JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, arising out of proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is quarter No. 7/10, Bhagwan Dass Quarters, Dehradun Smt. Shail Sharma, respondent No. 1, is the landlady. Dool Chand, the petitioner, is a tenant. Smt. Shail Sharma, the landlady, is residing in a tenanted accommodation, namely, quarter No. 12/4 Bhagwan Dass Quarters, Dehradun. The accommodation in occupation of the landlady is on the first floor of the accommodation. 3. The landlady filed an application for release of the accommodation in dispute on the ground that she requires the accommodation for herself and the members of her family and also on the ground that since she has been suffering from hypertension and has been advised not to climb up stairs, she requires the accommodation on the ground floor, which is the accommodation in dispute. 4. The need of the landlady was contested by the petitioner, the tenant. Ultimately, by an order dated 11th July, 1983, the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the need of the landlady was bonafide and genuine and that greater hardship will be caused to her in case the release application is not allowed and, consequently, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application and directed the property to be released in favour of the landlady. 5. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, an appeal was filed before the lower Appellate Court under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 10th July, 1985. The orders of the Appellate as well as the Prescribed Authority have been challenged by means of the present petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present case and since the Appellate Authority has relied upon the said Explanation, the finding in regard to bonafide need is vitiated in law. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present case and since the Appellate Authority has relied upon the said Explanation, the finding in regard to bonafide need is vitiated in law. He has also urged that the question as to whether the petitioner has got a property at Mussoorie or he is carrying on the business at Mussoorie, could not have been considered for the purpose of recording a finding in regard to the question of hardship. 8. In so far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, the finding of the Appellate Authority is that the petitioner has got a house in Mussoorie. He is also carrying on the business at Mussoorie. Explanation (i) Section 21(1) applies to a case where the tenant or any or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. In the instant case, the property was alleged to have been acquired in Mussoorie. It is a different municipality and, consequently, so far as the Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act is concerned, the submission of the learned counsel is correct that the said Explanation could not apply to the facts of the present case. 9. I have examined the judgment of the Appellate Authority. It is, no doubt, true that the Appellate Authority has considered Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act on the ground that the petitioner has a house in Mussoorie and is carrying on a business there. Besides this, the Appellate Authority has further considered the validity of the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority as to whether the need of the landlady was bonafide and genuine or not. The petitioner, who had filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, had only challenged the finding of bonafide need on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Chandra, who had given a certificate in favour of the landlady Smt. Shail Sharma. The petitioner, who had filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, had only challenged the finding of bonafide need on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Chandra, who had given a certificate in favour of the landlady Smt. Shail Sharma. The Appellate Authority has considered this argument and has rejected the same on the ground that the petitioner had not challenged the illness of Smt. Shail Sharma in the written statement filed by him. If a party does not challenge a particular fact in the pleadings then the Court is right in holding that it cannot be permitted to cross-examine a person on a matter which does not exist in the pleading at all or on a matter which is not in dispute. Smt. Shail Sharma was examined orally before the Prescribed Authority. The statement of Smt. Shail Sharma has been read before me. In her statement before the Prescribed Authority, she had categorically stated that she had been suffering from hypertension. This statement of Smt. Shail Sharma has also gone uncontroverted. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the question of bonafide need is, in any manner vitiated in law. One of the considerations was that the landlady was advised to reside on the ground floor. It cannot possibly be said that the mere mention of Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act has, in any manner, vitiated the finding in regard to bonafide need. 10. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel while considering the comparative hardship, the Court was right in considering one of the most important circumstances that the petitioner was found to be carrying on business in Mussoorie and was also found to be residing in Mussoorie. It cannot be said that these considerations are in any manner, irrelevant. Once the tenant was found residing at any other place and carrying on business at any other place, it could be held that the hardship in his favour was mitigated. 11. I have examined the judgment of the Appellate Authority and I do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that greater hardship will be caused to the landlady in case the release application is not allowed. 11. I have examined the judgment of the Appellate Authority and I do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that greater hardship will be caused to the landlady in case the release application is not allowed. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. In Paragraph 21 of the counter-affidavit filed in this Court, it has been stated that the son of the petitioner has entered into an agreement to sell in respect of house No. 50, Body Guard, Dehradun, on 10th October, 1983, and that possession of the house as well as the land has been taken over in pursuance of the said agreement of sale. It has been further stated that the petitioner along with his son has been staying in the said house. It has been further stated that an affidavit had been filed before the Appellate Authority to the same effect. 13. In the rejoinder affidavit which has been filed in this Court, the facts stated in Paragraph 21 of the counter-affidavit have been controverted only to the extent that house No. 50, Body Guard, Dehradun, is not a house, but a plot, which has been agreed to be transferred to Govind Ram, son of the petitioner. 14. The agreement of sale has been attached as Annexure 15' to the counter-affidavit. In the agreement of sale itself, in Paragraph 6, it has been mentioned that besides the land, which is agreed to be sold by virtue of the said agreement, there is also a house partially built existing on the said land. In Paragraph 5 of the said agreement of sale, it has been further stated that Govind Ram has been kept as a care taker of the said house and he will not cause damage to the property. From these clauses of the agreement of sale, it is clear that a house does exist, being house No. 50, Body Guard, Dehradun. The possession has also been taken over by Govind Ram, son of the petitioner. From these clauses of the agreement of sale, it is clear that a house does exist, being house No. 50, Body Guard, Dehradun. The possession has also been taken over by Govind Ram, son of the petitioner. Considering the fact that the petitioner's son has already agreed to purchase and has taken over possession of a house in Dehradun, and also considering the fact that the petitioner is already living in a house in Mussoorie and is carrying on business in Mussoorie, I do not think in the circumstances that it is fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the release order passed by the Court below. 15. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. The interim order dated 31st July, 1985, is hereby vacated. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their on Costs. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the premises in dispute. This prayer, in my opinion, is justified. I, accordingly, grant three months's time to the petitioner to vacate the premises, provided the petitioner gives an undertaking within one month from today before the Prescribed Authority that he will vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of three months and hand over vacant possession of the same to the landlady. In case of default, the release order shall be enforced forthwith.