JUDGMENT R.P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order passed by the IX Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, dated 31-10-1987 in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. The Petitioner is a landlady of the accommodation in dispute i.e., House No. 416, Old Katra, Allahabad of which Respondent No. 2 is the tenant. The Petitioner filed an application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act, inter alia, on the ground that her family has grown resulting in need for additional accommodation and that her daughter-in-law is of a quarrelsome nature and the strained relations between the Petitioner and her daughter-in-law had completely disturbed the mental peace of the members of the family and hence the Petitioner's need for the disputed accommodation i.e., house No. 416, Old Katra, Allahabad is bonafide and genuine as the Petitioner would like to shift one of her sons alongwith the daughter-in-law in the accommodation in dispute i.e., house No. 416, Old Katra, Allahabad and it was further pleaded that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in her favour. 3. The application moved by the Petitioner was contested on the ground that the need of the Petitioner for the disputed accommodation was not bonafide and genuine and that the tenanted house of the Petitioner 336, Old Katra, Allahabad is sufficient for the residence of the Petitioner and her family members and the Respondent No. 2 further denied the case of the Petitioner that the Respondent No. 2 has an alternative accommodation jointly owned by the Respondent No. 2 and his brother in Lala-ki-Saraiyya and hence contended that greater hardship would be caused to the Respondent No. 2 if the release application filed by the Petitioner is allowed. 4. 4. The Prescribed Authority, after considering the evidence on record, held that the disputed house No. 416, Old Katra, Allahabad was not sufficient for the Petitioner's family which consists of the Petitioner, her husband, one married son alongwith the daughter-in-law, one unmarried son and one unmarried daughter apart from one married daughter who are living alongwith the Petitioner and since there were only 3 rooms in the house in dispute, the need of the Petitioner for the release of the accommodation was held to be bonafide and genuine specially in view of the fact that the relations of the Petitioner with her daughter-in-law was strained and hence it has become necessary for the Petitioner to make arrangement for a separate accommodation for her daughter-in-law and her son in order to maintain mental peace in the family. The Prescribed Authority further held that greater hardship would be caused to the Petitioner if the accommodation is not released in her favour and on these findings allowed the application, vide his order, dated 24-7-1986. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the Respondent No. 2 went up in appeal before the IX Additional District Judge, Allahabad, who, however, holding that the Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding that the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute was bonafide and genuine and hence the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute is imaginary and without any basis, allowed the appeal without further applying his mind to the comparative hardship of the parties, vide his order, dated 31-10-1987 which is in challenge in the present writ petition. 6. Heard Sri Radhey Shyam Dwivedi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri S.R. Mishra, for the Respondent No. 2. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously contended that the Additional District Judge, Respondent No. 1, has committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the Prescribed Authority has not given a finding that the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide or genuine. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously contended that the Additional District Judge, Respondent No. 1, has committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the Prescribed Authority has not given a finding that the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide or genuine. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that one of the issues decided by the Prescribed Authority was whether the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute was bona fide and genuine and after considering the evidence on record, the Prescribed Authority clearly held that the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute was genuine specially in view of the fact that it is admitted by the Respondent No. 2 that the Petitioner has differences with her daughter-in-law and hence her need to provide separate accommodation to her daughter-in-law in order to keep the mental peace in the family, was all the more bona fide and genuine. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Additional District Judge has thus decided the case on irrelevant consideration by ignoring the material evidence produced by the Petitioner in support of her bona fide need for the accommodation in dispute and hence the order passed by the Additional District Judge is liable to be quashed. 8. On a perusal of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, I find that the Prescribed Authority has applied his mind to the question about the bona fide need of the Petitioner for the disputed accommodation. While considering point No. 2', the Prescribed Authority has held that- Even if it is believed that married daughters are not living with the applicant, applicant has with her husband, one married son with daughter-in-law, one unmarried son and one unmarried daughter. Two couples will require two separate rooms. Unmarried son and daughter each will require one room one guest room is also necessary for the family need, but the applicant has with her only three rooms whereas she needs four rooms. It is admitted to the O.P. that applicant has differences with her daughter-in-law her need to get the daughter-in-law away from herself and at the same time to provide her comfortable accommodation cannot be said to be unreasonable or illegal. Mental peace is as much necessary for the life as good food and other necessities. It is admitted to the O.P. that applicant has differences with her daughter-in-law her need to get the daughter-in-law away from herself and at the same time to provide her comfortable accommodation cannot be said to be unreasonable or illegal. Mental peace is as much necessary for the life as good food and other necessities. Tension is dangerous for life. So I am not inclined to accept that the need of the landlady is not genuine and legal. I am of the opinion that it is also established that Smt. Anju Jaiswal is also living with the landlady with her two children. Thus I find that the Prescribed Authority has applied his mind to the need of the Petitioner for accommodation in dispute and has held that the need of the Petitioner is genuine for the accommodation in dispute specially in view of the fact that the relations of the Petitioner with her daughter-in-law is strained and in order to remove the tension and maintain mental peace, it bas become necessary to provide a separate accommodation for her daughter-in-law so that the family may live in peace. Hence there is force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Additional District Judge has committed manifest error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the Prescribed Authotity has not applied his mind and has not recorded his findings on the question of bona fide and genuine need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute. 9. Strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law necessitating the need to provide separate accommodation for the daughter-in-law in order to keep the mental peace in the family has been held by this Court to be a bona fide need justifying the relesae of an independent accommodation for the daughter-in-law. In Dr. Jamuna Datt Tiwari v. IV Additional District Judge, Allahabad reported in 1982 (1) ARC 81, this Court observed as follows: The jurisdiction to allow an application u/s 21 depends on the bona fide need of landlord. What would be bona Ode need in a given circumstances cannot be defined with certainty. Strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brothers is not an unusual features of our society. Where the differences arise the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. What would be bona Ode need in a given circumstances cannot be defined with certainty. Strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brothers is not an unusual features of our society. Where the differences arise the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. It, therefore, may furnish reasonable ground for allowing an application for release of an independent accommodation. A landlord may not have the luxury of selecting accommodation but inability to live with, brother's family due to differences between brothers' wives and mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is certainly a ground on which he may seek vacation of his own house occupied by a tenant. 10. In Dau Dayal v. Additional District Judge, Aligarh 1982 UPRCC 92 strained relations between mother and wife has been held in the circumstances to create a bona fide need for the release of an accommodation. Reliance was placed in that case on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Lal Chand Khanna Vs. Dr. Parmod Kumar Sood and Others, AIR 1980 Delhi 142 , in which it was held that strained relation between the wife and mother of the landlord could be a ground for granting permission to the landlord to evict his tenant, The Delhi High Court had held that joint family living had been under considerable strain for economic and temperamental reasons arising largely on account of a conflict between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law with the result that a separate unit for some of branches of the family within the family home is not an unusual occurrence. Thus in the present case when it is proved that the relations between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law are strained, the need of the Petitioner for the release of the accommodation to provide a separate accommodation for her daughter-in-law is clearly established in the circumstances of the case and the order of the Additional District Judge that the Petitioner's need for the accommodation in dispute is imaginary and without foundation is wholly misconceived and is not based on consideration of the relevant and material evidence on record. Moreover, the Additional District Judge has completely misdirected himself in holding that the Prescribed Authority has not applied his mind to the question of bona fide and genuine need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute. Moreover, the Additional District Judge has completely misdirected himself in holding that the Prescribed Authority has not applied his mind to the question of bona fide and genuine need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute. As has been discussed above, the Prescribed Authority has found, on consideration of the evidence on record that the need of the Petitioner for the accommodation in dispute is genuine and in coming to this conclusion has also taken into consideration the strained relations between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law which had made it imperative for the Petitioner to provide a separate accommodation to the daughter-in-law to maintain peace in the family. Hence the order passed by the Additional District Judge is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 11. In the present case, it is clear that the appellate authority has committed a gross error in taking into consideration irrelevant facts and ignoring relevant evidence. In the case of Khanna Brothers v. 1st Addl. Distt. Judge, Kanpur 1986 (1) ARC 124 : 1985 AWC 1024 , it was held by this Court that "it is true that for establishing bona fide requirement a landlord is not needed to establish his stand for absolute need of property. The requirement of law would have been fulfilled if the need of the landlord is found to be honest and in good faith." Thus it has been held it would suffice if a person is said to need a premises bona fide if he requires it honestly. The connotation of the word 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that the landlord cannot get the premises released unless his requirement is absolute. The word 'bona fide' means genuinely and sincerely i.e., in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. In the circumstances of the present case, the need of the Petitioner has been clearly established to be in good faith and genuine and hence the order of the Additional District Judge is liable to be set aside. 12. The word 'bona fide' means genuinely and sincerely i.e., in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. In the circumstances of the present case, the need of the Petitioner has been clearly established to be in good faith and genuine and hence the order of the Additional District Judge is liable to be set aside. 12. Another aspect of the case argued by the Petitioner's counsel before me is that the Petitioner's husband is living as a tenant in house No. 336, Old Katra, Allahabad which has been purchasad by Sri Salik Ram and others who have set up their need for the tenanted house No. 336, Old Katra, Allahabad and moved an application for the release of the said accommodation, u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and hence the Petitioner, who is living with her husband in the said house as a tenant, is under a threat of being evicted from the said accommodation. The Petitioner brought to my notice an exparte order of release obtained by Salik Ram Jaiswal and Vijai Lakshmi Devi against the Petitioner's husband from house No. 336, Old Katra, Allahabad but subsequently, however, the said exparte order has been set aside and the matter is pending before the Prescribed Authority to be decided on merits. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that there is thus an impending danger of the Petitioner and her husband being evicted from the tenanted accommodation which creates a greater urgency and bona fide need for the release of the accommodation in dispute of which the Petitioner is the landlady. However, since this point has not been taken into consideration while deciding the case by the Prescribed Authority or the Additional District Judge, it would not be necessary or appropriate for me to go into this question at this stage. 13. In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is allowed, the order passed by the IX Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 31st October, 1987 is quashed and the case is remanded back to the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, Respondent No. 1, with a direction to apply his mind to the question of comparative hardship and to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law at an early date keeping in view the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.