ORDER Venkataswami, J. 1. The orders under challenge in this writ petition are the one passed by the 4th respondent on 13.12.1982, confirmed by the 3rd respondent on 6.4.1983 and further confirmed by the 2nd respondent in his order dated 'Nil' received by the petitioner on 2.5.1984. 2. The petitioner was working as Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force when he was suspended by an order dated 1.3.1982. The suspension order was followed by a charge memo dated 10.3.1982 issued under Rule 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called 'the Rules'). The petitioner submitted his explanation on 22.4.1982. The disciplinary authority himself (Asst. Security Officer) functioned as Enquiry Officer and after completing the enquiry, a provisional conclusion was reached by him and on the basis of that conclusion, a second show cause notice was issued under Rule 44(10)(2) of the Rules proposing a punishment of reduction of petitioner's pay by two stages for a period of one year. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 5.6.1982. Not accepting the explanation, the Disciplinary Authority confirmed the penalty proposed by order dated 14.6.1982. That order was received by the petitioner on 17.6.1982. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 14.6.1982, received by him on 17.6.1982, the petitioner claims to have preferred an appeal on 15.7.1982 in accordance with Rule 52 read with Rule 53 of the Rules. However, the petitioner received the proceedings of the 4th respondent dated 22.7.1982 purporting to be one passed under Rule 60 in and by which the 4th respondent while setting aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority, directed a re-enquiry by appointing a different Assistant Security Officer with a direction to that Officer to submit a report within 30 days. In accordance with the proceedings of the 4th respondent dated 22.7.1982, the New Enquiry Officer conducted a de novo enquiry, examined witnesses and submitted his report to the 4th respondent. On the basis of the second enquiry, the 4th respondent issued a second show cause notice proposing a punishment of removal from service without accepting the explanation of the petitioner dated 25.11.1982, the 4th respondent by an order dated 13.12.1982, removed the petitioner from service. 4. Aggrieved by the order of removal, the petitioner preferred appeal as directed in the order of the 4th respondent and the 3rd respondent also confirmed the order of removal in his order dated 6.4.1983. 4. Aggrieved by the order of removal, the petitioner preferred appeal as directed in the order of the 4th respondent and the 3rd respondent also confirmed the order of removal in his order dated 6.4.1983. Further revision to the 2nd respondent also met with the same result, Hence the present writ petition. 5. Mr. V. Suresham, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the charge memo served on the petitioner will clearly show that apart from the petitioner, two of his superior officers were also involved in the incident for which the petitioner alone was charged. Nevertheless, the two superior officers were not proceeded against, but examined as witnesses against the petitioner. That according to the petitioners' Counsel amounts to discrimination, and on that ground the orders impugned are liable to be set aside. The second ground of attack was that when the appeal filed by the petitioner was pending before the Appellate Authority, the invocation of Suo Motu revision by the very same authority under Rule 60 without disposing of the appeal vitiates the impugned orders. The allegation of Mala Fides against the 4th respondent who initiated proceedings under Rule 60 is proved from the manner in which that authority had acted in invoking Rule 60 Suo Motu power. The learned Counsel submitted that the second enquiry ordered by the 4th respondent on the same charge offends Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. The last contention was that the Rules contemplate one appeal against the punishment and a further revision, and in fact, Rule 52(2) expressly prohibits a second appeal. But in this case, curiously, the 4th respondent, an appellate authority before whom the appeal filed by the petitioner was pending, has directed the filing of an appeal against his order before the 3rd respondent. Therefore, in all, the petitioner had to file two appeals, face one Suo Motu revision and thereafter file one revision. On this ground also, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, as the proceedings are contrary to the Rules, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Makeshwar Mathsrivastrava v. State of Bihar and Ors. in support of his submission that the Suo Motu power of revision should be exercised under extraordinary circumstances to help a delinquent and not otherwise. 6, Mr. The learned Counsel cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Makeshwar Mathsrivastrava v. State of Bihar and Ors. in support of his submission that the Suo Motu power of revision should be exercised under extraordinary circumstances to help a delinquent and not otherwise. 6, Mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, contending contra, submitted that the allegation in support of the charge framed against the petitioner will make it clear that the charge was levelled only against the petitioner and that the two other superior officers were not involved in the offence for which the petitioner was charge-sheeted, and that therefore the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was chosen for different treatment is not tenable. Learned Counsel would further submit that the invocation of the Suo Motu power under Rule 60 by the 4th respondent is in accordance with the rules and the order passed by him 4th respondent) is also quite in accordance with the Rules. Regarding the allegation of Mala Fides against the Officer who initiated SUO Motu revision, Mr. Venkateswara Rao submitted that the Officer who passed the final order was different and, therefore, the allegations of Mala Fides against the officer who initiated the proceedings will not help the petitioner to challenge the impugned order of the 4th respondent. The argument based on Article 20(2) of the Constitution, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, is misconceived as the petitioner was not punished twice inasmuch as the first punishment was set aside and a De Novo enquiry was ordered. Placing reliance on Rule 43 and Explanation to Rule 44, learned Counsel submitted that under certain circumstances, it is possible to file two appeals and a further revision and, therefore, the contention that the petitioner was directed to face two appeals, one Suo Motu revision and another revision by himself is without force. The learned Counsel submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court, relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions and averments in the affidavit, counter affidavit and reply affidavit, I am of the view that the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted and on that ground the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 8. 7. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions and averments in the affidavit, counter affidavit and reply affidavit, I am of the view that the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted and on that ground the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 8. The specific case of the petitioner in the affidavit is that on receipt of the first order of punishment dated 14.6.1982, he filed an appeal within 30 days of the receipt of that order and, therefore, there was no scope for the 4th respondent to invoke Rule 60 of the Rules. Neither in the counter affidavit nor in the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent, a positive denial was made stating that no appeal was filed by the petitioner. Only evasive replies are given in the counter affidavit. Let me extract the relevant portions of the replies from the counter affidavit. ... It is not correct to say that the appeal dated 15.7.1982 was ignored by the 4th respondent. The allegations that Shri Anandamurthy, the then Security Officer, Tiruchirapallai had not taken action on the petitioner's appeal dated 15.7.1982 and he was biased and bent upon removing the petitioner from service are not true and are denied. In fact, the review under Rule 60 was taken up only after the appeal time was over by the then Security Officer, Tiruchirapallai on his own motion. The contention that the appeal was pending with the fourth respondent when the enquiry proceedings were reviewed "Suo Motu" by him on 22.7.1982 is not correct and hence the question of acting under Rule 58 does not arise. It is open to the 4th respondent to exercise his powers under Rule 58 or to invoke his powers under Rule 60. The last portion of the extract will clearly indicate that notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, the 4th respondent has taken the view that it is open to him to invoke Rule 60 of the Rules. In the absence of any clear denial of receipt of the appeal memo, in the light of the assertion in the affidavit and the reply affidavit, I hold that the petitioner preferred an appeal within time and that was pending before the 4th respondent when he invoked the provision of Rule 60. 9. Rules 58 and 60 of the Rules read as follows: 58. 9. Rules 58 and 60 of the Rules read as follows: 58. Consideration of Appeals... (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether, in the light of the provision of Rule 40 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not, and confirm of revoke the order accordingly. 2. In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 41, the appellate authority shall consider (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice: (b) Whether the findings are justified; and (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and pass orders: (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming, or enhancing the penalty; (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case: Provided that: (i) The appellate authority shall not impose any enhanced penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent in the case to impose; (ii) No order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty; and, (iii) If the enhanced penalty, which the appellate authority proposes to impose, is one of the penalties specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 41 and an inquiry under Rule 44 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 47, itself hold such inquiry of direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and after giving the appellant an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such penalty pass such orders as it may deem fit. 60. Revision-(1) Any authority superior to the authority making the order may, on its own motion, or otherwise, revise the order (whether original or appellate) passed by such lower authority: Provided that no action under this sub-rule shall be initiated after the expiry of one year from the date of the order aforesaid. 2. 60. Revision-(1) Any authority superior to the authority making the order may, on its own motion, or otherwise, revise the order (whether original or appellate) passed by such lower authority: Provided that no action under this sub-rule shall be initiated after the expiry of one year from the date of the order aforesaid. 2. The revising authority may remit, vary or enhance the punishment imposed, or may order a fresh enquiry or the taking of further evidence in the case as it may consider necessary. 3. The provision of Rule 58 relating to appeals would apply so far as may be to such orders in revisions. 10. A reading of Rule 58 will show that even under Rule 58, the Appellate Authority could have set aside, reduced, confirmed enhanced the penalty imposed by the first authority or could have remitted the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. However, under Rule 58, the Appellate Authority after setting aside the punishment imposed by the first authority, cannot direct a fresh enquiry to be held by an authority named by him and punish the delinquent as if he was the disciplinary authority. I am also of the view that when an appeal is pending, without considering the same as contemplated under Rule 58, the Appellate Authority cannot invoke the Suo Motu power of revision under Rule 60. Though this point was raised by the petitioner before the respondents 3 and 2, they have not directly dealt with the same. On this ground alone, the order of the 4th respondent is liable to be set aside, and the further orders of the respondents 3 and 2 confirming the order of the 4th respondent dated 13.12.1982 are also liable to be set aside. Even otherwise, the proceedings taken under Rule 60 by the 4th respondent cannot be sustained. We have noticed that the first order imposing the penalty on the petitioner was passed on 14.6.1982 and received by the petitioner on 17.6.1982. The appeal was filed by the petitioner on 15.7.1982. Even otherwise, the proceedings taken under Rule 60 by the 4th respondent cannot be sustained. We have noticed that the first order imposing the penalty on the petitioner was passed on 14.6.1982 and received by the petitioner on 17.6.1982. The appeal was filed by the petitioner on 15.7.1982. While so, the 4th respondent invoking Rule 60 passed an order on 22.7.1982, the concluding portion of which reads as follows: Further the penalty of reduction in pay in the time scale for one year imposed by Ascr/Mdu is also inadequate and not commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Hence I do not agree with the findings of the E.O. in this case. Under these circumstances with the powers vested with me under Rules 56 and 60 of RPF Rules, 1959, (1) the punishment of reduction in pay in the time scale for one year with recurring effect is set aside without prejudice to further re-enquiry and (2) ASCR/TPJ Sri. M. Rengaraj is nominated as E.O., to re-enquire the case as a whole and submit his proceedings within 30 days. This order was passed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner. Not only that, this order proceeds as if the 4th respondent was considering the correctness of the findings of the Enquiry Officer and himself (4th respondent) was the punishing authority. This is evident from the portions extracted below from that order: I find from the perusal of the records, that the E.O., has not properly examined the material evidence in this case and also not collected proper evidence and hastily arrived at a decision. Further I find that the punishment imposed was not commensurate to the gravity of the case. I do not agree with the findings of the E.O., on the following grounds: Hence I do not agree with the findings of the E.O., in this case. ... Sri M. Rengaraj is nominated as E.O., to re-enquire the case as a whole and submit his proceeding within 30 days. From the extracts above, it is clear that the 4th respondent completely forgot that a competent disciplinary authority had already gone into the matter and the 4th respondent was the superior authority considering the correctness of the final order passed by the disciplinary authority. For this additional reason also, the order of the 4th respondent, confirmed by the orders of respondents 3 and 2, is liable to be set aside. For this additional reason also, the order of the 4th respondent, confirmed by the orders of respondents 3 and 2, is liable to be set aside. 11. In view of my above conclusion, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the other contentions. 12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders impugned in this writ petition are set aside. The 4th respondent, if considers it necessary can proceed with the appeal filed by the petitioner and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500.