JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, Member. - These are two connected appeals filed against the judgment and decree of the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut dated 12-3-1973 through which the appeals filed against the judgment and decree of the judicial Officer (Revenue) Meerut dated 7-9-1970 were dismissed. 2. The facts of these cases are that Smt. Sukhbiri brought two separate suits under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act for the partition of her th share in the land in suits. The suit was contested on the ground that the plaintiff had no title. The suit was however decreed and the plaintiff's share was held to be th. The appeals filed by the defendants were also dismissed, hence these second appeals. In these appeals a compromise was filed by the counsel for the appellant and the same was sent to the trial court for verification. The presiding officer of the trial court verified the compromise and forwarded the same to this court. An application has however been moved by the plaintiff Smt. Sukhbiri that she has not entered into any compromise and her thumb impression has been obtained by playing fraud upon her. 3. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the record. 4. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the compromise which has been verified by the trial court should be accepted and the decree must be prepared in accordance there with. It was further argued that even through the plaintiff has resiled from the compromise but this-step of her should not be accepted and she should not be permitted to withdraw the compromise. 5. As against the above contention it was argued on behalf of Smt. Sukhbiri that the original compromise was never signed by her and her L. T. I. was obtained by fraud before the trial court during the verification proceedings which were never explained to her, and, therefore, such compromise cannot be acted upon for preparing the decree. 6. On the perusal of the compromise I find that though it has been signed by the plaintiff husband Hardan Singh who is also a defendant but it was not signed by the plaintiff Smt. Sukhbiri. Such compromise can utmost be called an application but it cannot fall within the definition of compromise because it was not originally signed by the plaintiff. Such compromise can utmost be called an application but it cannot fall within the definition of compromise because it was not originally signed by the plaintiff. Under order 23 rule 3 C. P. C. a deed of agreement, if lawfully taken to be compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties failing which it cannot be treated as a compromise. The mere fact that the signatures of the plaintiff were obtained during verification on the back of the alleged compromise deed would not make it a compromise and, therefore, it is not possible to decide these appeals on the basis of this document, because it does not fall within the definition of order XXIII rule 3 C. P. C. Moreover even if it is taken that the compromise was knowingly verified by the plaintiff it cannot be acted upon for passing the decree since it has been resiled from by the plaintiff. The proviso attached to rule 3 of Order XXIII C. P. C. clearly lays down that a party may deny the execution of the compromise and the question of the execution of the compromise and the validity thereof shall be determined by the court which follows that in such cases it would not be proper for the court to pass the decree on such a compromise without assessing the genuineness thereof. Consequently in the instant case when the plaintiff has denied to have executed the compromise it would not be proper to pass any decree on the basis of the same. In such circumstances the alleged compromise dated 30-11-1981 is rejected and no decree can be passed thereof. As regards the merits of the case both the courts below have given a concurrent finding about the share of the plaintiff and there is no reason to interfere in that finding. No other point of law arises in these appeals. Both the appeals are, therefore, devoid of any merit and are dismissed. Let the record be sent back to the trial court to prepare final decree. This order shall govern S.A. No. 302 (z) of 1972-73/Meerut.