SANTOSH DUGGAL, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein seeks awrit of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, order Ordirection under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read withsection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the consequential prayer for his release forthwith, after quashing theorder of detention dated 16/12/1987, passed by respondent No. 2 herein, namely, Shri K. L. Verma, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. New Delhi, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of FOREIGN Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, (COF eposa for short ). ( 2 ) THE facts, as called from the grounds of detention, brieflystated are that one Mohindeen Abdul Khader, resident of 15/81. East Street, Kailakarai, a police in Romanad District, Tamilnadu was apprehended by the officers of the Central Excise. Coimbatore. at a place in Tamil Nadu. on 9/07/1987, whilehe was travelling in Bus No. TCB-1274 plying between Palaniand Pollachi and was found in possession of a sum ofrs. 6. 00,000. 00. Certain documents such as accounts, receipts,chits given by the parties were also recovered from his possession. The currency and the documents were seized andhanded over to the Directorate of Enforcement for furtherinvestigation. During the course of interrogation on 10thjuly, 1987. the said Mohindeen Abdul Khader disclosed thatout of the seized amount of Rs. 6,00,000; Rs. 3,00,000 weremeant tor making payment to M. Mohammed Ali (petitioner),and that this name figured in one of the slips seized from him,and that on earlier occasion also, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 hadbeen paid by him to the said M. Mohammed Ali, which alsowas indicated on one of the slips, seized from the aforesaidmohindeen Abdul Khader. He further revealed that payments were made on behalf of one Amer of Dubai. ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the aforesaid disclosure, a search of theresidential premises of the petitioner at Wandoor, in Districtmalappuram, State of Kerala, was conducted on 11/07/1987. There also number of documents, such as small slips,accounts and other documents were recovered. They wereduly seized, under a Mahazar prepared at the spot. The petitioner revealed in his statement given to the officers of theenforcement Directorate on 11/07/1987 that he hadworked from 11/10/1978 upto 12/10/1980in Dubai, and thereafter in Saudi Arabia from 21/07/1981to 31/07/1985 and that he had seven brothers out of whomthree were still working abroad. They wereduly seized, under a Mahazar prepared at the spot. The petitioner revealed in his statement given to the officers of theenforcement Directorate on 11/07/1987 that he hadworked from 11/10/1978 upto 12/10/1980in Dubai, and thereafter in Saudi Arabia from 21/07/1981to 31/07/1985 and that he had seven brothers out of whomthree were still working abroad. He gave their names as wellas addresses of the places they were working; all of whichhappened to be in Saudi Arabia. ( 4 ) IN a subsequent statement, the petitioner further revealed that he had been operating on behalf of his elderbrother Shabeer Ahmed living in Saudi Arabia, and that themodus operandi was worked out during the visit of his youngerbrother Inamu Rehman, also living in Jaddah. Saudi Arabiaduring February, 198 7/04/1987 and that Shabeer Ahmedused to send him a list, containing names of the persons towhom money had to be disbursed in India, against a slip,bearing his brother s signature and that amounts used to b3paid accordingly, to all such persons, and that the seizedmoney was also meant for similar payments. It was furtherrevealed by the petitioner that under instructions from hisbrother, he had been collecting the slips, after making payments. and that in this manner he received since March, 1987,rs. 16. 50. 000 on four different occasion from persons from Tamil Nadu and that within two or three days of the receiptof the amount; people came to his house with chits and aftercareful examination of his brother s signature. and the amountwritten in code. the petitioner had been distributing money,and the papers recovered on search of his house, also included those slips. ( 5 ) AS a sequal to disclosures, made by these two personsand on the basis of the facts coming to light, on scrutinyof seized documents; such as chits, receipts, accounts etc. , thepetitioner was arrested by the Chief Enforcement Officercalicut on 12/07/1987 and on production before thechief Judicial Magistrate, Calicut on 13/07/1987. remanded to the judicial custody till 27/07/1987 but OR anapplication being moved, he was ordered to be released onbail by order dated 1/08/1987, subject to certain conditions such as that he was not to leave Calicut, and furnishhis address there, and also make himself available for interrgation on ail working days; besides execution of a boad withsolvent sureties. remanded to the judicial custody till 27/07/1987 but OR anapplication being moved, he was ordered to be released onbail by order dated 1/08/1987, subject to certain conditions such as that he was not to leave Calicut, and furnishhis address there, and also make himself available for interrgation on ail working days; besides execution of a boad withsolvent sureties. These conditions were, later on modified andeventually the restriction imposed was that petitioner shall report at the office of the Enforcement Directorate every Monday. The investigation by the Enforcement Directorate continued even hereafter and some other statements resulting infurther disclosures were given by the petitioner. These were,however, retracted by means of a letter addressed on 2 1/08/1987 to the concerned authority. The other personhad also retracted confessional statement and thereafter obtained stay of the proceedings being conducted by the officersof the Enforcement Directorate, on a writ having been filedbefore the Madras High Court. ( 6 ) THE detention order, assailed in this writ petition, waspassed on 16/12/1987, under Section 3 (1) of thecofeposa with the object of preventing the petitioner fromindulging in activities prejudicial to the augmentation ofcountry s foreign exchange resources. The petitioner was served with this order on 31/01/1988, and one of thechallenges to the legality of the order is delay in executionthereof. ( 7 ) IT is contended that the petitioner was meticulouslycomplying with the conditions of bail imposed on him andwas reporting to the officee of the Enforcement Directorateevery Monday as ordered, and inspite of the fact that theorder of detention was passed on 16/12/1987. itwas served only on 31/01/1988, thus involving a longand unreasonable delay in execution of the detention order. which has the effect of vitiating satisfaction of the detainingauthority. The plea is that had there been genuine need forpreventing the petitioner from the alleged prejudicial activitiesthen the detaining authority would have acted with promptitude, bringing a sense of urgency to bear upon the matter. The fact that period of about one month and 15 days wasallowed to lapse in execution of the order of detentionis indicative of the fact that the detaining authority, was notgenuinely satisfied about the necessity for preventive detentionof the petitioner, it is urged. The fact that period of about one month and 15 days wasallowed to lapse in execution of the order of detentionis indicative of the fact that the detaining authority, was notgenuinely satisfied about the necessity for preventive detentionof the petitioner, it is urged. ( 8 ) SHRI Harjinder Singh appearing for the petitioner developed this point by referring to the facts of the case, reiterating that there is no suggestion even that the petitioner wasnot available at the residence or other known places of addressfor being served with the detention order, and that the indications were that he was very much available inasmuch as hecontinued to report to the office of the Directorate everymonday, for there is no complaint about his having not beencomplying with the conditions of the bail, and thus the delayremains unexplained. According to learned counsel, the onlycorollary deducible from this situation is that detention of thepetitioner was not needed, and the order of detention waspassed in mala fide exercise of powers, vested in the concerned authority. He also made reference to judgments of thiscourt, wherein in the absence of proper explanation for thedelay involved, and keeping in view the circumstances of thecase in hand, it was held that any undue or inordinate delayon the part of the detaining authority to have the order executed, would strike at the validity of the order itself. One suchjudgment quoted is by learned Single Judge of this Court incriminal Writ No. 1ll of 1988 : Shri Yogesh Chopra v. Administrator of Delhi and others, decided by H. C. Goel, J. on 19/04/1988 (1) where the delay involved was thatone month and 24 days. On the facts, it was held that thedelay remained unexplained, and that the order of detentionstood vitiated and was thus liable to be quashed. Anotherjudgment, cited, also by the same learned Single Judge, is incriminal Writ No. 16 of 1988 : Shri K. Thomas Vincent (a)Vichu v. Union of India and others, decided on 26/04/1988 (2 ). where also unexplained delay in execution of detention order was held to be a vitiating factor. Anotherjudgment, cited, also by the same learned Single Judge, is incriminal Writ No. 16 of 1988 : Shri K. Thomas Vincent (a)Vichu v. Union of India and others, decided on 26/04/1988 (2 ). where also unexplained delay in execution of detention order was held to be a vitiating factor. ( 9 ) SHRI U. L. Watwani, learned Government Advocate,appearing for the respondents urged, in reply to thisground of attack, by referring to the circumstances detailedin the counter reply filed on behalf of the respondents, andurged that in fact there was no delay as such, and in casethere was any that stood fully explained He invited attention. in this respect, to paragraph 8 of the affidavit, of the. detaining authority himself, Shri K. L. Verma, Joint Secretary inthe Ministry of Finance, filed in reply, and also to the,with reference to ground No. XVI, whereafter controvertingthe contention that there had been any long or unexplaineddelay: it has been stated that after the detention order waspassed on 16/12/1987 at Delhi, the same was forwarded on the same day to the Home Secretary, Governmentof Kerala, to get the same executed and that the Home Secretary, Government of Kerala passed the same on to the policeauthorities, who had to apprehend the detenu, and serve theorder. It is further stated that the detention order passedthrough many hands and ultimately the same was executedon the detenu by the concerned police authority of the areawhere the detenu resides. It is added that since the petitionerknew Malayalam language, the grounds of detention and documents relied upon by the detaining authority, were got translated and served on the detenu in the Malayalam language, andthat this process also consumed time, and thus it could notbe said that there had been any unreasonable and unexplaineddelay in execution of the detention order. Mr. Watwani urgedthat in any case, the delay could not be said to be inordinate. so as to have the effect of vitiating the subjective satisfaction ofthe detaining authority. ( 10 ) IT may be noted here that Shri Harjinder Singh veryfairly conceded that delay by itself could not be treated asfatal, and that his insistence was that the same must be explained. He reiterated that in this case this explanation waswholly lacking, and whatever offered was not enough to repelthe charge of mala fide exercise of powers, with a view tocircumvent the process of law. He reiterated that in this case this explanation waswholly lacking, and whatever offered was not enough to repelthe charge of mala fide exercise of powers, with a view tocircumvent the process of law. This allegation of abuse ofpower has been specifically controverted, by the detainingauthority on affidavit, and it is averred that the detaining authority had passed the detention order after close scrutiny of therecords placed before him and subjectively arrived at the decision to detain the petitioner on the basis of the clinching evidence available with him, that the detention of the petitionerwas necessitated with a view to preventing him from continuingto indulge in activities entailing violation of Foreign Regulationsand other connected laws. ( 11 ) IT may be noted that the delay in passing of the detention order was also urged in the writ petition, to be one of thegrounds, assailing the validity of the detention order, but thatground has obviously not been pursued and pressed becauseof the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, in Rajendra kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1988s. C. 1255 (3 ). Since in this case before the Supreme Court,there was no delay in execution, inasmuch as the order hadbeen served on the detenu there in three days, their Lordshipsdid not advert to this aspect but have overruled as many as fivejudgments of this Court whereby petition had been allowedinter alia on the ground of delay in passing the order of detention. After taking into consideration, the explanation given,as to how the action had proceeded in that case, it was observed that even though there was no explanation for delay between certain intervals covered by the total period taken, it couldnot give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine orthat the grounds were State or illusory or that there was norational connection between the grounds and the impugned orderof detention. It was also emphasised that the court has to investigate whether the casual connection had been broken in thecircumstances of each case, by reference to an earlier Judgmentof the Supreme Court, in Odut Ali Miah v. State of West Bengal; AIR 1974 S. C. 957 (4), where the plea raised on delay,was repelled, and it was held that the test of proximity is nota rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merelyabsolute or obsessive, and there has to be lee-way, dependingthe order of detention. ( 12 ) IT has been held yet in another case by the Supremecourt in Francis Coralie Mullin v. W. C. Khambra and others. (1980) 2 SSC 275 (5); that the time-imperative can never heabsolute or obsessive, and there has to be lee-way, dependingupon the necessities of the case. ( 13 ) THE guiding factor is the test as to whether the actionof the concerned authority smacks of lethargic indifference, orneedless procrastination, or whether there is absolute lack ofsense of urgency verging on near total inaction, and in suchcases there may be scope for the inference that the concernedauthority was not earnest about the need for preventive detention, of the person concerned, and that_the circumstances aresuch, as were indicative of mindless exercise of power. Withall respects to the view taken, in the judgments of this Court,cited before me, I have no hesitation in recording that thesecould not have been intended to be laying down any universalprinciples of mechanical application in all cases; and were essentially based on the facts of each particular case. The proposition that whenever there is delay, the order has to bestruck down, cannot be countenanced as a rule of uniformapplication. The real requirement is that of explanation forsuch a delay. ( 14 ) I have carefully analysed the explanation, given in theaffidavit of the detaining authority, and I find that on the factsof this case, it is not possible to accuse the detaining authorityof any inordinate delay in execution of the detention order. The plea is that the order was passed by the detaining authority located in Delhi and it was transmitted the same day tothe Home Secretary, Kerala State, for having the detentionorder served on the detenu. That had necessarily to passthrough various local and functional jurisdictions, before itcould be served on the other petitioner. The plea is that the order was passed by the detaining authority located in Delhi and it was transmitted the same day tothe Home Secretary, Kerala State, for having the detentionorder served on the detenu. That had necessarily to passthrough various local and functional jurisdictions, before itcould be served on the other petitioner. I do not find anyelement of unreasonableness in this explanation for the courtcannot be unmindful of the various inter-State. inter-departmental and inter-jurisdictional procedures, which have to becrossed before this order could be served on the detenu athis place of residence in some village, of a district in the Stateof Kerala. ( 15 ) THE fact that he was presumably reporting everymonday in the office of the Enforcement Directorate would bewholly inconsequential as the order was to be executed by thepolice authorities of the place at his residence. ( 16 ) THE plea that some time was also spent in having thetranslation of the grounds of detention, as well as the accompanying documents in Malayalam, is an added explanation andcannot be rejected outright, as being without substance. ( 17 ) IN the cases referred to by the learned counsel for thepetitioner; in one case viz. Shri Yogesh Chopra (supra), thedelay of one month and 24 days was held to be fatal for thereasons that the detaining authority was the Administrator ofthe Union Territory of Delhi, and the petitioner s place ofresidence as well as business was also in Delhi, and there wasdefinite material to show that during that period the petitionerhad attended the court of a Metropolitan Magistrate, atleastfour times during the month of February, 1988 itself, and itwas in this setting of facts that it was held that the fact of thepetitioner there being available at his residence, as well as placeof work, during the entire period from 8/01/1988 to 1/03/1988, would materially effect the genuineness of thesubjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, for preventivedetention. ( 18 ) AS against this, in the present case, as already noted. the explanation in the reply affidavit of the detaining authority,is that no time was wasted in despatching the order of detention because it was sent on the same day to the Home Secretary, State of Kerala and that the execution of the same tooktime as it had to pass through various hands, before and afterbeing entrusted to the police authorities. the explanation in the reply affidavit of the detaining authority,is that no time was wasted in despatching the order of detention because it was sent on the same day to the Home Secretary, State of Kerala and that the execution of the same tooktime as it had to pass through various hands, before and afterbeing entrusted to the police authorities. The inbuilt limitations of the situation cannot be lost sight of and authoritiesaccused of remissness or lapses, by applying mathematic formulae of counting the days, obvious of the factors involved:such as seat of the detaining authority being in Delhi, whereasthe detention order had to be served through the local policeauthorities, which in this case happened to be some remotevillage in the State of Kerala. ( 19 ) THE ratio of the other case, referred to by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner in Criminal Writ No. 16 of 1988 :shri K. Thomas Vincent @ Vichu v. Union of India and others,is also not obviously applicable, because the delay there wasfive months and three weeks, and there were factors to indicate long intervals, when the concerned authorities at each stagehad been inactive or betrayed lack of proper diligence or senseof urgency. The. Supreme Court s authority referred to in thecase of Shri Yogesh Chopra (supra) also proceeded on thefacts of that case where there was a delay of 2-1/2 months indetaining the petitioner, pursuant to the detention order andthe case proceeded on the facts of that case as there was totallack of explanation. It is pertinent to note that in that casealso the detenu was local resident of the same place where theseat of the detaining authority was. ( 20 ) CONSIDERING the totality of the circumstances, as explained in the reply affidavit in this case, I am of the considered view that present is not the case where period of onemonth and 15 days in all, including the time taken in transit,and also having the translation of the grounds of detention andthe accompanying documents being done; can be said to constitute such element of unexplained or undue delay, which wouldhave the effect of vitiating the detention order. The ground ofdelay in execution of the detention order, therefore, cannotprevail in the facts and circumstances of the. present case, andthe contention based thereon is thus rejected. The ground ofdelay in execution of the detention order, therefore, cannotprevail in the facts and circumstances of the. present case, andthe contention based thereon is thus rejected. ( 21 ) ANOTHER ground of challenge pressed strenuously is thatthe Advisory Board declined request of the petitioner for asitting in some place in Kerala, made by means of a letter,sent personally, as well as through a lawyer, for the reasonthat the petitioner was an illiterate person, and unfamiliar withany language except Malyalam, and had thus expressed hishandicap in the representation sent to the Advisory Board andfurther pleaded that he was a poor person and not in a position to afford to bring his witnesses, all the way from Keralato Delhi, for production before the Advisory Board and thatthe hearing may be held at Trivendrum or at some convenientplace in the State of Kerala. Mr. Harjinder Singh argued thatdespite this request, the Advisory Board went ahead with the sitting on the scheduled date, and that the counter reply nowfiled on behalf of the respondents reveals that this requestdid not find favour with the Advisory Board and the representation of the petitioner was rejected in absentia thereby depriving him of an opportunity to effectively represent beforethe Advisory Board. ( 22 ) THE whole thrust of arguments of the learned conuselis that proceedings of the Advisory Board stand vitiated as anelement of arbitrariness had crept there and were bereft offairness of procedure. It is argued that recommendation ofof the Advisory Board, being a very relevant consideration forthe Appropriate Government, for the confirmation of the detention order, and this report having been given without affording full opportunity to the. detenu of presenting his defence. including evidence in rebuttal, the confirmation order standsvitiated, rendering the continued detention of the petitionerunsustainable. ( 23 ) A reference has been made, with great vehemence, tothe dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case ofa. K. Roy v. Union of India and another, AIR 1982 S. C. 710 (6), wherein guiding principles were laid down in connection with the proceedings of an Advisory Board. ( 23 ) A reference has been made, with great vehemence, tothe dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case ofa. K. Roy v. Union of India and another, AIR 1982 S. C. 710 (6), wherein guiding principles were laid down in connection with the proceedings of an Advisory Board. The learnedcounsel pointed out that one of the important rights recognisedby the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in that casewas that the detenu may offer oral and documentary evidencebefore the Advisory Board in order to rebut the allegationswhich are made against him, as it was pointed out that neitherthe Constitution nor the relevant Statutes dealing with preventive detention, contained any provisions denying to the detenuthe right to present his own evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him, and that the proceedings of the Advisory Board should be so structured as to ensure reasonableness of procedure. ( 24 ) DEVELOPING his arguments, based on the aforesaid guidelines, Mr. Harjinder Singh made reference firstly to the representation dated 21/03/1988 (Annexure J) addressedto the Chairman, COFEPOSA Advisory Board, Delhi Highcourt, New Delhi by Mr. K. M. Suresh Chandran, Advocate,on behalf of the detenu, requesting that the Board meetingshould be held somewhere in Kerala so that the detenu canbring his witnesses and lead evidence in rebuttal to the chargeslevelled against him, and also to a translated copy of a representation dated 23/03/1988 (Annexure K) sent tothe Advisory Board by the. petitioner himself, reiterating thesame request. He also indicated the names of the witnesses hewished to examine stating that they were residents of a placein district Malappuram. Kerala State and that they were similarly placed as the petitioner, namely, not conversant with anylanguage other than Malayalam, and that apart from the difficulty, due to lack of financial resources, for the detenu to bringthem to Delhi for examination before the Advisory Board; evenotherwise also they being not conversant with any language besides Malayalam suffer from the handicap of lack of communication. and for that reason themeeting was necessary to be heldin Kerala so as to enable the petitione. r to make an effectiverepresentation before the Advisory Board. and for that reason themeeting was necessary to be heldin Kerala so as to enable the petitione. r to make an effectiverepresentation before the Advisory Board. The learned counsel,therefore, argued that the failure on the part of the Advisoryboard, as revealed from the counter reply, to accede to thisrequest, and having concluded the proceedings, and finalise thereport, without the petitioner having been able to avail of theopportunity, would have the effect of rendering Advisory Board sreport vitiated and thus continued detention of the petitionerwas liable to be revoked. ( 25 ) MR. U. L. Watwani, Advocate, appearing for the respondents, centered this plea by contending that there was noprovision in the COFEPOSA or in the Constitution, whichconferred any right on the detenu to seek shifting of the venueof the Advisory Boards meeting or to insist that its proceedingsbe held at a place desired by him, or on the territory of hischoice, and as such there was no infirmity in the proceedingsconducted by the Advisory Board, which can vitiate the confirmation of the. detention order or render illegal the continueddetention of the petitioners thereunder. ( 26 ) MR. Watwani also pointed out that the date of hearingwas well within the knowledge of the petitioner, as is indicatedfrom his laywers letter dated 21/03/1988 because itcontains a reference to the date fixed for meeting, namely, 5/04/1988 and that this letter clearly states that the detenuhad been informed of the Advisory Board s meeting fixed for 5/04/1988. The learned counsel also submitted that thedocuments sought for by the detenu in his letter dated 21 stmarch, 1988 had already been supplied to him on 16/03/1988 as mentioned in the counter reply and also corroborated by letter dated 14/03/1988 (Annexure 1), addressedby the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Governmentof Indila. Madras to the detenu enclosing copies of the documents as requested by him vide his letter dated 7/03/1988 addressed to the Ministry. The copy of the memorandum dated 7/03/1988 (Annexure H) is also on record,which has been filed by the detenu himself, and while conveying the rejection of his representation by the detaining authority. he was informed that in so far as the prayer for supply ofdocuments was concerned; the Enforcement Directorate wasbeing directed to provide to him the available documents, andthat it was pursuant to this that the copies of documents wereforwarded to him, and received by him on 16/03/1988. Mr. he was informed that in so far as the prayer for supply ofdocuments was concerned; the Enforcement Directorate wasbeing directed to provide to him the available documents, andthat it was pursuant to this that the copies of documents wereforwarded to him, and received by him on 16/03/1988. Mr. Watwani argued that inspite of having received them on 16/03/1988 the detenu had falsely complained in hisletter dated 23/03/1988 addressed to the Advisoryboard that he had not been supplied copies of the documentsrequested for by him. The learned counsel pleaded that therewas no requirement for the Advisory Board to go to the placeof detenu s home State and that it was for the Advisory Boardto regulate its procedure particularly when it is comprised ofthree sitting or retired Judges, headed by a sitting Judge ofdelhi High Court, and the detenu could not expect all of themto proceed to Kerala to accede to his request for a sittingthere. ( 27 ) I have given earnest consideration to the respective contentions in this regard. I am afraid, it is not possible to subscribe to the arguments setforth by the learned counsel for thepetitioner. It is to be noted that no such requirement, assought to be made out by the learned counsel, can be speltout from the wording of Article 22 (5) of Constitution of India. It does ensure right of an effective representation before all theconcerned authorities, including the Advisory Board, but thefact remains that the Advisory Boards have been left free toregulate their own procedure. This position has been recognisedby the Supreme Court in a very recent judgment reported asharbans Lal v. M. L. Wadhawan and others. AIR 1987 S. C. 217 (7) whereby taking note of the dictum of the Supreme Courtin A. K. Roy s case (supra), recognising the right of a detenuto lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegations against him, before the Advisory Board, it was emphasised that it is obligatory upon the detenu to keep his witnesses ready for examination at the appointed time. It was specifically observed: "the law recognises a right in the Advisory Board toregulate its own procedure within the constraints ofthe Constitution and the Statute and this procedureis referable to the time limit within which the Advisory Board must complete its enquiry. It was specifically observed: "the law recognises a right in the Advisory Board toregulate its own procedure within the constraints ofthe Constitution and the Statute and this procedureis referable to the time limit within which the Advisory Board must complete its enquiry. " ( 28 ) IN the leading authority in A. K. Roy s case (supra),aswell as in this latter judgment, the only right granted to thedetenu. in so far as the proceedings before the Advisoryboard are concerned, is that of proper representation, rightof cross-examination and the right to present his evidence inrebuttal, but there is a clear and unambiguous acknowledgmentof the constraint of time to which the Advisory Board s proceedings are subjected, inasmuch as under section 8 (a) ofcofeposa, the Advisory Board is required to forward itsopinion to the Appropriate Government, as to whether therewas, or not, sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned and this report the Advisory Board is obliged to submitwithin 11 weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. In A. K. Roy s case, where certain rights which wereavailable to the detenu, qua the proceedings betore the Advisory Board were spelt out including the right to examine witnesses, it was stressed that, "if the detenu desires to examineany witnesses, he shall have to keep them present at the appointedtime and no obligation be caste on the Advisory Board tosummon them". It was further pointed out by their Lordships: "the Advisory Board, like any other Tribunal, is freeto regulate its own procedure within the constraintsof the Constitution and the statute. It would beopen to it, in the exercise of that power to limitthe time within which the detenu must competehis evidence. " ( 29 ) IT was also observed in this case that the detenu cannot insist as a matter of right for an adjournment and the Advisory Board would be justified in a given case to close thecase. if the. detenu does not have his evidence ready. It hasbeen emphasised at more than one place in the said judgmentthat incase the detenu wants to examine any evidence in rebuttal he has to keep his witnesses ready, and produce at his ownresponsibility before the Advisory Board, and that he canneither seek an adjournment for this purpose nor insist thatthe Board summon the witnesses named or cited by him. It hasbeen emphasised at more than one place in the said judgmentthat incase the detenu wants to examine any evidence in rebuttal he has to keep his witnesses ready, and produce at his ownresponsibility before the Advisory Board, and that he canneither seek an adjournment for this purpose nor insist thatthe Board summon the witnesses named or cited by him. ( 30 ) IT is thus clear that although detenu s rights of a reallyeffective representation before the Advisory Board, includingthe right of cross-examination of witnesses as well as right ofevidence in rebuttal and right to assistance by friend duringhearing, and even by a legal practitioner, in case the department takes aid of a lawyer during proceedings before the Advisory Board, is recognised, but nevertheless the freedom toregulate its procedure has been left entirely to the Advisoryboard. It has been rather acknowledged that the Advisoryboard, like other Tribunals is free "to regulate its own procedure" (emphasis supplied ). ( 31 ) THE judgment in Harbans Lal s case (supra) furtherrecognises the fact that the Advisory Board has to work within a limited time frame-work inasmuch as the report is to besubmitted to the appropriate government within II weeks ofthe date of detention, and in that context full freedom in thematter of regulation of procedure has to be left to the Advisoryboard. ( 32 ) THERE can be no gainsaying the fact that the placewhere the Tribunal or Board holds its sitting is a matter ofprocedure for the said Tribunal or Board. Consequently, noone including the detenu, in the case of a hearing before theadvisory Board, can claim or insist as of right that the Advisory Board hold its sitting at the place of his choice. In thefacts of this case, it is clear that the detenu had the information about the date of hearing before the Advisory Board wellin advance so that he could have time even to contact alawyer, and get a representation forwarded to the Advisoryboard. In given cases, detenu s rights to have assistance evenof a legal practitioner has been recognised and once the petitioner had a lawyer to guide or assist him, then his plea thathe or his witnesses were not conversant with any language otherthan Malayalam, is without any substance, and it cannot nowbe urged by him that the Advisory Board proceedings stoodvitiated by its refusal to grant him his request for a meetir. . . in the State of Kerala. ( 33 ) THE counter reply indicates that the Advisory Boardhad addressed itself fully to this request and did not find ittenable and after rejecting the same, and after taking note ofthe fact that in spite of notice of hearing, the detenu had chosennot to present himself before the Board, gave its report. It isalso mentioned in the counter reply, on the basis of record ofproceedings forwarded by the Advisory Board, that the Boardhad informed the detenu that he could take the assistance ofhis friends and lawyer at the time of hearing. ( 34 ) I, therefore, do not find any case made out for entertaining this ground of attack on the validity of the detentionorder or continued detention of the petitioner. ( 35 ) ANOTHER point very strenuously urged by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner, and rather taken up as the firstpoint, is that all the relevant material had not been placedbefore the detaining authority, and that this by itself detractedfrom the subjective satisfaction of the said authority: thus vitiating the validity of the detention order. The material to whichreference was made in this connection was the petition formodification of the terms and conditions of the bail moved bythe petitioner, subsequent to the order of bail passed in thefirst instance, and the modifications ordered thereon. Thelearned counsel conceded that the fact that the petitioner hadbeen arrested, was remanded to judicial custody, and had beenallowed bail as also the fact that he was put on certain termsand conditions while granting bail, were all placed before thedetaining authority, as also the fact of his retraction of hisstatemeat, made to the Custom authorities but still contendedthat the subsequent modifications of the bail order, were alsovery relevant material and that failure to place the same before the detaining authority would vitiate the detention order. He further laid stress on the point that these modifications weregranted by the concerned Court, without any opposition fromthe sponsoring authority and that this by itself was a very pertinent factor to have been taken into consideration by the detaining authority, and the inference cannot be ruled out thathad it been placed before the detaining authority, he wouldhave come to the conclusion that preventive detention of thepetitioner was not necessary. ( 36 ) THE learned counsel referred to number of judgmentsin support of his contention that the bail order or subsequentmodifications issued by the court to the original order, wererelevant material, required to be placed before the detainingauthority. I do not find it necessary to refer to them in detailbecause of the controversy now having been put at rest, by ajudgment of the Supreme Court in case Haridas Amarchandshah of Bombay v. K. L. Verma and others, decided on 9/12/1988, reported in Judgment Today 1988 (4) S. C. 632 (8), where it has been specifically held that in cases ofpreventive detention of a person allegedly indulging in Hawalabusiness, the failure to place before the detaining authoritythe application for variation of bail, and order of the magistrate modifying the terms and conditions of bail would not. in any manner, vitiate the detention. It has been observed bytheir Lordships : "the detention was to prevent the detenu from indulgingin Hawala business i. e. making various paymentsto various persons in this country on receivinginstructions from Rafiq from Dubai. The application for variation of condition of bail and theorder passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate varying the condition of bail is. in our opinion, not avital and material document inasmuch as the granting of bail by the Magistrate enabled the detenuto come out and carrying on his business activitiesas before. Condition imposed by the Magistratedirecting the detenu to appear before the office ofthe Enforcement Department every day between11 a. m. to 2 p. m. has been varied to the extentthat "the accused to attend Enforcement Department as and when required. The condition imposedby the Magistrate has no relation to the activitiescarried on by the detenu and as such the Highcourt after considering all the circumstance, heldthat the order varying the condition of bail wasnot a relevant document and failure to produce thedocument before the detaining authority before arriving at his subjective satisfaction had not vitiatedthe order. We agree with the same. " ( 37 ) THESE observations clinch the arguments against thepetitioner and I do not feel called upon to notice the earlierjudgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitionerbecause in the present case, like in the above cited case. thedetenu is accused of indulging in activities of making Hawalapayments, and thus the case is identical to the one before thesupreme Court. This ground, therefore, is also of no availto the petitioner. thedetenu is accused of indulging in activities of making Hawalapayments, and thus the case is identical to the one before thesupreme Court. This ground, therefore, is also of no availto the petitioner. ( 38 ) NO other ground was pressed at the time of hearingthough there was some attempt to assail the continued detention on the contention that there was long and unreasonabledelay in consideration of the representation of the detenu bythe detaining authority as well as by the Central Government. ( 39 ) HOWEVER, on a reference to the counter reply, filed bythe detaining authority: it is noted that there is a complete explanation, which is fully satisfying, and it, cannot he said onthe facts of this case that there has been any delay in disposalof the representation cither by the detaining authority or thecentral Government. In so far as the detaining authority isconcerned, it is stated on affidavit, that the representationdated 22/02/1988 addressed to the detaining authority was received in the COFEPOSA unit of the Ministry offinance, on 25/02/1988 and that some of the pointsraised in the representation required comments from the Directorate of Enforcement and so it was forwarded to the saiddirectorate on the same day and that it was sent to the Madrasoffice of the Enforcement Directorate on 26/02/1988by speed post and it was received there on 29/02/1988. The comments were sent by Madras office also by speed post. on 1/03/1988, and the same were. sent by the Directorof Enforcement to the Ministry on 3/03/1988. Thesewere placed before the detaining authority on the same day,namely, 3/03/1988. It is specifically averred that 4th, 5thand 6/03/1988 were public holidays, therefore, the detaining authority considered the representation on 7/03/1988 and passed the order of rejection on the. same day, andcommunicated the same by means of memorandum to thepetitioner on that day itself. ( 40 ) THERE is thus no delay at any point of time or stageby the detaining authority in consideration or disposal of therepresentation of the detenu. ( 41 ) SIMILARLY, the representation dated 8/03/1988 addressed to the Central Government, had been dealt with veryexpeditiously inasmuch as it is stated to have been receivedin the COFEPOSA unit on 17/03/1988 and for thereason that some clarifications were required from the sponsoring authority, it was sent to Directorate of Enforcement forcomments on that very day i. e. 17/03/1988 and thatcomments were received back on 22/03/1988. Thecounter reply further discloses that the file containing the representation the comments of sponsoring authority as well asother material was forwarded to the Finance Minister on thatvery day through the Minister of State for Revenue and thelatter forwarded the file with his comments to the former alsoon the same day. The order, rejecting the representation, afterdue consideration, was passed by the Finance Minister on 3 1/03/1988. It is explained that the Finance Minister was ontour on 23rd, 26th, 27th and 28/03/1988. Thus the onlyperiod, during the interval from 22/03/1988 to 31stmarch. 1988, thatt he was in Delhi was of four days; namely. 24th, 25th, 29th and 30/03/1988 and that Parliamentwas in session during those days and the Finance Minister was busy particularly in connection with the budget and other important parliamentary work and so could attend to the representation only on 31/03/1988. ( 42 ) ON the facts and circumstances of this case when theparliament was in session, and the Finance Minister is statedto have been busy in connection with budget and other parliamentary work, period of four days taken, cannot be said byany stretch of reasoning, to be unreasonable. It has alreadybeen noticed, while dealing with the contention of the petitioner regarding delay in execution of the detention order, thatdelay by itself is not fatal, and that the only consideration isthe explanation or want thereof. The courts have also tobear in mind that the time factor cannot be reduced to mechanical or mathematical formula, divorced from the facts of agiven case or the constraint of time or pressure and demandsof other official work, under which a given authority or functionarywas operating at a relevant time. ( 43 ) THE memorandum conveying rejection of the representation was issued on 4/04/1988 and again there is explanation to the effect that 1st, 2nd, and 3/04/1988 werepublic holidays. There is thus no delay atall in the facts andcircumstances of this case in the disposal of the representationof the petitioner either by the detaming authority or the Central Government. ( 44 ) NO other point remains for consideration nor any urged,it is, therefore, a case where rule is to be discharged and thewrit petition dismissed. It is ordered accordingly. ( 45 ) NO order as to costs.