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1988 DIGILAW 80 (ALL)

Gulab Devi v. Gauri Shankar

1988-01-25

A.P.MISRA

body1988
ORDER A.P. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. The present revision is directed as against the order dated 16th Jan. 1985 passed by the VIIth Additional District Judge, Agra decreeing the suit of the plaintiff respondent for recovery of Rs. 4875/- as arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month from 1st Aug. 1976 to 15th April, 1979 and Rs. 590/- as interest on that account at the rate of Rs. 9% and Rs. 30/- as cost of notice and for recovery of mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month from 16th April, 1979 till the actual date of delivery of possession along with interest future and pendente lite at the rate of 9% per annum as payment of requisite court-fee. The plaintiff- respondent filed the aforesaid suit on the grounds that the defendant was tenant of deceased plaintiff Gauri Shankar of a portion of Ahata detailed in the foot of the plaint on a rent of Rs. 150/- per month. The defendant did not pay the rent since Ist Aug. 1976 and thus the amount of Rs. 4875/- became due as arrears of rent. The notice to quit. was also issued to defendant on 14th July, 1978 but the said notice was returned with the collusion of the postman whereby another notice was issued on 3/4th Oct. 1978 which was duly served personally on 10th Oct. 1978. In spite of the said service of notice the defendant did not vacate the premises nor paid the arrears of rent. 2. The defendant contested the suit denying the plaint allegations and pleaded that in the month of April, 1970 the defendant's husband Sri Soanpal took an open Ahata measuring 3 bigha-9 kattha in the eastern corner, three rooms and one Chabutra by the side of sadar gate on monthly rent of Rs. 150/- per month. Thereafter the rent was taken in the year 1973 in the name of Virendra Kumar who remained tenant up to 21-4-75. It is also alleged that on 20-4-1975 the plaintiff agreed to change the tenancy in the name of defendant subject to payment of Rs. 10,000/- in advance which was to be adjusted in the future rent. The said amount was duly paid by the defendant through her husband Soanpal and got the receipt on 22nd April. 1975. It is also alleged that on 20-4-1975 the plaintiff agreed to change the tenancy in the name of defendant subject to payment of Rs. 10,000/- in advance which was to be adjusted in the future rent. The said amount was duly paid by the defendant through her husband Soanpal and got the receipt on 22nd April. 1975. The defendant requested the plaintiff to adjust t he said amount towards rent and in view of the same nothing was due to be paid to the plaintiff up to February, 1982 and thus on the date of the filing of the suit there was no arrears. It is also alleged that the said notice was never received by the defendant besides the said notice being illegal. 3. The trial court allowed the suit as aforesaid and did not accept the contention raised by the defendant in their pleading by holding that the alleged notice was duly served on the defendant and the said notice was valid. There was no advance made by the defendant of Rs. 10,000/- as alleged. The receipt shown was held not to have been proved. It was further recorded that even though there was no allotment order in favour of the defendant but by virtue of S. 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the tenancy was duly regularised. Aggrieved as against the said finding the present revision has been filed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Mainly three contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the applicant firstly that the finding recorded by the trial court regarding regularisation of the tenancy is invalid. In fact, the Judge Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit. In view of Naween Chandra Sharma v. VIth Addl. Dist. and Sessions Judge, AIR 1983 All 116 wherein it has been held that in the absence of allotment the person occupying the accommodation would be unauthorised and any deed of agreement would be void document. 5. The second contention was that the plaintiff had failed to prove the notice terminating the tenancy and also failed to prove the service of notice on defendant and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The third contention raised is that the finding recorded by the trial court that the receipt showing the payment of Rs. 5. The second contention was that the plaintiff had failed to prove the notice terminating the tenancy and also failed to prove the service of notice on defendant and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The third contention raised is that the finding recorded by the trial court that the receipt showing the payment of Rs. 10,000/- is not duly proved, the same is perverse, illegal and liable to be set aside. It is further urged that the defendant has duly proved the said document in view thereof there can be no question of defendant being in arrears of rent and the finding to the contrary recorded by the trial court is liable to he set aside. 6. Coming to the first point I find that in the present case it is not in dispute that deed of agreement between the plaintiff and defendant was executed on 2nd July, 1975 though, in fact, she came in possession of the tenancy from 22nd April, 1975. It is also not in dispute that the Amending U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 came into force on 5th July, 1976 by virtue of which S. 14 of Act No. 13 of 1972 was amended. The question whether a tenancy in the absence of allotment would be unauthorised or not, would not be relevant to be gone into the present case. Since by virtue of the aforesaid Amending Act, the tenancy of the defendant would be deemed to have been regularised. By virtue of S. 14 where the tenant is in occupation of the building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the said Amending Act, he would be deemed to be authorised tenant of the said building. On the admitted facts of this case the defendant was admitted into tenancy by the landlord prior to coming into force of the aforesaid Amending Act, therefore, the defendant would be deemed to be an authorised tenant by virtue of the said section. In view of this I find that the finding recorded by the trial court does not call for any interference. 7. Coming to the second argument that the notice terminating the tenancy has not been proved and there is no service of the said notice on the defendant, I find that the finding recorded by the trial court gives very cogent reason for repelling this contention. 7. Coming to the second argument that the notice terminating the tenancy has not been proved and there is no service of the said notice on the defendant, I find that the finding recorded by the trial court gives very cogent reason for repelling this contention. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the notice which is 56 G has not been proved in this case. I have perused the evidence of P.W. 1 wherein he has specifically stated that the counsel has signed the said notice before him, therefore, under the Evidence Act the said document in terms thereto stands proved. The contention raised by the learned counsel was that in the earlier occasion he was not certain whether it was signed by him or not and therefore, no credibility should be placed on his testimony. The contention is without any force. What was said by the witness was that I do not know English language, he very specifically stated that the counsel signed before him. This should be sufficient compliance of the proof of the document. Thus the contention that the said notice is invalid, is not correct. 8. Finally it has been urged that the service has not been made on the defendant and since notice was sent not on correct address there would be no presumption that the notice would have been received on proper address. In view of this the finding to the contrary is perverse and illegal. 9. In the present case the notice was signed by Smt. Gulab Devi, the applicant herself. In the present case Smt. Gulab Devi herself has not come in the witness box to deny her signature. Coming to the question regarding the wrong address being shown in the notice the finding has been recorded that on the perusal of the plaint it appears that the address of Gulab Devi is written wife of Saonpal resident of Etamadpur, district Agra. No such objection was raised to this extent in the written statement. It is also admitted in her evidence that there is post office in the house of Har Prasad whose daughter is Smt. Gulab Devi. The A.D. shows that her father's name as well as her husband's name both are written on the A.D. therefore. No such objection was raised to this extent in the written statement. It is also admitted in her evidence that there is post office in the house of Har Prasad whose daughter is Smt. Gulab Devi. The A.D. shows that her father's name as well as her husband's name both are written on the A.D. therefore. the finding was rightly recorded that it could not be said that on this address the letter could not reach. Apart from this when the signature of Smt. Gulab Devi is written to be on the A.D. it was her duty to come in the witness box to deny her signature, but she did not come. There is no question of any presumption whether she has received or not once signed the letter. On this count also both the aforesaid two grounds raised by the learned counsel for the applicant are not sustainable. The finding was rightly recorded. Notice was also duly served on Smt. Gulab Devi. Finally the learned counsel for the applicant urged that the payment of Rs. 10,000/- was made by him and since the said payment was made there is no arrear of rent due against the defendant and the finding to the contrary by the trial court is perverse and illegal. Reliance was placed on the statement of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 learned counsel for the applicant states that D.W. 1 Ashok Chand Jain was advised to state that he has typed the said receipts showing that the payment of Rs. 10,000/- was made and that the finding recorded by the court below in this regard is an interpolation which is not sustainable. He further states that the statement of D.W. 2 also shows that the advance of Rs. 10,000/-was made and the finding of the court below to the contrary is perverse. 10. I have perused the statements of the aforesaid two witnesses and looked into the circumstances of the case. I find that the finding recorded by the court below is perfectly valid on the facts of the present case. It is alleged on the aforesaid receipt which is 69G. alleged to have been signed by Sri Gauri Shankar. Gauri Shankar, the plaintiff denied his signature on the said document. Gauri Shankar was examined as (P.W. 1) and there is no cross examination on this point on behalf of the defendant. It is alleged on the aforesaid receipt which is 69G. alleged to have been signed by Sri Gauri Shankar. Gauri Shankar, the plaintiff denied his signature on the said document. Gauri Shankar was examined as (P.W. 1) and there is no cross examination on this point on behalf of the defendant. In the absence of the cross examination and also in the absence of his denial as well as by not referring the signature to the expert, the finding that the document does not show that any advance of Rs. 10,000/- was made, cannot be said to be perverse or illegal and the same does not call for any interference by this Court. Further circumstance that the rent note was written on 27th July, 1975 which is Paper No. 30A does not mention about the payment of Rs. 10,000/- nor any reasonable explanation has been given by the defendant as to why this mentioning was not made specifically when the rent note was executed. From these circumstances I come to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove that Rs. 10.000/- was advanced by him and the finding to that effect that no such payment was made by the court below does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 11. In the result, I find that the present revision is devoid of any merit and the grounds raised therein do not call for any interference by this Court and the same is accordingly dismissed.