JUDGMENT 1. - The Chief Justice has constituted this Bench for consideration of correctness of the view taken by a Single Bench of this Court in the case of Satar Khan v. Thanwardas ( 1987 (1) RLR 131 ). In the aforesaid case the learned Single Judge has taken the view that if the plaint does not conform to the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. so far as the plaint may conform to the afore aid provision cannot be allowed. The learned Chief Justice has not framed the question, which is to he answered by this Division Bench and before we proceed further in the matter we formulate the point for consideration. If in a suit for performance of contract of sale, the plaint does not conform to Section 16 (c) of the Act inasmuch as it is not averred in the plaint that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. then whether the said plea cannot be allowed to be introduced in the plaint by way of amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C.? 2. We may state that after the reference of S.B. Civil Revision Petition No 409 of 1982, Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Ram Krishan to this Bench another S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 406 of 1984, Kajji Ram v. Bhagwan Sahai was also filed in this Court and because S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 409 of 1982 had been referred to a larger Bench, a learned Single Judge of this Court also ordered that revision be also tagged with this revision. 3. We will take up the facts of the two cases at relevant stage of this judgment and for the present we will confine ourselves to the dealing of the point formulated by us in the earlier part of this judgment. 4. In the case of Satar Khan (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court expressed her agreement with the view expressed by the Allahabad, Patna and Karnataka High Courts. 4. In the case of Satar Khan (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court expressed her agreement with the view expressed by the Allahabad, Patna and Karnataka High Courts. We will presently deal with the view taken by the aforesaid High Courts, but suffice it to say that a view has been taken that if the averment in respect of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract are not contained in the plaint arrestment under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. incorporating the said averments cannot be allowed. We may at the very out-set state that in the aforesaid case of Sitar Khan (supra) the learned Single Judge has taken an extreme view and we are of the opinion that it cannot be uniformly laid down that in no circumstances an amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. in the plaint can be allowed, so that the plaint may conform to the requirements of Section 16 (c) of the Act. 5. In Mahmood Khan and another v. Ayub Khan and others, ( AIR 1978 All. 463 ) it was held that compliance of requirement of Section 16 (c) of the Act is mandatory and absence of necessary averment in the plaint and in the absence of proof of the same that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract-the suit cannot succeed. It was further held in para 24 that the amendment could not be allowed for two reasons; "firstly because a valuable right has accrued to the respondents and, secondly, because the amendment seeks to bring out a cause of action in the plaint, which was conspicuous by its absence in the plaint as originally filed." We may state that one of the reasons why amendment in that case was not allowed was that the defendants had raised a plea before the first Appellate Court that there was a defect in the plaint and the suit should be dismissed on that ground alone and yet the plaintiff did not care to get the plaint amended and the amendment application was only moved for the first time in second appeal. 6. We will like to deal with few cases of Allahabad High Court, which perhaps were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. 6. We will like to deal with few cases of Allahabad High Court, which perhaps were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. In Budhoo Teli v. Ram Surat Tewari and others (I.L.R 1981 (1) Allahabad 393) a learned Single Judge of that Court took a view that after the enactment of the Act it was no longer obligatory on the plaintiff to make averment in the plaint that he is ready and willing to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract. He also held that forms contained in Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure cannot override the provisions of an Act which has been subsequently passed. Reference was made before the learned Single Judge to the aforesaid case of Mahmoud Khan (supra) and the learned Judge distinguished the aforesaid case and other cases cited before him on the ground that in each of those cases the plaintiff seeking relief of performance had not stated terms of the contract which were to be performed by him and in his opinion it was on account of total want of this essential requirement that the Court entered verdict against the plaintiff in the said case. 7. We are of opinion that to the extent the opinion of the learned Judge in the aforesaid case of Budhoo Teli (supra) that after the enactment of the Act it is no longer obligatory on the plaintiff to make such an averment, we find ourselves unable to agree with him. The plaint in that case was construed as having the necessary averments of readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract which were to be performed by the plaintiff. 8. In the case of Dhian Singh v. Tara Chand and another ( AIR 1984 All. 4 ) though the question of amendment of the plaint so as to conform it to the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act was not involved, but the Court said that the substantive provision incorporated in Section 16(c) of the Act does not insist upon a particular set of words being employed; the averment, according to Section 16(c), must in substance indicate the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the person suing. The form prescribed tinder Order 6 Rule 3 C. P. C. is procedural; it is a rule of pleading; this has for its object the advance of the causes of justice and is not intended to short circuit decision on merits. A reference to the case of Mahmood Khan was made and the learned Judge said that examination of various paras of that case would reveal that there was `absolutely' no averment about the plaintiff's readiness to perform his part of contract and thus, that decision rest upon the particular state of pleading in that case. 9. In Ram Singhasan Choubey and others. v. Sudama Prasad Sah ( AIR 1982 Pat. 200 ) though there was no averment in the plaint as required by Section 16(c) of the Act in respect of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, but evidence had been led to that effect. Placing reliance on the aforesaid case of Allahabad High Court in Mahmood Khan (supra) it was held that the amendment cannot be allowed under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. so as to make the plaint conforming to the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Act. 10. In the case of Palthur Honnur Saheb v. Beponna Annapumamma and others (AIR 1986 Karnataka 109) the Court even went to the extent that it is not simply sufficient to mention in the plaint various circumstances showing the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. But he must go further and allege in the plaint that he was and is ever willing and ready to perform his part of the contract. In that case the trial Court had decreed the suits and one of the defendants being dissatisfied filed two appeals and while the said two appeals were being argued, it was contended on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the two suits were incompetent as the plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of Section 16(3) of the Act. It was at that stage that plaintiff in both the suits filed an amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P C. seeking leave of the Court to amend the plaint. The District Judge set aside the judgments and decrees and remanded the case to the trial Court for fresh disposal and disposal of the application for amendment. It was at that stage that plaintiff in both the suits filed an amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P C. seeking leave of the Court to amend the plaint. The District Judge set aside the judgments and decrees and remanded the case to the trial Court for fresh disposal and disposal of the application for amendment. In this case also reliance was placed on the case of Mabmood Khan (supra) of the Allahabad High Court. 11. Contrary to above three cases, namely Mahmood Khan v. Ayub Khan, Ram Singhasan Choubey and others v. Sudama Prasad Sah and Palthur Honnur Saheb v. Bopanna Annapumamma and others of the Allahabad, Patna and Karnataka High Courts (supra), apart from the two Allahabad High Court cases to which reference has been made above. other High Courts have taken a medium course and a view has been taken that if the limitation has not expired, even if there is no averment of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract in the plaint, on an application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 Criminal Procedure Code being moved for leave of the Court so as to make the plaint in conformity with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act, the application can be allowed. It has also been held that the procedural laws are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. If there are some averments in the plaint on which the plaint can be constituted to conform the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Act in respect of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff of perform the essential terms of his part of the contract, then amendment by way of clarification can be allowed. 12. In the case of Trimbak Shanker Tidke v. Sivratti Shanker Tidke ( AIR 1985 Bom. 12. In the case of Trimbak Shanker Tidke v. Sivratti Shanker Tidke ( AIR 1985 Bom. 128 ) though the learned Judge held that the plaintiff had averred whatever was required by him and the plaint was in conformity with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act, but at page 129 went a step further and stated that even if in case such a statement was not made by the plaintiff when it was necessary to be made, the Court should normally give an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint for incorporating such averment in the plaint because by doing so the plaintiff does not change the nature of the case at all and normally no prejudice is caused to the defendant if the plaintiff is allowed to amend the plaint in such circumstances. 13. In Kamdev Nath Choudhary v. Devendra Kumar Nath (AIR 1979 Gauhati 65) though it was not a case of seeking amendment by the plaintiff to make it conform to the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Act the Court said that the forms Nos. 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure are merely guidelines assisting the litigant and the court and a substantial compliance with the rule is enough. The Court further said that procedural laws are intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice, and provisions regarding pleadings in civil actions ought not to be treated technically. Pleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other and to enable the Court to determine the real issue between the parties. The Court said, "In a suit for specific performance of contract if the plaint does not contain the specific words as set out in the forms and/or the specific words 'readiness and willingness' on the part of the plaintiff but read as a whole it appears to the Court that it complies with the provisions of law in substance the plaint should not be thrown out. 14. In Rama Nand Chaudhary v. Mst. Bhonri, (AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 291) the Court was dealing with a case wherein the amendment of the specific performance was considered. 14. In Rama Nand Chaudhary v. Mst. Bhonri, (AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 291) the Court was dealing with a case wherein the amendment of the specific performance was considered. In that case even the stage for recording of evidence has not yet arrived and an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. was filed by the plaintiff to amend the plaint to bring it in conformity with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act. The trial Court had refused leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint and it was held that the stage for recording of evidence had admittedly not yet arrived and the plaintiff made the application for leave to amend the plaint in this crucial respect at the earlier possible opportunity. There was no delay on the part of the plaintiff to make the application and the order of the trial court declining to permit the amendment would result in grave injustice to the plaintiff as such a plea is necessary in a suit for specific performance of a contract. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, therefore, allowed the amendment. 15. In Ram Swaroop Singh and others v. Bijoy Kumar Singh (AIR 1986 Patna 60) the amendment application to bring the plaint in conformity with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act was pressed after the close of the case of the defendants and the delay in filing the application was not explained. The Court while dismissing the revision petition observed that the matter would be quite different if an amendment application of the plaint is brought at the stage when the parties had not begun adducing evidence in the case. 16. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Byomnesh Banerjee v. Nani Gopal Banik (AIR 1987 Calcutta 92) was dealing with a case in which there was absence of averment as to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract in the plaint. The trial Court proceeded with the trial in which defendant fully participated without any objection. The decree was passed. There was evidence as to plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The Court held that the suit should not be thrown out and the plaintiff should be given reasonable opportunity to make the defect good by amendment of the plaint. The decree was passed. There was evidence as to plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The Court held that the suit should not be thrown out and the plaintiff should be given reasonable opportunity to make the defect good by amendment of the plaint. The Court refer red to the law on the amendment of pleadings and said that if the materials on record clearly and sufficiently demonstrate plaintiff's readiness and willingness, the plaintiff should not be non-suited because he or his lawyer did not know how to draft a plaint and did not insert in the plaint the necessary averment as to such readiness and willingness. 17. To our mind there can be no dispute that before a plaintiff can succeed in a suit for specific performance of contract he must aver and prove that he has performed and has always been and willing to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract which are the opening words of Section 16 of the Act, "Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced ........." and these words leave no manner of doubt that averment in the plaint and proof by evidence that the plaintiff has performed and has always been ready and willing to perform essential terms of his part of the contract is mandatory and the adding of the Explanation for the purpose of clause (c) of Section 16 of the Act does not make any difference. At the same time mention of the actual words 'readiness and willingness' is not necessary and if the plaintiff has averred the facts in the plaint which go to show readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him and on construction of the plaint it can be said that the plaint conforms with the requirements of Section 16 of the Act, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited. We are also of the opinion that if some facts in respect of readiness and willingness as aforesaid of the plaintiff are mentioned in the plaint, then further facts can be supplied by away of amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 C.PC. 18. We are also of the opinion that if some facts in respect of readiness and willingness as aforesaid of the plaintiff are mentioned in the plaint, then further facts can be supplied by away of amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 C.PC. 18. A reading of Order 6 Rule 17 C P.C. will show that the discretion is vested in the Court at any stage of the proceedings to allow either party to amend his pleading in such manner or on such terms as may be just. The aforesaid Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. has made it mandatory on the Court to allow all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining question of real controversy between the parties. In a suit for specific performance it can hardly be disputed that for the purpose of determining the real question of controversy between the parties averment of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his essential terms of the contract & to mention the necessary facts in their regard is mandatory. 19. In the case of Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley and others, (( 1969 2 SCC 539 ) some observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court are relevant and should be quoted as under : "A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit, for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out the agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and it still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the point nor at any subsequent stage of the suit, the plaintiff has taken those pleas." 20. In Charan Das and others v. Amir Khan and others ( AIR 1921 P.C. 50 ) Lord Buckmaster expressed his full agreement in the statement of the Judicial Commissioner in that case that "however defective the frame of the suit may be. In Charan Das and others v. Amir Khan and others ( AIR 1921 P.C. 50 ) Lord Buckmaster expressed his full agreement in the statement of the Judicial Commissioner in that case that "however defective the frame of the suit may be. the plaintiff's object was to preempt the land; their cause of action was one and the same whether they sued for possession or not." Lord Buckmaster further said that where the plaintiff. through some clumsy blundering, attempted to assert rights that they undoubtedly possessed under the statute in a form which the statute did not permit, they should be at liberty to express their intention in a plainer and less ambiguous manner, and to amend the plaint so as to express the rights which it has been really their intention all along to establish, although the amendment of plaint is sought to be made at a time when the suit itself if instituted then would be time barred. And though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where its effect is to, take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are outweighed by the special circumstances of the case. 21. In the case of Ms Shwe Mya v. Maung Ma Hnaung, ( AIR 1922 P.C. 249 ) again the same learned Judge Lord Buckmaster while dealing with the question whether or not live to amend the plaint was properly given in accordance with the Rule by which that leave must necessarily be regulated, said, "All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and he subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoined and should always be liberally expressed, but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit." 22. In the case of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Session, (AIR 1928 P. C. 208) two propositions were laid down; (i) that in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on plaintiff's part upto the date of decree is as necessary as it was always in England, it seems invariably to have been recognised that the Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same; and (ii) the Courts have wide power of granting an amendment in proper case and that power is salutary and indeed necessary. But it is one to be most carefully and jealously exercised in all the circumstances of each individual case and with due regard to its effect upon the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The learned Lord Blanesburgh said that if the defendant is to be prevented by the possible exercise of the power from starving a plaintiff out of his right, the plaintiff out of his right, the plaintiff must not by its ill-considered exercise be permitted to turn his suit into a gamble for himself at the defendant's expense. It would appear to be a wipe precaution for a Judge before allowing any such amendment in a contested case to require the plaint to he actually remodelled in a form appropriate in action seeking compensation for breach of contract and nothing else. 23. In the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd., and another v. Messrs Jardine Skinner and Co. ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ) in para 16 , it is said that it is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. 24. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. 24. Again in the case of P.H. Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others, (AIR 1957 SC 263) placing reliance on the aforesaid case of Leach & Co Ltd. (supra) in para 10 the Supreme Court approved the observations of Bachelor J. in 33 Bombay 644 and said that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. It was further held that the amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. In the view of their Lordships of the Supreme Court where the plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused and to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. In the opinion of the Judges of the Supreme Court the ultimate test therefore still remains the same; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not ? 25. In Haridas Girdharidas and others v. Varudaraja Pillai and another ( AIR 1971 SC 2366 ) dealing with Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. the Supreme Court allowed amendment at that stage i. e. during the pendency of appeal before it, but the amendment was confined for mesne profits for three years before the date of application for amendment of the plaint was filed. The Court said that because the amendment was only limited to the mesne profits for a period of three years before the date of the application the defendants have no just cause to complain. 26. The Court said that because the amendment was only limited to the mesne profits for a period of three years before the date of the application the defendants have no just cause to complain. 26. In Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others ( AIR 1974 SC 1126 ) the Supreme Court said that under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. the power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court. In the facts of that case the Supreme Court said that the order of the High Court in allowing the amendment was not justified and observed that the High Court was wholly in error in allowing such a belated amendment when valuable rights had accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time. 27. In M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, ( AIR 1978 SC 484 ) the Supreme Court observed that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situation resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. The Court further observed that even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. In the opinion of the Court the error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued. 28. From the decisions of the aforesaid cases it will be clear that the Courts at any stage of the proceedings have powers to grant its leave to amend the pleadings of the parties, but generally if valuable rights accrued to the other side or limitation has expired on the date of application for amendment is filed, then the poser to allow amendment, which is to be liberally exercised, should not be exercised unless there are special considerations with the Court. 29. 29. In a suit for specific performance under Section 20 of the Act the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Therefore in a case of specific performance of contract if there are no averments whatsoever in respect of the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract and the application for leave to amend the plaint is filed by the plaintiff after the expiry of three years when the cause of action arose, a valuable right having accrued to the defendant, generally the Court will decline its leave to plaintiff to amend the plaint. But whether or not there are any averments as afore- said in the plaint, if the period of limitation is sill there in a suit for specific performance then if an application is filed for amendment of the plaint. the Court should exercise its discretion under Order 6 Rule, 17 C P.C. liberally and allow the amendment as in such cases it cannot be said that either the defendant has been taken by surprise or that any right has accrued to the defendant. As already stated earlier in the case of Ouseph Varghese (supra) the observations of the Supreme Court that the plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pended in the written statement are not without significance. Therefore, as aforesaid even if averments in the plaint in respect of the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of essential terms of the contract are not there, the plaintiff can apply for leave of the Court to amend the plaint and the Court under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. will take into consideration that the suit, if filed on the date of the application for specific performance would have been within time and should generally give its leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint. 30. 30. In the case of Satar Khan (supra) the learned Judge has taken a view that when plaintiff has failed to state in his plaint his readiness and willingness to perform his part of essential terms of the contract, a valuable right accrues to other side of not getting the contract enforced against him and because such averment is a statutory requirement, non-compliance of the same will become a lacuna in the case which cannot be allowed to be patched up by amendment and permitting any amendment which will defeat provisions of Section 16 (c) of the Act would amount to taking away valuable right of the defendant. With due respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with her and as stated earlier the Court has discretion under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. to allow amendment at any stage of the suit which stage will include the appeals also and in the latter part of Order 6 Rule 17 C P.C. the Court is duty-bound to allow amendments to decide the real controversy between the parties. Therefore if the application for amendment is within limitation in a suit for specific performance of contract, generally the Court should grant its leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint, because in such cases the defendant can always be compensated by costs and by that time it cannot be said that any valuable right has accrued to the defendant. We may observe that readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his essential terms of the contract cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. In this connection we may make reference to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Chandiok and another v. Chunnilal Sabharwal (dead) by his legal representatives and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1238 ) (Para 7 column 2 at page 1242). In this connection we may make reference to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Chandiok and another v. Chunnilal Sabharwal (dead) by his legal representatives and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1238 ) (Para 7 column 2 at page 1242). We may further observe that if some facts in respect of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of essential terms of the contract are contained in the plaint and merely the words -readiness' and willingness' are not contained therein, the Court will have to see the plaint as a whole to see as to whether from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned, can it be said that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract. If in a given case the facts are already there and the plaintiff seeks leave to amendment only to clarify, then such an amendment can be allowed at any stage of the suit. 31. Having discussed the legal position in respect of the amendment in a suit for specific performance of the contract, we will have to see and examine the facts in each case. But before we do that we may state that despite the fact as to whether the Court grants leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint or not as aforesaid. the Court is still required to see the facts contained in the plaint as to whether from that the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of his part of the contract on the date of the suit can be made out of not. 32. Taking up the case of Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Ram Krishan (S.B. Civil. Revision Petition N,). 409 of 1982) , we may state that the case was at initial stage in the trial Court and even issues have not yet been framed. It cannot be said for the present that any valuable right had accrued to the defendant. Apart from this, the averments in the plaint will show that readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract can be inferred. It cannot be said for the present that any valuable right had accrued to the defendant. Apart from this, the averments in the plaint will show that readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract can be inferred. As already stated earlier under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. the Court has discretion to allow the parties to amend the pleadings and on latter part of the same the Court is bound to give its leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint in case the amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties. The Court having exercised the discretion in allowing the amendment in the circumstances, no case for interference is called for. 33. Coming to the case of Kajji Ram v. Bhagwan Sahai (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 406 of 1984) , we may not like to make any observation as to whether the plaint initially contained or not the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract and it is for the trial Court to say the same, but in this case we may state that the trial Court has refused leave to the plaintiff to amend his plaint and one of the reasons is that the limitation for the suit of specific performance had expired on the date when application for leave of the Court to amend the plaint was filed. It will appear from a bare perusal of the same that the same was filed on March 4, 1977 and the cause of action for the suit as per the plaint was said to have accrued on September 20, 1976. The application for leave to amend the plaint was only filed on February 1, 1983. There were no special circumstances and the Court in exercise of discretion did not give its leave to the plaintiff to amend the plaint. The discretion of the Court cannot be said to have been exercised arbitrarily. We may state that under the Order dated July 10, 1984 the trial Court allowed the defendant its leave to amend the written statement to incorporate plea under Section 16 (c) of the Act. It could have done so and discretion exercised to that extent cannot be said to have been wrongly or capriciously exercised. 34. We may state that under the Order dated July 10, 1984 the trial Court allowed the defendant its leave to amend the written statement to incorporate plea under Section 16 (c) of the Act. It could have done so and discretion exercised to that extent cannot be said to have been wrongly or capriciously exercised. 34. Consequently, we find no force in either of the revisions and both are dismissed with no order as to costs.Revisions dismissed. *******