JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This Misc. Second Appeal is directed against the order of the learned District Judge, Mandi, dated May 17, 1978, whereby the appeal of the respondents, Smt. Bhuteshwari Devi and others, herein, against the appellants Jethu and others was allowed and the order of the Compensation Officer, Sadar Mandi, dated September 6, 1974 was set aside. 2. The facts of this case reveal a very sad tale. It shows how a little wrong step by the courts during the course of dispensation of justice can put affected parties to avoidable troubles. 3. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants herein, Harji was tenant in respect of certain land under the respondent Smt Bhuteshwari Devi and others. He then initiated proceedings for acquisition of proprie tary rights in respect of those tenancy holdings before the Compensation Officer under the old Act known as the "Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act" and the Compensation Officer granted him the proprietary rights on payment of Rs. 162.45 p. The respondents, however, challenged this order of the Compensation Officer in appeal before the learned District Judge. During the course of the pendency of the appeal, the parties effected a compromise whereby the said Harji undertook to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,670 instead of Rs. 162.45 to the respondent landlords. The District Judge then while disposing of the appeal vide order dated July 2, 1970, directed that said Harji would deposit this amount of Rs. 1,670 minus Rs. 162.45 (which amount stood already deposited) with the Compensation Officer concerned by July 1, 1971 and in case of default, the application of said Harji for acquisition of proprietary rights would stand dismissed. It then transpires from the record that before this due date for depositing the amount of Rs. 1,670, that is, July 1, 1971 arrived, said Harji died on December, 3, 1970 leaving behind the present appellants as his heirs. They then moved an application before the learned District Judge, Mandi, on August 25, 1971 wherein they averred that when after the death of said Harji, Jaithu, one of the appellants, approached the counsel said Harji had previously engaged in these proceedings, he came to know that there was some compromise as a result of which the amount of Rs. They then moved an application before the learned District Judge, Mandi, on August 25, 1971 wherein they averred that when after the death of said Harji, Jaithu, one of the appellants, approached the counsel said Harji had previously engaged in these proceedings, he came to know that there was some compromise as a result of which the amount of Rs. 1,670 was to be deposited on or before July 1, 1971 and that prior thereto they had no such knowledge and that in fact the sons of Harji that is, Jethu, Sohan Lal and Punu were still minors and their mother Smt. Chhangi was an illiterate rustic woman and in these circumstances the date for the deposit of the said amount be extended as the same had since expired- The learned District Judge then vide his order dated October 11, 1971 held that he could not review the order of the District Judge dated July 2, 1970 so as to grant extension to the appellants for the deposit of the amount of Rs. 1670 and, therefore, the appellants should make necessary application for extension of time before the Compensation Officer concerned and he thus dismissed the application. 4. The appellants then again approached the Compensation Officer vide their application dated October 14, 1971 for the same purpose, namely, extension of time to deposit the aforesaid amount. The learned Compensation Officer then vide his order dated February 22, 1972 held that since the time limit was fixed by the learned District Judge, Mandi, vide his order dated July 2, 1970, therefore, he had no powers to extend the time and it was only the learned District Judge who could extend this time and he thus submitted the entire case to the learned District Judge, Mandi, for necessary orders. The learned District Judge then vide his order dated July 21, 1972 held that the reference by the Compensation Officer in this case was no competent and that it was the Compensation Officer alone who had to dispose of the application in accordance with law and the reference was accordingly rejected and the parties were directed to appear before the Compensation Officer on August 2, 1972. 5. The learned Compensation Officer then again became seized of this matter and after the reply was filed by the respondents, he raised as many as nine issues which are as follows : 1. 5. The learned Compensation Officer then again became seized of this matter and after the reply was filed by the respondents, he raised as many as nine issues which are as follows : 1. Whether the application is maintainable and competent ? O.RP. 2. Whether the application in form L. R. Ill stands dismissed, ipso-facto vide order dated 2-7-1970 of the learned District Judge ? OPR. 3. Whether the application is within time ? OPP. 4. Whether the court has got no jurisdiction ? OPR. 5. Whether the petitioners have got cause of action ? OPP* 6. Whether the petitioners are legal heirs of Harji deceased ? OPP. 7. Whether the petitioners had no knowledge of the proceedings under section 11 of Act No. 15 of 1954 and the decision there-of? OPP. 8. Whether Harji died on 3-12-1970 ? OPP. 9. Whether there is sufficient cause to extend the time for deposit of compensation as prayed for? OPP. 10. Relief. Out of these issues, five were treated by him as preliminary issues and gave a finding thereon in favour of the appellants vide order dated September 6, 1974, which order was then impugned before the learned District Judge, Mandi and which resulted in the order impugned/dated May 17, 1978. 6. Thus apparently the Compensation Officer had only decided the preliminary issues with regard to his competence or jurisdiction to hold the proceedings for extension of time but no extension of time had yet been granted under issue No. 9. From the impugned order of the learned District Judge, dated May 17, 1978, however, it appears as if the Compensation Officer had allowed the extension which was factually in accurate. 7. The unfortunate position in the face of these facts and circum stances boils down to this that the District Judge at Mandi at no time applied his mind in a proper manner at any stage as and when he had occasion to deal with the proceedings in question. As a matter of fact, the first order that was passed by the District Judge on October 11, 1971 was patently erroneous and illegal. As a matter of fact, the first order that was passed by the District Judge on October 11, 1971 was patently erroneous and illegal. Obviously, the appellants in the proceedings before him had only requested the District Judge to extend the time to deposit the amount of Rs, 1,670 in view of the fact that the same could not be deposited on the date prescribed by the learned District Judge, namely, July 1, 1971, vide order dated July 2, 1970 on account of the fact that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, Harji who had given that undertaking had died earlier prior thereto, that is on December 3, 1970, leaving behind his widow Chhangi and three minor children who were applicants before him and they had categorically asserted that they had no such knowledge that this amount was to be deposited by July 1, 1971 and that they came to know about this compromise only from their lawyer who was representing said Harji before the District Judge on August 18, 1971 when they contacted him to learn as to what had happened to the proceedings initiated by said Harji with regard to the acquisition of proprietary rights. There can be no two opinions on the point that it was the District Judge alone and none-else who could given this extension of time and all that the learned District Judge was required to do on the institution of this application dated August 25, 1971 was to issue notice to the respondents and, after hearing both the parties, to decide the said application in accordance with law on the point as to whether the extension should be allowed or not. The learned District Judge, however, fell into an error by holding in that order of October 11, 1971 that the application was not competent before him and that in his opinion they should make this type of application before the Compensation Officer for making the deposit and extension of time. The learned District Judge, however, fell into an error by holding in that order of October 11, 1971 that the application was not competent before him and that in his opinion they should make this type of application before the Compensation Officer for making the deposit and extension of time. Strangely enough, however, the learned District Judge stuck to this view even after a reference was made by the Compensation Officer vide order dated February 22, 1972, that it was within the competence of the District Judge alone to grant such extension and then submitted the proceedings before him to pass an appropriate order ; inasmuch as, the learned District Judge again vide his order dated July 21, 1972 purports to have treated this order of the Compensation Officer as a reference and held that the reference before him was not competent and observed that the application for extension of time filed before the Compensation Officer by the appellants should be disposed of by him alone in accordance with law. 8. It also transpires from the record that thereafter the Compensation Officer again took up the matter and, before him, a number of preliminary issues were taken by the respondents in their reply and the Compensation Officer only gave finding on the preliminary issues vide order dated September 6, 1974 holding that the application for extension of time was competent before him since the learned District Judge Mandi held it to be so and before the Compensation Officer could decide this application on merits the respondents again took this matter in appeal to the District Judge which resulted in the order dated May 17, 1978, impugned in this appeal which again is erroneous inasmuch as the court has treated the matter as if the same had been finally disposed of by the Compensation Officer while actually it was not so. 9. Now in view of these facts and circumstances it is clear that the impugned order has also to be set aside. It is also equally clear that the Compensation Officer is not competent to grant the requisite extension and it is the Court of the learned District Judge who had fixed the date for the deposit of the compensation which had to grant this extension and the District Judge was in error in holding that such application was competent before the Compensation Officer. 10. 10. While piercing through this maze of confusion and chaos unnecessarily created by the learned District Judge, it has to be held that the application as originally instituted before the learned District Judge, dated August 25, 1971, in file No. 31 of 31-8-1971, Jethu and others v. Mst. Bhuteshwari, was legal and proper and the learned District Judge was required to take action thereon and when he failed to act in accordance with law and passed the order dated October 11, 1971 the order is apparently illegal as the learned District Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him by law as is quite apparent from the provisions of section 148 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and this order, therefore, deserves to be quashed. 11. Now apparently, after this, as per the directions of the learned District Judge, the appellants filed similar application for extension before the Compensation Officer on October 14, 1971 wherein initially the reference was made to the learned District Judge by the Compensation Officer vide order dated February 22, 1972 to the effect that it is the District Judge who had to grant the extension which again was rejected by the learned District Judge vide order dated July 21, 1972. This order again deserves to be quashed since even on this reference, the District Judge could call for the record and granted the appropriate relief as the proceedings in this behalf before the Compensation Officer were apparently not competent and the order is accordingly quashed. 12. After these proceedings were remanded by the learned District Judge again to the Compensation Officer, the Compensation Officer only decided that the application before him was competent as even so held by the learned District Judge. Thus the order impugned herein passed by the learned District Judge that extension of time was improperly granted by the learned Compensation Officer is also illegal and void and is hereby quashed. 13. Now the legal position that emerges from all this is that once the first order of the learned District Judge dated October 11, 1971 is set aside, the application of the appellants dated August 25, 1971 revives and all the subsequent orders in this behalf whether passed by the Compensation Officer or the District Judge are also illegal and void and are hereby quashed. 14. 14. In view of this, there are now two options open for this Court, namely, either to accept the appeal and remand the proceedings again to the District Judge with direction to decide the application of the appellants dated August 25, 1971 in accordance with law or this Court itself should embark upon the decision thereon. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, it would be highly inequitous, improper and rather scandalous if not culpable to resort to the first alternative. Obviously, more than seventeen years have elapsed since this application was first made before the learned District Judge and in case of remand it might again not only result in further delay but also entail financial burdens which may prove ruinous to the poor appellants. Obviously, to a similar application filed by the appellants before the Compensation Officer, on October 14, 1971 a reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents dated August 19, 1972. This shall be treated to have been filed by the respondents in file No. 31 of 31-8 1971 in reply to the application dated August 25, 1971. Now in this, the respondents have not specifically denied that Harji had died on December 3, 1970. Their only theme was that since the appellants failed to make the deposit within the period prescribed by the Court, that is, July 1, 1971, no such extension can be given by the Court. I, however, feel that in the background of these facts and circumstances of this case, the application of the appellants deserves to be allowed. The Honble Supreme Court has m no uncertain terms held in AIR 1961 SC 882, Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Dass, that section 148 in terms, allowed extension of time even if the original period fixed had expired and that an order extending time for payment though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. The Honble Court further observed:— "The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart), are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. The Honble Court further observed:— "The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart), are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Sections 148, 149 and 151 clothed the High Court with ample power to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made out for extension". 15. In the instant case, it is clear that the party to the original agreement whereby the amount of Rs. 1670 was required to be deposited by July 1, 1971, was Harji, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. He died on December 3, 1970 and the appellants have categorically stated that they had no knowledge that such an amount was to be paid by the prescribed date and that they came to know about this only on August 18, 1971 and that they then hastened to make an application for extension of time. It is also clear that when Harji was succeeded by the present appellants, that is, three sons and his widow Chhangi, all the three sons were minor and Chhangi was obviously an illiterate rustic harijan lady. In these circumstances, I feel that having regard to the provisions of sections 148 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, there are sufficient grounds to allow this application for extension of time. 16. In view of this, the appeal is accepted, the order appealed against is set aside, the application of the appellants dated August 25, 1971 in file No. 31 of 31-8-1971, is allowed and the appellants are given three months time to deposit the amount of Rs. 1,670 in the Court of the Compensation Officer at Mandi from today. The respondents shall also pay the costs of this appeal which is quantified at Rs. 600. Appeal allowed.