N. B. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) HESE two appeals are directed against the common order dated the 17/06/1986 passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol whereby he has disposed of Civil Misc. Application No. 231 of 1981 and Misc. Civil Application No. 158 of 1985. By this order the learned Judge has allowed Civil Misc. Application No. 231 of 1981 (filed by the present respondent) by accepting the award made by the Sole Arbitrator regarding the disputes between the parties arising from two Contracts. Misc. Civil Application No 158 of 1985 (filed by the appellant) urging that the award may be set aside has been dismissed by the learned Judge. Thus it is the composite order over-ruling the objections against the award and the coverting of it into the rule of the Court which is the subject-matter of these two appeals filed by the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (to be hereinafter referred to as the Board) against M/s. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. (to be hereinafter referred to as the Contractors ). ( 2 ) ONE of the contentions taken up by the Board against the acceptance of the award was that it was pronounced beyond limitation period and the Contractors have filed Civil Application No. 1508 of 1987 urging that if necessary this Court may grant extension of time to make and publish the award (vide Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act ). We propose to dispose of both the appeals filed by the Board and also the Civil Application filed by the Contractors by this common judgment. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to the filing of the two Misc. Civil Applications and then to these appeals may first be set out. By two Contracts entered into between the parties the Contractors undertook to provide fabricating laying and jointing 1000 mm. dia steel welded pipeline for a distance of 10. 1 kms. and 7. 4 kms. respectively. The two Contracts entered into by the parties were in Standard Form B-2 of the P. W. D. and they were contracts Nos. B-2/1 and B-2/2 of 1978-79. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the execution of the two Contracts each side alleging that the other had committed breach of the Contracts. 1 kms. and 7. 4 kms. respectively. The two Contracts entered into by the parties were in Standard Form B-2 of the P. W. D. and they were contracts Nos. B-2/1 and B-2/2 of 1978-79. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the execution of the two Contracts each side alleging that the other had committed breach of the Contracts. The two Contracts under which the work was to be carried out contained an arbitration clause being Clause No. 30 in each Contract. The arbitration clauses in both the Contracts were identically worded. This arbitration clause (Clause No. 30) provided that if any disputes enumerated in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (viii) of Clause 30 arose between the parties the same shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator. Since disputes did arise between the parties the Contractors filed Misc. Civil Application No. 231 of 1581 under Secs. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol for appointment of Arbitrator as per Clause 30 of the Contract and for reference of the disputes to the Arbitrator. Thereupon the Court appointed one Shri G. G. Vaidya as an Arbitrator and by his interim decision dated 5/05/1982 Shri Vaidya decided that the disputes (claims) mentioned in paras 10 (g) to 10 (i) of Civil Misc. Application No. 231 of 1981 were not arbitrable as they did not fall within any of the sub-clauses (i) to (viii) of Clause 30 of the Contracts whereas the rest of the disputes (claims) were arbitrable. The Board challenged this decision of the Arbitrator Shri Vaidya by filing Special Civil Application No. 2750 of 1982 before this High Court but this Special Civil Application was dismissed by this Court by its order dated the 16/03/1983 The Board then took the matter to the Supreme Court against the said decision of this Court by filing Special Petition (Civil) No. 9610 of 1983. While the matter was pending before the Supreme Court the parties submitted consent terms before the Court and the proceedings before the Supreme Court were thereupon disposed of in the same terms by an order dated the 30/01/1984 The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and substituted in its place its own order in terms of the compromise submitted by the parties. By the consent terms the parties agreed to appoint Shri M D. Patel. retired Secretary P. W. D Gujarat State and then a sitting member of the Board as the Sole Arbitrator in place of Shri G. G. Vaidya to decide all the disputes between them concerning the works in question. It was also provided that the Board should also put up its counter-claim before this Sole Arbitrator and shall have a right to agitate all points both in fact and in law before the Sole Arbitrator including the question of arbitrability within the meaning of Clause 30 of the Contract. It was also provided in the consent terms that both the parties shall agree to extend time as and when necessary for completion of the arbitration proceedings. Execution by the parties of a formal agreement for arbitration defining the scope of arbitration was also envisaged by the consent terms The Sole Arbitrator Shri M. D. Patel was thereafter approached by letter dated 16/02/1984 addressed to him by the Secretary of the Board to enter upon the reference. A copy of the consent terms placed before the Supreme Court was enclosed with this letter addressed to the Arbitrator. It appears that a formal agreement dated the 31/03/1984 appointing Shri M. D. Patel as Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon and give his award as per the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1940 in respect of various claims of both the parties against each other in respect of both the works covered under the agreements Nos. B-2/1 and B-2/2 subject always to their admissibility under Clause 30 of the Contracts was arrived at between the parties. It appears however that this formal agreement did not bear the signature of anybody on behalf of the Contractors. Be this as it may Shri M. D. Patel entered upon the reference and the Contractors placed before him a statement of their claim under different items or heads totalling up to an amount of Rs. 4 92 20 685 The Board also submitted a statement of counter-claim under different heads aggregating to a total amount of Rs. 26 87 217 The proceedings before the Arbitrator culminated into a lump-sum award of Rs. 57 65 273 in favour of the Contractors. This award is dated the 8/07/1985 and it was on adjudication upon the claim and counter-claim submitted by the parties before the Arbitrator. 26 87 217 The proceedings before the Arbitrator culminated into a lump-sum award of Rs. 57 65 273 in favour of the Contractors. This award is dated the 8/07/1985 and it was on adjudication upon the claim and counter-claim submitted by the parties before the Arbitrator. The award was filed before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S. D) Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol and the Contractors moved the Court in Civil Misc. Application No. 231 of 1981 to make it the Rule of the Court and to pass a decree in terms thereof. On the notice of the filing of the award having been served upon the Board it filed Civil Misc. Application No. 158 of 1985 detailing its objections against the acceptability of the award and urging that the award be set aside. After hearing the parties as regards the objections raised by the Board against the award the learned Judge has rejected the said objections and has made the award the rule of the Court and has ordered that a decree for Rs. 57 65 273 with running interest at the rate of 17% per annum thereon from the date of the application i. e. the 6/08/1981 till the date of the decree as awarded by the Arbitrator and for further interest at the same rate from the date of the decree till realisation of the amount be drawn up against the Board. The judgment of the learned Judge resulting in this order is in challenge before us in the two appeals. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the Board a number of contentions were urged before the learned Judge against the acceptability of the award but Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the appellant-Board has not raised all these contentions before us and we shall deal with only those contentions which have been urged before us. The submissions urged before us by Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the Board may conveniently be divided under four heads viz. (i) Arbitrability issue (ii) Limitation (iii) Award of interest and the rate at which the same is awarded and (iv) Non-application of mind by the Arbitrator. It may be convenient at this stage to reproduce the award. It reads: @@@" AWARD In the matter of Arbitration Act 1940 AND in the matter of1 fabricating laying and jointing 100 mm. dia 10 100 mm. It may be convenient at this stage to reproduce the award. It reads: @@@" AWARD In the matter of Arbitration Act 1940 AND in the matter of1 fabricating laying and jointing 100 mm. dia 10 100 mm. long steel welded pipeline under Bhavnagar Water Supply Scheme based on Shetrunji Dam Agreement No. B-2/1 of 1978-79. AND 2. fabricating laying and jointing 100 mm. dia 7 400 mm. long steel welded pipeline under Bhavnagar Emergency Water Supply Scheme based on Shetrunji Dam Agreement No. B-2/2 of 1978-79. In the matter of consent arrived at between M/s. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Gandhinagar appointing Shri M. D Patel as Sole Arbitrator to arbitrate upon all disputes and claims and counter claims arising from the above works. Claimants: M/s. UNIQUE ERECTORS (GUJARAT) PVT. LTD. a Company registered under the Companies Act 1956 having their registered office at 2nd floor Natraj Chambers Ashram Road Ahmedabad. Versus gujarat WATER SUPPLY and SEWERAGE BOARD having their registered office at Block GH Sector 16 Near Shalimar Cinema Gandhinagar. Whereas M/s Unique erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. Ahmedabad and the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Gandhinagar who are the parties to the contract for both the works above name have appointed me vide their letter dt. 16-2-1984 of Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board as Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon their respective claims counter claims and to give my award in respect of various claims of both parties against each other in respect of both the said works covered under Agreement No. B-2/1 and B-2/2 of 1978-79. Now I M. D. Patel Sole Arbitrator and Chairman of M/s. Gujarat State Construction Corporation Limited and retired Secretary P. W. D. Government of Gujarat Ahmedabad. having taken upon the burden of the reference heard and examined and considered pleadings submitted on behalf of the parties and the documentary and oral evidences produced before me by them as also their oral submission and arguments. having taken upon the burden of the reference heard and examined and considered pleadings submitted on behalf of the parties and the documentary and oral evidences produced before me by them as also their oral submission and arguments. That by consent of the parties the time has been enlarged for publishing the award from time to time and lastly it has been extended upto 31/07/1985 I have also heard on the point of arbitrability of the claims and counter claims as per clauses of the contract agreement and after considering all the above aspects I do hereby make and publish this my final award in writing of all concerning matters referred to me. I hereby award and direct that the respondent M/s. Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board shall pay to the claimants M/s. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. amount of Rs 57 65 273 (Ruppes Fifty seven lacs sixty five thousand and two hundred seventy three only) with interest to be calculated at the rate of 17% per annum (seventeen percentage per annum) in the above sum adjudged by with effect from 6/08/1981 the date on which the application was filed by the claimant for appointment of the arbitrator in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.) at Narol till the date of actual payment or till the date of decree that may be passed by the competent Court of law whichever is earlier in full and final settlement of all claims/counter-claims raised before me in the present reference. Each party will boar its own costs in witness thereof I the said Shri M. D. Patel Sole Arbitrator in the above reference has put my band and seal this Eighth day of July 1985 Signed and sealed and delivered by the within named Shri M. D. Patel. Gandhinagar dt. 8/07/1985 sd/ (M. D. Patel) Sole Arbitrator Chairman, gujarat State Construction Corporation Limited Gandhinagar. @@@ ( 5 ) IT was firstly contended by Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the Board that the Arbitrator has not decided either as a preliminary issue or along with other issues the question of arbitrability of the various disputes between the parties and the award does not show which of the claims have been held by the Arbitrator as arbitrable or non-arbitrable in the light of Clause 30 of the Contracts between the parties. In the submission of Shri A. H. Mehta the award is therefore so unintelligible as to be totally vitiated. In this connection Shri A. H. Mehta drew our attention to the compromise arrived at between the parties and submitted before the Supreme Court in terms whereof the Supreme Court has passed the order dated the 30/01/1984 He laid stress on the fact that by the consent term No. 4 it was specifically provided that the Board had a right to agitate all points both in fact and in law before the Sole Arbitrator as per the terms and conditions of the Contracts including the question of arbitrability within the meaning of Clause 30 of the Contracts Similarly Shri A. H. Mehta pointed out that the formal agreement dated the 31/03/1984 between the parties provided that the Arbitrator should adjudicate upon and give his award in respect of various claims of both the parties against each other for the works covered under the two Contracts Subject always to their admissibility under Clause 30 of the Contract. On reading the consent terms submitted before the Supreme Court as also the formal agreement dated the 31/03/1984 there remains no doubt as to the position that the Arbitrator was required to decide the question about the arbitrability (in the light of Clause 30 (i) to Clause 30 (viii) of the Contracts) of each and every item of the claim and the counter-claim the arbitrability of which may be challenged by the concerned party. At the same time however it is also clear from the consent terms and the formal agreement that they do not require the Arbitrator to decide the dispute of arbitrability wherever raised separately or by way of a preliminary issue. The question is whether in the circumstances of this case it can be said that the Arbitrator has not at all decided the dispute of arbitrability of any item of the claim raised by the Board simply because of the Arbitrator has not disclosed in his award as to whether he had found all the items of the claim arbitrable or simply because he had not specified any particular items as having been fount by him as non-arbitrable and therefore as having been kept by him out of consideration while making the lump-sum award in favour of the Contracts. The question really is whether it should or should not be presumed that the Arbitrator must have considered and decided the dispute regarding arbitrability in respect of each and every item of the claim where the same was challenged before him by the Board. The submission of Shri N. J. Mehta on behalf of the Contractors was that it was to be presumed that the Arbitrator had decided the question of arbitrability in respect of each and every item (where it was challenged) and had either found that all the items were arbitrable or that he had kept out of his consideration those items which were found by him to be non-arbitrable. ( 6 ) BEFORE deciding this question of presumption one way or the other it may be appropriate to dispose of one connected contention raised by Shri A. H. Mehta. Referring to the award it was strenuously urged by Shri A. H. Mehta that it does not anywhere state that the Arbitrator had decided the question of arbitrability of the claims and counter-claims. The relevant para in the award to which Shri A. H. Mehta invited our attention in this connection runs as under:"i have also heard on the point of arbitrability of the claims and counter claims as per clauses of the Contract agreement and after considering all the above aspects I do hereby make and publish this my final award in writing of all concerning matters referred to me. " ( 7 ) IT is true as submitted by Shri A. H. Mehta that the Arbitrator has not specifically stated in the award that he had decided the question of arbitrability. It is true that he has rested content only with saying that he had heard the parties on the point of arbitrability of the claims and counter-claims. But then he has also proceeded further and stated that after considering all the above aspects he was making and publishing his final award of all concerning matters referred to me. The question is whether the language employed by the Arbitrator does not convey and show that he had not merely heard and considered the question of arbitrability but had also decided the same. The question is whether the language employed by the Arbitrator does not convey and show that he had not merely heard and considered the question of arbitrability but had also decided the same. In our view the aforesaid para in the award leaves no room for doubt what soever that the Arbitrator was very much aware of the fact that he was required to decide the question of Arbitrability or to decide the disputes between the parties subject to their admissibility or arbitrability in the light of the provisions of Clause 30 of the Contracts. The Arbitrator has clearly conveyed by the aforesaid recital in the award that bearing in mind all the above aspects (which would undoubtedly include the aspect of arbitrability to which the Arbitrator has made a specific reference) he was making his final award of all concerning matters referred to him. It may be recalled here that the consent terms arrived at between the parties were furnished to the Arbitrator and they left the question of Arbitrability to be decided by him. In fact in the preamble to his award the Arbitrator has specifically referred to the fact that he was appointed as Sole Arbitrator pursuant to the consent terms arrived at between the parties. Thus the Arbitrator who was required to arbitrate on all the disputes including the dispute of arbitrability and who was aware of that fact has stated that he had considered this aspect of the arbitrability and after considering the same he was making his final award. In these circumstances it is impossible to say that the Arbitrator had not decided the question of arbitrability wherever it arose in respect of any of the items simply because he has stated that he had considered the dispute regarding arbitrability but has omitted to state that he had decided the same. Shri A. H. Mehta submitted that the mental process of considering a dispute cannot be equated with the mental process of deciding it. This may be true. But it would not be correct in the face of the aforesaid data to jump to the conclusion that the Arbitrator has not undertaken and completed the process of deciding the dispute. At the most one may say that the Arbitrator had not employed as perfect and precise language as meticulous lawyer would have employed. This may be true. But it would not be correct in the face of the aforesaid data to jump to the conclusion that the Arbitrator has not undertaken and completed the process of deciding the dispute. At the most one may say that the Arbitrator had not employed as perfect and precise language as meticulous lawyer would have employed. It is not possible to say that the Arbitrator had embarked upon an exercise in futility by merely recalling to his mind the submissions made by the parties on the point of arbitrability and had avoided the necessary exercise of deciding the same. Reading the award as a whole we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Shri A. H. Mehta that the Arbitrator may have considered but had not decided the question of arbitrability arising before him. ( 8 ) WE may now proceed to deal with the contention that in fact the Arbitrator had not decided the arbitrability dispute as a preliminary issue or along with merits of the relevant claim. ( 9 ) IT is obvious from the award reproduced above that the Arbitrator has purported to make and publish a final award in writing of all concerning matters referred to me. In other words the Arbitrator has purported to give what is called a de premises award. He also refers to the fact that he had heard (the parties) on the point of arbitrability of the claims and counter-claims as per clauses of the Contracts and considered all the aspects of the matters. Thus the Arbitrator has said that he had considered all the aspects including the aspect of arbitrability of the claims made before him. It is true that he has not specifically and explicitly said that he had decided either by way of a preliminary issue or a final issue as to which items of the claim and counter-claim were found by him to be arbitrable. Another feature to be noted about the award at this stage is that it is a non-speaking award for a lump-sum of Rs. 57 65 273 in favour of the Contractors and against the Board. He has not recorded separate decisions in respect of each and every item of the claim and the counter-claim. Another feature to be noted about the award at this stage is that it is a non-speaking award for a lump-sum of Rs. 57 65 273 in favour of the Contractors and against the Board. He has not recorded separate decisions in respect of each and every item of the claim and the counter-claim. ( 10 ) IT was contended by Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the Board that the consent-terms produced at mark 4/3 and paragraph 4 of the order of the Supreme Court on the said consent-terms produced at mark 414 enjoined upon the Arbitrator to decide in respect of each item of the claim and the counter-claim whether it fell within or outside the scope of Clause 30 of the Contracts and to take cognizance of only those items which fell within the scope of the said clause and to keep out of his consideration those items which fell outside the scope of the said clause. The contention of Shri A. H. Mehta was that the award in this case was vitiated because the Arbitrator had not decided either by way of a preliminary issue or by way of final issue the question of arbitrability of such of the Items of the claim or counterclaim as was challenged. It was submitted by Shri A. H Mehta that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case where the claim made by the Contractors comprised of several items and similarly the counter-claim made by the Board also comprised of several items it was absolutely necessary for the Arbitrator to not only decide but also to record his decision in respect of each and every item whether the same was held by him to be arbitrable or not. The Arbitrator having not adopted this course it was submitted by Shri A H. Mehta the award suffered from the vice of unintelligibility also and should therefore have been rejected by the Court. The Arbitrator having not adopted this course it was submitted by Shri A H. Mehta the award suffered from the vice of unintelligibility also and should therefore have been rejected by the Court. ( 11 ) BEFORE dealing with the aforesaid main contention raised by Shri A. H. Mehta it will be advantageous to clear some legal ground having a bearing on the question as to what approach should be made by the Court towards an award given by an Arbitrator and whether an Arbitrator can make a lump sum award and that too without assigning any reasons for his award even in a case like the present one where a number of items have been put forward by way of claim and counter claim by the parties. It may also be examined as to what is the legal position as regards the question whether the Arbitrator ought to give separate findings on the question of arbitrability of different items of the claim and the counter claim. ( 12 ) SO far as the approach to be made by the Court to the Arbitrators award is concerned it is a very well-settled position that the Court must uphold an award unless it is impossible to do so. This position has been reiterated over and over again in a number of decisions. But it may suffice to quote the following observations of Lord Goddard C. J. in Mediteranean and Eastern Export Co. Ltd. v. Fortress Fabrics Ltd. (1948 (2) All. ER 196) cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Anr. 1987 (4) SCC 497 :" The modern tendency Is in my opinion more especially in commercial arbitration to endeavour to uphold awards of the skilled persons that the parties themselves have selected to decide the questions at issue between them. " ( 13 ) IT is also a well-established position that even in a case where a number of items are placed before the Arbitrator for his decision by way of a claim and a counter-claim the Arbitrator can give a consolidated or a lump-sum award Similar no fault can be found with the award even if it is a non-speaking award i. e. an award in Which the Arbitrator has not articulated his reasons for arriving at the consolidated amount award by him. A reference may be made in this connection to the case of Santa Sila Devi and Anr. v. Dhirendra Nath Sen and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1677 wherein the Supreme Court has laid down:"besides it is obvious that Unless the reference to arbitration specifically 50 requires the arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately. but can deliver a consolidated award. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the Arbitrator on each matter of difference. "it was also observed by the Supreme Court in this case:"since the award now impugned expressly states that it is made de premissis i. e. of and concerning all the matters in dispute referred to the Arbitrator there is a presumption that the award is complete In the circumstances the principle of construction enunciated by Parke. B aptly covers the case and silence of the award as regards the claim for accounting must therefore be taken to be intended as a decision rejecting the claim to that relief. " ( 14 ) IN the above case the Supreme Court has held that when an award is made de premissis the presumption is that the Arbitrator intended to dispose of finally all matters in difference and his award will be held final if by an intendment it can be made so. One of the questions before us will be whether in the present case also where the award is a de premissis award it should not be presumed that the Arbitrator had decided the question of arbitrability even though he might not have recorded an explicit decision on the said question. The point to be noted here is that in the case of a de premissis award the presumption will be that the Arbitrator had intended to dispose of finally all matters in difference and his award will be final. ( 15 ) IN the case of Kanpur Maha Nagar Palika v. M/s. Narain Das 1969 (2) SCC 260 the Arbitrator had made a lump-sum award on the whole case. ( 15 ) IN the case of Kanpur Maha Nagar Palika v. M/s. Narain Das 1969 (2) SCC 260 the Arbitrator had made a lump-sum award on the whole case. It was contended by the Nagar Palika that the claim of the Contractor for money due on account of the work done was governed by Sec. 326 of U. P. Act and not by the period of limitation of three years under the Limitation Act and that if the Arbitrator had decided in favour of the plaintiff it was in contravention of Sec. 326 and amounted to an apparent error. The Supreme Court did not entertain this contention on the ground that the award does not lay down any proposition of law on the question of limitation and does not put any construction on Sec. 326 of the U. P. Act. The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that the Arbitrator should have specifically dealt with the question of limitation. In N. Chellappan v. Kerala State Electricity Board AIR 1975 SC 230 the umpire had referred to the claims made by the Contractor and the arguments of the Kerala State Electricity Board in support of its plea and had then awarded a certain amount without expressly adverting to or deciding the question of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the umpire as Sole Arbitrator was not bound to give a reasoned award and if in passing the award he makes a mistake of law or of fact that is no ground for challenging the validity of the award. It was also held that only when a proposition of law is stated in the award and is made the basis of the award and if that proposition is found to be erroneous the award can be set aside or remitted on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the record. ( 16 ) THERE cannot be any doubt that the limitation contention goes to the very root of the matter and is a jurisdictional contention. Despite this position it emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court that the mere fact that a decision is not explicitly recorded even on such a question would not vitiate the award. ( 16 ) THERE cannot be any doubt that the limitation contention goes to the very root of the matter and is a jurisdictional contention. Despite this position it emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court that the mere fact that a decision is not explicitly recorded even on such a question would not vitiate the award. This is so because presumption in the case of a de premissis award has to be that the Arbitrator has decided all issues referred to him notwithstanding the fact that he has not explicitly recorded his decisions on such issues. ( 17 ) IN principle then there is no reason why in the present case the award should be rejected merely because the Arbitrator has not specifically or separately recorded his decision on the question of arbitrability of the items of claim. The question of arbitrability will as much strike at the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator as the question of limitation would. ( 18 ) IN the present case there is all the more reason why the presumption should be that the Arbitrator has decided the question of arbitrability rather than that he has not decided it. This is so because the award makes it clear that it was very much present to the mind of the Arbitrator that he was required to decide all disputes between the parties including the dispute of arbitrability. Or in other words the award makes it clear that the Arbitrator was alive to the fact that he had to decide the disputes between the parties subject to their arbitrability as per Clause 30 of the Contracts. The matter does not rest here. The Arbitrator has in clear words stated in his award that he had also heard (the parties) on the point of arbitrability of the claims and counter-claims as per the clause of the contracts and after considering all the aspects he was making and publishing his final award in writing of all concerning masters referred to me. ( 19 ) IT is true that if the submission to the Arbitrator itself requires the Arbitrator to decide any particular issue as a preliminary issue or to decide it separately or if the submission requires him to decide each and every claim separately he will be found to do so. ( 19 ) IT is true that if the submission to the Arbitrator itself requires the Arbitrator to decide any particular issue as a preliminary issue or to decide it separately or if the submission requires him to decide each and every claim separately he will be found to do so. But if the submission does not require him to decide any issue as a preliminary issue or to decide it separately as in our case he may not do so and may make a lumpp-sum award. In Union of India v. Jai Narain Misra AIR 1970 SC 753 the Supreme Court has observed:"the Arbitrator is not bound to give an award on each point. He can make his award on the whole case. (See: Gulam Khan v. Mohammad Hassan (1901) ILR 29 Cal. 167 ). An Arbitrator may award one sum generally in respect of all money claims submitted to him unless the submission requires him to award separately on some one or more of them. . . . . . As the final award in favour of the respondent professes to be made concerning all the matters referred to him it must be presumed that making it the Arbitrator has taken into consideration all claims and counter claims. . . . . . . . . We hold that the award is a final and certain determination of all the disputes referred. " ( 20 ) IN our view by analogy the Arbitrator our case having not been required to decide the arbitrability issue as a preliminary issue or separately from other issues his award cannot be found fault with on the ground that he had not decided the issue as a preliminary issue or separately from other issues. . ( 21 ) SHRI N. J. Mehta also drew our attention to the case of M/s. Tarapore and Company v. Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Cochin and Anr. AIR 1984 SC 1072 wherein D. A. Desai J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court has held:"even the question of jurisdiction of an Arbitrator can be the subject matter of a specific reference. AIR 1984 SC 1072 wherein D. A. Desai J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court has held:"even the question of jurisdiction of an Arbitrator can be the subject matter of a specific reference. If the parties agree to refer the specific question whether the dispute raised is covered by the arbitration agreement it becomes a specific question of law even if it involves the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and if it is so a decision of the Arbitrator on specific question referred to him for decision even if it appears to be erroneous to the Court is binding on the parties. " ( 22 ) ON reading the Supreme Court order based on the consent terms arrived at by the parties and the formal agreement between the parties as also earlier background of the Board having been taken to the High Court the preliminary decision of the former Arbitrator. Shri Vaidya about the arbitrability of some of the claims there remains no doubt in our mind that in our case also the parties had also referred to the Arbitrator the specific question whether the claims made before him were arbitrable or not in view of Clause 30 of the Contracts. That this specific question of law impugning on the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator was referred to the Arbitrator for his decision is evident in our case at every stage of the proceedings. It is already seen above that the parties had made their submissions before the Arbitrator relating to the arbitrability of the claims advanced by the Contractors. We have also reached the conclusion as mentioned earlier that the Arbitrator must be presumed to have decided the dispute of arbitrability (wherever it was raised) even though the Arbitrator has not given explicit and claim-wise decisions on the question of arbitrability. This is so because the award in our case is a de premissis award. ( 23 ) HOWEVER Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the Board tried to distinguish the aforesaid Supreme Court case of Acts. Tarapore and Co. ( AIR 1984 SC 1072 ) on the ground that the facts of the said case were vitally different from the facts of our case Now in that case the appellant M/s. Tarapore and Co. Tarapore and Co. ( AIR 1984 SC 1072 ) on the ground that the facts of the said case were vitally different from the facts of our case Now in that case the appellant M/s. Tarapore and Co. made a certain claim against the respondent Cochin Shipyard Ltd. on account of increase in the cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees on the ground that the Contractor was entitled to be compensated by the respondent for the same. By its letter dated the 1/03/1976 M/s. Tarapore and Co. invoked the arbitration clause and by their letter dated the 17/03/1976 the respondent-Cochin Shipyard Ltd. denied the claim for compensation and simultaneously framed three points including their contention that the dispute or claim raised by M/s. Tarapore and Co. was not covered by Clause 40 i. e. the arbitration clause in the Contract between the parties. The appellant M/s. Tarapore and Co. by their letter dated the 19/04/1976 suggested that the proper course would be to refer to the arbitration even the dispute regarding arbitrability as also the merits of the claim for compensation for increase in the cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-how. Thereafter the parties appointed one Shri C. Srinivasa Rao as the Sole Arbitrator and the points/disputes referred by the parties to the Sole Arbitrator read as under:"1. Does the claim of Messrs Tarapore and Co. on Cochin Shipyard Ltd. for compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know how fees referred to in Clauses (2) and (3) hereunder fall within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of contract entered into between the two parties ?2 If the answer to (1) above is in the affirmative in terms of the provisions of the contract are Messrs Tarapore and co. entitled to compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees to be paid to them by Cochin Shipyard Ltd. ? If so what is the amount ?3 The dispute that has arisen between Messrs Tarapore and Co. and Cochin Shipyard Ltd. regarding the claim of M/s. Tarapore and Co. for compensation for increase in the cost of the improved pile driving equipment and the technical know-how fees. 4 Costs. If so what is the amount ?3 The dispute that has arisen between Messrs Tarapore and Co. and Cochin Shipyard Ltd. regarding the claim of M/s. Tarapore and Co. for compensation for increase in the cost of the improved pile driving equipment and the technical know-how fees. 4 Costs. " ( 24 ) THE Arbitrator Shri C. Srinivasa Rao held on point No 1 that the claim made by the appellant Messrs Tarapore and Co. did fall within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the Contract entered into between the parties. The Arbitrator then awarded Rs. 99. 0 lakhs as compensation to the appellant-Messrs Tarapore and Co. for the increase in the cost. The Kerala High Court held that the question whether the dispute is arbitrable or not cannot be finally decided by the Arbitrator because it is a matter relating to his jurisdiction. Reversing this decision the Supreme Court speaking through D. A. Desai J. held that the arbitrability dispute was specifically referred by the parties to the Arbitrator for his decision and laid down that as the specific dispute of arbitrability was referred to the Arbitrator he had the jurisdiction to decide it and his decision on the dispute will be binding to the parties even though the Court may feel that the decision of the Arbitrator on the dispute was erroneous. ( 25 ) SHRI A. H. Mehta submitted that in our case it was not possible to say that the specific dispute regarding arbitrability of the claims made by the Contractors was specifically referred to the Arbitrator. He also submitted that in our case there was no specific decision pronounced on the issue of arbitrability as in the case before the Supreme Court. It was therefore that he submitted that in the facts of the present case the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court will not be applicable. We are afraid this is not so. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is that when a specific dispute of law is referred to the Arbitrator his decision on the issue will be binding to the parties notwithstanding the fact that the question of law referred touches upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and notwithstanding the fact that the Court may fund the decision of the Arbitrator to be erroneous. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned we are clearly of the opinion that in our case also the parties had specifically referred to the Arbitrator for his decision the specific question whether the claims made by the Contractors were arbitrable or not. This is clear apart from everything else from the fact that all disputes including the dispute of arbitrability were referred by the parties to the Arbitrator for his decision. So far as the second aspect adverted to by Shri A. H. Mehta viz. that the Arbitrator has not recorded his specific decision on the aforesaid issue is concerned it must be said that the Arbitrator has not explicitly recorded any decision whether he had found all claims made by the Contractors to be arbitrable and if he had found some of the claims only to be arbitrable he had not explicitly specified as to which claims were found by him to be arbitrable and which were not found by him to be non-arbitrable It will be presently seen whether this contention makes the award invalid. Before however we refer to that question it may be repeated that from the mere fact that the Arbitrator has not explicitly pronounced his decisions claim-wise regarding the arbitrability it cannot be said in the case of a de premissis award like the one made by the Arbitrator that the Arbitrator has not at all decided the question of arbitrability wherever it arose. We have already spelt out our reasons for this view and need not repeat the same We will only repeat that this being a de premissis award and there being sufficient indication on the face of the award it must be held that the Arbitrator had decided all the disputes raised by the parties including the dispute of arbitrability ( 26 ) SHRI A. H. Mehta laid heavy reliance on the case of M/s. G. S. Atwal and Co. (GUA) v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1976 Delhi 150 in support of his next submission that the non-pronouncing of the decision explicitly by the Arbitrator on the question of arbitrability renders the award in this case so unintelligible and vague as to vitiate it altogether. For appreciating this submission of Shri A. H Mehta it may be necessary to refer to the facts of the case before the Delhi High Court. For appreciating this submission of Shri A. H Mehta it may be necessary to refer to the facts of the case before the Delhi High Court. In that case an Arbitrator was appointed by the General Manager. Northern Railway to decide claims of the Contractor on determination of the Contract. It bears repetition to state that the Arbitrator was appointed only to decide the claims of the Contractor and not to decide any counter-claim that mat be put up by the Railway. Yet the preamble of the award referred not only to the claims made by the Contractor but also to the counter-claims made by the Railway and the Arbitrator without stating what claims and counter-claims were considered by him gave a lump-sum award without stating any reasons and details. Furthermore the award mentioned that from the lump-sum awarded the Railway may recover income tax at 2% as required by the Finance Act. 1972. The Court found that this was not a matter referred to him by the General Manager but was taken as an additional plea in the counter-claim. It was held that if the Arbitrator had said noshing about what was referred to him and merely said that a sum was awarded to one of the parties the Objector (Contractor) could hardly have pressed any objections to the award. Pointing out that the Arbitrator had in so many words said that he had decided the disputes and differences not only in the statement of claim but also in the counter-claim. it was held that it followed that the Arbitrator must have decided the counter-claim. It was further observed that in the circumstances it can be inferred (in view of total lack of detail and reasoning carried to the stage of unintelligibility so as to debar the Court from determining what exactly was decided by him) that the award might have been for a larger amount if the counter-claim had been left out of consideration. It was held that the award could not be upheld as it had apparently decided matters outside the scope of the reference. It was also found that apart from the fact that the Arbitrator had transcended his limits in allowing the deduction for income tax the Arbitrators finding that under the provisions of the Income Tax Act the Railway were entitled to make deduction was erroneous. It was also found that apart from the fact that the Arbitrator had transcended his limits in allowing the deduction for income tax the Arbitrators finding that under the provisions of the Income Tax Act the Railway were entitled to make deduction was erroneous. It was on these grounds that the award in that case was set aside. It is obvious from these facts that the award was held to be bad on the ground of unintelligibility because the unintelligibility was of such a nature as definitely to cause prejudice to the Objector (Contractor) in that case. The parties had not referred to the Arbitrator any counter-claim which the Railway might advance and yet the Arbitrators award clearly indicated that the Arbitrator must have also decided the counter-claim which was of an order of Rs. 1 57 772 and the Arbitrator had taken this counter-claim into consideration while computing the amount awarded to the Objector and hence it could be referred that the award might have been for a larger amount if the counter-claim had been left out of consideration. Thus this was a clear case in which the silence of the Arbitrator as to what part of the counter-claim if any was allowed by him to be set off against the claim made by the Contractor resulted into an uninteligibility causing prejudice to the Contractor. It is clear on a careful reading of the entire judgment that if this aspect of the prejudice to the Contractor had not arisen in the case the award might not have been found to be invalid. Therefore the real question to be considered in our case is whether the silence on the part of the Arbitrator is not explicitly speaking as to which claims were found by him to be nonarbitrable or his omission to say explicitly that he had found all claims to be arbitrable as the case may be had resulted in any prejudice to the Objector i. e. the Board. In this connection it is very important to bear in mind that in our case as stated at the Bar the dispute about arbitrability was raised by the Board alone against some of the items of claim made by the Contractors. The Contractors had not raised any dispute about arbitrability qua any of the stems in the counter-claim put forward by the Board. The Contractors had not raised any dispute about arbitrability qua any of the stems in the counter-claim put forward by the Board. If the Contractors had challenged the arbitrability of any item of the counter-claim and if the Arbitrator had upheld the challenge made by the Contractors and had therefore excluded from his consideration such item of counter-claim and had yet not specified such item the Arbitrators action would have prejudiced the Board. This is so because the Board would not then have been in a position to know as to which item of its counter-claim was excluded from consideration by the Arbitrator and yet it would not have been able to pursue any alternative remedy available to it for enforcing such item of the counter-claim. But this is not the situation arising in our case because the Contractors did not challenge the arbitrability of any item of the counter-claim made by the Board. In the facts and circumstance of our case the silence of the Arbitrator would cause prejudice to the Contractors and not to the Board. But the Contractors do not feel aggrieved by the award made by the Arbitrator. Therefore the factsituation in our case is entirely different from the one before the Delhi High Court in M/s. G. S. Atwal and Co. s case AIR 1976 Delhi 150 (supra ). But the Contractors do not feel aggrieved by the award made by the Arbitrator. Therefore the factsituation in our case is entirely different from the one before the Delhi High Court in M/s. G. S. Atwal and Co. s case AIR 1976 Delhi 150 (supra ). ( 27 ) ROUNDING up the discussion therefore we conclude that: (I) Dispute regarding arbitrability was specifically referred to by the parties to the Arbitrator; (II) The award being a de premissis award the presumption is that the Arbitrator had decided the dispute regarding arbitrability in respect of those items of claim made by the Contractors the arbitrability whereof was challenged by the Board; (III) The Arbitrator was not required to decide separately or as a preliminary issue the dispute regarding the arbitrability and therefore it was not necessary for him to decide it by way of preliminary issue or separately; (IV) There is nothing illegal about the Arbitrator having awarded a lump-sum to the Contractors; (V) Even if the Arbitrators decision on the question of arbitrability is erroneous it is binding to the parties notwithstanding the fact that the dispute involves a question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator; and (VI) No prejudice has occurred to the Board by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the Arbitrator to make an explicit or claim-wise pronouncement on the question of arbitrability and the award cannot therefore be set aside on the ground of unintelligibility in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 28 ) THE above were the only submissions made by Shri A. H. Mehta on the question of arbitrability and we find no substance in any of them. ( 29 ) THE next contention urged by Shri A. H. Mehta on behalf of the Board was that the award was invalid as it was pronounced by the Arbitrator beyond the statutory limitation period of four months fromthe date on which the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference. It was suggested by Shri A. IT. Mehta that the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference on 2/04/1984 that is the date on which he first issued notices to the parties and thereby called upon them to file their statements of claims etc. before him. It was suggested by Shri A. IT. Mehta that the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference on 2/04/1984 that is the date on which he first issued notices to the parties and thereby called upon them to file their statements of claims etc. before him. It was submitted that the Arbitrator was statutorily required to pronounce his award within four months of this date i. e. on or before the 1st of July (sic August) 1984 unless the Court had extended the time for giving the award or both the parties had moved the Arbitrator for extension of time\ and the Arbitrator had extended the same. It may be noted that the award was pronounced on 8/07/1985 and therefore it was certainly beyond the period of four months counting from 2/04/1984 There is no dispute that the Court had at no stage extended the period for the making of the award. However the contention raised on behalf of the Board was sought to be repelled by Shri N. J. Mehta on behalf of the Contractor firstly on the ground that in law the Arbitrator can be said to have entered upon the reference not on the 2/04/1984 but on the 22/08/1984 when the Arbitrator for the first time applied his mind to the questions to be resolved by him or in other words towards the adjuicatory functions which he was required to discharge as Arbitrator. Secondly it was submitted by Shri N. J. Mehta that before the statutory period of four months counted from the 22/08/1984 expired on the 21/12/1984 the Arbitrator bad extended the period for submission of the award upto the 31/03/1985 with the consent of the parties expressed in the shape of a joint purshis submitted on the 15/12/1984 Shri A. H. Mehta challenged the genuineness of this alleged purshis dated the 15/12/1984 and pointed out that it did not bear the signatures of the parties. 1: it appears that the parties had in fact moved the Arbitrator on the 15/12/1984 to extend the period upto the 31/03/1985 and the Arbitrator had accordingly extended the period upto that date it is indisputable that the award is not hit on the ground of being beyond the period of limitation This is so because there is no dispute that on the 19/04/1985 the parties had again moved the Arbitrator by a joint application to extend the period till the 30/06/1985 and had again moved the Arbitrator by a joint purshis dated the 15/06/1985 to extend the period till the 5/07/1985 and the Arbitrator had extended the period upto the 30/07/1985 and before expiry of the said period. had pronounced his award on the 8/07/1985 ( 30 ) BEFORE proceeding further some of the relevant dates may be mentioned which would of course involve repetition of the mention of the aforesaid dates also. These dates are as follows:16-2-84 The Arbitrator was informed by the Board about his appointment as such pursuant to the Supreme Court order and was requested to enter upon the reference. 31-3-84 The Arbitrator was informed about the formal agreement of reference executed by and between the parties pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court. 2-4-84 Registered notices by the Arbitrator to the parties informing the parties of his acceptance of the appointment as Arbitrator and calling upon the parties to file their claims counterclaims documents etc. within the time schedule mentioned in the said letter and further informing them that he would proceed to enter upon the reference and fix the date and time and place of the first hearing only on receipt of the claims counter-claims documents etc. 19-4-84 The Contractors filed statements of their claim. 28-4-84 The Board asked for time upto the 30/06/1984 to file their counter-claim and the said request was granted. 30-6-84 The Board filed its counter-claim. 9-7-84 A copy of the counter-claim of the Board supplied to the Contractors. 26-7-84 or thereabout The Contractors filed their rejoinder. 6-8-84 The Arbitrator attempted to the parties that the first hearing will be held on the and August 1984. 12-8-84 The first meeting held by the Arbitrator in presence of the representatives of the parties. 16-9-84 The second hearing before the Arbitrator. 23-11-84 The third bearing before the Arbitrator24-11-84 The fourth hearing before the Arbitrator14-12-84 The fifth hearing before the Arbitrator. 12-8-84 The first meeting held by the Arbitrator in presence of the representatives of the parties. 16-9-84 The second hearing before the Arbitrator. 23-11-84 The third bearing before the Arbitrator24-11-84 The fourth hearing before the Arbitrator14-12-84 The fifth hearing before the Arbitrator. ( 31 ) THE minutes of the aforesaid fifth meeting are dated the 1/01/1985 and there is a specific mention therein the parties had submitted a joint application requesting the Arbitrator to enlarge the time limit for three months and the Arbitrator had enlarged the time for three months i. e. upto the 31/03/1985 The unsigned purshis dated the 15/12/1984 is referred to as the joint request by the parties to enlarge time upto the 31/03/1985 Thus if 22/08/1984 is taken to be the date on which the Arbitrator entered upon the reference this joint request was made within four months of the said date viz. the 22/08/1984 and in that case the time can be said to have been validly extended upto the 31/03/1985 ( 32 ) THE question therefore is as to which is the date on which the Arbitrator can be said to have entered upon the reference. The Board submits that the 2/04/1984 was the date on which the Arbitrator can be said to have entered upon the reference because that was the date on which the Arbitrator had called upon the parties to submit their claim counter-claim and the documents etc. It is however pertinent to note that in this very letter the Arbitrator himself has clearly stated in para 8 that he would enter upon the reference and would fix the date. time and place of the first hearing only on receipt of the statements of the claim and counter claim etc. It is true as submitted by Shri A. H. Mehta that merely because the Arbitrator or one of the parties mentions a particular date as the date upon which the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference that date can not become the first date of entering upon the reference if in laws it cannot be held to be so. ( 33 ) IN order to appropriate the rival contentions of the parties on this point in a proper perspective it may be necessary to refer to some material legal provisions. ( 33 ) IN order to appropriate the rival contentions of the parties on this point in a proper perspective it may be necessary to refer to some material legal provisions. ( 34 ) SECTION 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration agreement unless a different intention is expressed therein shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule in so far as they are applicable to the reference. It is not said that in this case the agreement between the parties expressed therein an intention as to the duration within which the Arbitrator was required to give his award. Therefore the provision set out in the First Schedule as to the period within which the award must be given will be attracted by the facts of this case. Now the relevant provision on the point is to be found in para 3 of the First Schedule which lays down: The Arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the Court may allow. ( 35 ) SPEAKING about the present case therefore the Arbitrator was required to make his award within four months after entering upon the reference. In this case the Court itself has not extended the time for the making of the award by the Arbitrator. ( 36 ) THE power of the Court to enlarge time for making the award is dealt with by sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act which says that the Court may if it thinks fit whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not enlarge from time to time the time for making the award. We are not concerned in the present case with this provision of Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act but we are directly concerned with the provision made in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act. That sub-section clearly lays down that any provisions in an arbitration agreement whereby the Arbitrator umpire may except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement enlarge the time for making the award shall be void and if no effect. (2) of Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act. That sub-section clearly lays down that any provisions in an arbitration agreement whereby the Arbitrator umpire may except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement enlarge the time for making the award shall be void and if no effect. ( 37 ) IT is 511 too apparent even from a bares reading of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act that even if there is a clause in the arbitration agreement that the Arbitrator may extend time suo motu or at the instance of one of the parties it will be void. At the same time however it is equally clear that if there is a clause in the agreement that the Arbitrator may with the consent of all the parties to the agreement enlarge the time for making the award such a clause will be perfectly valid and binding. Now in this case if we turn to the consent terms submitted before the Supreme Court it is clearly provided in para 7 thereof that both the parties shall agree to extend the time as and when necessary for completion of arbitration proceedings. Thus the agreement between the parties in this case did not only empower the Arbitrator to extend the time for the making of the award with the consent of the parties but it also enjoined upon the parties to consent to such extension whenever it was necessary for completion of the arbitration proceedings. At this stage it is also pertinent to mention that the Arbitrator in this case was very much aware of the fact that he has to give his award within four months from the date of entering upon the reference. This is evident from the fact that the Arbitrator has in para 9 of his registered notice dated 2/04/1984 served on both the parties specifically cautioned the parties that the award has to be given within four months from the date of entering upon the reference and therefore they should submit their claim and counter-claim strictly within the time schedule fixed by him in the said notice. The Arbitrator having apprised the parties of this position it can welt be taken that the parties were also aware of the same. The Arbitrator having apprised the parties of this position it can welt be taken that the parties were also aware of the same. It is especially in the context of this background that we have to consider whether the parties had or had not jointly moved the Arbitrator at the meeting dated the 14/12/1984 to extend the time and had not given a joint purshis to that effect dated the 15/12/1984 though that purshis omitted to bear the signature of the parties. ( 38 ) BEFORE however going further into the above question it may be considered as to when the Arbitrator can be said to have entered upon the reference whether on the 2nd April 1584 or on the 22/08/1984 The expression entering upon the reference is not defined and therefore when we turn to some decided cases throwing light on the question of connotation of this expression we find that there is overwhelming authority for the proposition that the Arbitrator enters upon the reference only when he applies his mind for the first time to the disputes to bet resolved by him and not when he first issues a notice (like the notice dated the 2/04/1984 in this case) whereby he calls upon the parties to produce their statements of cases etc. See: Soneylal Thakur v. Lachhminarain Thakur and Anr. AIR 1957 Patna 395 Ramsahoi Sheduram v. Harishchandra Duttchandji and Anr. AIR 1963 MP 143 Assadullah Makhdoomi and Ors. v. Lassa Baba and Ors. AIR 1966 J. and K. 1 and M/s. Kalinga Otto (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Charanji Kochhar AIR 1972 Orissa 1972. ( 39 ) A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Romanath Agarwalla v. Messrs Goenka and Co. AIR 1973 Calcutta 253 has also held:". . . The Arbitrator under the Act may have to do various ministerial acts but the doing of any of the ministerial acts is not entering on the reference. It is only when he first applies his mind to the dispute referred to him that he enters on the reference. When however in a particular case he first applied his mind to the dispute would depend in the facts and circumstances of that case. It is only when he first applies his mind to the dispute referred to him that he enters on the reference. When however in a particular case he first applied his mind to the dispute would depend in the facts and circumstances of that case. "this view of the Calcutta High Court is followed by the Bombay High Court in M/s. Jolly Steel Industries v. Union of India and Anr AIR 1979 Bombay 214 wherein it is pointed out that an arbitration proceeding consists of some merely ministerial acts as also of effective adjudicative acts in furtherance of the work of arbitration. It is further laid down in the said case that the Arbitrator cannot be said to have entered upon the reference unless he starts the effective adjudicative part of his functioning as Arbitrator. It appears that in that case the Arbitrator had only issued notices to the parties on the 17/11/1971 to file their statements of claims and it was held that the Arbitrator cannot be said to have entered upon the reference on that day. The hearing of the dispute had actually commenced on the 21/02/1972 and it was held that each one of the earlier stages covered merely some or other ministerial acts such as issuing of notices acceptance of the statements of claims and adjourning the case to suit the convenience of the parties. As already said in the facts and circumstances of that case the 21/02/1972 was held to be the date on which the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference. ( 40 ) THUS there is heavy weight of authority in support of the proposition that the Arbitrator enters upon the reference on the date on which the starts the adjudicative part of his function and not when he starts just the ministerial part of his function. Applying this test to the facts and circumstances of the present case there should not be any hesitation in holding that the Arbitrator had entered upon the reference earliest on the 22/08/1984 The period of four months from the 22/08/1984 would therefore have been over on the 21/12/1984 and the question is whether both the parties had not moved the Arbitrator on the 14/ 15/12/1984 for extension of time. . . ( 41 ) THE faint suggestion that this document dated the 15th December 19 which purports to be a joint purshis by the parties for extension of time is a fake document does not merit any consideration whatsoever. It is true that it does not bear the signatures of the parties. However it appears to be a clear omission. The minutes of the meeting dated the 14/12/1984 recorded on the 1/01/1985 clearly mentioned about the submission of this joint purshis dated the 15/12/1984 Nowhere any allegation of partisanship or mala fides is made against the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator had no reason to allow either party to smuggle in this document on the record or to himself do so. It is also an indispute table and undisputet fact that even after this date viz. the 14/ 15/12/1984 the Board participated in the proceedings without any demur whatsoever and had in fact given two more applications for extension of time (dated the 19/04/1985 and the 15/06/1985 jointly with the Contractors ). There was also no dispute about the fact that the minutes dated the 1/01/1985 drawn for the meeting held on the 14/12/1984 were sent to the parties and the said minutes made a specific reference to the joint purshis dated the 15/12/1984 We have therefore no hesitation in finding that the parties had actually Jointly moved the Arbitrator for extension of time on the 14/15th December 1984 and even though the purshis dated the 15/12/1984 does not hear signatures of the parties they were the conscious authors of the said purshis and had in fact submitted the same to the Arbitrator for extension of time. This purshis cannot be equated with a pleading in a civil case and the mere omission on the part of the parties to sign it cannot detract from the fact that the parties had jointly moved the Arbitrator to extend the time and the Arbitrator had done so with their consent. One may go further and say that it is not necessary that the consent of the parties to enable the Arbitrator to extend time has to be in writing. It may as well be oral (vide Sakalchand Moti v. Ambaram Harzbhai AIR 1924 Bombay 380 ). One may go further and say that it is not necessary that the consent of the parties to enable the Arbitrator to extend time has to be in writing. It may as well be oral (vide Sakalchand Moti v. Ambaram Harzbhai AIR 1924 Bombay 380 ). It appears in this case that on the 14/12/1984 the parties must have orally moved the Arbitrator to extend the time and must have submitted the purshis on the next day forgetting that they had not put their signatures thereon. ( 42 ) IN the case of Chaturbhai Sohanlal v. M/s. Clive Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1965 Calcutta 145 there is authority even for the proposition that the parties may by consent enlarge time after expiry of the period of four months and the Court can also do so. We are also of the same view and this will cover the gap between 31-3-1985 and 19-4-1985 also. ( 43 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion there is no manner of doubt in our mind that the award in this case was made within the stipulated and validly extended time limit. It may only be mentioned that while contending forcefully that the award in this case was not vitiated on the score of limitation as contended by the Board the Contractors have also filed Misc. Civil Application No. 1508 of 1987 urging that if necessary this Court may grant extension of time to make and publish the award. Since we have taken the view that the award is made within the validly extended period there is on question of the Court having to grant extension of time to make and publish the award. We may however add that if such a contingency had arisen we would not have hesitated in the facts and circumstances of this case to extend the time ex post facto by allowing Misc. Civil Application No. 1508 of 1987. The main reason why we would have adopted that course is that even after December 1984 the Board had participated in the proceedings before the Arbitrator without any demur whatsoever and fully willingly. In that connection the Court would also have been required to take note of the fact that in the consent terms before the Supreme Court the parties had bound themselves to agree for extension of time for completion of the arbitration proceedings. In that connection the Court would also have been required to take note of the fact that in the consent terms before the Supreme Court the parties had bound themselves to agree for extension of time for completion of the arbitration proceedings. It would also have been a very material consideration that the parties have spent lot of money and time to have their disputes resolved by arbitration. Furthermore if the award were to be set aside on this ground the agreement to have the disputes referred to the Arbitrator would still have stood and there would have been another round of arbitration proceedings. The considerations which should weigh with the Court in the matter of extending the title for the making of the award are spelt out by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited v. C. Rajasekhar Rao 1987 (4) SCC 93 and in our opinion the ratio laid down in the said case is squarely attracted by the facts and circumstances of the present case. We therefore find no merit in the challenge of the Board against the award on this count. ( 44 ) WE now proceed to deal with the contention raised by Shri A. H. Mehta in respect of the award of interest by the Arbitrator to the Contractors. It may be noted in this connection that the Arbitrator has awarded to the Contractors the total amount of Rs. 57 65 273 with interest to be calculated at the rate of 17% per annum (seventeen per cent per annum) on the said amount with effect from the 6/08/1981 (the date on which the application was filed by the claimants (Contractors) for the appointment of an Arbitrator in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.) at Narol) till the date of actual payment or till the date of the decree that may be passed by the competent Court of law whichever is earlier in full and final settlement of all claims counter-claims raised before him in the reference. Shri A. H. Mehta challenged the authority of the Arbitrator to award any interest whatsoever to the Contractors. Secondly in his submission the Arbitrator had committed all error apparent on the face of the record in awarding interest at the rate of 17% per annum even assuming that he had the authority to award interest at all. Shri A. H. Mehta challenged the authority of the Arbitrator to award any interest whatsoever to the Contractors. Secondly in his submission the Arbitrator had committed all error apparent on the face of the record in awarding interest at the rate of 17% per annum even assuming that he had the authority to award interest at all. It was the contention of Shri A. H. Mehta that the award of any interest whatsoever was beyond the scope of reference made to the Arbitrator and was therefore totally bad in law. Shri A. H. Mehtas argument was that the parties had not specifically referred to the Arbitrator any dispute regarding interest climbable by one from the other nor were all the disputes referred by them to the Arbitrator unequivocally and therefore this is not a case in which it can even be said that any dispute regarding interest was implidely referred to the Arbitrator. It was submitted by Shri A. H. Mehta that the dispute regarding interest can be said to have been referred to the Arbitrator only if: (i) all the disputes arising between the parties are referred to the Arbitrator or (ii) the dispute regarding interest is specifically referred to the Arbitrator or (iii) when reference to the Arbitrator is by a Court in a pending suit involving an issue of interest and the Court has appointed an Arbitrator to decide all disputes arising in the suit. There cannot be any doubt that the contingency No (iii) stated just hereinabove does not exist in the present case because the reference was not made in the course of a suit. However the question still remains for consideration whether in the circumstances of the present case it must not be held that the parties or at least the Contractors had specifically referred to the Arbitrator their claim for interest against the Board and also whether there was not a reference to the Arbitrator of all the disputes arising between the parties which would implidely cover an issue or dispute regarding interest. There cannot be any quarrel with the submission of Shri A. H. Mehta that the reference to the Arbitrator in the present case was only of those issues which were covered by Clause 30 of the two Contracts. There cannot be any quarrel with the submission of Shri A. H. Mehta that the reference to the Arbitrator in the present case was only of those issues which were covered by Clause 30 of the two Contracts. However whether any particular dispute fell within the parameters of Clause 30 or not and was therefore arbitrable or not was also specifically referred to the Arbitrator as already stated earlier. Therefore if the Contractors had advanced a claim for interest on the amount adjudged as payable to them it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to pronounce whether the claim was covered by Clause 30 of the Contract or not. Again if the Arbitrator has held explicitly or implidely that the dispute was covered by Clause 30 of the Contract that decision of the Arbitrator will be final and cannot be challenged on the ground that it was beyond the scope of refracts and beyond the scope of authority of the Arbitrator. In this case it is an indisputable and undisputed fact that the Contractors had in fact claimed interest on the amount which according to them was payable to them. There is then no doubt in our mind that all the disputes subject to their arbitrability in the light of Clause 30 of the Contracts were referred to the Arbitrator. We therefore fail to understand as to how it can be contended that the Arbitrator had no authority to award interest or that the award of interest by him fell outside his jurisdiction. Shri A. H. Mehta of course rightly pointed out that Clause 30 does notspecifically empower the Arbitrator to award interest. However merely because the said Clause does not explicitly and specifically refer to the award of interest it cannot tn our opinion be contended that it takes away the authority of the Arbitrator to decide that by necessary implication the award of interest was covered by terms of Clause 30. In this connection one more fact to be noted is that Clause 30 does not specifically exclude the authority of the Arbitrator to take cognizance of a dispute regarding award of interest and to decide the same. Since the Arbitrator has in fact awarded interest to the Contractors it must be presumed that he had hold that he had at least the implied authority to award the interest. Since the Arbitrator has in fact awarded interest to the Contractors it must be presumed that he had hold that he had at least the implied authority to award the interest. This is especially so because interest in such circumstances may be taken to be incidental to the award of the principal amount. ( 45 ) A. HOWEVER in support of his proposition that if the dispute regarding interest is not referred to the Arbitrator he cannot award the same Shri A. H. Mehta sought support from the decision of M/s. Umraosingh and Co. Mahanagar Lucknow (UP.) v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1976 MP 126 . But then we have no hesitation in finding that this case does not help Shri A. H. Mehta. In that case the Contractors had claimed additional payments under 11 items on different grounds and the Arbitrators had partly allowed all additional claims except one under item No. 6 The Arbitrators had also allowed interest on the additional amount awarded by them at the rate of 6% per annum after expiry of two months from the date of the award in case of non-payment of the amount by the Government. The question which fell for the decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was whether the Arbitrators were right in awarding interest. It was pointed by the High Court that none of the claims referred to the Arbitrators included claim for interest. Pausing here it may be pointed out that in the case before us the Contractors had made a specific claim for award of interest to them. The learned Judges after referring to the fact that none of the claims referred to the Arbitrators included a claim for interest quoted the following observations of the Supreme Court from Thawardas v. Union of India AIR 1955 SC 468 :"it was suggested that at least interest from the date of suit could be awarded on the analogy of Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 But Sec. 34 does not apply because an arbitrator is not a `court within the meaning of the Code nor does the Code apply to Arbitrators and but for Sec. 34 even a Court would not have the power to give interest after the suit. This was therefore also rightly struck out from the award. This was therefore also rightly struck out from the award. " ( 46 ) AFTER referring to the aforesaid observation in Thawardass case the learned Judges of the M. P. High Court have however pointed out that the view taken in the said case is modified to some extent in subsequent cases viz Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukumachand Mills AIR 1967 SC 1030 Union of India v Bungo Steel furniture AIR 1967 SC 1032 and State of M. P. v. S and S (P) Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 1507 . The learned Judges have pointed out that in all these cases it is held that Thawardass case does not deal with the question whether the Arbitrator can award interest subsequent to the passing of the award if the claim regarding interest was referred to the arbitration. It is also observed that. in these cases it is pointed out that if a dispute as to interest is referred to arbitration it is an implied term of the reference that the Arbitrator will decide the dispute according to the existing law and give such relief with regard to interest as the Court would give if it decided the dispute. It is said that on this basis it is held in the aforesaid cases that the principle of Sec 34 will be applicable in such cases and the Arbitrator will have jurisdiction to allow interest subsequent to the passing of the award It is also made clear that the aforesaid Supreme Court cases lay down that if the reference is of `all matters in difference the Arbitrator may allow interest as was held by the Court of Appeal in Chandris v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. (1951) 1 KB 240. The M P. High Court has therefore. concluded in the case of Umrapsingh and Co. (supra) that the position therefore is that if there is a dispute as to interest which is referred to the arbitration or if all the matters in difference are referred to arbitration the Arbitrator may award interest on principles analogous to Sec. 34 of the Code but if the reference does not include a dispute as to interest or if it is not so widely worded as to include `all matters in difference it appears that Thawardass case will still prevail and the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to allow interest after the date of the award. It was found by the M. P. High Court that in the case before them the claims referred to Arbitrators did not include any dispute as to interest and; further the reference was Dot of all matters in difference but only of specific matters In that view of the matter the M. P. High Court held in the case before it that Thawardass case was applicable to the facts of the said case and the Arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction in awarding interest. ( 47 ) IT should be clear from the aforesaid judgment of the M. P. High Court cited by Shri A. H. Mehta himself that if the dispute regarding interest is referred to the Arbitrator or if all the disputes between the parties are referred to the Arbitrator the Arbitrator has ample authority to award interest on principles analoguous to the principle embodied in Sec. 34 of the C. P. Code. Therefore the real question to be considered in our case is whether the dispute regarding award of interest was referred to the Arbitrator or not or whether all disputes between the parties were referred to the Arbitrator or not. In our opinion it is entirely a different matter that the question whether a particular dispute fell under Clause 30 of the Contracts or not and was therefore arbitrable or not was also referred to the arbitration. If dispute regarding interest was referred to the Arbitrator or if all the disputes between the parties were referred to the Arbitrator the Arbitrator was of course required to decide whether the dispute regarding interest was covered by Clause 30 of the Contracts. Now in the present case a conjoint reading of the consent terms submitted before the Supreme Court and the formal agreement leaves no doubt in our mind as to the fact that all disputes between the parties including the dispute regarding arbitrability were referred to the Arbitrator. No only that but the Contractors had specifically made a claim for award of interest and it is in that context that it has to be seen that all disputes were referred to the Arbitrator subject of course to their arbitrability in the light of Clause 30 of the Contracts. No only that but the Contractors had specifically made a claim for award of interest and it is in that context that it has to be seen that all disputes were referred to the Arbitrator subject of course to their arbitrability in the light of Clause 30 of the Contracts. However as already stated the mere fact that the dispute regarding interest was not explicuty enumerated in any of sub-clauses of Clause 30 it cannot be said that the Arbitrator could not have upheld the plea that the dispute regarding interest was impliedly covered by Clause 30 of the Contracts. In any event even if the Arbitrator has committed an error in holding that the dispute regarding interest was covered by Clause 30 such finding of the Arbitrator will be binding to the parties and cannot be disturbed by the Court. This is so because the parties had conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Arbitrator to decide even the dispute regarding arbitrability of any claim including the claim for interest. ( 48 ) SHRI A. H. Mehta also submitted that there was nothing on the face of the award to show that the amount of Rs. 57 65 273 awarded by the Arbitrator did not include some interest for the period prior to the date of the filing of the Misc. Civil Application by the Contractors in the Civil Court at Narol and if the Arbitrator had included in the aforesaid amount any amount of interest for the period to the date of the filing of the application the award to that extent must be held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator However we have to presume if and whenever necessary that the Arbitrator had acted within the scope of his authority. We cannot presume otherwise as submitted by Shri A. H. Mehta. The presumption has to be in favour of the validity of the award and not in favour of its invalidity. In this connection it may be repeated that the Contractors bad claimed interest at 17% per annum on all claimed amounts from 13 till the date of actual realization (vide paragraphs 1 (c) and 10 of their Misc. Civil Appli. No. 231 of 1981 filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Narol ). In this connection it may be repeated that the Contractors bad claimed interest at 17% per annum on all claimed amounts from 13 till the date of actual realization (vide paragraphs 1 (c) and 10 of their Misc. Civil Appli. No. 231 of 1981 filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Narol ). It may also be repeated that the consent terms before the Supreme Court and the formal agreement dated 31 read together refer all disputes between the parties concerning the two works to the Arbitrator subject of course to the arbitrability of such disputes under Clause 30 of the Contracts. This means that all claims including the claim of interest were referred to the Arbitrator. Of course the Arbitrator had to find out whether the claim for interest fell within the explicit or implied purview of Clause 30 or not. The award of interest by the Arbitrator must as already mentioned imply that he had held the said claim to be arbitrable. ( 49 ) IN Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Private Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1032 the Supreme Court has observed:"though in terms Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitration proceedings the principle of that section will be applied by the Arbitrator for awarding interest in cases where a Court of law in a suit having jurisdiction of the subject-matter covered by Sec. 34 could grant a decree for interest. "in the said case the Supreme Court also quoted with approval the following observations from the judgment of the Jarvis CJ. in the case of Edwards v. Great Western Rly. (1851) 11 CB 588 viz. :" A further answer would be that this is a submission not only of the action but of all matters in difference; and the interest would be a matter in difference whether demanded by the notice of action or not. If the Arbitrator could give it he might give it in that way notwithstanding the want of claim of interest in the notice. If the Arbitrator could give it he might give it in that way notwithstanding the want of claim of interest in the notice. " ( 50 ) IN M/s. Ashok Construction Company v. Union of India 1971 (3) SCC 66 the relevant Clause of the arbitration agreement provided:"except where otherwise provided in the contract 311 questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications designs drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other questions claim right matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contracts designs drawings specifications estimates instructions orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute the same whatever arising during the progress of the work or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Superintending Engineer. " ( 51 ) THUS the terms of the arbitration agreement in the case referred to in the preceding paragraph did not specifically provided for reference of any dispute regarding interest to the Arbitrator but the Supreme Court noted that the terms of the arbitration agreement did not exclude the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to entertain the claim for interest on the amount due under the Contract and held that the award of interest by the Arbitrator cannot be said to be invalid. In our case also Clause 30 does not exclude from the purview of the authority of the Arbitrator taking cognizance of any dispute relating to interest and furthermore all disputes arising between the parties were referred to the Arbitrator subject of course to the question of arbitrability of such disputes. ( 52 ) THE case of The State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1507 is also an authority for the proposition that if all disputes are referred for arbitration the Arbitration the Arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite i. e. during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. It is also observed in the said case:"in the case before us admittedly the contract does Dot provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. It is also observed in the said case:"in the case before us admittedly the contract does Dot provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. "it is also observed in this case:"therefore the question ultimately will be whether the dispute referred to the Arbitrator included the claim of interest from any particular period or whether the party is entitled by contract or usage or by a provision of law for interest from a particular date. "it is also pertinent to note that in this case there was a contention that the award of interest at 9% per annum was exhorbitent and the Supreme Court has said:"mr. Shroff further contended that the award of interest at 9% per annum is exhorbitent. The short answer for negativing this contention is that it is seen from the claim statement filed by both the appellant and the respondent firm that each of them claimed for payment of the amount due to them with interest at 12 per annum under Sec. 61 of the Sale of Goods Act. Therefore it follows that the rate of interest awarded is not excessive. As we have already held that the Arbitrator has got power in this case to award interest from 7/06/1958 at the rate specified by him the third contention of Mr. Shroff will have to be rejected. " ( 53 ) A reference of this aspect of the case (rate of interest) is made here because in the case before us also the appellant-Board itself had admittedly charged interest from the Contractors at the rate of 17% per annum for certain amounts advanced by them to the Contractors as envisaged by the Contracts and yet they now contend that the award of the interest at the rate of 17% by the Arbitrator was excessive. We will further advert to this aspect of the reasonability of the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator a little later also. ( 54 ) IN State of Punjab v. Ajit Singh and Ors. We will further advert to this aspect of the reasonability of the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator a little later also. ( 54 ) IN State of Punjab v. Ajit Singh and Ors. AIR 1979 P. and H. 179 also a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the power to grant future interest i. e. interest from the date of the reference did not depend on the pleadings of the parties and that interest cannot be refused on the ground that the party entitled had not expressly claimed it. Referring to Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code the Full Bench has further observed that the matter of granting interest under Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code is primarily in the discretion of the Court itself and cannot easily be fettered on the technical plea that the claim for future interest was not made by the party entitled thereto in so many words. ( 55 ) APART from the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court there is authority provided by Gopalkrishna Pillai and Ors. v. Meenakshi Ayal and Ors. AIR 1967 SC 155 and Lala Gobind Ram Kapoor and Ors. v. Prem Parkash Kapoor and Ors. AIR 1984 J. and K. 48 for the proposition that future interest or future mesne profits are as it were incidental matters and may be awarded even though not specifically claimed if the same are not inconsistent with the other reliefs claimed. ( 56 ) IN the aforesaid Jammu and Kashmir High Court case it is also laid down that if a Court can award interest in exercise of its powers under Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code even though the same is not claimed in the suit there can be no manner of doubt that an Arbitrator has also power to award interest in arbitration proceedings even if it has not been specifically claimed. ( 57 ) THE Orissa High Court has held in State of Orissa v. M/s. J. N. Choudhary AIR 1982 Orissa 275 that unless there is a specific Clause in the agreement prohibiting award of interest the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest. ( 57 ) THE Orissa High Court has held in State of Orissa v. M/s. J. N. Choudhary AIR 1982 Orissa 275 that unless there is a specific Clause in the agreement prohibiting award of interest the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest. It is also held that the Arbitrator has power to award interest when it is an implied term of reference and in the absence of prohibition in the agreement interest may be awarded from due date till the date of the award and the award allowing interest is not vitiated on that ground. In our case there is no prohibition against the award of interest which may be found due to any party. ( 58 ) IN M/s. Krishan Kumar Madhok v. Union of India AIR 1982 Delhi 332 the Delhi High Court has held that though Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code does not specifically apply to arbitration the Arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite as the Court itself could give if the question of interest has been referred for arbitration. It is held that the power of Arbitrator in this regard is discretionary in the same way as it is discretion with the Court under Sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is also held in this case that if the Arbitrator thinks that 18% per annum is the reasonable rate at which the interest should be awarded the Court should not interfere with the award of the Arbitrator regarding the rate of interest. ( 59 ) THE Orissa High Court following the Supreme Court decision in the case of M/s. Ashok Construction Co. v. Union of India (supra) has held that if the arbitration agreement did not exclude the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to entertain the claim for interest on the amount due under the Contract then his award on that count cannot be said to be invalid. It is still more important to note that in this case the Orissa High Court has observed that the question of payment of interest is certainly a matter incidental to the final settlement of the claim. It is still more important to note that in this case the Orissa High Court has observed that the question of payment of interest is certainly a matter incidental to the final settlement of the claim. It is again interesting to note that is this case before the Orissa Court also both the parties had claimed interest in their claims and counterclaims and it was observed that they had possibly done so as they were conscious of the fact that the payment of interest was covered by the agreement. It is also to be noted that the parties by demanding interest on their claims and counter-claims were held to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to assess the quantum of interest on their respective claims and counter-claims. It is also pointed out that the Chief Engineer who acted as an Arbitrator in the said case before the Orissa High Court was expected to know the usage of the trade in such cases and so also the award of interest by him can justly be attributed to the usage of the trade and his award on that point cannot be struck down. ( 60 ) THE proposition that the Arbitrator has power to grant interest pendente lite is further fortified by the decision in the case of Executive Engineer R. E. Division Dhenkanlal and Anr v J. C. Budhraj AIR 1981 Orissa 172 and Union of India v. M/s. Builders Union AIR 1981 Orissa 188. Similarly the implied authority of the Arbitrator to grant interest is upheld in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. M/s. D. P. Wadia and Sons AIR 1977 Bombay 10. There is thus overwhelming and conclusive authority for the proposition that if the Contract does not prohibit the award of interest and if all disputes are referred to the Arbitrator the Arbitrator has authority to award interest pendente lite. In the present case there is nothing in the relevant contracts which excludes claim for interest being made by any party entitled thereto and by virtue of the consent terms submitted to the Supreme Court and the formal agreement between the parties all disputes were referred to the arbitation subject to their arbitrability. In the present case there is nothing in the relevant contracts which excludes claim for interest being made by any party entitled thereto and by virtue of the consent terms submitted to the Supreme Court and the formal agreement between the parties all disputes were referred to the arbitation subject to their arbitrability. It must therefore follow that the Arbitrator had the authority to award interest pendente lite and the Contractors had referred their claim for interest to the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator has impliedly found that such claim for interest was not non-arbitrable under Clause 30 of the Contracts. We therefore find no substance in the submission of Shri A. H. Mehta that the award of the Arbitrator or even its relevant part (awarding interest) is vitiated by the ground of interest. . ( 61 ) WE also find no substance in the contention that the award of interest at the rate of 17% as made by the Arbitrator is bad. As already seen the Board itself had charged interest from the Contractors at the rate of 17% It must also be borne in mind that the Arbitrator was a sitting member of the Board and an experienced retired officer of a high rank and the presumption must be that he knew as to what was the prevailing market rate of interest or bank rate of interest. We therefore reject even the contention that the rate at which interest is awarded by the Arbitrator is excessive. ( 62 ) THAT takes us to the last contention urged lay Shri A H. Mehta viz. that the award is vitiated by non-application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator. The basis on which this contention is advanced by Shri A. H. Mehta appears to be extremely frail. The ground is based on the fact that the Arbitrator has recited in his award that he had considered oral evidence also in arriving at his conclusions and making the award. It was pointed out by Shri A. H. Mehta and there is no dispute about it that neither party had led any oral evidence before the Arbitrator in the sense in which the expression oral evidence is understood in Courts and other similar forums. It was pointed out by Shri A. H. Mehta and there is no dispute about it that neither party had led any oral evidence before the Arbitrator in the sense in which the expression oral evidence is understood in Courts and other similar forums. Before proceeding further on this point it may be pointed out that what the Arbitrator has stated in his award by way of preamble is Now I M. D. Patel Sole Arbitrator and Chairman of M/s. Gujarat State Construction Corporation Ltd. and retired Secretary P. W. D Government of Gujarat Ahmedabad having taken up the burden of reference heard and examined and considered the pleadings submitted on behalf of the parties and documentary and oral evidence produced before me by them as also their oral submissions and arguments. . . . . hereby award and direct. . . . . . ( 63 ) IT is clear from the above that the Arbitrator has not merely stated in his award that he had heard and considered the oral evidence led by the parties before him but he has also categorically mentioned that he had heard examined and considered the pleadings and the documentary evidence and the oral submissions and arguments of the parties. The question is whether in the face of this statement it can be said that the Arbitrator was guilty of non-application of mind merely because he had referred to oral evidence even though there was no oral evidence on record before him in the sense in which men versed in law understand the expression oral evidence. We are emphatically of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case it is not possible to say that the award made by the Arbitrator was a product of nonapplication of mind. It must be remembered that the Arbitrator chosen by the parties in this case was not a man of law who can be credited with precision of language to the same degree as a man of law would be especially in matters of legal parlance. Furthermore the record clearly shows that the meetings and the hearings before the Arbitrator had stretched to several sittings and oral submissions were made by the Advocates of the parties before the Arbitrator. Furthermore the record clearly shows that the meetings and the hearings before the Arbitrator had stretched to several sittings and oral submissions were made by the Advocates of the parties before the Arbitrator. If in these circumstances the Arbitrator merely said that he had heard and considered oral evidence it must simply be taken as a loose way of expressing himself but nothing more than that. It is already seen that the approach to be made to awards of the Arbitrators should not be to prick holes and to find faults here and there but should be such as would sustain the award the reason being that the Arbitrator is a person in whom both the parties have reposed confidence for resolving their disputes effectively and honestly. It is also possible that the Arbitrator was mistaken in referring to oral submissions made before him as oral evidence. This possibility appears to be more plausible in the circumstances of this case and it is not possible to jump to the conclusion that the Arbitrator had not applied his mind to the matters before him particularly when the record shows that he had before him documents produced by the parties and had considered the same and had also entertained arguments from the parties at length. ( 64 ) RELIANCE placed by Shri A. H. Mehta on his point on The Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. M/s. Bhagat Painters AIR 1986 Orissa 82 is with respect misplaced. The decision does not lay down any proposition that merely because the Arbitrator is imprecise in the use of language in his award he must he held guilty of non-application of mind. The dispute between the parties in that case was in respect of a claim made by the respondent for reimbursement of costs amounting to Rs. 10 0 lakhs approximately which the respondent had spent for de-watering 3 0 0 kilo litres of water while executing additional works in a Coal Handling Tunnel. Each and every averment made in the claim statement filed before the Arbitrator was denied in the written statement and no evidence either oral or documentary was led before the Arbitrator by either party but the Arbitrator had simply inspected the site on one day had passed the award for Rs. Each and every averment made in the claim statement filed before the Arbitrator was denied in the written statement and no evidence either oral or documentary was led before the Arbitrator by either party but the Arbitrator had simply inspected the site on one day had passed the award for Rs. 8 20 800 It was specifically found by the High Court that by the time the Arbitrafor inspected the site the work in question had already been over and was not inprogress and the Arbitrator could not have arrived at the conclusion as to the quantity of dewatering merely by his inspection of the site after the work was over. In these facts and circumstances it was held that the conclusion of the Arbitrator was not backed by any evidence and that such conclusion can be interfered with by the Court even though the Arbitrator bad not given any reasons for arriving at the said conclusion. The determination made by the Arbitrator was therefore held to be perverse and the perversity was held amounting to mis-conduct within the meaning of Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act enabling the Court to interfere with the award. It was in these facts and circumstances that the Orissa High Court reached a clear conclusion that the award was vitiated by such non-application of mind as would amount to misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator. After having reached this conclusion one more fact notice by the Orissa High Court was that the record showed that the Arbitrator had indicated that he had gone through the documents produced before him when in fact no documents were produced before him by either party. This circumstance was referred to by the High Court as giving one more indication of non-application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator. The facts of the case before us cannot even remotely be linked with the facts of the case before the Orissa High Court. In this case the fundamental ground on which the award was struck down by the Court was that there was no evidence whatsoever before the Arbitrator to find out the extent of de-watering and yet he had passed an award in a huge amount and while doing so he had stated that he had referred to the documentary evidence on record when in fact no such evidence existed. The award in that case was not struck down merely because of the wrong recital made in the award about the Arbitrator having considered the documentary. Hence but it was struck down basically because in fact there was no evidence whatsoever before the Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion which he had done. It is therefore that we find that Shri A. H. Mehta cannot derive any help from this decision. ( 65 ) SHRI N. J. Mehta on behalf of the Contractors rightly relied on the following observation from Russel on Arbitration at page 303 (Twentieth Edition) to repel the contention of Shri A. H. Mehta in this behalf The citation in question reads:"an Arbitrator cannot by a false recital give himself an authority beyond the submission. Nor on the other hand will a false recital invalidate the award. AN award is not vitiated by a recital containing a mistake as to the Arbitrators having considered the decision of the umpire when there has in fact. been no consultation with the umpire. " ( 66 ) SIMILARLY the following observation quoted from Halsburys Laws of Egland (Vol. II Arbitration) is quite apt in the context and negatives the contention of Shri A. H. Mehta. The observation is: Inaccurate recitals do not affect the validity of the award. ( 67 ) IN the result of the above discussion therefore we find no substance in the contention of Shri A. H. Mehta that the award is bad on the ground of non-application of mind by the Arbitrator. ( 68 ) HAVING thus given all possible consideration to the contentions and submissions raised by Shri A H. Mehta we find ourselves unable to accept any of the same. ( 69 ) IN the result therefore both the appeals viz. First Appeal No. 848 of 1986 and First Appeal No. 849 of 1986 are dismissed with costs. Interim relief vacated. ( 70 ) IN view of the observations made in our judgment hereinabove on the question of limitation. we find it unnecessary to pass any order on Civil Application No 1508 of 1987 filed by the Contractors for extension of lime to make and publish the award and the said application is therefore filed without any orders as to costs thereof. ( 71 ) AT the request of Mr. K H. Baxi for Mr. we find it unnecessary to pass any order on Civil Application No 1508 of 1987 filed by the Contractors for extension of lime to make and publish the award and the said application is therefore filed without any orders as to costs thereof. ( 71 ) AT the request of Mr. K H. Baxi for Mr. A. H. Mehta the operation of this order is stayed till 15/06/1988 in order to enable the Board to approach the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate orders. No further extension will be granted appeals dismissed .