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1988 DIGILAW 72 (GUJ)

GORUMIYA NOORMIYA SHAIKH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,surat

1988-04-18

D.C.GHEEWALA, J.P.DESAI

body1988
J. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who has been detained by the Commissioner of Police Surat City by an order dated 19-8-1987 under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has challenged the said order of detention on various grounds. ( 2 ) THE order of detention is at Annexure A page 11 of the compilation while the grounds of detention are at Annexure C at pages 19 to 24 The grounds of detention show that the petitioner was involved in a number of prohibition cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act the first offence enumerated therein being dated 22-9-1985 while the last being dated 25-7-1987. The grounds of detention show that on account of the anti-social activities of the petitioner enumerated in the grounds of detention the detaining authority was satisfied that the petitioner was required to be detained and accordingly an order of detention has been passed The grounds of detention show that statements of several persons were recorded by the Police Inspector of Surat City and the said statements disclosed that after the commission of the alleged offence on 25-7-1987 the petitioner was indulging in anti-social activities and two instances one of 26-7-1987 and the other of 2-8-1987 are enumerated in the grounds of detention. The details of those statements are also given in the grounds of detention showing that even after the commission of the alleged offence on 25-7-1987 the petitioner had indulged in such activities showing that the petitioner was at large even after the commission of the alleged offence on 25-7-1987. ( 3 ) THE first ground of challenge is that there was violation of Para. 19 (2) of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (Prevention of Anti Social Activities) Order 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Order for the sake of brevity) in that the detaining authority after receiving the copy of the representation addressed of the State Goverment did not forward its remarks to the Government. It appears that the detenu addressed a representation dated 24-8-1987 to the Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City the Additional Chief Secretary Home Department (Special) and the Honble Mr. It appears that the detenu addressed a representation dated 24-8-1987 to the Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City the Additional Chief Secretary Home Department (Special) and the Honble Mr. Justice M B. Shah Chairman Advisory Board and the Jailor forwarded one copy of the same to the Commissioner of Police Surat City because the detaining authority was the Commissioner of Police Surat City and not Ahmedabad City. It appears that the Commissioner of Police passed an order on 30-8-1987 rejecting the said representation and intimated to the detenu about the same. it is an admitted position that the Commissioner of Police Surat City who was the detaining authority did not forward his remarks at any time to the Government as required by Para 19 (2) of the Order. There was thus a clear breach of Para. 19 (2) of the Order in the present case. The question is whether the continued detention of the petitioner has been adversely affected on account of the inaction on the part of the detaining authority in not forwarding its remarks to the Govern. ment as required by Para. 19 (2) of the Order. It appears from the affidavit of Mr. Roy Chaudhary Deputy Secretary Home Department which is at page 67 of the compilation that the representation addressed to the Government was received in the Home Department on 25-8-1987 i. e. on the next day and it was considered and rejected on 29-8-1987 and therefore it cannot be said that there was any delay on the part of the State Government in considering the representation on account of the inaction on the part of the detaining authority in not forwarding its remarks to the State Government as required by Para. 19 (2) of the Order. The continued detention of the petitioner is therefore not vitiated on account of the aforesaid inaction on the part of the detaining authority. We would however like to impress upon the detaining authority that the detaining authority should have forwarded its remarks to the Government expeditiously as required by Para. 19 (2) of the Order. The detaining authority of course after passing the order of rejection on 30-8-1987 forwarded a copy of the same to the State Government but that cannot be equated with forwarding the remarks to the State Government as required by Para 19 (2) of the Order. 19 (2) of the Order. The detaining authority of course after passing the order of rejection on 30-8-1987 forwarded a copy of the same to the State Government but that cannot be equated with forwarding the remarks to the State Government as required by Para 19 (2) of the Order. The copy of the Order dated 30-8-1987 rejecting the representation by the detaining authority only shows that the detaining authority after taking into consideration the representation was pleased to reject the same after careful consideration. It does not disclose any comments on the part of the detaining authority so far as the grounds taken in the representation are concerned. The inaction on the part of the detaining authority in not complying with Para 19 (2) of the Order cannot be justified for a moment. But as the State Government rejected the representation on 29-8-1987 and as there was no delay on the part of the State Government in considering the representation on account of the inaction on the part of the detaining authority the continued detention of the petitioner is not in any way vitiated. ( 4 ) THE next ground of challenge is that even though the petitioner was on bail the grounds of detention do not disclose that the detaining authority vas alive to this aspect and therefore the detention is vitiated. It is true that in the grounds of detention it is not stated in so many words that the detaining authority was alive to this aspect. The detaining authority has filed an affidavit which is at page 79 and it is mentioned in the said affidavit at page 80 that the detaining authority was alive to the fact that the petitioner who was accused of non-bailable offences was released on bail and was on hail when the order of detention was passed. It is not as if there is only here affidavit of the detaining authority so far as this aspect is concerned. In the grounds of detention which are at pages 19 to 24 the cases which were pending against the petitioner have been enumerated The last offence at Serial No. 7 is alleged to have been committed by the petitioner detenu on 25-7-1987. In the grounds of detention which are at pages 19 to 24 the cases which were pending against the petitioner have been enumerated The last offence at Serial No. 7 is alleged to have been committed by the petitioner detenu on 25-7-1987. The detaining authority relied upon several statements copies of which have been supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention and those statements are also there in the compilation at pages 51 to 56. The statement of one Mohmad Hanif recorded on 4-8-1987 shows that the petitioner was involved in one incident on 26-7-1987 in the morning at about 9 a. m It also appears that some other statements also show that the petitioner was involved in an incident which took place on 26-7-1987. This shows that the petitioner was out of custody on that day. Similarly the statement of one Mohmed Javed Sadruddin shows that the petitioner was involved in an incident on 2-8-1987 also and that also shows that on that date the petitioner was on bail. The petitioner could not have indulged in such activities on 26-7-1987 and 2-8-1987 unless he was released on bail. The order of detention was passed on 19-8-1987. It is note that there are only copies of the statements supplied to the detenu which disclose the above state of affairs but those statements are incorporated in the grounds of detention. The dates are also specifically mentioned in the grounds of detention which show that the petitioner-detenu was involved in two incident-one on 26-7-1987 and another on 2-8-1987 i. e. after the commission of the alleged offence under the Prohibition Act on 25-7-1987. The details mentioned in the grounds of detention at pages 20-21 clearly show that the detaining authority was alive to the fact that the petitioner was on bail In view of this it is difficult to accept the condition raised on behalf of the petitioner that the detaining authority was not alive to the fact that the detenu was on bail. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. H L Patel who appeared on behalf of the petitioner drew our attention to two decisions of this Court-one in Special Criminal Application No 585 of 1987 decided by a Division Bench of this Court (Coram: A. P. Ravani and B. S. Kapadia JJ ) on 17-12-1987 (Haji Ibrahim Kachara v. State and Ors.) and another decision in Special Criminal Application No. 852 of 1987 rendered by another Division Bench of this Court (Coram: S. B. Majmudar and B. S. Kapadia JJ ) on 29-2-1988/1-3-1988 (Rajnikant Uttamram Vankawala v. P. K. Bansal Police Commissioner Surat 1988 (1) GLR 633 ) and submitted that unless it was stated in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was on bail the fact that such statements are on record and are incorporated in the grounds of detention will not show that the detaining authority was alive to the aspect that the petitioner was on bail. We have carefully gone through these two judgments of this Court delivered by two different Division Benches. We are in complete agreement with the ratio of these two decisions of this Court. But we would like to mention here that they were decided on the facts of those two cases. Mr. H. L. Patel very much relied upon the following observations made at para 8 of the judgment in Special Criminal Application No. 585 of 1987 (Haji Ibrahim Kachara v. State):"8 In absence by advancing the aforesaid argument the learned Counsel for the respondents requests us to put the logic in reverse. The argument comes to this. Because the detaining authority took into consideration certain incidents which took place after the release of the petitioner detenu on bail it should be inferred that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was on bail. Such reverse legal cannot be accepted. If this argument is accepted each and every relevant circumstance which is otherwise required to be taken into consideration and which is held to be material and vital for arriving at necessary satisfaction but excluded from consideration can be said to have been taken into consideration by showing that subsequent incident has been considered. Such a course would be neither proper nor reasonable and hence the argument is not accepted. Such a course would be neither proper nor reasonable and hence the argument is not accepted. " ( 6 ) THIS decision came up for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 852 of 1987 (Rajnikant Uttamram Vankawala v. P. K. Bansal Police Commissioner Surat 1988 (1) GLR 633 ) which we have referred to earlier. Reliance was placed before the said Bench on para 8 of the judgment of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 585 of 1987 (Haji Ibrahims case) which is reproduced above and the said Division Bench observed with respect to the said paragraph that though the said Division Bench was in complete agreement with the ratio of the said decision of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 585 of 1987 (Haji Ibrahims case) the said Division Bench should not be treated to have fully endorsed the wider observations made in para 8 of the said judgment. ( 7 ) AS against the aforesaid two judgments of this Court upon which Mr. Patel placed reliance there is another judgment of this Court (Coram: S. B. Majmudar and B. S. Kapadia JJ.) in Special Criminal Application No. 837 of 1987 decided on 17/03/1988 (Nasimbanu Munnamiya Shaikh v. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad) which shows that the facts of that case were more or less similar to the facts of the present case. In that case also it appears that there were statements of witnesses which disclosed that the detenu was on bail and there was also mention in the grounds of detention referring to the said statements which disclosed that the detaining authority was alive to the aspect of the petitioner being on bail. There was also affidavit of the detaining authority showing that the detaining authority was alive to the aspect that the detenu was on bail. Taking into consideration all these aspects the Division Bench held that the detaining authority was alive to the said aspect viz that the detenu was on bail and therefore the detention was not vitiated on that ground. The discussion in this regard will be found in that said judgment in the discussion No. 1 raised in that petition. The discussion starts at page 5 of the judgment but the relevant discussion will be found at pages 14 15. 16 and 17. The discussion in this regard will be found in that said judgment in the discussion No. 1 raised in that petition. The discussion starts at page 5 of the judgment but the relevant discussion will be found at pages 14 15. 16 and 17. We may also mention here that in Special Criminal Application No. 852 of 1987 (Rajnikants case 1988 (1) GLR 633 ) though the facts were more or less similar the detaining authority in that case bad not mentioned in the affidavit-in-reply that it was alive to the fact that the detenu was on bail. It was only stated in the affidavit that the facts stated in the grounds of detention and the statements indicate that the detenu was on bail and that affidavit was not considered to be quite sufficient by the said Division Bench for reaching the conclusion that the detaining authority was alive to this aspect. Looking to the ratio of the decision of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 837 of 1987 decided on 17/03/1988 (Nasimbanu Amunnumiya Shaikh v. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad) which we have discussed above we are inclined to reject this contention raised by Mr. Patel. ( 8 ) THE next ground of challenge is that the petitioner is illiterate and the grounds were not explained to him. There does not appear to be any substance in this contention because the Vakalatnama is signed by the detenu and below the order of detention also there is signature of the detenu. The endorsement shows that the order of detention which was in English was explained to him in Gujarati and even the grounds and the other documents which were in Gujarati were also explained to the detenu. In view of this this ground deserves to be rejected. ( 9 ) THE next ground of challenge is that addresses of the witnesses are not complete. There also does not appear to be any substance in this contention because addresses appear to be quite complete because the names of the streets are mentioned. ( 10 ) THE next ground of challenge is that the aspect of lesser drastic steps was not considered by the detaining authority. There also does not appear to be any substance in this contention because addresses appear to be quite complete because the names of the streets are mentioned. ( 10 ) THE next ground of challenge is that the aspect of lesser drastic steps was not considered by the detaining authority. But there is no substance in this challenge also because page 23 shows that the detaining authority was satisfied that there was no other way out except to detain the detenu for preventing him from carrying on his unlawful activities. The detaining authority has considered this aspect at page 23 of the grounds and therefore this ground of challenge also deserves to be rejected. ( 11 ) THE next and the last contention raised by Mr. Patel was that the allegations made in the statements were very vague. The statements clearly show the date time and place and therefore there is no vagueness as contended. This ground of challenge also deserves to be rejected. ( 12 ) THE discussion made above will go to show that there is no merit in this petition and therefore it is required to be dismissed. The petition therefore is dismissed and rule is ordered to be discharged. Petition dismissed. .