JUDGMENT 1. - A sketch of the primary fact will help delineate the pristinely controversy evolved in this writ petition where, a direction in the nature of certiorari has been sought to quash the impugned order (Exhibit 9) dated 25.10.1977 of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Jaipur (respondent No. 2). The prayer has also been to issue direction against the respondents restraining them from interfering with the property rights of the petitioner in or over the disputed land, Shyambagh either by themselves or through their agents in any manner and also from proceeding further for allotment of land. 2. The petitioner, a registered Housing Co-operative Society, claimed to be a purchaser of the land in question which is said to be three portions of abadi land situated in village Kishanpole now popularly known as Adarsh Nagar and formed part of one Shyam Bagh alias Tiwari-Ji-ki-Bagichi-one measuring 150 ft. x 88 ft. comprising 1466.6 sq yards and another two parts measuring 11,119.89 sq. yards, bearing khasra Nos. 468, 469 and 470 as shown in Jama Bandis (Exhibit 3) for st years, 2025 to 2029, under two registered sale deeds (Exhibit 1 and 2)-one executed on 15 5.1975 by Shri Mannu lal Tiwari for Rs. 43, 981 /--and another by Shri Suresh Mohan Tiwari s/o Late Shri Man Mohan Lal Tiwari for Rs. 1,00,000/-on 9-10-1975. 3. Pristinely the backdrop of the land is : this land was given in grant by the Erstwhile Jaipur State to one Shri Shyam Nath Tiwari the tenure of grant was that of Istamrar, and no the sad demise of Shri Shyam Nath Tiwari, his son-Ram Kumar Tiwari inherited the said property and on whose death, Man Mohanlal Tiwari, Mannulal Tiwari and Satya Narain alias Chandra Mohan Tiwari inherited the said property. Thus, the present vendors alongwith other heirs are stated to have succeeded and being successors of Late Shyam Nath Tiwari, alienated the disputed property to the petitioner. Shyam Baeh was consisting of private houses of family of Jagir of village Akodia (Tehil Chaksu District Jaipur) whose Jagirdas is stated to have been Shri Shyam Nath Tiwari - after his demise Ram Kumar Tiwari and thereafter his eldest son Man Mohan Lal Tiwari, succeeded, and also consisting of a well situated in khasra No. 468 apart from private temple etc. The disputed land is stated to be part of grant on the basis of Istamrari, for which no rent was chargeable, the purpose of which was for abadi and it was on the basis of a separate grant in the year 1928 than the Jagir of Akodia. According to the petitioner, presumably, it was on this reason that neither this land was resumed nor its possession was ever taken and thus it remained throughout in possession of Man Mohanlal Tiwari and his family members- successors of Shri Shyam Nath Tiwari. 4. The backdrop. Now, the facts and circumstances become decisive of the fate of the case even where the law is simplistic or fair in its face. Here, what are the events and environments of the controversy leading to the writ petition being given the boot ? 5. An application was filed by three brothers (Man Mohan Lal Tiwari, Chandra Mohan Tiwari and Mannulal Tiwari) for a permission is respect of sub-division of the land comprising of the land of Shyam for Bagh chalking out plots before the respondent No. 3-Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur which vide its letter (Exhibit 8) dated 25 2.19/5 laid down certain conditions for sub-division of the land- which were not agreed upon by the three brothers, especially by which major portion of the land measuring 30,000/- sq yards out of 34,000/- sq. yards i.e. 7/8 as to be handed over to the respondent No. 3. According to the petitioner, the disagreement by it on the aforesaid condition enraged the Officers of the respondent No. 3 and thus, in order to obsess the petitioner, the respondent No. 3 then wrote a letter to the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) who took the matter and ordered the Tehsildar Jaipur to take possession of the land in question as if the land had already been resumed though the land in question was a separate grant unconnected with Jagir of Akodia, according to the petitioner, 6. A salient circumstance which led the petitioner to move before this Court need emphasis. A salient circumstance which led the petitioner to move before this Court need emphasis. An advertisement was got published by the respondent No. 3 in the daily `Rajasthan Patrika' on 5.5.1978 for allotting the land in question situated in Shyam Bagh to the people desiring plots which drew notice to the petitioner-Society and according to it, the reap indent No. 3 had no right of whatsoever nature in or over the land in question and even than the respondent No. 3 was embarking upon the action of allotment of plots and hearing claims upto 20.5.1978 - against which, the petitioner moved making representation to the Secretary of the respondent No. 3 asserting therein that it has no title over the disputed land and so, the said advertisement was without jurisdiction. 7. Thus, being aggrieved by the judgment (Exhibit 9) dated 25.10.1977 of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) and apprehending that the respondent No. 3 would not allow its objections; that the plots would be allotted to the favoured persons of the respondent No. 3's officer's and that its property would be snatched in an unjust and atrocious manner, this petitioner-Society has come up before this Court in a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking writ of certiorari and direction, as stated in earlier part of this judgment. 8. The foremost grievance of the petitioner-Society is that its property rights protected and enshrined Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) of the Constitution have been infringed both, by the order (Ex. 9) and impugned proceedings initiated by the respondent No. 3 publishing advertisement dated 5.5.1978; and moreover the society is being deprived of its property without due course of law. Thus, according to the petitioner, the impugned order (Ex. 9) is exfacie without jurisdiction because, the land in question was never acquired nor resumed under the Rajasthan Lard Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. (For brevity. the Jagirs Act') moreover three is no proof whatsoever on record to show that the land comprised in Shyambagh stood resumed. 9. Thus, according to the petitioner, the impugned order (Ex. 9) is exfacie without jurisdiction because, the land in question was never acquired nor resumed under the Rajasthan Lard Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. (For brevity. the Jagirs Act') moreover three is no proof whatsoever on record to show that the land comprised in Shyambagh stood resumed. 9. In reply to the writ petition, the respondent No. 3 denying the claim of the petitioner, stated that in fact, the land in question stood resumed by the state Government on account of the resumption of Jagir of the village Akodia and the Jagir Commissioner vide order dated 18.8.1963 (Exhibit 6) decided that the compensation for resumption of Jagir would be paid in the ratio of 40:30:40; thus, according to the respondent, the petitioner had no right to purchase the Government land vide Exhibit-1 and 2 and no rights had and are vested in them. It was also assailed that the land in question which is part of Khasra Nos. 468, 469 and 470 situate in village Kishanpole, Jaipur and out of which no income was having to the Jagirdar, was resumed and no compensation was claimed by the Jagirdar and no legal rights are accrued and vested in the petitioner and thus the sale deeds are void and gave no right or title in their favour. 10. Next assertion by the respondent No. 3 in its reply is that earlier proceedings which were initiated and culminated has no bearing with the land in question and are not conclusive as against the respondent No. 3 because, it was not a party to those proceedings. 11. The respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4, in their reply to the writ petition have denied all the averments made in writ petition with regard to the claim of the petitioner on the land in question; and in para 4, has stated that the land in question is not abadi land but, is agricultural According to these respondents, Istamrar/Jagirdars were not legally authorised to sell the land in question through registered sale-deeds to the petitioner because, Tiwari brothers who were undisputedly Jagirdars of the land nowhere claimed the property in question as their personal one. Further, after resumption of the Jagir, the Ex- Jagirdar (Tiwari brothers) had no right and title over the land in question in view of the provisions contained in Section 22 of the Jagirs Act; and after the entire Jagir being resumed by the State on 15.8.54 by virtue of Section 23 of the Jagirs Act, the Tehsildar Jaipur was rightly directed by the Dy. Collector (Jagirs) by order dated 25.10.1977 to take possession of the land in question bearing Khasra Nos. 468, 469 and 470 except constructed building and pursuantly, the Tehsildar had already taken possession of the vacant land of the Jagir, these respondents added. These respondents also asserted that the compensation of the resumed Jagirs could have been determined only on presentation of claim by the Jagirdars and even after taking possession if no claim has been presented so far it can be done still now but this cannot be claimed as defence and that all kinds of Jagirs and Grants including Istamrari stood resumed by the State on 15 8.54 by virtue of Section 23 of the Jagirs Act-Its possession including land in question of Khasra Nos. 468, 469 and 470 of village Kishanpole (Jaipur) could only have been taken by the Tebsildar on deriving knowledge of not having taken possession till October, 1977 which was done in October, 1977, itself, lately for the valid reasons. 12. The rival versions illumine the factual confrontation, the resolution of which is no easy legal essay. As per the assertions and all the contentions of the petitioner, the land in question was a Grant of Istamrari which according to it is not covered by the definition of 'Jagir' but, on the other band, the respondents asserted that the land in question was a part of Jagir and the same was resumable. 13. The pivotal rival versions of the parties turns upon the interpretation of the word. `Jagir land', which is defined in Section 2(la) and accordingly, it means any land in which or in relation, to which a Jagirdar has rights in respect of land revenue or any other kind of revenue and includes any land held or any of the tenures specified in the First Schedule attached to the Jagirs Act. In view of the afore definition clause, any land held or any of the tenures specified in the First Schedule is also covered by 'Jagir land'. In view of the afore definition clause, any land held or any of the tenures specified in the First Schedule is also covered by 'Jagir land'. First Schedule includes the tenure of Istamrar which is shown at S. No. 2. Thus, a reading of definition clause and first schedule altogether makes it precise that the land held on Istamrar tenures specified at S. No. 2 of the first schedule would be safely treated as Jagir land and in other words, the land held or occupied by Istamrar would certainly be Jagir land. Thus, viewed, the contention or the petitioner that since the land in question was a Grant on Istamrari basis, it is not covered by the definition clause of Jagir land, is fallacious being untengible. 14. This led us to consider next limb of point in controversy which arises out of the pleadings their clarificatory statements and the abandonment of the allegations by the respondents, which we condense in these issues, whether the Jagir has been resumed or whether the compensation has been paid to Istamrars or whether no compensation was payable on the land in question because during the period/tenure of Istamrari no income was drawn from the land held on Istamrari tenure. 15. Apparently, from the pleadings. the petitioner claims possession over the disputed land asserting that before alienation of the disputed property, it was in possession of their vendors whereas contrarily, the respondents claim that after resumption of the Jagir, the land in question was taken into possession by the Tehsildar and it was alienated to the respondent No. 3 (Urban Improvement Trust, now Jaipur Development Authority). 16. In view of the clarificatory statements and the abandonment of the allegations try the parties, we may straightway observe that the possession over the disputed land and further the question whether do earlier proceedings initiated by the Ex-Istamrars which ended in their favour, bind the respondents, all are disputed; and unless these disputed questions are decided by a probe into the matter, this writ petition cannot be disposed of; and the fate of these questions requires a probe in a protected (sic) inquiry otherwise no decision is possible on these afore questions condensed by us. 17. 17. Another curious feature which casts a speck on the aforesaid circumstances is, whether such an inquiry by probing into the matter is possible in exercise of extra ordinary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Undisputedly, the aforesaid questions can only be decided by a competent forum in case any of the parties sue in a regular procedure of law. It is also disputed that alternative remedy is available to the parties. A remedy provided for under Article 226 is a discretionary one which a High Court has always, to refuse grant of any reliefs if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate remedy elsewhere. The remedies made available by Articles 220, 226 (sic 226-227?) should not be permitted to be utilised as substitutes for ordinary remedies, as has been laid down in a plethora of decisions of the Apex Court which need not be briefed here in extenso as the law laid down is the same except that judicial response to each case situation leads to emphasis on different facets Hence, considered, all the High Courts are accordingly agreed that writs or directions under Article 226 should ordinarily not be issued where an alternative remedy, equally efficient and adequate, exists, unless there is any exceptional reason for dealing with the matter under the writ jurisdiction The rule that when there is an adequate alternative remedy the High Court would be reluctant to interfere under Art, 226, is only a rule of discretion and not a rule of law. The High Court can issue a writ, although an adequate remedy exists, where there is a patent went of jurisdiction or where there has been a denial of natural justice before a court of summary jurisdiction, or where a party comes to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right has been infringed and seeks relief under Article 226. In the present case, none of these things prevail. Moreover, the right of property claimed by the petitioner has become disputed which can only be ascertained by a probe in an appropriate Istamrar tenures specified at S. No. 2 of the first schedule would be safely treated as Jagir land and in other words, the land held or occupied by Istamrar would certainly be Jagir land. Moreover, the right of property claimed by the petitioner has become disputed which can only be ascertained by a probe in an appropriate Istamrar tenures specified at S. No. 2 of the first schedule would be safely treated as Jagir land and in other words, the land held or occupied by Istamrar would certainly be Jagir land. Thus, viewed, the contention or the petitioner that since the land in question was a Grant on Istamrari basis, it is not covered by the definition clause of Jagir land, is fallacious being untengible. 18. Thus, the question whether the land in question was owned and possessed by the Ex-Jagirdars or Ex-Istamrars at the time when it was alienated to the petitioner-Society, is obviously a question of fact as the same has been disputed by the respondents claiming their rights over the property in question. Hence it is not possible for this Court to enter into the disputed questions of fact in writ application. The High Court transgresses its jurisdiction if it enters upon the merits of the controversy by embarking upon an inquiry into the disputed facts. Further, we may follow that the supervision of this "Court exercised through writ of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of Jurisdiction and the other the qualifications and conditions of its exercise. A writ of certiorari would not be issued as a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie to bring up an order or decision for rehearing. 19. Applying these tests, in our opinion, the points raised by the petitioner-Society, viz., that the vendors of the property in question was having a perfect title when the property in question was transferred alienated to the petitioner-Society; that, earlier proceedings initiated at the instance of Tiwari brothers (Istamrars/Jagirdars) were final as against the respondents; and that, Sections 21, 22, 23 of the Jagirs Act have no bearing to the present case, apart from the point that principle of promissory estoppel applies against the respondents cannot be entered upon unless an inquiry is embarked upon in order to intermine these disputed points raised by the petitioner. And, it is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for the writ petitioner-Society should be to seek relief by way of a suit and not by writ. And, it is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for the writ petitioner-Society should be to seek relief by way of a suit and not by writ. We express no opinion on merits in regard to the questions of fact remained undecided by this Court. 20. In the net result, we dismiss this writ petition for want of jurisdiction leaving free to the petitioner-Society to get its right decided in accordance with law in an appropriate forum and not in writ forum. We make it clear that the findings or observations made in this judgment will not effect or operate as res judicata in the appropriate proceedings or remedy yet to be initiated/availed of by the parties and if initiated, then the forum trying the case shall not influence itself by the observations made by or in this judgment. It will also be open for the parties to seek condonation of delay with the aid of the relevant provisions including the Limitation Act. in availing of the appropriate remedy before the competent court of law or forum. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******