This appeal under Rule 21 of the "Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills District, 1937" is directed against the order of conviction and sentence on the appellants dated 12.8.80 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Paren Sub-Division, Kohima District in G. R. Case No. 14/80 under sections 447/ 427 of Indian Penal Code. On 15.5.80 a complaint was lodged in the Court of Extra Assistant Commissioner, Jalukie by the Forest Beat Officer, Jalukie, Nagaland against the appellants to the effect that the four appellants trespassed into the protected reserve, destroyed the forest products and started cultivation of their own. It is the case of the prosecution that as per agreement between Tribal Council authority and the Government of Nagalattd in J969 the forest department took over the Tribal Council Protected Forest, Jalukie within a defined boundary roughly measuring about 7 (seven) sq. miles. Thereafter, the forest department cleared the jungles and planted coffee sapling, mixed plantation and crop plantations, etc. The case of the prosecution is that these four appellants trespassed into the said land and damaged the crops and coffee plantation and started cultivation of their own. On receipt of the complaint the learned Magistrate, on taking cognizance of the offence under sections 447/427 of the Indian Penal Code, issued process upon the appellants to stand their trial. On appearance of the appellants, the learned Magistrate framed charges against all the accused U/ss. 447/ 427, Indian Penal Code. However, it was noted in the order sheet dated 2.8.80 that when the charges were explained to the accused-app­ellants they pleaded guilty. Yet, the learned Magistrate proceeded with the trial summered the witnesses, examined them and also examined the accused and recorded their statement U/s 313, Criminal Procedure Code. In course of trial as many as four witnesses were examined and after hearing and at the close of the trial, the learned Magistrate having found the appellants guilty U/ss. 447/427, Indian Penal Code, con­victed them under the aforesaid provisions of law and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years on both the counts. This is how the appeal has been preferred in this Court. The appellants have challenged the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence inflicted on them by the learned Magistrate. 2. This is how the appeal has been preferred in this Court. The appellants have challenged the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence inflicted on them by the learned Magistrate. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Public Prosecutor, Nagaland on behalf of the respondent. My attention has been drawn to the impugned judgment and order dated 12. 8. 80 by the learned counsel for the appellants. In that context it is submitted that the learned trial Court didnot consider the evidence on record nor the facts as revealed from the evidence of P.W. 4 but in one sentence disposed of the case holding the accused persons guilty U/ss. 447/427, Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn any attention to the fact that the copies of the impugned judgment and order which were furnished to the appellants are different from that of the order as recorded in the case records dated 12.8.80 in respect of which an affidavit has also filed by the appellants stating the aforesaid fact. I have perused the copy of the judgment and order which is stated to be furnished to the accused-appellants and annexed as Annexure-'2' to this petition, I have myself noticed the discrepancy of both the orders. In this context I would like to say that while the accused persons are entitled to free copy of the judgment it is expected that correct copy of the judgment should be furnished to the accused. But in this case the copy which was furnished to the accused was not a true and correct copy as it appears from the impugned judgment and order dated 12.8.80, as recorded in the order sheet maintained by the Court. 3. Let me enter into the merit of the case. The prosecution examined the Beat Officer, Forest, Shri H. K. Randa, as P.W. 1. In his deposition he has stated that "As per agreement between the Tribal Council authority and the Government of Nagaland in 1969, the forest department took over the Tribal Council protected forest Jalukie." He has further stated that the forest department developed the protec­ted forest by clearing jungles and planting coffee sapling and mixed plantation. In his deposition he has stated that "As per agreement between the Tribal Council authority and the Government of Nagaland in 1969, the forest department took over the Tribal Council protected forest Jalukie." He has further stated that the forest department developed the protec­ted forest by clearing jungles and planting coffee sapling and mixed plantation. He has further stated that in January, 1980 some people from Jalukie town encroached the land, caused damage by cutting valuable trees and also destroyed the virgin forest. In his evidence he has further stated that even now the accused persons are cultivating the encroached land for their own use. In his evidence, though he has deposed about the agreement between the Tribal Council authority and the Government of Nagaland in respect of the land but that was not proved nor the boundary was explained by the P.W. 1 in respect of which the alleged offence was committed by the accused. P.W. 2, Shri M.I. Bora was the Administrative Officer. He has given only a general idea that the forest department was managing the said forest since 1969 immediately after the agreement was executed. He has further stated that some Tribal people were encouraged to encroach the forest land by some neighbouring people. On going through the evidence of P.W. 2, it does not appear that his evidence any way could be of any help to the prosecution to prove the guilt beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellants. P.W. 3 was the Investigating Officer. He has only stated that he investigated the case, arrested the accused and that he found the accused persons in dock were cultivating their own" kheti after they destroyed the forest, 'it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the accused had committed any offence in respect of the protected forest areas. The important witness No. P.W. 4, who was examined by the prosecution is Ex-Gaon Burah of Jalukie Village. He has stated in his evidence that the land was given to the Govern­ment for establishment of Jalukie 'town but not for the reserve; forest. He has also stated that he gave the land to the accused for cultivation. In cross-examination he stated that he was not aware of any agreement and he did not explain the contents of such agreement. He has admitted that he had allowed the accused to cultivate the land for their own cultivation. He has also stated that he gave the land to the accused for cultivation. In cross-examination he stated that he was not aware of any agreement and he did not explain the contents of such agreement. He has admitted that he had allowed the accused to cultivate the land for their own cultivation. P.W. 4 has supported the case of the accused. The accused persons in their examination under section, 313, Criminal Procedure Code have stated that they had been cultivating the-land as allowed to do so by P.W. 4 and while they were cultivating the land they were apprehended by police. 4. Now the main question is as to whether the prosecution could prove the guilt of the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. The* appellants were charged U/ss. 447/427, Indian Penal Code. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the prosecution could not prove even the ingredients of the provisions of law to sustain conviction of the appellants U/ss. 447/427. Indian Penal Code. In the aforesaid context and in summing up the evidence of the witnesses, the learned counsel has further submitted that the prosecution having failed to prove the identity of the property in respect of which the appellants have been alleged to commit the offence of trespass, the question of conviction under both the provisions of law cannot sustain. Reliance is sought to be placed in Jaysree Tea & Industries vs. R. Gogol, as reported in (1982) 1 GLR 107. In the above case the ratio of the decision of Nishlkanta Das vs. State of Assam as reported in 1977 Assam Law Reports 47, as to the proof of essential ingredients of criminal trespass was considered. A bonafide claim was raised by the accused and in the aforesaid context this Court in Nishikanta (supra) held that- "Trespass is a genus. It may be civil trespass or a criminal trespass. Every type of trespass is not criminal trespass. Section 441 I.P.C. does not postulate any every unlawful entry to be criminal trespass. A bonafide claim was raised by the accused and in the aforesaid context this Court in Nishikanta (supra) held that- "Trespass is a genus. It may be civil trespass or a criminal trespass. Every type of trespass is not criminal trespass. Section 441 I.P.C. does not postulate any every unlawful entry to be criminal trespass. The entry must be with the necessary intent envisaged in Sec. 441, I.P.C. The section, contemplates three necessary or essential ingredients :- (1) there must be entry into or upon a property in possession of another; (ii) even if such entry is lawful, it may amount to criminal, trespass, if the person entering there, unlawfully remains upon such property and ; (iii), such entry as aforeseid or unla­wfully remaining as stated above must be with the intent (a) to commit an offence, or (b) to intimidate insult or annoy the person in possession of the property.” It was further held that the claim of the, accused person entering upon the land might even be ill-founded but if the claim is well founded, question of approaching a criminal Court or bringing a case against them does not arise at all. It was further observed that even if the claim is ill-founded in law but he 'acts upon such ill-founded right, he cannot be made liable under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case and from the statement of the accused as recorded under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code read with the evidence of P.W. 4 it appears that the accused persons cultivated the land as allowed by P.W.4. Even if their claim of entering into the land and cultivating the same appear to be ill-founded in law, and if they acted upon such ill-founded right, they cannot be made liable under section 447, Indian Penal Code as decided in Nishikant (supra). That apart, the prosecution could not furnish any material to the Court about the actual area that was treated as protected forest by virtue of the agreement in 1969 as referred to by P.W. 1 in his evidence. No such agreement was produced in Court by the prosecution. Therefore it is very difficult to ascertain the actual area of protected forest as the prosecution claimed. The identify of the land stated to be encroached by the appellants has also not been proved by the prosecution. No such agreement was produced in Court by the prosecution. Therefore it is very difficult to ascertain the actual area of protected forest as the prosecution claimed. The identify of the land stated to be encroached by the appellants has also not been proved by the prosecution. Therefore, it would be difficult to hold that the appellants did commit criminal trespass without disclosing the identity of the land in respect of which each of the accused was stated to have committed trespass. The prosecution having failed to prove the ingredients of the offence U/ss, 447, Indian Penal Code and of the identity of the land in question, the accused persons cannot be held guilty U/S 447, Indian Penal Code. The next question is with regard to offence U/S 427, Indian Penal Code for which all the appellants have been convicted by the trial Court, The offence of mischief imports an act done wilfully and not merely negligently. Mere carelessness is not sufficient to constitute the offence of mischief. Mens rea is an essential ingredients of the offence of mischief and in absence of it, at best a civil liability may arise and, therefore, a person cannot be liable , for criminal prosecution. That apart, the prosecution must show by positive 'evidence that the mischief was caused to such an extent I that the value of which was at Rs. 50/- or mate.. Here in this case, peculiarly enough, the prosecution could not show, that the accused had any mens rea to cause the mischief in respect of which the concerned authority sustained loss of even , Rs, 50/- or more. In absence of cogent evidence, it is difficult to hold the appellants guilty under the aforesaid provisions of law. Therefore, the conviction under this count is also not sustainable and must Be set aside. 5. For the aforesaid reasons j I bold that ,the conviction and, sentence of all the appellants under both the counts namely, U/ss. 447/427, Indian Penal Code be set aside, which I accordingly do, 6. In the result the judgment and order dated 12.8.80 convicting the appellants and sentencing them are set aside. The appellants are acquitted. The appeal is allowed and the. appellants are, dis­charged from their bail bond.