JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - On 17th April, 1983, the Committee of Management of Bhartiya Siksha Sadan Intermediate College, Sikandarpur, Farrukhabad (hereinafter referred to as the College) resolved to terminate the services of the respondent No. 3, Raj Kumar Sharma, a Head clerk. The respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal. The Deputy Director of Education passed an order dated 6th January, 1987 allowing the appeal in part. He set aside the order of termination. However, he substituted certain minor punishments instead of the order of termination of service. This order of the Deputy Director of Education is being impugned by the Committee of Management in the present writ petition. 2. It is not in dispute that the Committee of Management passed its resolution dated 17th April, 1983, terminating the services of the respondent No. 3 without obtaining the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. One of the grounds given for setting aside the order of the Committee of Management was that the action had been taken by the Committee of Management in violation of Regulation 31 as contained in Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. These Regulations provide that the punishment of removal or discharge from service could be imposed upon an employee only with the prior approval of the Inspector or the Regional Inspectors, as the case may be. However, the Deputy Director thought that some minor punishment should be imposed upon the respondent No. 3. 3. Two contentions have been advanced in support of this petition. The first is that the District Inspector of Schools in approved the resolution of the Committee of Management terminating the services of the petitioner and, therefore, in any view of the matter, the order of termination will be deemed to come into existence from the date of the approval. This is not a sound contention. The regulation framing authority made its intention clear by using the word 'prior' in Regulation 31. The use of this word leaves no scope for the argument that the approval given on a subsequent date will infuge life into the order of punishment and bring it into existence from the date of the approval. The resolution of the Committee of Management was still born in the absence of an approval and no life could be infuged into it by subsequent approval. 4. The resolution of the Committee of Management was still born in the absence of an approval and no life could be infuged into it by subsequent approval. 4. The second contention is that the Deputy Director was not justified in imposing a minor punishment upon the respondent No. 3. The argument is that he exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him by Regulation 34 of Chapter III. This contention cannot be considered on a mere interpretation of Regulation 34. It has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. It is admitted that the Committee of Management found the respondent guilty of embezzlement. However, in its wisdow, it resolved that it was prepared to take a lenient view and to reconsider its decision terminating the services of the respondent No. 3, provided he (the respondent No. 3) paid off half the amount alleged to have been embezzled and also tendered an apology. The Deputy Director held that this sort of resolution in itself was illegal. Keeping this attitude of the management in view, he went into the whole matter and directed that he considered it fit that instead of an order of termination an order awarding some minor punishment should be passed. Against this Back drop, let us how read Regulation 34 which ways : "In deciding upon the punishment to be imposed, mitigating factors, if any, and record of service of the employee concerned may be taken into account." It is not the case of the petitioner that prior to this Act, which has been impugned in the present writ petition, there was any case of misconduct against the respondent No. 3. As regards the mitigation factor, I have already emphasised that the Committee of Management itself thought it fit that if the respondent No. 3 deposited half the amount alleged to have been embezzled and tendered apology, it will reconsider its order terminating the services of the respondent No. 3. It is to be remembered that the Deputy Director accepted the defence set up by the respondent No. 3 that although the entries in the cash - book were in the handwriting of the respondent No. 3. yet, he had made those entries at the instance of the Assistant clerk. This court is not sitting as a court of appeal over the judgment of the Deputy Director. yet, he had made those entries at the instance of the Assistant clerk. This court is not sitting as a court of appeal over the judgment of the Deputy Director. He may have taken an erroneous view on this part of the case of the respondent No. 3. But it cannot be said that he acted either without jurisdiction or irrationally in accepting the defence of the respondent No. 3. Initially the petitioner was granted an interim order to the effect that the order of the Deputy Director should not be given effect to. This order was for a limited period and was not extended thereafter. 5. This petition fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.