KAMLESHWAR NATH, J. A book entitled "chalees Saal", written by opposite party No. 1, Sri Chandra Bhushan Pandey, Civil Judge, Lucknow, bearing his declaration dated 25-12-1987, was printed and published respec tively by opposite parties Nos. 3 and 2. The petitioner, Sri Prakash Awasthi, a practising lawyer ; filed this petition on 22-3-1988 for punishing the opposite parties under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, insofar as they had written, printed, and published the book containing statements set out in paras 7, 9 and 11 of the petition. 2. Notice was issued by this Courts order dated 22-3-1988 to opposite party No. 1 to show cause as to why proceedings for contempt of court may not be initiated against him. 3. Reserving right to file a detailed counter-affidavit at the appropriate stage, opposite party No. 1 filed a reply on 9-5-88 stating that the petitioner had not obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate- General of U. P. Fur initiating proceedings for criminal contempt and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. Opposite party No. 1 admitted to be the author of the book commenting upon the difference in the various aspects of life in this country during the first 49 years of independence, i. e. 1947 to 1987. It is urged that there is no reference, whatsoever, to any particular case or particular judge or particular court or of the conduct of a judge or the judgment of any court, and that there was nothing in the book which could either scandalise any court or interfere with the due course of the judicial process or with a administration of justice. 4. On 13-5-88 the petitioner made an application stating that the permission of the Advocate-General was not necessary as the Court was being approached to take suo motu action. It was added that the book contained allegations against lawyers, judiciary and Karamcharis, and since the Advocate General falls in the category of Advocate, the taking of permission from him to launch the proceedings for contempt of court would place Advocate-General in an awkward position and shall serve no purpose. This application was prayed to be incorporated as part of the petition for taking contempt proceedings. 5. This application was prayed to be incorporated as part of the petition for taking contempt proceedings. 5. Extensive arguments have been addressed before us by the petitioners learned counsel, Sri K. B. Sinha and opposite party No. 1 learned counsel Sri Markendya Katju on the preliminary objection concerning the consent of the Advocate-General and on the prima facie case for initiating contempt pro ceedings. 6. Relevant portion of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (For short, the Act) runs as follows:- "15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.- (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by- (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . (e ). . . . . . . . . . . . . It is plain that sub-section (1) of Section 15 contemplates motion for criminal contempt in three ways- (1) Suo motu by the Court, (2) by the Advocate-General; and (3) by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. Admittedly, there is no motion of the Advocate-General in this case ; the motion is by the petitioner, and there is no consent in writing of the Advocate-General. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite parties says that if the consent in writing of the Advocate-General has not been obtained, motion cannot be made by any person. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that a motion by any person, without the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, can sitll be used as an information to the Court, on which the Court can take suo motu action. Learned counsel for the opposite parties refers to Rule 3 (4) of Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules of Court and contends that every petition moved, with out the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, must clearly state the reasons why the consent in writing of the Advocate-General could not be obtained, and why the court has been approached to act suo motu. It is urged the reasons stated in the petitioners application dated 13-5- 1988 for not obtaining the written consent of the Advocate-General are untenable and. It is urged the reasons stated in the petitioners application dated 13-5- 1988 for not obtaining the written consent of the Advocate-General are untenable and. therefore, the prayer for suo motu action is not entertainable. Rule 3 (4) aforesaid runs as follows :- "every petition in respect of criminal contempt, where it is not moved by the Advocate-General and where the consent in writing of the Advocate-General had not been obtained, and every petition in regard to criminal contempt of a subordinate court where no reference has been made by it and the petition is moved without the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, shall clearly state the reasons why the consent in writing of the Advocate-General could not be obtained and why the court has been approached to act suo motu. " Emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the opposite party upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar and others, AIR 1988 SC 1208 and Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta v. Dr O. P. Chakravarty and others, 1975 Cri LJ 164 (All ). 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the case of Conscious Group v. Mohd. Yunus, (1987) 3 SCC 89 ; Vinaya Chandra Misra v. Sachindra Kumar Sarkar, (1974) Cri LJ 962 (Allahabad; leading to appeal in the Supreme Court in the case of Sachindra Kumar Sarkar v. Vinaya Chandra Misra, AIR 1981 SC 723 . 9. On a careful consideration of the cited cases and the provisions of the statute, we do not find any bar tor a person to submit information to the Court, on the basis of which the court may take action suo motu. The obser vations contained in para 30 of P. N. Dudas case (supra) that the only course open to a citizen for initiating proceedings for contempt is to move for consent in writing of the Attorney General or Solicitor General (which means Advocate General in the case of States) relate only to those cases where the court does not take cognizance of its own motion, or where the Attorney General or Solicitor General does not take action. The observation in Para 3? The observation in Para 3? of the decision that the object of prescribing the procedural modes, under Section 15 of the Act, was to safeguard the valuable time of the Court or with the frequent use of suo motu powers on information furnished by an incompetent petition, may render those procedural safeguard otiose, does not by any means prevent the Court from taking suo motu action on a petition which contains relevant facts. Indeed, it would appear from Para 59 that if the Advocate-General is either not in a position to take a decision, or refuses consent, it may not serve any purpose for the Court to find out whether the Advocate-General should have given a decision one way or the other, because it is open to the petitioner always to place information in his possession before the court, and request the court to take action. Para 61 would show that the petition given in that case before the Supreme Court was considered by the court as information under Rule 3 (a) of the Supreme Court Rules for suo motu action, but after hearing the counsel for the contemner it was held that there was no need to initiate the proceedings for contempt of Court. 10. In the case of Conscious Group (supra) the question of taking suo motu action was not considered. In the case of Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta (Supra) of this court, it was observed that Section 15 excluded any private citizen from setting the criminal contempt in motion unless he made the motion for consent in writing of the Advocate-General ; but the Court went on to say that such citizen may at the worse lay information before the court itself praying the court to take action on its own motion. (See page 166 ). In other words, this court is not prevented from taking suo motu cognizance of the contempt on the information contained in the petition, other conditions being satisfied. 11. The other question which requires to be decided is whether the application made by the present petitioner can be considered to be an appro priate information to the Court for suo motu action. 11. The other question which requires to be decided is whether the application made by the present petitioner can be considered to be an appro priate information to the Court for suo motu action. There can be doubt that the application should satisfy the conditions of Rule 3 (4) of Chapter XXV-E of the Rules of Court which requires the petition to state clearly the reason why consent in writing of the Advocate- General could not be obtained, and why the court has been approached to act suo motu. One reason stated is that the publication of the book caused agitation among the lawyers and employees leading to strike and stoppage of court work for almost two weeks, and further delay in obtaining the permission of the Advocate-General would have resulted in more agitations. This is purely hypothetical. Moreover it is not disputed that this application had been filed after the strike was withdrawn and court work was resumed. Another reason given was that the allegations contained in the book are not only against the judiciary and court employees but also against lawyers, and since the Advocate-General is within the category of lawyers, the motion for obtaining his consent to launch the proceedings for contempt of court would have placed the Advocate General in an awkward position, and would serve no purpose. Learned counsel for the opposite parties say that the assumption of the petitioner regarding the Advocate-General is baseless and untenable and, therefore, the prayer for suo motu action may not be entertained. The contention is not without substance because in the absence of any indication that the Advocate-General had expressed his mind one way or the other in the context of the allegations contained in the book, there would be no reason to hold that the Advocate General could either feel embarrassed or would not consider the motion dispassionately and imparetilly ; but a special feature of the case of which we must take due notice, is that the alleged contemner is an officer of the subordinate judiciary and holds a rank of importance, namely, Civil Judge, in which he exercises unlimited civil pecuniary jurisdiction as also an Assistant Sessions Judge (if the requisite powers have been conferred on him ). The conduct of opposite party No. 1 is under the superintendence of this Court, not only judicially under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, but also administratively under Article 235 of the Cons titution. This Court must guard the independence of the subordinate judiciary. We would, therefore, not consider it appropriate to make his conduct subject to scrutiny of any person including to Advocate-General, it will certainly not be proper to place the conduct of a judicial officer into the hands of the Advocate-General in any manner whatsoever, we feel that this Court is bound to take decisions in respect of the officers of the subordinate judiciary entirely on its own without the advice or influence of any outside element including the Advocate-General. 12. In this connection we may refer to the decision in the case of P. N. Duda (supra) where the question of form of motion for contempt by way of information to the Court came up for consideration. In Para 52 of the REPORT, the Rules of the Supreme Court, regarding to form, were considered, and it was noticed that the application was not in proper form. However, it was observed in Para 53 that the petition may not be dismissed melely because it does not conform to the form. 13, On a consideration of the relevant provisions, we hold that although the reason contained in the application dated 13-5-88 of the petitioner for not approaching the Advocate-General to grant consent in writing may not be convicing are full, nevertheless, having regard to the special features of the present case, this court is competent to act suo motu on the information contain ed in the petition. 14. The only question which remains to be considered at this stage is whether it is a fit case in which the opposite parties should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished for committing contempt of Court. 15. The statements of opposite party No. 1, contained in the book and alleged to constitute contempt of court, are set out in paras 7, 9 and 11 of the petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time of hearing of the argu ments, confined his submissions to the statements which concern Judges and lawyers as contained in Paras 7 and 11 of the petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time of hearing of the argu ments, confined his submissions to the statements which concern Judges and lawyers as contained in Paras 7 and 11 of the petition. The contention of learn ed counsel for the opposite parties is that the statements in question do not refer to any particular base, Judge, court or judgment of any particular court and, therefore, they do not fall within the purview of criminal contempt as defined under Section 2 of the Act. Sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act refers to scandalisation etc. of "any court". Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, refers to the "due course of any judicial proceeding. " Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to indicate, nor any of the extracts in the petition contain any reference to any particular court, or to any judicial proceeding. We find, therefore, that the alleged contempt is outside the purview of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act. 16. The only question is whether the statements fall within the mischief of sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act. This sub clause runs as follows : "interfers of tends to interfere or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner. " On the face of it the expression "administration of justice" has a wide ambit. Learned counsel for the opposite parties referred to a decision of this court in the case of Nurul Huda v. Amitabh Bachchan, 1984 ALJ 1254 to show that a crimimal contempt is an offence and, therefore, the expression is exhaustive. The submission is not quite clear. In the case of Barad Kanta Misra v. Registrar High Court of Orissa and another, (1974) 1 SCC 374 it has been held in Para 43 that there is no comprehensive definition of the expression "administration of justice". The Supreme Court, after setting out the definition of criminal contempt under the Act in para 33, observed in Para 34 that the terminology used in the definition was borrowed from English Law of Contempt and have to be understood in the sense in which they have been so far understood by our courts with the aid of English law, where necessary. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt is a Constitutional power under Article 215 of the Constitution, and even though the Legislature is competent to enact laws in regard thereto under Article 246 read with Entry 77 of List I and 14 of List III of Seventh Schedule, the pre-Constitutional powers as Court of Record have been recognised by Article 215. Further, Section 9 of the Act itself contemplates situations leading to contempt of court apart from the provisions contained in the Act. Section 9 of the Act runs as follows : "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience breach, publication or other act is punishable as con tempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this Act. (Emphasis supplied ). The emphasised portion of the section clearly recognises contempts other than those which are specifically provided in the Act itself. It is not possible there fore, to hold that the definition of criminal contempt, contained in the Act, is exhaustive. 17. Contempt, which is referable to interference, obstruction or tendency thereof with the administration of justice in any manner, other than those contemplated in sub-clauses (1) & (2) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, has been stated in the case of Barad Kanta Mishra (supra), Paras 44,47 and 48 speak of a far wider import than mere adjudication of case from the seat of justice. It has been held that the courts of the justice from the highest to the lowest are by their constitution directly connected with the administration of justice and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who are likely to have business therein that the courts perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill will, and it is this traditional confidence in the courts that the justice will be administered in them which is sought to be protected by proceedings in contempt. It is plain enough that anything which brings the administration of justice into ridicule or disrepute or shakes the confidence of the people therein, is criminal contempt. It is plain enough that anything which brings the administration of justice into ridicule or disrepute or shakes the confidence of the people therein, is criminal contempt. In the case of E. M. S. Namboodiripad v. T. N. Nambiar, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 2015, the statement of a contampt in a press conference that the judiciary, as part of the ruling classes, works against peasants, and other sections of working classes, and the law and system of judiciary essentially served the exploiting classes, was held to be criminal contempt. In the case of M. R. Parashar and others v. Dr. Farooq Abdul la and other, (1984) 2 SCC 343 a general allegation of corruption against the judiciary was held to be not protected by the liberty of free expression and carried the case never the law of contempt, (see Para 10 ). 18. Learned counsel for the opposite party laid great emphasis upon the observation of the Supreme Court in P. N. Dudas case (Supra), in Para 9, that the court must recognise that times and clime have changed in the last two decades and there has been a tremendous erosion of many values. This observation cannot be interpreted to signify that even if a statement containing disparaging remarks against the judiciary amount to a ridicule or disrespect for administration of justice, it would not be treated as contempt of court because times and clime have changed and values have tremendously eroded. The Sup reme Court indeed accepted the ratio in E. M. S. Namboadripads case (Supra) and while observing that changes are to be taken notice of, did not go to the extent of saying that such utterances would not constitute contempt of court. Indeed, in the very early part of the judgment (Page 2014 Column No. 1) the Supreme Court said that any criticism about the judicial system or the Judges which erodes faith in the objective approach of the judges and bridges the administration of justice into ridicule, must be prevented and proceedings for contempt of court arise out of that attempt. 19. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that far more dis paraging remarks, considered in P. N. Dudas case (supra), were held not to con stitute contempt of court. 19. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that far more dis paraging remarks, considered in P. N. Dudas case (supra), were held not to con stitute contempt of court. That may be so, but the coclusion was arrived at by the Supreme Court on the basis of the explanation submitted by the contemner in his counter affidavit (vide Paras 48 and 61 ). In the present case, the petitioner has reserved his right to file a detailed counter affidavit. We do not, therefore, have the benefit of his stand on the merits, we have only to examine prima facie. 20. Learned counsel for the opposite party lastly urged that a contempt, in order to be punishable. Should have the potentiality of causing imminent danger of interference with administration of justice or of bringing the adminis tration of justice into disrepute. He says that the impugned statements of the opposite party do not fall in that category. It is true that it has been hold in para 29 of P. N. Dudas case that the contemners speech in that case, read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair administration of justice and that there was no imminent danger of interference with administration of justice, nor of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. But, that conclusion also was arrived at on a consideration of the merits in the light of court of affidavit of the contemner. That stage has yet to arrive in the present case. 21. Learned counsel for the parties have referred to few other decisions which we do not consider it necessary to set out here ; they may have to be considered at the time of hearing on then merits of the case. 22. Even so, only some portions of the extracts of the writings of opposite party No. 1 set out in the petition, may prima facie be treated to constitute contempt of court, for which opposite party No. 1 may be charged. 23. 22. Even so, only some portions of the extracts of the writings of opposite party No. 1 set out in the petition, may prima facie be treated to constitute contempt of court, for which opposite party No. 1 may be charged. 23. On a careful consideration of the extracts, contained in the petition, we charge opposite party No. 1 suo motu, and direct him to show cause as to why he should not be punished for committing criminal contempt of court in respect of his writings extracted as follows : (1) The extract contained in Para 7 of the petition, and (2) The following portion in Para 9 : " (I) one vershon me jo Nyayapalika ham bana paye wah ek dukan ki tarah hoti ja rahi hai. Jahan kagaj Stamp, File, Nakil se lekar kabhi kabhi faiwla tak ki kharidane aur beche jana ki boat honey lagi hai. " Opposite party No. 1 shall file his counter affidavit in respect of the charge within a period of two weeks and the case will be listed for disposal in the week commencing 19-9-1988 with due regard to the provisions of Chapter XXX V-E, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court 1952. Immediately after we have pronounced this order Sri Sudhir Shanker, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1, prays for issue of a certificate of fitness to appeal before the Honble Supreme Court. The decision is only at the stage of initiation of proceedings and we do not think any question arises which needs to be decided by the Honble Supreme Court nor any substantial question of law of general importance arises therein. The prayer is rejected. Order accordingly. .