JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the order dated 24.7.1980 (Ann. 3) of the Government of Rajasthan reopening the ceiling case, and also the orders arose consequently. 2. To fire away, a broad brush factual back drop, da capo, will help delineate the pristinely forensic controversy. Under Chapter 111-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, (for brevity, Old Ceiling Law'), ceiling matter in regard to the petitioner's land (measuring 87 bighas and 15 biswas of land) situated in village Meharana (Tehsil Digod District Kota) was decided by the Sub- Divisional Officer, Kota vide order (Ann. 2) dated 31.3.1975 dropping the proceedings against the petitioner and, holding that the petitioner possessed only 22.53 st. acres of land which is less than ceiling limit of 30 st. acres. 3. Ceiling proceedings were also initiated against the petitioner under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (in short, `New Ceiling Law') which were decided on 17.4.1976 in case No. 954/75 by the Authorised Officer, Kota, holding that no surplus land was found in possession of the petitioner. 4. Then, ceiling matter decided under the Old Ceiling Law was re-opened by the State Government under Section 15 (2) of the New Ceiling Law on a reference made by the Collector, Kota The Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan (Revenue and Ceiling Department) by the impugned order dated 24.7.1980 reopening the old ceiling case of the petitioner, authorised the Additional Collector Kota to hold an inquiry and determine the ceiling area afresh. Pursuantly, the Additional Collector Kota decided the denovo ceiling case vide his order dated 13.7.1981 (Ann. 4) declaring 12.53 standard acres of land as surplus in possession of the petitioner. Dissatisfied with this order (Ann. 4) the petitioner went in appeal before the Board of Revenue which dismissed it on 2.8.l984 vide order (Ann. 5) against Which, a review petition was also moved but it failed and was dismissed on 14.1.1988 vide order (Ann. 6). Hence this writ petition. 5. A short and sweet point in controversy condensed by us after considering the rival contentions of the parties, is as to whether after decision in the ceiling proceedings under New Ceiling Law, was the state Government not competent to re-open the case under Section 5 (2) of the New Ceiling Law and could it pass the order dated 24.7.1980 (Ann. 3) under challenge. 6. 3) under challenge. 6. To fortify his arguments on the point in controversy, Shri K K. Mehrish vociferously on behalf of the petitioner, placed reliance on the decisions of this Court : (1) Smt. Pori Devi v. State of Rajasthan, ( 1985 RRD 98 -1984 RLR 931) (2) State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Dakhan, (D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 228/84 decided on 20.7.1984 at Jodhpur) (3) State of Rajasthan v. Prithvi Singh and Ors. (1986 Rajasthan Law Reporter 32) (4) Smt. Amarjeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan, (1987 (I) R L. R. 544) . 7. In State of Rajasthan v. Prithvi Singh (supra) which has been followed in Smt. Amar Jeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan (supra), this Court observed as under : "We may further make it clear that there is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the land holders that even if proviso 2 to sub- section (1) of Section 4 is applied, the authorised officer can only determine the ceiling area applicable to him according to old law, but the question of a definition of 'family' recognition to transfer etc., should be determined according to the provisions of the new ceiling law. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel for the land holders is that the provision of the proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of section 4 of the new ceiling law is only restricted for the purpose of calculation of ceiling area according to new or old law, but all other matters like definition of family, recognition of transfers, vesting of surplus land, selection of land within ceiling area, determination of amount for acquisition, should all be governed by the provisions of the new Ceiling Law. We find no force in this contention. In our view so far as the provisions which have direct bearing in the calculation of the ceiling area like who can be included in the definition of family, recognition or non- recognition of certain transfers etc. will be applied as contained in the old ceiling law if the authorised officer wants to bring the case under proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 4. If the contention of learned counsel for land holders is accepted, this would make the provisions of the second proviso totally redundant and otiose. will be applied as contained in the old ceiling law if the authorised officer wants to bring the case under proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 4. If the contention of learned counsel for land holders is accepted, this would make the provisions of the second proviso totally redundant and otiose. if their contention is accepted and the area is calculated by taking the definition of family and recognition of transfers under the new Act, the question of applying the provisions of old ceiling law will be out of question. This would also result in giving unfair returns under the old ceiling law even though they had become trespassers over the excess land and in which the right of the State Government bad perfected. It is however, made clear that the authorised officer shall apply the provisions of the repealed law when it arrives a finding that the ceiling area applicable to any person or family in accordance with section 4 of the new ceiling law exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such person or family according to the provisions of law replaced by section 40." 8. Now, we advert to the facts in Smt. Amar Jeet Kaur v. State (supra) where, the proceedings under Chapter III-B of the Old Ceiling Law though dropped on 14th January, 1971 but, afresh under New Ceiling Law commenced and decided on February 28, 1976 against which an appeal was filed. However, even after two fresh innings, the Additional Collector vide order of 4th April, 1985 remanded the case to Assistant Collector, Shahbad for deciding the matter afresh under New Ceiling Law. However, even after two fresh innings, the Additional Collector vide order of 4th April, 1985 remanded the case to Assistant Collector, Shahbad for deciding the matter afresh under New Ceiling Law. In the meantime the Deputy Revenue Secretary by different orders dated 16.6.1918, 5.7.1978 and 10.7.78, had reopened the proceedings under Section 15(2) of the New Ceiling Law resulting in commencement of fresh proceedings by the Additional Collector, Kota under Old Ceiling Law which was decided on 5.11.1979; and the appeals of the petitioner to the Board of Revenue apart from review petition, were dismissed on 16.12.1985 and 17.3.86 and then writ petitions were filed where, the controversy raised by the petitioners by contending inter-alia that, the proceedings cannot be continued simultaneously under the old Ceiling Law as well as the new Ceiling Law; and that, when the proceedings initiated by the Assistant Collector and determined on 28.2.1976 are still pending before him in view of the remand order lastly of the additional Collector, Kota, dated 4.4.1985, the proceedings could not have been reopened under Sec. l5(2) of the new Ceiling Law by the Deputy Revenue Secretary; was held to be unnecessary and unreal taking benefit of enlightment derived from the decision of this Court in Prithvi Singh's case (supra). Ultimately, this Court, in Amarjeet Kaur v. State (supra), quashed the order of the Deputy Revenue secretary by which the case decided under the Old Ceiling Law was reopened; and the subsequent orders passed by the Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue in the matter which was re- opened. These orders were quashed by this Court merely on the ground that because the matter is pending under new ceiling law and in those proceedings while applying proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the New ceding law the Authorised officer is competent to determine the ceiling area under Old Ceiling Law. For the aforesaid view, this Court have derived comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring view in State of Rajasthan v. Prithvi Singh (supra) viz. "In our view, so far as the provisions which have direct bearing in the calculation of the ceiling area like, who can be included in the definition of family, recognition or non-recognition of certain transfers etc. "In our view, so far as the provisions which have direct bearing in the calculation of the ceiling area like, who can be included in the definition of family, recognition or non-recognition of certain transfers etc. will be applied as contained in the old ceiling law if the authorised officer wants to bring the case under proviso 2 to sub-section (I) of Section 4. If the contention of learned counsel for land holders is accepted, this would make the provisions of the second proviso totally redundant and otiose," By reproducing the wise and inspiring view at the cost of repetition, we discern harmony and consistency in case law from Smt. Amar Jett Kaur v. State ( 1987 (1) RLR 544 -supra) and State of Rajasthan Vs. Prithvi Singh (1986 RLR 32 supra) where this court elaborately discussed a catena of decisions which need not herein be covered in extenso as the law laid down is the same except that judicial response to each case situation leads to emphasis on different facets of the principle. So, we have considered these two mile stone decisions. 9. In the light of what we have disentangled, it is clear that if the proceedings under the new Ceiling Law are pending then the re-opening of the case decided under the old Ceiling Law is unwarranted. To our mind, the aforesaid view was infused by the rule that the Authorised Officer is competent to apply the provisions of the old Ceiling Law in a case pending under the new Ceiling Law as it is permissible under proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new Ceiling law- which inspired this Court to quash in these two cited cases the order of re-opening the coiling matters decided under the old Ceiling law. Even, similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Dakhan (supra) the order of the Government under Section 15 (2) of the new Ceiling Law for reopening the matter which was decided under the old Ceiling Law, was quashed on the ground that the writ petition was pending before the Court against the orders passed under the new Ceiling Law. 10. For a moment, we turn upon the rule of construction. 10. For a moment, we turn upon the rule of construction. It is no doubt true that the Court while construing a provision should not easily real into its words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. 11. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Astor, (1949 (2) All ER 155, 164) , Lord Denning, L. J. said : "When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament...and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature. A judge should ask himself the question, how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they should have straighthened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is women, but he can and should iron out the creases." 12. This rule of construction is quoted with approval by the Apex Court in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 , as referred to in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 . In Suit. Amarjeet Kaur v. State (supra) by making stress on the principles enunciated in Prithvi Singh's case (supra) that even if proviso 2 to sub- section (1) of Section 4 is applied under the new ceiling law, for the purpose of calculation of ceiling area, all other matters like definition of family, recognition of transfers, vesting of surplus land, selection of land within ceiling area, determination of amount for acquisition may be governed either by the provisions of the old or new ceiling Law whichever may be advantageous to the State, this Court has not done any violence to the statute nor embarked upon any legislative action and it has only construed the words of the statute in a reason- able way having regard to the context. That being so, this Court laid much emphasis to the observations made in Prithvi Singh's case (supra) that ceiling law on agricultural holdings is a socioeconomic law. Motive behind the Act is to advance socialisation and ensure equitable distribution of agricultural land as laid down in Article 39 of the Constitution for securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Determination of Ceiling area and surplus area is the main back bone of the entire ceiling law. Here, we must hasten to add that the ceiling law on agricultural holdings is enacted for the purpose of giving protection to landless persons against unreasonable holdings and for the purpose of making equitable distribution of the holdings amongst persons who are in need of them. Thus it will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature that those persons who were required to Surrender more land under the old ceiling law, may get benefit of surrendering less land under the new oiling law. 13. Thus, having benefited by the enlightments derived from the decisions, referred to above, we are of the view that the position which emerges by the principles enunciated in two milestone decisions is that the Government is competent under Section 15 (2) of the new Ceiling law to reopen the ceiling case decided under the old ceiling law. In case any proceedings are not pending under the new ceiling law or that while deciding the case under new ceiling Law, the case was considered in the light of the proviso 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new ceiling law. 14. A last ditch effort has been made to also see s decision of this Court in Smt. Pari Devi v. State of Rajasthan (supra). We may observe that the manner of dressing up an order does not matter. The Court will lift the veil to view the reality or substance. Hence we have gone into this decision to disabuse the impression that a new defence mechanism to protect the matter had been propounded in this ruling. We do not agree that any such innovation has been made, Smt. Pari Devi's case (supra) according to Shri Mehrish may seem to support him but a closer study contradicts any such view. Hence we have gone into this decision to disabuse the impression that a new defence mechanism to protect the matter had been propounded in this ruling. We do not agree that any such innovation has been made, Smt. Pari Devi's case (supra) according to Shri Mehrish may seem to support him but a closer study contradicts any such view. That being so, in view of what we have discussed, disentangled and held above, we agree to some limited extent with the decision of this Court in Smt. Pari Devi v. State of Rajasthan (supra), Per P.K. Banerjee, C.J,) that where the Ceiling Case has been decided under the old Ceiling Law and subsequently the case under the new Ceiling Law has also been decided after considering the implications of second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new Ceiling Law, then and then only, the Government is not authorise a to reopen the case under Section 15 (2) of the new Ceiling Law. We must hasten to clarify by observing that if a case under the new Ceiling Law is decided without considering the implications of second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new Ceiling Law, then, the State Government will be competent to reopen the case decided under the Old Ceiling Law. If a case is reopened under Section 15(2) of the New Ceiling Law then the person authorised to decide the case afresh has to apply the provisions contained in the Old Ceiling Law. If a case is reopened under Section 15(2) of the New Ceiling Law then the person authorised to decide the case afresh has to apply the provisions contained in the Old Ceiling Law. But, when in a case pending under the new ceiling law, the provisions of old ceiling law would also be applied with the aid of second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new Ceiling Law and if the case is decided in the light of the provisions contained in the new Ceiling Law then it will be unjust to exercise the powers under Section 15(2) of the new Ceiling Law and, in that situation, the State Government has to take recourse against the order passed by the Authorised Officer under the new Ceiling Law and if no action is taken against such an order by the State Government then it would be assumed that though the matter was considered under both, the Old and new Ceiling law but still the State Government did not choose to challenge the orders passed under the new Ceiling Law by preferring any appeal; in the situation, the order under new Ceiling Law would become final as against the State and the State Government would have no power to exercise the powers under Section 15(2) of the new Ceiling law. 15. It is now time to turn by adverting to the facts of the case in hand. Judicial notice can be taken of an order dated 17.4.1976 (which has been shown to the Court during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner) passed under the new Ceiling Law. A perusal of this order shows that the Authority examined the Ceiling Case of the petitioner only in the light of the provisions contained in the new Ceiling Law, and the case of the petitioner was not at all considered under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the new Ceiling Law. In these circumstances, applying the stated principles, in our considered opinion, the state Government was fully competent to exercise the powers under Section 15(2) of the new Ceiling Law. In these circumstances, applying the stated principles, in our considered opinion, the state Government was fully competent to exercise the powers under Section 15(2) of the new Ceiling Law. Hence, we do not find any error or infirmity in the order date3 24.7.1980 passed by the State Government while exercising the powers under Section 15(2) of the new Ceiling Law, warranting interference by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the result, this writ petition must fail and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******