JUDGMENT S.K. Mookerji, J. - I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The dispute relates to a shop in which petitioner-tenant is under-taking the business of shoes. An application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was moved by the respondent-landlords for the release of the shop in favour of the landlords, which the landlords required for the purpose of rehabilitating their two sons. The petitioner-tenant filed a written statement and hotlyon the contested. The Prescribed Authority by his impugned order dated 5th October, 1983, held that the need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine and considering the comparative hardship came to the conclusion that in case the application is not allowed, landlord shall suffer greater hardship. However, the landlords made an offer to the petitioner-tenant of an alternative shop. This shop is situate on the first floor, whereas the disputed shop is on the ground floor. The Prescribed Authority has come to the conclusion that there are almost 47 shops in the same area, but the judgment is absolutely silent whether any shop is on the first floor in the area. The petitioner-tenant is undertaking the retail business on ground floor and, therefore, he has strongly contended that the alternative accommodation was not suitable. However, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlords, under Section 21(1)(a), which necessitated the tenant-petitioner to file an appeal (Appeal No. 47 of 1982). This appeal has also been rejected by the IVth Additional District Judge, Agra by his impugned order dated 8th November, 1985. Thereafter, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. At this stage of admission itself, this Court without admitting the petition issued notices to the respondent-landlords for filing their counter-affidavit and also stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the lower Appellate Court. Counter and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged. Therefore, the case had been listed for admission. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, strenuously urged that the question of offering an alternative accommodation does not arise in this case as the accommodation in question is non-residential. Rule 16(1)(f) which speaks about the alternative accommodation offered by the landlords, relates to a residential accommodation. This argument is not accepted. Therefore, the case had been listed for admission. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, strenuously urged that the question of offering an alternative accommodation does not arise in this case as the accommodation in question is non-residential. Rule 16(1)(f) which speaks about the alternative accommodation offered by the landlords, relates to a residential accommodation. This argument is not accepted. Assuming Rule 16(1)(f) is not applicable in the present case still while deciding the question of comparative hardship, application under Section 21, can be disposed of in case suitable alternative accommodation is offered to the tenant by the landlord. Although Rule 16(1)(f) is not applicable in the case of non-residential accommodation but there is no bar while considering the question of comparative hardship in respect of a shop considering the offer of the landlord to a tenant as an alternative accommodation. This point, now sought to be argued before me, has neither been argued before the Courts below. However, the argument is negatived. The other argument advanced before me that the lower appellate Court has committed an error while stating that the tenant is doing business in the accommodation in question for only the last 13 years and that cannot be recorded as a very long time. I do not agree with this observation of the lower Appellate Court while considering the respective hardship of the landlord and the tenant. The other argument of there learned counsel for the petitioner is that the landlord-respondent had already three businesses-namely (1) M/s. Shanti Prakash and Bros. (ii) M/s. Shikka Footwears, and (iii) M/s. Shikka Industries. The lower Appellate Court has come to a definite conclusion that the business under the name of style of M/s. Shanti Prakash and Brothers is not existing. Regarding other two there is no whisper in the judgment. Learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that regarding the other two shops, there was no evidence on record; therefore, there was no argument, advanced before the lower Appellate Court. I have examined the material on the record and fully agree with the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Regarding other two there is no whisper in the judgment. Learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that regarding the other two shops, there was no evidence on record; therefore, there was no argument, advanced before the lower Appellate Court. I have examined the material on the record and fully agree with the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant at the end is, that the accommodation has been provided by the landlords on the first floor and this will result into some hardship at least to the petitioner-tenant in taking his business on the first floor and this will also result into loss of business; whereas the landlords want to start afresh shoes business by their two sons. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant further advanced his argument that the landlord-respondents can without difficulty start a fresh business in the first floor instead of disturbing the tenant on the ground floor. Unfortunately, this is substantial argument but has not been raised in clear terms before the Courts below. I feel in the interest of justice the following two points require reconsideration :- (1) In view of the fact that the tenant-petitioner is carrying on his business for 13 long years in the shop, the question of comparative hardship should be reassessed and, thereafter a clear finding be recorded. (2) On the basis of material on record, whether it is possible for the landlords to start their new business in the first floor instead of disturbing the shoe business of the tenant-petitioner on the ground floor. 6. In the result, I allow this writ petition and quash the order of the IV Additional District Judge, Agra, dated 8th November, 1985 in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1982, Amar Nath v. Satyapal Sikka and others, and remand the case back to the lower appellate Court for deciding the question of comparative hardship in accordance with law taking into consideration the observations made in this judgment expeditiously at a very early date after giving full opportunity to the parties. 7. There shall be no order as to costs.