JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner stands convicted under Section 302, Indian penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He is undergoing that sentence and is at present lodged in Central Jail, Jabalpur. In this petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus, his claim is that since on the date of his conviction, i. e. . 30-8-1983. he was below 19 years of age, he is entitled to benefits under the M. P. Borstal Act, 1928 and is accordingly, entitled to be released forthwith. His alternative prayer is that the district Judge who convicted him should be asked to make an inquiry as to his age and then to make recommendation to the State Government for making a direction. In the return filed on behalf of the State Government, the principal objection to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is that the provisions of the Borstal Act are not attracted to persons convicted for an offence punishable with death. Obviously the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code is punishable with death, the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit under the M. P. Borstal Act. ( 2. ) SECTION 2 (i) of the M. P. Borstal Act, 1928 defined offence as under : " (4) "offence" means - (I) an offence punishable with transportation or rigorous imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), other than - (a an offence punishable with death;" Clearly this definition of offence under the Act makes it wholly inapplicable to cases where the offence committed by the convict is punishable with death. Sections 5 and 6 of the Act which entitle the convict below 19 years to the benefit of the provisions of the Act relate to offences as defined under the Act. Since in the present case, the petitioner has been convicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and since death is one of the sentences which could be awarded for that offence, the provisions of the borstal Act are not attracted and the petitioner cannot be given any advantage under the Act. Since in the present case, the petitioner has been convicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and since death is one of the sentences which could be awarded for that offence, the provisions of the borstal Act are not attracted and the petitioner cannot be given any advantage under the Act. In a recent decision, in Subhash Chand vs. State of Haryana, W. P. No. 745 of 1987 decided on 11-1-1988= air 1988 SC 584 , a similar view has been taken by the supreme Court in regard to benefit under Punjab Borstal Act where the definition of the term "offence" is similar to the term as defined under the Madhya Pradesh Borstal act. Section 2 (4) of the Punjab Borstal Act excluded an offence punishable with death. It was, therefore, held that to a conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, the punjab Borstal Act would have no application. During the course of the judgment, the supreme Court made a reference to an earlier decision in Hava Singh vs. State of haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2001 , a case upon which learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance, and held that to be incorrectly decided. It has been observed that probably in Hava Singhs case the definition of the term offence was not placed for consideration before the Court and, therefore, the conclusion reached in that case is not correct. Reference was made also to yet another decision in State of Andhra pradesh vs. Vallabhapuram Ravi, AIR 1985 SC 870 , which took a view that a person detained in a Borstal School under Section 10-A has to be released after he has served the full term of 5 years of detention or on his completion of 23 years of age. He cannot be re-transferred thereafter to prison. Such a retransfer would defeat the very object and purpose of the Act of providing for detention of young offenders in Borstal School for the purpose of reformation and rehabilitation of such offenders. With reference to this decision, it was observed that the Andhra Act known as the Andhra Pradesh borstal Schools Act, 1925, does not have the definition of offence and there is no exclusion as provided in the Punjab Act. These observations fully apply to the M. P. Borstal Act where the definition of the term offence excludes offences punishable with death. ( 3. These observations fully apply to the M. P. Borstal Act where the definition of the term offence excludes offences punishable with death. ( 3. ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is not right in contending that he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the M. P. Borstal Act nor is he entitled to any direction for his release. Precisely for this reason, he is not entitled to a direction to the District Judge for making an inquiry as to his age. The petition is dismissed but with any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.