JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order dated 22-2-1986 passed by the Munsif, Pali. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this revision petition are that Panna Lal, decree-holder-petitioner initiated proceedings for execution of a compromise decree entered into between Panna Lal and Ghisoo Lal on 17-12-1980. Ghisoo Lal moved an application in these execution proceedings that the execution proceedings should be dismissed as the compromise decree which was passed by the court on 17-12-1980 was bad on the ground that the court which passed the decree had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass a compromise decree for the sum of Rs. 24,000/-. The learned Munsif disposed of the objection raised by there judgment-debtor respondent by the order under revision and held that in fact the compromise decree, which has been passed by the learned Munsif on 17-12-1980 is bad on the ground that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to grant such a decree. Hence, the present revision petition. 3. Mr. Nagori, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that once the court has passed a compromise decree though that court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass such a decree then too it is not open for the person who enters into the compromise to raise this objection in die execution proceedings. If Ghisoo Lal was not agreeable to the compromise, then there was no need to enter into a compromise. Once he entered into a compromise and the compromise has been submitted before the court and the court has passed a compromise decree in terms of the compromise then it does not lie in his mouth to challenge the competence of the court on the ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the amendment brought about to sub-section (2) of Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code as well as to the amendment made in Order 22, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the amendment brought about to sub-section (2) of Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code as well as to the amendment made in Order 22, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. Learned Counsel submits that in view of the amendment, now even the revisional Court or an Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to set aside a judgment or decree on the ground of the competence of the court regarding pecuniary jurisdiction unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance if the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all case where issues are settled, or before such settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Learned Counsel has also invited my attention to Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan & ors., AIR 1954 S.C. 340 , where in it was observed as under:- "The policy underlying Section 21 and Section 99, Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, is the same namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an Appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." Similarly, learned Counsel has invited my attention to Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 S.C. 199 wherein while dealing with the territorial aspect their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the Competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 the Code of Civil Procedure The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seized of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it." Learned Counsel has also invited my attention to Rooplal v. A.R. Allarakhai, 1961 R.L.W. 676 where in it was observed as under:- "An order recording a compromise is appealable and if the compromise is not lawful within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code the aggrieved party should file an appeal to challenge the validity of the compromise It permitted to challenge in the executing Court." Similarly, in Smt. Pushpa Sharma v. Gopal Lal Rawat a full bench of this court has taken a similar view and it was observed as under:- "So far as the objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction is concerned subsection (2) of Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code clearly lays down that no objection as to the competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by an Appellate or Revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Thus in the facts and circumstances of this case, no objection on the ground of any prejudice to the defendant is sustainable." 4. As against this, Mr. Thus in the facts and circumstances of this case, no objection on the ground of any prejudice to the defendant is sustainable." 4. As against this, Mr. Kewal Chand, learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that by the compromise between the parties no jurisdiction can be conferred upon the court, which lacks jurisdiction to entertain such suit. It is true so far as a general proposition of law is concerned There is no quarrel that a compromise entered between the parties cannot confer any jurisdiction to the court. But it is equally true that when a compromise has been arrived at between the parties then the party entering into the compromise if aggrieved by that compromise should challenge that compromise at the first available opportunity by filing an appeal on the ground that the compromise is bad on the ground of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. It does not lie in the mouth of the party to challenge the same when the execution starts. Thus in view of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as also this Court, it is settled that so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, no judgment or decree can be set aside unless it is shown that there is a complete failure of justice. That is not the case here. Here the learned Munsif has dismissed the objection on the ground that the compromise so entered into between the parties could not have been entered in a court as that court has no pecuniary jurisdiction. This view does not appear to be correct and as such the same deserves to be set aside. 5. In the result, the revision petition is allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Munsif, Pali dated 22-2-1986 is set aside. However, it will be open for the judgment-debtor to raise any other objection, which is available to him in accordance with low. No costs.Petition allowed. *******