JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.- This R. S. A. arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur and Una, Camp at Una, dated May 24, 1980. 2. The facts in brief are that the respondent Smt. Roshni Devi in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff’), filed a suit against the appellants Brahma Nand and his wife Seat. Brahami Devi (hereinafter referred to as the defendant Nos. 1 and T respectively) for possession of 7-17 kanals of land situate in village Dumkhar, Tappa Bhanet, Tehsil Una. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are sister and brother to each other and the plaintiff had inherited this suit land as her l/5th share on the death of her father Bansi Dhar sometime in the year 1956. It may be stated that at that time due to mistake of revenue officials, her l/5th share had been worked out to 5.7 kanals. The plaintiff then vide a registered sale-deed dated December 14, 1965, sold this 5.7 kanals of her share in the land in favour of defendant No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 500. On the same date a contemporaneous document was executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff whereby he undertook that he or his descendants would not dissipate or alienate this land but would go on benefiting therefrom from generation to generation as was desired by the plaintiff vendor and that in case he acted in violation of this condition, the plaintiff vendor would be entitled to purchase back this land on payment of Rs. 500. Defendant No. 1 vide a gift deed, the mutation whereof was attested on June 6, 1973, alienated this land of 5,7 kanals which he had purchased from the plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 2. The plaintiff then through the instant- suit challenged this alienation on the basis of the agreement dated December 14, 1965 on the ground that since it violated the stipulation regarding non-alienation, the plaintiff was entitled to get back this land on payment of Rs. 500. This plea of the plaintiff found favour with the trial Court and the said court vide judgment dated December 31, 1976, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 500. This plea of the plaintiff found favour with the trial Court and the said court vide judgment dated December 31, 1976, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Strangely enough, however, although the plaintiff in the suit had clearly stated that the sale was executed by her in favour of defendant No. 1 for a consideration of Rs, 500 which she was ready to pay on the rescission of the sale in favour of defendant No. 1 and the gift by him in favour of defendant No. 2, but the trial Court held that even this amount was not payable, The matter was then taken up in appeal before the District Judge who vide the impugned judgment, dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree of the trial Court with the modification that the plaintiff would get decree for possession of the land in dispute against both the defendants on payment of Rs. 500 to defendant No, 1 which was ordered to be deposited within three months. 3. The learned Counsel for defendants No. 1 and 2 in this appeal before me has assailed the findings of both the courts below and contended that since there was an out right sale by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1, the same had become irrevocable and that the contemporaneous agreement which purported to have been executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff whereby he undertook not to alienate this land in any manner was void and of no consequence as such an agreement was prohibited by the provisions of section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter called as the Act). 4. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand has contended that this type of condition would have been invalid had it been incorporated in the body of the sale-deed itself but since the defendant No. 1 had entered into an independent agreement with the plaintiff immediately after the execution of the sale deed in his favour, by which he voluntarily agreed to the restriction being imposed on his right to transfer this land in any manner, the agreement cannot be said to be void. 5. The sale-deed by which the plaintiff alienated 5.7 kanals of land in favour of defendant No. 1 is on record as Ex. D-1. 5. The sale-deed by which the plaintiff alienated 5.7 kanals of land in favour of defendant No. 1 is on record as Ex. D-1. The agreement which is also of the same date as that of the sale-deed and which forms the basis of the suit of the plaintiff, is Ex. P-l and since the whole controversy centres round this document, it would be put proper to produce in its entirety in Hindi script although it is in Urdu and strangely enough both the Courts below have failed to get its transliteration in Hindi placed on record which they were bound to do and which is as follows: — 1[* * *]. 1. Not Printed here. 6. It is thus clear that the contents of this document purport to convey that defendant No. 1 had purchased the suit land from his sister [he plaintiff, on the undertaking that he during his life or his descendants would not have any right to dissipate or alienate this land but rather always benefit therefrom from generation to generation as desired by his sister the vendor and, therefore, he was giving an undertaking that he would not in any manner dissipate this land and in case he did so the plaintiff would have the right to revoke the sale in his favour on payment of Rs 500 to him. Now the question is whether it was permissible for the plaintiff to have obtained this type of document from the defendant No 1 and thus she could revoke the sale she made in his favour on its basis on his transferring the land m favour of defendant No. 2 by way of gift which was subject-matter of sale? I feel that feel answer to this poser should be in the negative. This document Ex. I feel that feel answer to this poser should be in the negative. This document Ex. P.I suffers from various legal infirmities- in the first place the defendant No. 1 vide its terms had undertaken not to dissipate or fritter away this land (the lower Court has also used the latter term) which translation approximates to the words khurdburd repeatedly used therein, and in my opinion, this term khurdburd, dissipation or frittering away does not have the legal connotation of alienation alone but also includes other acts of the vendee such as acts of waste thereon so as to minimise its value or utility Secondly, as regards the alienation the prohibition therein is absolute that is to say, that not only the defendant no. 1 was prohibited from alienating it in any manner during his life time but this prohibition extended even to his descendants as well as it was to be enjoyed exclusively by defendant No. 1 or his descendants from generation to generation and in case it was alienated in any manner the plaintiff reserved the right to revoke such a sale on payment of Rs 500. Once the document is construed in this manner, I have no doubt in my mind that the same is void under law since it is in complete violation of the provisions of section 10 of the Act which reads as under:— "Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him...................." 7. It is a trite law that once a sale is complete it clothes the vendee with the beneficial ownership of property and a right to transfer or alienate is incidental to and inseparable from such a right and any absolute restraint on such right is repugnant to the concept of sale and this type of agreement, in my opinion, is forbidden by the provisions of section 10 of the Act. 8. 8. I feel that this type of agreement is also hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which lays down that the consideration of or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law. 9. Now in the instant case, the document in question places a complete embargo upon defendant No. 1 not only regarding alienation but also even to commit any act of waste so as to adversely affect its value or utility. This object of the agreement is as such, if not strictly forbidden by the provisions of section 10 of the Act, then atleast is of such a nature that if permitted, it would entirely defeat the provisions of this section and thus the document is void ab initio. 9-A. It may also be mentioned that the contract of sale by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 (Ex. D-l) is a valid document duly registered whereas the plaintiff now wants to revoke the same on the basis of an unregistered agreement and this, in my opinion, is prohibited by the proviso to section 92 of the Evidence Act. It has been so held in Madanmohan Jena and others v. Srinath Samal and others, AIR 1973 Orissa 22, wherein it has been observed : "A contract reduced to writing and registered, either voluntarily or as required by Jaw, can be modified or rescinded only by a registered instrument and no evidence of subsequent oral agreement to modify or rescind the contract is permissible," The bar of estoppel or waiver in such a situation also does not fall on the way of defendant No. 1 to challenge the validity of such a document as it is in violation of specific provisions of law contained in section 10 of the Act and the agreement in question is, therefore, vitiated on account of its being an illegal transaction. 10. 10. Once this document is held as invalid it automatically follows that the plaintiff had no right to institute the suit on the basis thereof so as to revoke either the sale made by her in favour of defendant No. 1 or the further alienation by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 by way of gift and the latter transaction inter se the defendants is quite valid. 11. In view of this finding, I accept the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated May 24, 1980 affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court with modification and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs throughout, 4ppeal allowed.