Yogesh Sachdeo v. IVth Additional District And Sessions Judge, Varanasi
1988-09-06
R.R.MISRA
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.R. Misra, J. 1. For the payment of the advertisement tax the petitioner, who is the proprietor of "Sajan Theatre, Varanasi" was served with a demand notice dated 13-2-76 by the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi, opposite party no. 2. It appears that the petitioner entered into some correspondence with the Nagar Mahapalika, who insisted that payment of original demand of tax dated 13-2- 1976 has to be made by the petitioner. Accordingly after making the aforesaid payment in the month of March, 1976 the petitioner filed a first appeal on 27-3- 76. Upon hearing of the first appeal, which came up for hearing before the Judge, Small Causes Court, Varanasi, the Nagar Mahapalika opposite party raised a plea that the appeal is barred by time. The said first appellate authority did not agree with the aforesaid preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Nagar Mahapalika-respondent and it by its order dated 31-8-77 held that the appeal of the petitioner-appellant was within time. Aggrieved against the same, the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi filed a second appeal before the District Judge, which has been disposed by him vide his impugned order dated 28-3-1980. Under the said order, the District Judge has taken the view that the first appeal filed by the petitioner was beyond time and the view taken to the contrary by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court was erroneous and, therefore, he set aside the said order dated 31-8-1977. 2. The sole question for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the appeal presented before the first appellate authority was within time. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on the facts of this case, the case of the petitioner is governed by the provisions of section 473 (d) of the said Adhiniyam. To appreciate the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to have a view of the scheme of levy of advertisement tax under the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. 3.
To appreciate the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to have a view of the scheme of levy of advertisement tax under the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. 3. In regard to the advertisement tax the charging section is Section 172 (2) (h) of the said Adhiniyam, which reads as follows : (2) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1) the Mahapalika may for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the following taxes, namely,- (h) a tax on advertisements not being advertisements published in newspapers ; " 4. Thereafter section 192 of the said Adhiniyam sets out the mode of computation of the said tax. It reads as follows : "192. Tax on advertisements.-Where a Mahapalika imposes a tax mentioned in clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 172, every person who erects, exhibits, fixes or retains upon or over any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure any advertisement or who displays any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, in any place whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement which is so erected, exhibited, fixed, retained or displayed to public view, a tax calculated at such rates and in such manner and subject to such exemptions as may be provided by the Act or rules made thereunder :" Section 472 of the said Adhiniyam makes provision regarding perferring of appeals setting out the authority to whom the appeal is to be preferred under sub-clause (1) of Section 472. Section 472 (2) (c) of the said Adhiniyam reads as follows : "(c) in the case of an appeal against any tax in respect of which provision exists under this Act for an objection to be made to the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari against the demand, such objection has previously been made and disposed of ;" 5. Section 473 of the said Adhiniyam further sets out the contingencies as to when a cause of complaint shall be deemed to have accrued. Sub-clause (b) and (d) of SECTION 473, which are relevant for our purposes, reads as follows : "473. Cause of complaint when to be deemed to have accrued.
Section 473 of the said Adhiniyam further sets out the contingencies as to when a cause of complaint shall be deemed to have accrued. Sub-clause (b) and (d) of SECTION 473, which are relevant for our purposes, reads as follows : "473. Cause of complaint when to be deemed to have accrued. For the purposes of SECTION 472, cause of complaint shall be deemed to have accrued as follows, namely.- (b) in the case of an appeal against any tax referred to in clause (c) of subsection (2) of (SECTION 472) on the day when the objection against the tax is disposed of by the authority concerned ; (d) in the case of an appeal against a tax not covered by clause (b) above on the day when payment thereof is demanded or when a bill therefor is served." 6. The submission made by the learned counsel for the assessee-petitioner is that on 13-2-1976 a demand was made, subject to inviting objections from the petitioner. On a question put to the learned counsel for the petitioner by the Court, however, learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any provision in the Adhiniyam, under which an objection against advertisement tax can be filed. In this situation, obviously, sub-clause (b) of Section 473 will not apply. Thus the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that on 13-2-1976 the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi intended to invite objection in respect of the proposed demand of advertisement tax has no legs to stand upon. From a reading of the provision of sub-clause (b) and (d) of Section 473 of the Adhiniyam, it is apparent that if sub-clause (b) of Section 473 does not apply as in the present case, the provision of sub-clause (d) of Section 473 will apply and in such situation limitation for filing the appeal will start running from the date when the payment is demanded or when a bill therefor is served. Admittedly in the present case a demand was raised against the petitioner on 13-2-1976 and under the said demand the assessee-petitioner was required to pay the amount demanded within a week. Therefore, to my mind, there is no error of law involved in the impugned order dated 28-3-1980 passed by the District Judge and the view taken in this regard by the first appellate authority to the contrary is clearly erroneous in law.
Therefore, to my mind, there is no error of law involved in the impugned order dated 28-3-1980 passed by the District Judge and the view taken in this regard by the first appellate authority to the contrary is clearly erroneous in law. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the demand notice dated 30-2-1976 since the petitioner was being repeatedly asked to pay the amount demanded there was a recurring cause of action. I find no force in this contention also raised on behalf of the petitioner. The assessment of advertisement tax is quantified only once and the same has been done in the present case on 13-2-1976. It is a different matter that after the quantification of the aforesaid demand the assessee has been entering into correspondence with the Nagar Mahapalika and every time in reply the Nagar Mahapalika insisted on the payment of the amount of originally demanded. The time consumed by the petitioner in correspondence with the Nagar Mahapalika, after service of the aforesaid demand notice dated 13-2-1976, to my mind, will be of no avail. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Secretary of State v. Kannopalli Jankiramayan, AIR 1914 Madras 534. It has been held in this case that a claim to recover a water cess illegally levied is not a suit to establish a periodically recurring right governed by Article 131, but the cause of action arise on such occasion when the cess is demanded. I fail to understand as to how this decision supports the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, I find that even according to this decision also the cause of action in the present case will arise when the notice of demand dated 13-2-1976 was