JUDGMENT S.R. Bhargava, J. - In this appeal facts as that one Gaya Prasad had wife Smt. Ram Pyari and his son Govind Prasad respondent No. 2. Appellant Smt. Maya Devi is wife of said Govind Prasad. In 1940 Gaya Prasad and Govind Prasad executed a simple mortgage in respect of a house. In 1955 a suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged house was filed. Both Gaya Prasad and Govind Prasad were parties to the said suit. Preliminary decree was passed. In the stage for final decree Gaya Prasad was represented by his wife Smt. Ram Pyari as his guardian on the ground of alleged lunacy. Final decree was passed. There was execution and sale of the mortgaged house. In i960 Gaya Prasad through his wife as his guardian filed suit for cancellation of decree and sale in the mortgage suit on the ground of alleged lunacy. In 1974 that suit was dismissed. Again Gaya Prasad represented by his wife filed appeal informa-pauparis. Gaya Prasad died and was substituted by his wife who also unfortunately died and then appellant Smt. Maya Devi was substituted. She was required to pay court fee and on her failure the appeal was dismissed on 14-9-1976. In 1981 appellant Maya Devi filed review application on the basis of order 44 Rule 3(1) contending that since Gaya Prasad filed suit informa pauperis and was declared pauper, in appeal, she should have been treated as indigent person. 2. With review application she filed application for ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from transferring or alienating the property and from causing any damage to the property or removing any article or effects therefrom or changing the material status of the property. An ex parte injunction was granted. But after objections by contesting respondents and after hearing the parties the lower court dismissed the injunction application. 3. Against this appellant has come up in appeal. Notices were issued and parties have been heard at admission stage. 4. Order 44 Rule 3 was introduced in the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 which came into force on 1st February, 1977. 3. Against this appellant has come up in appeal. Notices were issued and parties have been heard at admission stage. 4. Order 44 Rule 3 was introduced in the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 which came into force on 1st February, 1977. Sub rule (I) lays down that where an applicant referred to in Rule 1 was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred no further enquiry in respect of the question whether or not he is an indigent person should be necessary if the applicant had made an affidavit stating that he has not ceased to be an indigent person since the date of the decree appealed from; but if the Government pleader or respondent disputes, both of the statements made on such an affidavit, an enquiry into the question aforesaid should be held by the appellate court or under the orders of the appellate Court, by an officer of that court. Order 44 Rule 1(1), as introduced by aforementioned Amendment Act of 1976, lays down that any person entitled to prefer appeal, who is unable to pay the fee required for memorandum of appeal, may present an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal, and may be allowed to appeal as indigent person, subject, in all matters, including the presentation of such application to the provisions relating to suits by indigent persons, in so far as these provisions are applicable. 5. Firstly, it may be said that order 44 rules 1 and 3 are procedural and are, therefore, retrospective. Even if this is accepted, these provisions could be applied only to the applications to prefer an appeal informa-pauperis or as indigent person which were pending on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act or where the suits had been decided earlier but the applications to prefer appeal informa-pauperis or as indigent person were presented after the commencement of the Amendment Act. But these two provisions could not be retrospective to the extent of re-opening the applications which were presented before the amendment Act and were decided or dismissed prior to the Amendment Act. 6. Secondly word applicant in rule 3(1) refers to any person entitled to prefer appeal as mentioned in order 44 rule 1. But these two provisions could not be retrospective to the extent of re-opening the applications which were presented before the amendment Act and were decided or dismissed prior to the Amendment Act. 6. Secondly word applicant in rule 3(1) refers to any person entitled to prefer appeal as mentioned in order 44 rule 1. Further words may present in order 44 rule 1 make it clear that the benefit of Rule 3 can be given only to the person who has presented application to prefer appeal as indigent person. That benefit cannot be extended to a person who has been subsequently substituted in place of person who presented the application. It thus follows that review application of the appellants has prima-facie no force. 7. It is obvious that the contesting respondents are purchasers in auction sales. So long as the auction sale is not set aside, they have absolute right to enjoy their property. Ground of lunacy was not established in the trial court. Hence prima facie it cannot be said that the property is being wrongfully sold or alienated or changed or altered. In the circumstances of the case order 39 rule 1 C.P.C. cannot come into play. If at all, appellant could have secured an injunction for maintaining status-quo and that could have been done only under section 151 C.P.C. against that there could be no appeal. 8. Last of all have considered affidavit of the appellant, counter affidavit of the contesting defendants and rejoinder affidavit of the appellant. Alleged ground of lunacy of Gaya Prasad at the time of execution of the mortgage deed or during suit for enforcement of mortgage (till preliminary decree) is prima-facie not made out. Appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed. Application for ad-interim injunction is also dismissed.