JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - The petitioner, Kailash Behari Verma, was compulsorily retired on 5.3.1976 by an order of the Deputy Inspector of Police, Kanpur Range, Kanpur, under Fundamental Rule 56 (3) at the age of 50 years. 2. The order of compulsory retirement was challenged in a claims petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, II, Lucknow, being claims petition No. 343/11/78 Kailash Behari Verma v. State and others. The contention before the Tribunal, in short, was that the order compulsorily retireing the petitioner has been passed on un - communicated entries and the same entires should have been deemed as wiped out because the petitioner had crossed the efficiency bar in 1974. The next contention is that in the fact of a pending representation against the adverse entries given in 1975, which representation remained pending even at the time when the order compulsorily retireing him was passed, he could not be retired. 3. The decision in the writ petition will be confined to the last two aspects. 4. In so far as the first aspect is concerned, adverse entries which have been given even prior to the crossing of efficiency bar, if final, can be taken into consideration in passing an order of compulsory retirement. This aspect has been considered in detail in a decision of this Court, which is reported in 1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 714, Dr. Prabhu Dayal Khalsa v. U.P. Services Tribunal, and others, This decision will be relied upon on an another proposition, subsequently. 5. The other two aspects are the entires not communicated to the petitioner and upon those communication a representation of the petitioner having been kept pending even after the date of compulsory retirement. 6. In paragraph 5 of its judgment the Tribunal held that it is not expected of the opposite parties to prove before the Tribunal the communication of each and every entry until and unless some special facts are pleaded in respect of some entries. If an entry is likely to affect the prospect of a Government Servant and would place him in such a situation that he is required to furnish an explanation against such entires, then such entires need to be communicated to a Government Servant, and it is also the obligation of the department to prove that the entires have indeed been Communicated. 7. 7. It may be placed on record that Fundamental Rule 56, consequent upon being amended by U.P. Act No. 33 of 1976 cast an obligation on the department of communicating an adverse entry to the Government Servant. 8. The other aspect which remains is in reference to the entry of 1976. A representation of the petitioner against this was pending consideration. It is not in issue and the record accepts that the order of compulsory retirement has been passed in the face of a pending representation. This is accepted in paragraph 6 of the order of the Tribunal, which is sought to be impugned. The Tribunal has justified the order of compulsory retirement on the reasoning that other material was sufficient to sustain an order of compulsory retirement in the public interest. The Tribunal observed that "even if it be presumed for the sake of argument that this appeal against 1976 entry was pending and the entry of 1975 is ignored the Tribunal find (sic) that even the remaining material was more than sufficient in passing an order of compulsory retirement against him in public interest". 9. In die face of an adverse entry and a pending representation against such an adverse entry, prior to passing an order of compulsory retirement the adverse entry is to be looked into along with the pending representation by the appointing authority. This aspect was decided by this Court in re. Dr. Prabhu Dayal Khalsa's case (supra). The facts on record show that, that while the adverse entry was taken into account the pending representation had been overlooked and had not been taken into account. Paragraph 13 of the counter - affidavit filed in answer to the writ petition clearly states and accepts that an appeal against the adverse entry for the year 1976 was pending but as the petition had retired, it has been considered as infructuous. But this was not to be so, and there were only two alternatives available to the respondents prior to passing the order of compulsory retirement. Either to have disposed of the appeal prior to pass in the order of compulsory retirement or in the alternative to consider the adverse entry along with the representation or appeal, which was pending. 10. But this was not to be so, and there were only two alternatives available to the respondents prior to passing the order of compulsory retirement. Either to have disposed of the appeal prior to pass in the order of compulsory retirement or in the alternative to consider the adverse entry along with the representation or appeal, which was pending. 10. Thus, upon admitted facts, the Tribunal has fallen into a manifest error in over looking the circumstance that in reference to as adverse entry of 1976, a representation or appeal against it was pending, and the order of compulsory retirement had been passed in the face of a pending representation. It is accepted that the adverse entry of 1975 was taken into account at the time of passing of an order of compulsory retirement, but the representation or appeal of the petitioner was considered to be an infructuous. 11. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that what remains in the order of compulsory retirement is that it is virtually passed upon the entries given to the petitioner 1957, 1958 and 1962. In reference to this the Tribunal records that this in itself is sufficient to hold that the order of retirement of the petitioner at the age of fifty years under Fundamental Rule 56 (c) was in the public interest. This observation of the Tribunal is contained in paragraph 6 of the order, so impugned. In reference to this learned counsel for the petitioner cited a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1987 AIR SC 948 : Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab.The submission is that die entries for a period of more than ten years past are not to be taken into account as it would be an act of digging out past to get some material to make an order against the employee. In the face of the observation of the Supreme Court and that a representation against 1975 entry was still pending, it is contended that what had been taken into account was the record, which was more than ten years old. 12. The order of compulsory retirement dated 6.3.1976 in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is clearly bad and illegal and cannot be upheld. 12. The order of compulsory retirement dated 6.3.1976 in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is clearly bad and illegal and cannot be upheld. The judgment of the Tribunal in the face of two decisions (supra), one of this Court and the other of the Supreme Court, suffers from an error as it is against the settled law. 13. The order of compulsory retirement dated 6.3.1976, Annexure T to the writ petition, and the judgment of the Tribunal dated 23 October, 1979, Annexure 13 to the writ petition, are quashed and set aside. As the petitioner has already retired, this Court directs the respondents Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 to treat the petitioner as having retired in the normal courses, and deliver his arrears of salary and consequential benefits including post retirement benefits within three months from today. 14. The writ petition is, thus, allowed with costs.