amended from time to time", Schedule I appended to the Rules deals with permanent posts. It refers to Superintendents (serial No. 4), Private Secretaries (serial Nos. 5 and 6) and Readers (serial No. 7) separately, (though in the same scale of pay) and specifies the number of permanent posts in each category. For purposes of the definition of cadre, as contained in Fundamental Rule 9 (4), the number of posts in these categories which have been sanctioned as separate units will be deemed to constitute a cadre. The distinction between these three posts, having regard to qualifications therefor and the mode of recruitment thereto, including the source of recruitment, becomes more than clear when one looks at Schedule II appended to the Rules. One has only to look at entries 5 (Superintendents), 6 (Private Secretaries), and 7 (Readers), Rule 10 (b) (i) (as it then stood) provided that seniority shall be determined separately for each category of posts carrying the same grade of pay. By its Explanation, this Rule gives equivalence to the Personal Asstt. One has only to look at entries 5 (Superintendents), 6 (Private Secretaries), and 7 (Readers), Rule 10 (b) (i) (as it then stood) provided that seniority shall be determined separately for each category of posts carrying the same grade of pay. By its Explanation, this Rule gives equivalence to the Personal Asstt. to the Registrar with Assistants and to Junior Translators with clerks. The provision contained in Rule 12 that "incumbents of posts carrying corresponding scales and grades of pay shall be subject to inter se transfer to be effected in the discretion of the Chief Justice", cannot be read as providing equivalence to the three categories or making them part of the same cadre as canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. This Rule only provides for their inter-changeability solely for administrative convenience. 9. The fact that the State Government has not raised any objection till now to the grant of selection grade to incumbents of one post each in the three categories separately also makes it abundantly clear that it had sanctioned release of selection grade to 20% of posts in each of the categories separately as asked for by the High Court. The consequence of the acceptance of the submission made on behalf of petitioner Gulzar on this aspect of the case would be a reduction in the number of the posts in selection grade. It would not be desirable, after the lapse of a period of over ten years, to accept an interpretation of the office memorandum dated June 16, 1978, (Annexure-FG), which may result in that consequence, 10. The plea that it was not open to the High Court to depart from the principles contained in the office memorandum dated March L 1977, (Annexure-PH to the petition) may now be examined. The two principles in this office memorandum, as noticed earlier, are that selection grade is to be released on the basis of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit and that the minimum service for the release of selection grade should be ten years or service equivalent to 2/3rd of span of the pay scale in the service or post concerned whichever is less. 11. The office memorandum of June 16, 1978, (Annexure-PG) does not contain any reference to the office memorandum of March 1, 1977, (Annexure-PH). 11. The office memorandum of June 16, 1978, (Annexure-PG) does not contain any reference to the office memorandum of March 1, 1977, (Annexure-PH). It also does not say that the grant of selection grade would be subject to any condition, apart from the fact that the amount of arrears upto January 31, 1978, would not be paid in cash but would be credited to the General Provident Fund Account of the concerned on two years non-withdrawal basis. All that this office memorandum provides is that the selection grade would be admissible to 20% of posts. It is true, as pointed out on behalf of the petitioner, that in its letter of August 17, 1978, (Annexure-PN) the State Government had requested the High Court to intimate it whether the general principles and procedure laid down by the State Government in the office memorandum dated March 1, 1977, for release of selection grade to individual government servants, had been kept in view by the High Court while issuing the impugned notification of July 31, 1978 or not. Also, that if they had not been kept in view, the notification will have to be withdrawn. The High Court sent a reply to this letter on September 14, 1978, (Annexure PO. In this reply it is mentioned that the principles contained in the office memorandum of March 1, 1977, were brought to the notice of the Chief Justice who had kept them in view while making appointments to the selection grade posts "but appointments to the selection grade posts were made by the Honble Chief Justice on the basis of merit-cum-seniority". A copy of the reply was also endorsed to the Under Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh with reference to his letter dated August 4, 1978. By this letter a reminder had been issued by the Government to the Registrar of the High Court in respect of the information sought through the letter dated August 17, 1978. The State Government did not pursue the matter any further, nor insisted upon the withdrawal of the notification dated July 31, 1978, (Annexure PJ) by which selection grade to some of the respondents had been granted by the High Court, as per the proposal contained in its letter of August 17, 1978. The State Government did not pursue the matter any further, nor insisted upon the withdrawal of the notification dated July 31, 1978, (Annexure PJ) by which selection grade to some of the respondents had been granted by the High Court, as per the proposal contained in its letter of August 17, 1978. The State Government thus acquiesced in the view taken by the Chief Justice in regard to the basis on which grant of selection grade was to be made. 12. During the hearing of the petition the original records relating to the grant of selection grade, as also the further correspondence between the High Court and the Government in that regard, was placed before us by the learned Counsel, appearing for the High Court, as desired by us. Our attention was, in particular, drawn to three letters. Copies of these letters were also made available to the learned Counsel for the petitioner under our direction. The first of these letters was the one dated October 7, 1978. It had been sent by the State Government to the Registrar of the Court with reference to the High Courts letter of September 14, 1978. The Government had desired, through this letter, that copies of the orders of the grant of selection grade be forwarded to it. Also, the date of appointment of the persons to whom selection grade has been granted, in the previous grade as also the basic salary of each of them on the date of the grant of selection grade, was requested to be intimated to the Government. No objection, whatsoever, was made by the Government in this letter to the grant of selection grade to the persons concerned. A reminder to this letter of October 7, 1978, was also sent by the Government through its letter of November 17, 1978, to the High Court. The High Court wrote back to the Government, with reference to the letters of October 7 and November 17, 1978, to the State Government, on November 27, 1978. Along with this letter (No. HHC/Admn. 3 (13)/74-V-8078, dated November 27, 1978) the information asked for by the Government was furnished in the form of a statement which accompanied the letter. The High Court wrote back to the Government, with reference to the letters of October 7 and November 17, 1978, to the State Government, on November 27, 1978. Along with this letter (No. HHC/Admn. 3 (13)/74-V-8078, dated November 27, 1978) the information asked for by the Government was furnished in the form of a statement which accompanied the letter. In this statement the names of the persons to whom selection grade had been granted were mentioned separately category-wise and the dates of the appointment of each of them in the old scale and in the selection grade were also shown. The basic pay in the old scale, on the date of the grant of selection grade, was also mentioned in this statement in respect of each of the officers, The State Government did not, even thereafter, raise any objection to the grant of selection grade to respondents. They have not done so till now. 13. The grant of selection grade to the officers of the High Court of the category to which petitioner Gulzar and the respondents in the petition belong is not governed by any statutory rules. It is governed only by executive instructions. Article 229 of the Constitution enables the Chief Justice to lay down the norms on which selection grade may be granted. As far as the High Court of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, the question of grant of selection grade was considered by Chief Justice R. S. Pathak as far back as in March, 1977. The Office Memorandum dated March 1, 1977, was placed before him. On March 5, 1977, he recorded a note on the relevant file saying: "Perused Government Memorandum No. PEP (AP-JI)-B (Ll)-l/76, dated 1st March, 1977. Selection grade to be allowed on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. Sd/- R. S. Pathak, C. J. 5-3-1977." 14. The matter appears to have been discussed by the Chief Justice with T. U. Mehta, J. On March 9, 1977, a note was recorded by the Chief Justice that he had discussed the matter of adopting a principle for the grant of selection grades and that "the principle in all cases should be merit- cum-seniority". The matter appears to have been considered further by the Court after the State Government had sanctioned selection grade to the posts of Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers by Office Memorandum No. 5/9/ 72-Fin.-Reg., dated November 17, 1976. The matter appears to have been considered further by the Court after the State Government had sanctioned selection grade to the posts of Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers by Office Memorandum No. 5/9/ 72-Fin.-Reg., dated November 17, 1976. On April 2, 1977, the then Chief Justice (R. S. Pathak) examined the matter and, amongst other things, said that: "……………My attention has been drawn to the Office Memorandum of the Himachal Pradesh Government dated March 1, 1977, prescribing the basis for appointment to the Selection Grade posts and the qualifying period for eligibility to such appointment. In my opinion, so far as the officers and servants of the High Court are concerned their conditions of service fall within the exclusive competence of the Chief Justice, and the State Government has no power to prescribe such conditions of service. Accordingly, the Office Memorandum dated March 1, 1977, must be ignored so far as it seeks to operate in respect of the officers and servants of the High Court. I am further of opinion that appointment to the Selection Grade posts of Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers in the High Court should be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority………………” The Chief Justice directed the Registry to examine the question of amendment in the 1975 Rules and of proposing a Rule incorporating criteria of merit-cum-seniority for appointment to selection grade posts and also to examine whether the qualifying period should be prescribed. However, no such Rule was actually framed. 16. When the grant of selection grade was sanctioned for the posts of Private Secretaries, Superintendents and Readers of the High Court, the question of criterion to be adopted was examined again. Some representations, including one made by petitioner Gulzar, in regard to the basis for the grant of selection grade, had been made to the High Court. They were also examined and eventually an order was recorded, on July 22, 1978, by the Chief Justice for the grant of selection grade to the various respondents in this petition. It was noticed in this order that the question whether selection grade should be given on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or merit- cum-seniority had been considered in the past and it had been decided that the selection grade can be given only on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. It was reiterated that the same principle should be followed even in the present case. It was reiterated that the same principle should be followed even in the present case. While examining the case of grant of selection grade in the posts of Private Secretaries it was said in the order by the Chief Justice, inter alia, that: "Out of the 5 posts of Private Secretaries one post would be that of selection grade. Sarvshri S. D. Gulzar, K. N. Awasthi, G. D. Sehgal, T. R. Thakur, Bishan Dass and Maya Datt Kaushai are in the list and their seniority is in the order in which their names are stated here. The principle of merit-cum-seniority is to be followed in selecting one of these persons for the selection post. So far Shri S. D. Gulzar is concerned he is senior most but after referring to his service record it is held that he cannot be given the selection grade……………… It is found that having regard to the seniority of Shri G. D. Sehgal and having regard to the fact that his performance is outstanding he should be given selection grade 17. In All India Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare Association and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 1322, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the question of grant of selection grade on the criterion of merit. The Supreme Court took the view that the refusal of selection grade to the petitioner, after his case had also been considered with those of others, on comparison of the service record, on the ground that some officers junior to the petitioner before the Supreme Court were more suitable for the grant, could not be said to be unreasonable. 18. What was stressed on behalf of the petitioner by his learned Counsel was that the grant of selection grade was made with a view to avoid stagnation amongst those who cannot be promoted. It does not involve a process of selection because the post, duties and responsibilities continued to be the same. Consequently, the reasonable criterion for making the grant can only be seniority-cum-merit and not merit-cum-seniority. Our attention was drawn to some decisions. The first of these was in Lalit Mohan Deb and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1972 SC 295. Consequently, the reasonable criterion for making the grant can only be seniority-cum-merit and not merit-cum-seniority. Our attention was drawn to some decisions. The first of these was in Lalit Mohan Deb and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1972 SC 295. The observations that the Supreme Court made (in paragraph 7 of the report) amongst others, are that: "……………… It is well recognised that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay. A selection grade has a higher pay but in the same post. A selection grade is intended to ensure that capable employees who may not get a chance of promotion on account of limited outlets of promotions should at least be placed in the selection grade to prevent stagnation on the maximum of the scale. Selection grades are, therefore, created in the interest of greater efficiency. In the present case it is explained in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the Administration that the basis for selection of some of the Assistants to the higher scale is seniority-cum-merit which is one of the two or three principles of promotion widely accepted in the Administration and duly recognised by the Pay Commission in Chapter XXXXV of the report, (emphasis supplied by us)" 19. It is noticeable that, according to the observations of the Supreme Court, selection grades are created in the interest of greater efficiency. Also, that adoption of one of the two or three principles of promotion widely accepted in the Administration was permissible. We may also observe that in paragraph 9 of the report the Supreme Court also noticed the fact that the appointment to the selection grade was made on the basis of seniority-cum- merit based upon a test open to all Assistants carried out in accordance with a prescribed procedure. Further, that the appellant before the Supreme Court had not appeared for those tests and, therefore, could have no complaint about selection. 20. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court almost borrowed the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmidhar Mallick. and others v. State of Orissa and others, 1974 (1) SLR 165, when it said (in paragraph & of the report) that : "………………It is well recognized that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay and higher responsibility. A selection grade has higher pay but in the same cadre. and others v. State of Orissa and others, 1974 (1) SLR 165, when it said (in paragraph & of the report) that : "………………It is well recognized that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay and higher responsibility. A selection grade has higher pay but in the same cadre. A selection grade is intended to ensure that capable employees who may not get a chance of promotion on account of limited outlets of promotions should at least be placed in the selection grade to prevent stagnation on the maximum of the scale." 21. In D. K. Bhatnagar and another v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1979 (2) SLR 693, a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through T. U. Mehta, C. J., said (in paragraph 41 of the report) that: "……………..Unless the rules show that a particular promotion should be based principally on the principle of selection, the formula of merit-cum-seniority should not be applied, and the normal principle of seniority-cum-merit should be followed.” 22. The Division Bench was examining the question of inter se seniority between the petitioners and some others as Assistants. By the order impugned in the Writ Petition the name, inter alia, of petitioner Bhatnagar was removed from the seniority list of Assistants and inserted in the lower category of posts. The petitioner had sought a declaration that he was entitled to be retained on the post of an Assistant. The Bench noticed that while considering the case of regularisation of an official like Bhatnagar the Promotion Committee was not entitled to import, in the absence of any statutory rules, the principle of merit-cum-seniority while examining the matter. 23. In Dayaram Asanand Gursahani v. State of Maharashtra and others; AIR 1984 SC 850, while examining the question whether appellant Gursahani, while working in the cadre of District Judges, was entitled to get the salary and allowances in the selection grade observed (in paragraph 17 of the report) in the case before them that : "…………………..the mere nomenclature given to the extended pay scale as the selection grade pay scale does not lead to the inference that there is an element of selection involved in sanctioning it. In the circumstances it should be treated as just an extended pay scale………………….the refusal on the part of the High Court to sanction the selection grade pay scale to the appellant when it became due automatically on the ground that he was not found fit to be sanctioned that scale of pay is erroneous……………….." 24. These decisions do not lay down that the grant of selection grade cannot be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. In fact, the observations in Lalit Mohan Deb which we have quoted earlier seem to suggest that the grant of selection grade is created in the interest of greater efficiency. This object, we feel, would be furthered more if the element of merit took primacy in determining the question of grant of selection grade. We can find no error in the criterion which this Court chose to adopt in the matter of grant of selection grade, in the instant case. 25. The argument that the norms of eligibility, having regard to the length of service of the incumbents of the posts who were to be considered for grant of selection grade, or the criterion therefor and the number of posts which would be eligible for such grant could not be altered by the High Court on its own, and concurrence of the Governor was necessary before doing so as it involved greater financial burden, need not detain us for long. As noticed by us earlier, the State Government did not subject the sanction of selection grade to any of the conditions which have now been put forward on behalf of the petitioner. It is clear from a plain reading of the Office Memorandum dated June 16, 1978. The Office Memorandum does not mention any requirement of eligibility in the matter of number of years of service, it does not contain any criterion for the grant and, on its plain language, it says that selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents, which had been in existence for three years or more, without saying that the combined strength of these three categories was to be taken into consideration for determining the number of 20% posts. Besides, after the grant of selection grade to the number of posts to which it was made admissible by the- High Court and on the basis on which it was granted, the State Government was apprised of the position by the High Court repeatedly. It did not raise any objection to the grant made by the High Court. A challenge on the ground that the action of the High Court resulted in higher financial burden and the concurrence of the Governor was necessary, cannot legitimately be made by the petitioner in these circumstances. 26. In conclusion, we are unable to accept that the grant of selection grade to the respondents, and refusal thereof to petitioner Gulzar, was in any way erroneous in law. We are, therefore, unable to interpose any relief in favour of the petitioner in the present writ petition which deserves to be dismissed. We dismiss it but leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.