JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - These petitions have been grouped together and are being disposed of by a common judgment as, firstly, the issues raised therein are identical and, secondly, they are directed against the same notifications, one dated July 7, 1984 issued under Section 4 read with Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act and the other dated July 9, 1984 under Section 6 of the same Act. 2. The petitioners comprise both housing societies as well as individuals. The challenge to these notifications can be divided into two parts : (i) relating to the validity of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and (ii) concerning the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(4) directing that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply to the acquisition. Before we elaborate these submissions advanced at the Bar by the learned counsel for the parties, we may briefly set out the essential facts. 3. On 18-5-83 the Secretary. Ghaziabad Development Authority (G.D.A.' for short hereafter) sent a proposal to the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Ghaziabad, stating that the land measuring 229.60 acres lying on the borders of Delhi and situate in vill. Hasanpur Bhavapur, Tehsil Dadri. Dist. Ghaziabad, was urgently needed for planned development. namely, for implementation of a housing scheme and that consequently the same may be acquired on priority basis at the earliest. The letter was accompanied by an application in the prescribed form detailing, inter alia, the public purpose for which the land was required as well as the need for immediate action. This was followed by another letter dated August 9, 1983 addressed by the Vice Chairman of the GDA to the Collector reiterating that the land was needed for the aforesaid public purpose and stressing the urgency in the matter. These letters were followed by several reminders which have been annexed to the counter-affidavit of Ved Prakash filed on May 21, 1988 on behalf of the respondents. Acting on the request of the GDA. the Collector, Ghaziabad sent a letter to the Secretary, Department of Housing. Government of Uttar Pradesh, requesting that notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act may be immediately issued in view of the urgency of the matter. Acting on the request of the GDA. the Collector, Ghaziabad sent a letter to the Secretary, Department of Housing. Government of Uttar Pradesh, requesting that notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act may be immediately issued in view of the urgency of the matter. The letter states that the GDA urgently needs the land in question for planned development mentioned above and that a decision that residential houses may be constructed over this land for non-resident Indians has already been taken by the Government. This was followed by another letter dated April 9, 1984 of the Collector addressed to the same Secretary to the Government reiterating the earlier request and specifically stating that in view of the urgency the Government may issue a direction under Section 17(4) dispensing with the requirement of Section 5- A of the Act. On these letters and requests of the GDA routed through the Collector, Ghaziabad, the Government made certain queries eliciting comments of the GDA and the Collector why was it necessary to do away with the requirement of Section 5-A. The Collector thereupon sent a reply to the Government through a letter dated May 23, 1984 elaborating the reasons why a request was being made for invoking the urgency clause envisaged under Section 17(4) of the Act. The Collector also enclosed with that reply the letters exchanged between the Vice- Chairman of the GDA and the Collector on the subject. 4. It is after the aforesaid correspondence that the impugned notifications were issued by the State Government, first dated July 7, 1984 under Section 4 of the Act read with Section 17(4) and the second dated July 9, 1984 issuing the declaration that the Government was satisfied that the land in question was needed for planned development i. e. for implementations of a housing scheme undertaken by the GDA. The latter notification also contained a direction under Section 17(1) of the Act that in view of the urgency of the matter, the Collector may take possession of the land within 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) even though no award has been made till then. 5. We then revert to the submissions of the learned counsel. 5. We then revert to the submissions of the learned counsel. The first contention urged in support of the petition was that the purpose disclosed by the respondent for acquisition of the land in question was, on the face of it, not a public purpose at all. Sri Sudhir Chandra who led the arguments for the petitioners, vehemently contended relying on the fact that the Kendriya Karamchari Evam Mitra Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, (the petitioners of writ petition No. 12152 of 1984) was a Co-operative Housing Society established for construction of houses for its members comprising mostly Government employees. For achieving its objective, the Society had acquired in 198182 from various agriculturists several parcels of land aggregating about 53 acres. It has also applied to the GDA for the sanction of its building plans. That being so, the State Government could not possibly have formed that opinion in good faith that the land was needed for a public purpose which was the same towards which the petitioners Co-operative Societies had already taken the necessary steps, the only difference being that whereas the petitioners society was constructing houses for the Middle Income Group, the Housing Scheme of the GDA approved by the State Government was meant to cater to the needs of the rich non-resident Indians. 6. The submission, though attractive on its face. does not bear a closer scrutiny. The Housing Scheme in question approved by the State Government covers a large tract of land extending over 229 acres and envisages a comprehensive plan for the development of the area into a residential colony in which 30% of the houses are reserved for non- resident Indians, the remaining houses proposed to be constructed are for others. In our opinion, the mere fact that the petitioners Housing Societies also planned to construct residential houses for their members, could not by itself without more, take away the power either of the GDA to develop the area in question in a planned way by undertaking a comprehensive Housing Scheme or affect the exercise of sovereign powers of the State to acquire land for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. The right of Co- operative Housing Societies to construct houses for its members is subject to the Land Acquisition Act and the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and other similar statutes operating in that area and not in derogation thereof. The right of Co- operative Housing Societies to construct houses for its members is subject to the Land Acquisition Act and the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and other similar statutes operating in that area and not in derogation thereof. It is exercisable only if the Government itself does not choose to acquire the land for a public purpose even if the public purpose happens to be similar in nature. Such a right is also exercisable only within the frame-work of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. Further, whereas each Co-operative Housing Society would be concerned solely with the welfare of its members, the concerns of the development authority are much wider such as developing in a planned way whole township comprising residential buildings the benefit of which would be available to the community at large. 7. Sri Sudhir Chandra laid considerable stress on the fact that the impugned notifications have been issued for the benefit of the 'stinking rich' (as he put it) non-resident Indians in total disregard of the poor and the Middle Income Groups whose need for shelter is undeniably far more pressing than the former class. The impugned action is thus ex-facie mala fide and arbitrary. 8. We are unable to agree. Under the proposed Housing Scheme only 30% of the houses have been reserved for non-resident Indians while the remaining houses are for the residents of this country. Further. non- resident Indians are also citizens of this country and a housing scheme designed to take into account requirement of such citizens could also constitute a valid public purpose. In any case, it is for the Government to determine while exercising powers under the Land Acquisition Act the desirability or necessity for providing housing accommodation to any particular section of the society. It is common knowledge that development authorities, are constructing houses under different schemes for all sections of the society. Some are meant for the Lower Income Groups, others for the Middle Income Groups and some even for the Higher Income Group. It is again for the development authorities and the State Government to select the category of people for catering to the needs of which it may assign a particular Housing Scheme. Some are meant for the Lower Income Groups, others for the Middle Income Groups and some even for the Higher Income Group. It is again for the development authorities and the State Government to select the category of people for catering to the needs of which it may assign a particular Housing Scheme. And no material has been brought on the record that the GDA is implementing Housing Schemes meant exclusively for the rich or that it has not undertaken any Housing Scheme for the Lower or Middle Income Groups. 9. The next challenge to the impugned notification was found on certain Government orders issued from time to time true copies whereof have been annexed as Annexures 14, 15 and 16 which provide that as far as possible lands of Co-operative House Building Societies ought not to be acquired. Sri Sudhir Chandra relying on these Government orders vehemently contended that in view of these Government orders the State Government should not have acquired the land in question. The submission need not detain us as a complete answer to the same as furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. New Okhala Industrial Development Authority reported in AIR 1988 SC 1 . An identical contention built on the same Government Order dated April 9, 1980 (annexure 14) was expressly rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was observed in paragraph 10 of the judgment : "The G.O. dated 9-4-1980 merely states that the lands of Co-operative House Building Societies are not to be acquired : 'as far as may be'. This Government order cannot be considered to be mandatory but directory inasmuch as it merely says that the lands of Co-operative House Building Societies should not be acquired as far as may be. Moreover this order is not a statutory one being not issued under any statutory provision. It is at best an administrative instruction. The contention that this order creates an express bar on the power of the Government to acquire lands of Co-operative House Building Societies is without any substance. Moreover this order is not a statutory one being not issued under any statutory provision. It is at best an administrative instruction. The contention that this order creates an express bar on the power of the Government to acquire lands of Co-operative House Building Societies is without any substance. The sole object of the 1976 Act is to develop certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township in a planned way by the Authority constituted under the Act and as such the Co-operative Societies cannot be permitted to develop their lands for the purpose of building houses haphazardly. This will frustrate the entire object of the Act. The contention that the lands of the Societies are exempted from acquisition cannot be sustained being devoid of any merit. The Government has power to acquire land for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" (Emphasis added). 10. This statement of law applies with equal validity to the other two Government Orders relied on by the learned counsel, namely, Annexures 15 and 16 respectively dated May 16, 1983 and April 25, 1984 as these Government Orders are simply reiteration of the policy already spelled out in the Government Order dated April 9, 1980. The contention, therefore, that in view of the aforesaid Government Orders the land acquired by the petitioner Co-operative Housing Societies for its members could not be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be accepted. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the decision cited above such Government orders, non-statutory and directory as they are, cannot operate as a bar on the power of the Government to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act or even the power of the Development Authorities created and constituted expressly for the purpose of developing in a planned way properties and lands lying within the urban areas declared as a development area. 11. Sri Murlidhar, appearing for some of the petitioners, advanced an additional submission against the validity of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. His contention was that admittedly on the date of the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 the land in question fell within an area which was shown in the Master Plan prepared under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 as a green belt. His contention was that admittedly on the date of the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 the land in question fell within an area which was shown in the Master Plan prepared under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 as a green belt. Unless, therefore, this Master Plan was modified under Section 13 of the said enactment so as to permit construction of residential houses within the area in question, no development work towards construction of a housing colony could be undertaken because of the bar imposed under Section 14 of the enactment. The sum and substance of the submission was that the purpose disclosed in the impugned notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act being contrary to the land use permitted in the existing Master Plan, the same could not lawfully constitute a valid public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. It was urged that a notification under Section 4 could not legally be issued in anticipation of the modification of the existing Master Plan. 12. We regret our inability to accept the contention. Indeed the submission stands completely answered by a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in AIR 1974 SC 2077 and a Division Bench decision of our own Court in the case of Technical Associates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Utter Pradesh reported in 1984 All LJ 1093. In Aflatoon's case (supra) an identical contention was dealt with by the Supreme Court and negatived in these words : "The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Lakshmi Devi, (1963) Supp (2) SCR 812: AIR 1963 SC 1077 ). In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Act.' Section 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property, acquisition generally precedes development. For planned development in an area other than a development area, it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority". 13. Amendment of a Master Plan is permissible with the approval of the State Government under Section 13 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and in the present case the Master Plan showing the area in question as green belt was modified with the approval of the State Government which approval no doubt was accorded subsequent to the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6. However, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the mere fact that till the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4 the necessary approval of the Government had not been obtained cannot preclude the Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Land Acquisition Act. Acquisition generally precedes development and consequently the land in question could be acquired in anticipation of the approval of the State Government for the change of the land use of the Master Plan prepared by the Development Authority. 14. In the case of Messrs. Technical Associates(Pvt.) Ltd., (supra) also the position was that under the existing Master Plan the area in question was earmarked partly for industrial purpose and partly as green belt and consequently a Housing Scheme could not be undertaken without alteration or the amendment of the Master Plan. An identical argument was raised before the Bench namely, that the land could not be acquired under Section 4 until the Master Plan had been amended so as to permit construction of Housing Colony. An identical argument was raised before the Bench namely, that the land could not be acquired under Section 4 until the Master Plan had been amended so as to permit construction of Housing Colony. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon's case (supra), the learned Judges constituting the Bench repelled the argument with the following observations vide paragraph 18-A. "In view of the decision in Aflatoon's case, AIR 1974 SC 2077 (supra), the acquisition proceedings could be undertaken and the land could be acquired even in anticipation of Government's sanction to the proposed amendment to the master plan of 1970. It was urged in passing that there was no zonal development plan as contemplated by the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. The master plan had been prepared under the earlier enactments and was to continue in force until it was revised under the new Act. The master plan itself divides the area covered thereby into various zones. The question of the master plan being not valid for want of zonal development plans does not, therefore, arise. It is only when a new plan is to be framed under the new Act that the procedure laid down in that Act, vide Sections 8 and 11, is to be followed :" 15. As an extension of the same argument Sri Murlidhar also submitted that S. 26 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 makes undertaking or carrying out of any development work in contravention of the Master Plan without the permission, approval or sanction of the State Government, punishable with fine and consequently the public purpose disclosed in the notification under S. 4 of the Act must be held to be unlawful. That which is punishable and unlawful, he argued, could not legally constitute a public purpose. The submission is devoid of any merit. As ruled in Aflatoon's case by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that acquisition precedes development. What is punishable under S. 26 of the aforesaid Act is the actual carrying out of development of land in contravention of the Master Plan. The occasion to attract the penalties proved under S. 26 would hence arise only if the actual developmental work is commenced without prior approval by the State Government of the modified Master Plan. The formation of opinion under S. 4 of the (Land Acquisition Act is not by itself punishable. 16. The occasion to attract the penalties proved under S. 26 would hence arise only if the actual developmental work is commenced without prior approval by the State Government of the modified Master Plan. The formation of opinion under S. 4 of the (Land Acquisition Act is not by itself punishable. 16. For sustaining the challenge to the impugned notifications Sri Vishnu Sahai pressed in aid the Explanation added to S. 4(1)(2) of the Land Acquisition Act by Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment and Validation) Act (Act No. VIII of 1974) which reads as follows : "Explanation- In respect of any land in a regulated area as defined in the Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, a notification under this sub-section may be issued in anticipation of the preparation and finalisation of a scheme for the planned development of the area in which the land is situated, and notwithstanding anything contained in S. 5-A, it shall be sufficient to specify in such notification that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for the planned development of that area without further specification of the particulars of the proposed development". 17. Relying on this Explanation, the learned Counsel submitted that the legislative intent was that a notification under S. 4(1) could be issued in anticipation of the preparation and finalisation of a scheme for planned development only in respect of a land situate in a regulated area' as defined in the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958. By necessary implication, therefore, he submitted, the Government could not issue a notification under S. 4(1) in anticipation of the approval of the modified Master Plan, prepared under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. 18. The submission need not detain us as the same has been dealt with elaborately by our Division Bench in Technical Associates (P) Ltd., (supra). This is how the Division Bench answered the submission in paragraph 17 of the decision : "Sri Agarwal has contended that the LDA could only act within the four corners of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. Under that Act it could act only in accordance with duly framed plans. The existing. master plan did not permit the use of this area for residential and other purposes connected with the setting up of a new township. Under that Act it could act only in accordance with duly framed plans. The existing. master plan did not permit the use of this area for residential and other purposes connected with the setting up of a new township. As such it was not permissible for the Government to say that the land was required for planned development. The Explanation to S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act inserted by the U.P. Legislature by U.P. Act 8 of 1974, however, lays down that in respect of any land in a regulated area (within the meaning of U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act a notification under this sub-section may be issued in anticipation of the preparation and finalisation of a Scheme for the planned development of the area in which the land is situated. Although the provisions of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act stand suspended under S. 59(1) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act in respect of a development area, the expression 'regulated area' should in the light of the principles underlying S. 8 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, be read as including a development area within the meaning of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. It was laid down in National Sewing Thread Co. v. James Chandwick, AIR 1953 SC 357 , Union of India v. Mohammad Usman, AIR 1965 All 269 , and Mistra Nand Kaushik v. State of U.P., AIR- 1968 All 204, that the principles underlying the General Clauses Act may be invoked even where the provisions of any section of that Act do not in terms apply". 19. Sri Vishnu Sahai attacked the validity of the impugned notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 also on the ground that these notifications do not specify or indicate the details of the Housing Scheme for which the land was being sought to be acquired. The submission ignores the settled legal position that these notifications are not required to disclose the minute details of the scheme for which the land is being acquired. The requirement of law is that the public purposes should be stated in broad and understandable terms. The details of this broad public purpose need not be specified in the notifications. The submission ignores the settled legal position that these notifications are not required to disclose the minute details of the scheme for which the land is being acquired. The requirement of law is that the public purposes should be stated in broad and understandable terms. The details of this broad public purpose need not be specified in the notifications. In Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 SC 1788 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled a similar argument with the following observations in paragraph 23 of the judgment : "Lastly, he contended that the Government had not before issuing the notifications prepared any scheme. This is true that the Government has not until now prepared any scheme for the utilisation of the developed sites. But the notification itself shows that the sites would be used as residential and industrial sites. There is no law that requires a scheme to be prepared before issuing a notification under S. 4 or S. 6 of the Act. We have, however, no doubt that the Government will, before disposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal". 20. Judged by the ratio of the pronouncement cited above, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the impugned notifications specify the public purpose with sufficient particularity. The notifications stated that the land is required for planned development, namely for implementation of a Housing Scheme. 21. The above discussion disposes of the entire submissions directed against the validity of the notification issued under S. 4. 22. That finally takes us to the last contention which concerns the legality and propriety of the direction issued by the Government under S. 17(4) dispensing with the procedure laid down under S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that the decision of the Government that S. 5-A shall not apply, was reached without any application of mind, at any rate, without applying the true tests which have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the subject in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1977 SC 183 . Learned counsel placed particular reliance on the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,41 and 43 of the decision cited above and submitted that what the Government is required to see before dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5A is to ascertain whether the urgency is of a degree that warrants eliminating even a summary enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. Learned counsel urged that in the present case no such urgency existed so as to warrant the application of S. 17(4). 23. Having given the submission our careful and anxious consideration, we are unable to accept the contention. We have no hesitation in holding that on the material which was before the State Government it could legitimately form the opinion that looking to the urgency of the matter the enquiry under S. 5-A should be dispensed with. In order to satisfy ourselves on this issue we sent for and perused the record of the State Government pertaining to the impugned notifications, Before, however, we refer to the material which was placed before the State Government we may briefly examine the parameters within which the court's enquiry as to the legality and propriety of the decision of the State Government regarding application of urgency clause under S. 17(4) has to be limited. Referring to the scope of enquiry by the Court on this matter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate's case (supra) approved three grounds spelled out by the Bombay High Court in the judgment which was under challenge before the Supreme Court. These were : Firstly, on the ground of mala fides, secondly, on the ground that the authority which formed that opinion or which arrived at such satisfaction did not apply its mind to the material on which it formed the opinion or arrived at the satisfaction, and thirdly, that the material on which it formed its opinion or reached the satisfaction was so insufficient that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion". The third ground was elucidated by their Lordships in the following terms : "So far as the third point is concerned, no court of law can, as in an appeal, consider that, on the material placed before the authority, the authority was justified in reaching its conclusion. The third ground was elucidated by their Lordships in the following terms : "So far as the third point is concerned, no court of law can, as in an appeal, consider that, on the material placed before the authority, the authority was justified in reaching its conclusion. The, court can interfere only in such cases where there was no material at all or the material was so insufficient that no man could have reasonably reached that conclusion." 24. The petitioners in the present case have completely failed to establish the ground of mala fides alleged against the respondents. The only circumstances on the basis of which learned counsel for the petitioners sought to support the ground of mala fides was that the impugned action was designated to protect the interest of the rich non-resident Indians at the cost of the poorer sections of the society, such as, Government employees and so on. This, learned counsel submitted, was ex facie mala fide, arbitrary and unfair. We have already dealt with this aspect of the matter at some length. It is hence unnecessary to dilate further on this issue. The other ground on which the charge of mala fides was sought to .be sustained was that there was no such urgency as to justify elimination of even a summary enquiry under S. 5-A. This ground is inextricably linked to the issue whether or not the material before the State Government could justify invoking of the urgency clause and consequently the same is being disposed of in the discussion that immediately follows : We will now examine the material based on which the Government took the impugned action. The correspondence which was exchanged between the GDA on the one hand and the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the Collector on the other, in which the former had stressed the need for urged action has already been adverted to. We would, however, like to refer to the letter of the Vice-Chairman of the GDA dated 21-10-1983 addressed to the Collector (Annexure 5 to the counter-affidavit) filed in Writ Petition No. 27363 of 1986. In-t-his_letter.. the Vice Chairman has asserted that in view of the fact that the land lies on the border of Delhi, transactions of sale and purchase of land are taking place on a large scale and there is a strong possibility of unauthorised constructions coming up. In-t-his_letter.. the Vice Chairman has asserted that in view of the fact that the land lies on the border of Delhi, transactions of sale and purchase of land are taking place on a large scale and there is a strong possibility of unauthorised constructions coming up. It was with a view to minimise the obstacles and problems arising from such, activities that a request had already been made by the Development Authority by its letter dated 3-9-1983 that prompt action for acquisition of the land might be taken immediately. Consequently, it was necessary in the interest of planned development that notification under S. 4 be issued immediately. This letter was followed up by several reminders for taking immediate action under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. 25-26. The Collector thereupon after satisfying himself about the need for acquisition of the land in public interest, i.e. the planned development of the area for construction of residential houses wrote a letter dated 20-3-1984 addressed to the Secretary of the Department of Housing, Government of Uttar Pradesh. In this letter, it has been stated that the GDA has already deposited Rs. 16 lacs in part payment of the amount required to be deposited by it under the Rules. The letter further states that the GDA requires the land urgently for planned development in public interest and has also requested for issue of notifications under Sections 4, 5 and 17 of the Act. The Collector then adds that considering the importance of the scheme, it appears necessary in public interest that the urgency clause under S. 17 be invoked and notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 be immediately issued. When no action was taken by the Government, the Collector sent a reminder to the Government in March 1984. The application of the GDA in the form prescribed for acquisition of land along with various annexures including that which furnished grounds for invoking urgency clause had already been forwarded to the Government by the Collector. 27. After examining the entire correspondence including the application and reminders of the GDA, as well as the letters of the Collector, the Secretary of the concerned Department wrote a letter dated 18-4-1984 to the Collector asking him to send detailed comments on a large number of queries including that relating to the need for invoking urgency clause. 27. After examining the entire correspondence including the application and reminders of the GDA, as well as the letters of the Collector, the Secretary of the concerned Department wrote a letter dated 18-4-1984 to the Collector asking him to send detailed comments on a large number of queries including that relating to the need for invoking urgency clause. The Collector thereupon after making the necessary inquiry sent his reply through a letter dated May 23, 1984 setting out the grounds upon which the request for invoking the urgency clause was being made. He states that a decision for. utilising this land for constructing residential buildings for non-resident Indians has already been taken at the Government level. It was reiterated that the GDA requires the land in public interest for planned development. Further, that the area sought to be acquired has special importance situate as it is on the Delhi - U.P. border. The letter further states that if possession is not taken immediately and delivered to the G.D.A. by applying the urgency clause under S. 17, there would be imminent possibility of unauthorised constructions, encroachments and misuse of land resulting in the frustration of the entire plan. Completion of the scheme within the time schedule would in that event be impossible as it would inevitably involve the G.D.A. in multifarious litigations as the landowners would in a bid to keep their land out of the acquisition proceedings immediately start making construction and enclosing the same. In these circumstances, the Collector submitted that the requisite notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 be issued at the earliest. With the letter the Collector also annexed various certificates of the G.D.A. in proof the fact that the latter had completed all the requisite formalities for launching the scheme. Apart from the Collector's letter, we also find letters of the G.D.A. issued in June 1984 addressed directly to Government reiterating the need for taking immediate possession. 28. The entire material referred to above can be found on the Government's record which was produced before us. Apart from the Collector's letter, we also find letters of the G.D.A. issued in June 1984 addressed directly to Government reiterating the need for taking immediate possession. 28. The entire material referred to above can be found on the Government's record which was produced before us. On the basis of, this material a proposal was put before the Government not only for acquisition of land in public interest, namely, for development of the area in a planned way for constructing residential houses, but also for eliminating the procedure prescribed under S. 5-A. The proposal states that the scheme floated by the G.D.A. has special importance and consequently looking to the urgency of the matter, it was necessary in public interest that the urgency clause be invoked. This proposal was accepted by the Government whereupon the impugned notifications were issued. 29. On the material, the gist of which has been summarised above, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the urgency was of a degree which could reasonably warrant elimination of the time consuming procedure of inviting and determining objections under S. 5-A. At any rate, on the tests laid down in Aflatoon's case, ( AIR 1974 SC 2077 ). We cannot go into the sufficiency of material. Suffice it, therefore, to say that on the material on the record, looking to the special significance of the location of land the Government could reasonably form the opinion under S. 17(4) which it did. There was material to show that there was eve possibility of land grab on a large scale. The unauthorised constructions, encroachment and other similar activities would have land the GDA into multifarious litigation resulting in the frustration of the entire scheme. large tract of land measuring 229 acres o land was being acquired. A whole township was planned by the GDA. Hundreds o agriculturists would have inevitably been involved. Consequently the objections under S. 5-A would have been many and varied, the decision of which would on a modes assessment have taken years. As it is four years have already elapsed. The impact o the delay on the scheme and it costs is not difficult to visualise. 30. Indeed the situation prevailing in the present case is akin to that which existed in the case of Technical Associates (P) Ltd, (1984 All L 11093) (supra). As it is four years have already elapsed. The impact o the delay on the scheme and it costs is not difficult to visualise. 30. Indeed the situation prevailing in the present case is akin to that which existed in the case of Technical Associates (P) Ltd, (1984 All L 11093) (supra). The Bench rightly observed (See paragraph 29) : "So far as the Gomati Nagar Scheme is concerned, at least a few hundred objections could have been expected to be filed and they could well have taken, on an optimistic estimate, at least a year to dispose of if an inquiry under S. 5-A howsoever summary in nature, were to be held. It is a notorious fact that even summary inquiries take a very long time, particularly when a large number of objections are involved. Even service of. notices on individuals in respect of dates of hearing takes a long time to complete. Thereafter, successive procedural hurdles are often encountered. In such a big scheme a delay of even one year would have meant a tremendous escalation of cost in view of the constant increase in prices in these days of galloping inflation. The expected escalation would ultimately have been passed off to the consumers, namely, the prospective allottees, in other words, the general public including economically weaker sections and not merely the middle income group and higher income groups as contended by the petitioners." The observations apply with full force to the instant case. 31. Coupled with the material mentioned above, justifying application of urgency clause we have the admitted fact that the impugned acquisition is for planned development which is covered by S. 17(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act and that the planned development is for construction of residential houses in regard to which their Lordships of the Supreme court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Smt Pista Devi reported in AIR 1986 SC 2025 have made the following observations : "The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case' of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S. 17(1) of the Act and to dispense; with the compliance with S. 5-A of the Act. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case' of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S. 17(1) of the Act and to dispense; with the compliance with S. 5-A of the Act. Perhaps, at the time to which the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCR 763 : AIR 1977 SC 183 related the situation might have been that the schemes relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres were not so urgent and it was not necessary to eliminate the inquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. The acquisition proceedings which had been', challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it is no longer possible. for the Court to take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not 'appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquities under S. 5-A of the Act..... ... ... ... ..." "What was said by the learned Judge in the context of provision of housing accommodation to Harijans is equally true about the problem of providing housing accommodation to all persons in the country today having regard to the enormous growth of population in the country." These observations fully fortify our conclusion. 32. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the decision of the Government to eliminate the enquiry under S. 5-A was reached after full application of mind, and on the material which was before it, it could legitimately form the opinion that looking to the urgency of the matter the enquiry under S. 5-A should be eliminated. 33. There remains then the last submission urged by Sri Murlidhar. He argued that the procedure prescribed for amendment of Master Plan under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act by its very nature takes some time and consequently there was no justification for dispensing with S. 5-A even before the approval of the State Government to the proposal for modifying the Master Plan was obtained. 34. We cannot agree. As Supreme Court has observed in Aflatoon's case, (supra) acquisition proceedings. could be undertaken even in anticipation of the Government's sanction to the proposed amendment of the Master Plan. 34. We cannot agree. As Supreme Court has observed in Aflatoon's case, (supra) acquisition proceedings. could be undertaken even in anticipation of the Government's sanction to the proposed amendment of the Master Plan. Where, therefore as here, the circumstances justify that possession should be taken immediately, that is, before it is too late, the Government could invoke the urgency clause even prior to according sanction to the proposed amendment of the Master Plan. Further, the authority competent to sanction the proposed amendments in the Master Plan is the same, namely, the Government which was to take the decision regarding acquisition of land as well for a housing scheme under a planned development covered by S. 17(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act and consequently the Government could take the decision under S. 17(4) even before sanctioning-the proposed amendments to the Master Plan. 35. Lastly, some of the petitioner's counsel submitted in the alternative that if their; contentions are not accepted on merits, the respondents should at least make provision for making available house sites of reasonable size to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses in the urban area in question following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Smt. Pista Devi reported in AIR 1986 SC 2025 (paragraphs 9 and 10). We are of the opinion that the GDA may consider the request of the petitioners in the light of he principles spelled out by the Supreme, Court in the above decision and make an I earnest endeavour as far as may be practicable to provide suitable house sites to the displaced persons on the principles spelled out in Pista Devi's case (supra). The GDA should solve this problem with sympathy and understanding such as each case may deserve. 36. With these observations, the petitions are dismissed. But we make no order as to costs. The interim orders are discharged.