Hansaria, J. — In this batch of cases, common, questions of law are involved. A common judgment is therefore being passed on the question of Jaw. One of the questions relate to the validity and effect of section 11 of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958, hereinafter the Act, which was inserted by the Garo Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating (Amendment) Act, 1972. Section 11, whose validity has been assailed in some of these petitions reads follows :- "11. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Courts: No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of the Act". In some other petitions, the validity of the aforesaid section has not been assailed, but it has been contended that despite the afore­said express bar to entertain any suit or proceeding by Civil Court, Civil Court's jurisdiction is really not barred. 2. To appreciate the later submission, we have note certain pro­visions of the Act, which was enacted in 1959 to remove doubts which had arisen as to the legal force of the social customs and usages prevails in the District of Garo Hills. The Act was, thereafter anacted to validate those social customs and usages which were not against morality or public policy. Sections 7, 8 and 9 are the relevant provisions of the Act which need be noted. They read as below :- "7. The succession to the Nokmaship of any Akhing shall be recognised in accordance with such social custom or custom­ary practice as was followed prevalent in that behalf before the commencement of the Constitution, except that the powers which were exercised by the Deputy Commissioner before the commencement of the Constitution shall hereafter be exercised by the Revenue Member of the District Council. 8. (1). Wherever a vacancy accure in the office of Nokma of any Akhing or there arises any dispute in the matter of succession to Nokmaship of any Akhing or any dispute with regard to any other matter relating to or connected with, any Akhing and the boundaries thereof, the matter shall be referred, in the first instance, to the Revenue Member for disposal in accordance with the customary practice and the usages in the Garos. (2) Any person aggrieved at the order of the Revenue Member under sub-section (1) above may prefer an appeal to the Chief Executive Member within 60 days from the date of order. 9. All successions to Nokmaship hereto affected and all disputes with regard to any other matter relating to any Akhing and the boundaries thereof hereto settled shall be deemed to be validly affected and validly settled notwithstanding any irregu­larity contained therein provided such succession and settle­ment of disputes is consistent with this Act and for that purpose this Act shall be deemed to have come into force from the date of the commencement of the Constitution." The dispute in this batch of petitions is connected with the Nokmaship of the Akhing. 3. To appreciate the rival contentions advanced, it would be approp­riate to first acquaint ourselves as to the meaning and significance of the word "Nokma" and "Akhing". The word "Nokma" has been defined in section 4 (8) of the Act as "head of a clan or machong who holds any land as custodian on behalf of a clan or machong." The word "Akhing" has been defined in the Garo Hills District (Jhum) Regulation, J954, in its section 2 (1) as below: - "(1) "Akhing" means- (a) any land hold by a clan or 'machong' under the custody of the head of the clan or 'machong' called 'Nokma' recognised as such by the District Council; (b) any land held collectively by a particular community of a particular village or group of villages which is under the custody of the head of the said community or group of villages called 'Nokma' recognised as such by the District Council;" From the aforesaid definitions themselves it is clear that Nokma is a headman. It would, however, be profitable to know what some writers have said about these concepts. In "Principles of Garo Law" by J. Sangma, it has been stated at page 24 that Nokma is a person who holds title to the akhing land of village community as a head of the clan. Nokma is the first man in his village and as a head of the community he has the instinct to preserve the custom. In the Note at page 24 it has been stated : "It is often noticed that the terms nokma and nokna are confused by many. Nokma means headman and nokna means heiress". 4. Nokma is the first man in his village and as a head of the community he has the instinct to preserve the custom. In the Note at page 24 it has been stated : "It is often noticed that the terms nokma and nokna are confused by many. Nokma means headman and nokna means heiress". 4. As per J.L.R. Marak's "Garo Customary Laws and Practices" (1985), the Garo society follows the matrilineal system, as descent is always traced from the mother alone and through her, it traces its origin back to the great common ancestress. The Garo society is organised into matrilineal groups which are known as 'Machongs' (see page 135). At page 20, it has been observed that prior to the event of the British into Garo Hills, all civil and criminal cases were settled by the indigenous tribal agency like Nokmas and their councils. At page 21 we find the observation that in the plains areas of Garo Hills also the nokmas (headmen) have to take the full responsibility of administering the village. Thus, prior to the British entry into the Garo Hills, the nokmas were all along administering justice according to social customs and traditions. The British appointed Sardars and Laskars in addition to the Nokmas of the Akhing. The expression "Akhing land" has been explained at page 151 to mean “he land belonging to the motherhood" and the same is the joint property of the whole motherhood. In the Glossary, the word Nokma has been defined as "owner of the Akhing land ; headman of the village ; rich man". As per "Customary Law and Justice in the Tribal areas of Meghalaya", a study undertaken under the auspices of the Indian Law Institute, the word "Nokma" has been explained to generally mean a wealthy man or headman of the village or group of villages amongst the Garos. (see page 182). It has been observed at page 131 of this work that the Garo matrilineal society is divided into a number of groups which are known as machongs (motherhood). The children belong to the mother's clan, e. g. the children of a Sangma mother and Marak father would be a Smgma. From what has been stated at page 40 of Major A. Play-fair's "The Garos" (1975), it would appear that Nokma is a headman. 5. The children belong to the mother's clan, e. g. the children of a Sangma mother and Marak father would be a Smgma. From what has been stated at page 40 of Major A. Play-fair's "The Garos" (1975), it would appear that Nokma is a headman. 5. Thus, there is no doubt that the duties and responsibilities of nokma would allow him to be described as the headman. This aspect of the case has its importance, in deciding the question of competence of the Garo Hills District Council in inserting section 11 of the Act by which Civil Court's jurisdiction has been barred, as noted above. 6. The submission of Shri Mahanta who has attacked the validity of section 11 is that the Garo Hills District Council had no competence to enact a provision like section 11 of the Act. This submission has been advanced by the learned counsel by contending that the law-making power conferred by para 3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (which presently deals with the provisions as to the Administration of Tribal Areas in the States of Assam, Meghalaya Tripura and Mizoram) has not entitled the Garo Hills District Council to enact a provision like section 11 of the Act. To establish this submission, Shri Mahanta has drawn our attention to the powers conferred on the District Council to make laws by para 3 aforesaid. According to the learned counsel, the law-making power conferred by the aforesaid para has not entitled the District Council to define the "jurisdiction and power of the courts" relating to the subject matters of which mention has been made in the aforesaid para. Before adverting to this aspect, it would be apposite to note various clauses of para 3(1) which are attracted in the present case. According to Shri Mahanta, clauses (h) dealing with "the inheritance of property" and (j) with "social customs" alone are applicable to the case at hand ; and as these two clauses have not dealt with the powers of Nokmas, the Garo Hills District Council could not have enacted section 11 to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court when rights relating to Nokmas are involved. But then there is another clause (g) in para 3 the subject matter of which is "the appointment of succession of Chiefs or Headmen". 7. But then there is another clause (g) in para 3 the subject matter of which is "the appointment of succession of Chiefs or Headmen". 7. May we state here that the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution provide a self contained Code in itself for the governance of the tribal areas and they deal with all the relevant topic in that behalf, as observed in para 11 of Edwingson Bareh vs. State of Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1220 . From what has been stated above, we have no doubt that a Nokma is a headman and as such the Garo Hills District Council was within its competence to enact any provision relating to appointment or succession of Nokmas. Shri Mahanta however urges that even as the District Council could not have dealt with the question of jurisdiction of the Courts relating to the succession of Nokmaship. To satisfy us about the tenability of this submission, the learned counsel has referred us to entry 95 of List-1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, entry 65 of List-II and entry 46 of List-Ill. In all these three entries, there is a specific mention about "Jurisdiction and power of all courts” except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in the concerned lists. Para 3(1) of the Sixth Schedule having stated nothing about the jurisdiction and power of the courts, it is contended by Shri Mahanta that a District Council could not have taken away the jurisdiction of the civil courts with respect to any matters mentioned in para 3(1). Our attention has also been invited to entry-13 of List-Ill which has dealt with Civil Procedure Code, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. By relying on the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution, Shri Mahanta has contended that the District Council had no competence to enact section 11. Our attention has also been invited to entry-13 of List-Ill which has dealt with Civil Procedure Code, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. By relying on the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution, Shri Mahanta has contended that the District Council had no competence to enact section 11. It is urged by the learned counsel by referring to District Council of United K & J Hills vs. Sitimon, AIR 1972 SC 787 , that the District Councils unlike the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not intended to be clothed with the plenary power of legislation as stated in para 14 wherein it has also been pointed out that the power of District Councils to make laws is expressly limited by the provisions of the Sixth Schedule which has created them and they can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribed their power. Further observation in this regard is that it is beyond the domain of the Court to enlarge const­ructively their power to make laws. This view was reiterated in para 11 of the District Council of Jowai Autonomous District vs. Dwet Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1930 , wherein it was held that levy of royalty on timber which is in the nature of tax, was not within the competence of the District Council. But it was stated that having regard to the nature of a fee which is an amount levied as quid pro quo for services rendered, the power to levy fees in respect of any of the matters mentioned in para 3 should be necessarily implied. 9. It would be appropriate in this connection to state that when the question of vires of any enactment is raised, it has to be seen whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation substantially ( as distinguished from a remote connection ) with respect to any of the entries in the list, as pointed out in Subramanyan vs. Muttuswamy, AIR 1941 FC 47 (54). Once it is held that it does, the legislative power conferred by that entry will extend to all ancillary matters which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic of legislation, vide United Provinces vs. Antique, AIR 1941 FC 16 (25). Once it is held that it does, the legislative power conferred by that entry will extend to all ancillary matters which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic of legislation, vide United Provinces vs. Antique, AIR 1941 FC 16 (25). These two rules of interpretation have given rise to the doctrine of "pith and substance", which is applied when judging the competence of a law making authority to enact a particular law". Another rule of construction in this regard is that widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry. 10. We may refer here to para 4 of the Sixth Schedule. Sub-para (1) of this para has specifically conferred power on the District Councils to constitute village councils or courts for the trial of suits and cases between the parties all of whom belong to Scheduled Tribes. By virtue of power under sub-para (2) of this para, the District Councils can also confer powers of a court of appeal in respect of all suits and cases triable by courts or councils constituted under sub-para (1). So, lack of any mention in para 3 (1) regarding jurisdiction and powers of all courts which power is specifically conferred by entries referred by Shri Mahanta (which we have noted above) is not material. 11. If the subject matter of the legislation at hand can be said to be connected with the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen, as it has to be, because Nokma is a headman as already noted, and the "pith and substance" of the Act be further related to inheritance and social customs, with which the Act is apparently connected, and if the District Council be further empowered to constitute courts which power has been specifically conferred by para 4 of the Sixth Schedule, we are of the view that it as within the competence of the District Council to say which forum could decide any dispute relating to the appointment or succession of Nokmas, which institution is a part of social customs of Garos. The District Council in its wisdom might have thought it proper to confer the power to decide such disputes first by Revenue Member and then on appeal by the Chief Executive Member, because they being representative of the people might have been regarded as more appropriate persons to know about the social customs in question. The District Council in its wisdom might have thought it proper to confer the power to decide such disputes first by Revenue Member and then on appeal by the Chief Executive Member, because they being representative of the people might have been regarded as more appropriate persons to know about the social customs in question. 12. Because of all these, we would held that by inserting section 11 in the Act, the Garo Hills District Council did not trespass into a prohibited territory and the legislative competence of the District Council in the matter at hand cannot be said to be non­existent. 13. The next question is whether despite the express bar contained in section 11 of the Act, it could be said that the parties were not prevented from approaching civil court relating to matter touching the succession of Nokmaship. The contention of the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, who has appeared for the petitioners in some of the cases is that despite section 11 of the Act being in the statute book, the parties could approach the civil court. This submission' has been advanced by relying basically on what was stated in Secretary of State vs. Mask & Company, AIR 1940 PC 105, wherein it was stated at page 110 as below:- "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclu­sion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, civil courts have jurisdiction to examine cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure." This decision was cited with approval in firm I. S. Chetty & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 (see para 12) wherein it was stated :- "Non-compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non compliance with the fundamental principles of statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, they may also tend to make the proceeding illegal and void and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is because of this nature where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that this provision may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute". This view was reiterated in Desika Charyuly vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 807 ; D D. Bhalla vs. District Co-operative Bank Limited, 1969 (3) SCC 694 ; State of West Bengal vs. Iron and Steel Company Ltd, AIR 1970 SC 1298 ; and K. C. Dora vs. G. Ammamanayudu, AIR 1974 SC 1096. 14. Relying on the aforesaid decisions, the learned Advocate General contended that civil court's jurisdiction is not barred, despite insertion of section 11 in the Act, because according to him what has been provided in section 8 (1) of the Act is not at all in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure inasmuch as when a Revenue Member disposes of disputes like those at hand, parties are not heard, lawyers are not allowed to appear and no evidence is taken. The decision of the Revenue Member is thus not in conformity with the principles of judicial procedure. Though what has been submitted by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, has force, we think the objection raised by him can be met by requiring the Revenue Member to follow the essential principles of judicial procedure which deciding a dispute raised before him. 15. In this connection, we have been referred by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, to Premier Automobiles Limited vs. K.S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 . Though this decision has dealt with the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to industrial dispute, the principles laid down being of universal application what has been observed in this regard is of use and the same may be noted. The law was summed up as below in para 23 :- "23. Though this decision has dealt with the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to industrial dispute, the principles laid down being of universal application what has been observed in this regard is of use and the same may be noted. The law was summed up as below in para 23 :- "23. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus :- (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter-VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." It seems to be that principle No. 2 might have applied in the present case before insertion of section 11 in the Act which would have left the matter to the choice of the suitor to decide whether he should have approached the civil court or taken recourse to the remedy provided in the Act. The aforesaid principle can have no application, according to us, after insertion of section 11 in the Act. 16. Shri Mahanta has advanced another reason to persuade us to hold that despite insertion of section 11 in the Act, civil court's . jurisdiction is not barred. The aforesaid principle can have no application, according to us, after insertion of section 11 in the Act. 16. Shri Mahanta has advanced another reason to persuade us to hold that despite insertion of section 11 in the Act, civil court's . jurisdiction is not barred. The submission is that under Rule 22 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Council) Rules, 1951, the entire Executive Committee consisting, inter alia, of both the Revenue Member (who is to be approached in the first instance as per section 8 (1) of the Act) and the Chief Executive Member (to whom appeal lies under section 8 (2) of the Act from decisions of the Revenue Member) being collectively responsible to the District Council, it is doubtful how far parties would get justice by approaching the Chief Executive Member in appeal against the order of Revenue Member. We think that the collective responsibility of the Executive Committee visualised by Rule 22 being related to executive matters, the same has no relevance while deciding about the judicial functions of the aforesaid two members. 17. Sri Goswami, learned Advocate General, Assam who has appeared for some of the respondents has urged that keeping in view the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No. 7 (H) of 1973 (Khakong Sangnia vs. Nongjan Sangma) and the connected matters rendered ' on 21.2.77, it has to be held that approach to the civil court is totally barred. / perusal of that judgment shows that the aforesaid view was taken bearing in mind the provisions finding place in the Garo Hills Autonomous District ( Administration of Justice ) Rules, 1953. Rule 48 of the 1953 Rules provides as below :- "48. In civil cases, the procedure of the District Council Court or the sub ordinate District Council Court, or the Addi­tional District Council Court shall be guided by the spirit but not bound by the letter of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in all matter not covered by the recognised customs and usages of the District". Reference was then made in the aforesaid judgment to the provisions finding place in para 4 of the Sixth Schedule whose sub-paras (1), (2), (3), and (4) were taken specific note of. Reference was then made in the aforesaid judgment to the provisions finding place in para 4 of the Sixth Schedule whose sub-paras (1), (2), (3), and (4) were taken specific note of. It was then observed that Rule 48 of the 1953 Rules made it clear that in all matters depending on "recognised customs and usages" of the District, the civil courts are bound to follow these law or usages of that district. In matters which are not dependent on such customs and usages they shall be guided by the spirit of the Code but not bound by the letter thereof. By adverting to section 8 (1) of the Act, it was pointed out that the procedure for disposal of a case falling within the purview of the Act has to be "in accordance with the customary practices and usages of the Garos”. This provision indicated, accor­ding to the Bench which decided the aforesaid cases, that sub-section 8 (1) showed that not only the application of the letters of the Civil Procedure Code but also the spirit of the Code has been barred in the trial of suits and cases of the nature at hand. It maybe useful to point out here that under the provisions of Rule 48 of the 1953 Rules, the District Council Courts are to be guided by the spirit but not the letter of the Civil Procedure Code. The judgment ultimately stated that after in section of section 11 in the Act, the civil court's jurisdiction was expressly barred and as a civil court could not entertain a suit or proceeding relating to succession of Nokmaship or of disputes with regard to any other matter relating to Akhing. 18. Before proceeding further, it would be in fitness of things to refer to another Bench decision of this Court in Civil Rule No.183/54 (Jacksin Marak and ors vs. Watjang Sangma and ors, disposed of on 3. 5.56) wherein it was held that right to Nokmaship or to akhing land has to be decided by the ordinary civil court. But this decision was rendered before the sun light of the day. 5.56) wherein it was held that right to Nokmaship or to akhing land has to be decided by the ordinary civil court. But this decision was rendered before the sun light of the day. It has been observed in this judgment, when attention of the Court was drawn to para 3 (g) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution which permits making of law with respect to "appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen", that no such law had been framed. The position which prevails now is entirely different inasmuch as the law on the subject was formed in 1959 in which section 11 was subsequently inserted. This judgment would not, therefore, be of much assistance in deciding the question at hand. 19. The decision of this Court in Civil Revision No. 7 (H) of 1973 (and other connected cases) was rendered on 21. 2. 77 and the concerned persons have accepted the judgment as good and sound. In our view such an acceptance by the people at large should not be undone at this stage. In this connection, we may refer to the observations made in para 26 of Inder Mohan Lal vs. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986 , wherein it has been observed that in the matter of interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. 20. For all these reasons, we would held that the Revenue Member alone has jurisdiction to decide the types of disputes at hand. But then while doing so, the Revenue Member has to follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure ; these being : (1) framing of issues which has been regarded as necessary for courts to get the grip of the case. See Vindeo vs. Ziakrpse, 1983 (1) GLR (NOC) 34). (2) Opportunity to lead evidence on the issues framed, the evidence given could be recorded in full or summary of the same could be noted ; and (3) hearing of the parties themselves or through their lawyers, if engaged. See Vindeo vs. Ziakrpse, 1983 (1) GLR (NOC) 34). (2) Opportunity to lead evidence on the issues framed, the evidence given could be recorded in full or summary of the same could be noted ; and (3) hearing of the parties themselves or through their lawyers, if engaged. This apart, some other accepted principles of sound judicial procedure like not allowing a document to be used in a case without the other side having been given opportunity to rebut the same should also be followed when the case is taken up by the Revenue Member in the first instance or by the Chief Executive Member on appeal. 21. Civil Rule No. 58/78. We may now advert to the facts of the cases. In to far as this aspect in concerned, we were addressed by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, only and that too concerning Civil Rule No. 58/78. 22. The contention of the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya is that the matter relating to Nokmaship of the Akhing in question having been decided in favour of the petitioners as early at on 4.1.37 by the then Deputy Commissioner in Case No. 12 MC/36-37, any fresh decision in the matter is barred by the principle of res judicata. It has been urged that even if the spirit of the Civil Procedure Code were not to apply to the proceedings under the Act, the principle of res judicata would have application. To substan­tiate this contention, we have been referred to Humtse Village vs. Yakbum Village, 1983 (1) GLR (NOC) 32 in which it was held that the spirit of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable in Nagaland. Same view was taken in Vindeo vs. Ziakruse, 1983(1) GLR (NOC) 34. This view, however, could be taken because the spirit of the Code was applicable inasmuch as the matter was adjudicated upon by the Deputy Commissioner. In the present case, however, even the spirit of the Code is not applicable as noted above. Shri Lahiri has urged that would not make any difference in view of what was stated in Satyadhyan vs. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC, 941, wherein it was observed that even if section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. Shri Lahiri has urged that would not make any difference in view of what was stated in Satyadhyan vs. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC, 941, wherein it was observed that even if section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. This view was reiterated in Gulabchand Chhotelnl vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 and Daryo vs State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 , wherein it was held that the rule of res judicata is an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. It was pointed out that it is in the interest of public at large that finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over the same litigation. In Lalchand vs. Radha Kishan AIR 1977 SC 789 , it was observed in para 19 that section 11 of the Code is not exhaustive and the principle of which motivates that section can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly within the letter of the law. It was pointed out that the principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle was said to be founded on equity, justice and good conscience, which require that party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. 23. Because of what has been stated above, we are of the firm view that principle of res judicata which is founded on equity, justice and good conscience has to apply to proceedings before the Revenue Member also. Depufy Commissioner, Mr. W. Shaw, having held as early as 4. 1. 37 (that is, more than five decades before) that the petitioner Dore Sangma was Nokma being Khangee's own daughter, it is too late in the day to disturb that finding. Depufy Commissioner, Mr. W. Shaw, having held as early as 4. 1. 37 (that is, more than five decades before) that the petitioner Dore Sangma was Nokma being Khangee's own daughter, it is too late in the day to disturb that finding. May we state that the dispute in the present case is between the petitioners who are claiming through Khangee and the opposite parties claiming through Dingma who was the first wife of Goban Marak whereas Khangee is the second wife of Goban. It may be that the appellate order of the Chief Executive Member is founded on good reasons but then that is not enough by itself to undo the order passed by then Deputy Commissioner Mr. Shaw on the self-same matter on 4.1.37. Principle of res judicata would not allow us to reopen the controversy relating to nokmaship after the death of Goban Marak. 24. In this view of the matter, we would allow this petition and make the Rule absolute. In so far as other cases are concerned they would be set down for hearing on facts.