JUDGMENT : S. K. DUBEY, J. The Board of Revenue, Gwalior, has referred the following question of law, at the instance of the assessee-dealer, M/s. Anand and Sons, Indore, under section 44 (1) of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), to this Court for its opinion : " Whether, in the circumstances of the case and in the presence of an affidavit and doctors certificate taken on record, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the applicant was negligent in not preferring the appeal in time ?" 2. The statement of the case, as received, is as follows : The applicant was assessed to tax for the period 1st October 1973 to 30th September, 1974. He preferred the first appeal against the best judgment assessment before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, which was disallowed. A second appeal was preferred before the Tribunal. First appellate order was communicated to the applicant on 19th February, 1979. The appeal was sent by registered post on 20th April, 1979 and was received by the Tribunal on 24th April, 1979. Delay of 4 days had taken place as under section 38 (4) of the Act an appeal has to be preferred within a period of 60 days before the Tribunal. The applicant submitted an affidavit before the Tribunal on 17th July, 1979 to the effect that he was sick between 16th April, 1979 to 20th April, 1979 on account of fever and dysentery and was under the treatment of Dr. N. L. Goyal. A medical certificate dated 17th July, 1979 of Dr. N. L. Goyal was also submitted along with the affidavit. At the time of hearing, an objection was raised on behalf of the Revenue that the appeal was barred by time in as far as the delay of 4 days had taken place and it was not suitably explained and in the absence of explanation, it will be deemed negligence on the part of the applicant. The Tribunal considered the arguments of both tile parties and came to the conclusion that the memo of appeal was prepared on 17th April, 1979 and the sickness of the applicant could not be exclusive ground for delay because if he could prepare the memo of appeal in time, he could have ensured that the same was despatched in time. The Tribunal considered the arguments of both tile parties and came to the conclusion that the memo of appeal was prepared on 17th April, 1979 and the sickness of the applicant could not be exclusive ground for delay because if he could prepare the memo of appeal in time, he could have ensured that the same was despatched in time. The appeal was, therefore, rejected on the ground that it was barred by time. 3. Before us, the assessee, who is not represented by any counsel, submitted written submissions and relied upon the decisions reported in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 343 , Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 354 , Moreshwar Hari Mahatma v. State (Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu) (1980) 3 SCC 110 and Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969 SC 575 . Though in written submissions, the authority of the Apex Court in the State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749 has not been relied upon, but we considered the same also, as it is mentioned in statement of the case. 4. On behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, we heard the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, who was present in person. He supported the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay. 5. The facts stated above, in our opinion, do not make out any case for making a reference under section 44 (1) of the Act, as the question of condonation of delay is purely a question of fact and exercise of the discretion to condone or not to condone the delay, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be a question of law, what constitutes sufficient cause, is always a question of fact depending upon circumstances of each case. 6. We have gone through the entire record. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the application to condone the delay and dismissing the appeal as barred by time. The assessee knew fully well that the appeal was barred by time, as such, the assessee could have filed an application supported by an affidavit and/or medical certificate of the doctor to condone delay with the memo of appeal, but this was not done. The assessee knew fully well that the appeal was barred by time, as such, the assessee could have filed an application supported by an affidavit and/or medical certificate of the doctor to condone delay with the memo of appeal, but this was not done. When the appeal came up for hearing, it was pointed out to the assessee that the appeal was barred by time. The assessee sought time and thereafter filed a medical certificate of a private doctor dated 17th July, 1979 and in the affidavit of the proprietor, Mr. Sudhir Anand, para 5 of the order of reference shows that no such application for condonation was filed in the case. From the medical certificate and the affidavit, it is evident that the assessee was suffering from flue and dysentery from 16th April, 1979 to 20th April, 1979. But the Tribunal found that if during this period of suffering from the illness, the memo of appeal was prepared and signed by the assessee, then there was no reason for the assessee not to post the same on the same day or on the next day thereafter. For this, there is no explanation given either in the affidavit or in written submission. It is true, that the department has not filed any counter-affidavit in rebuttal but that does not mean that the Tribunal is bound to accept the affidavit and the medical certificate filed in the case. While assessing the value to be attached to the affidavit and the medical certificate, the Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that the assessee acted negligently and there was no sufficient cause to condone delay. It is settled law that the judges are not computers in assessing the value to be attached to evidence before them to consider the material or the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities (see Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, Raigarh AIR 1969 SC 255 ). 7. We have considered the authorities of the Apex Court relied on by the assessee-dealer in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749 . There is no dispute that the words "sufficient cause" receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the appellant. There is no dispute that the words "sufficient cause" receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the appellant. But in the present case, the negligence and/or want of bona fides are imputed to the applicant-assessee from the facts and material placed on record. The other authorities relied on by the applicant-assessee of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 343 (Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1952 SC 354 (Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab) and (1980) 3 SCC 110 [moreshwar Hari Mahatma v. State (Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu)] relate to appreciation of evidence in criminal cases and in particular type of offences under the Penal Code, which are not applicable in the present case. Moreover, a case is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may logically follow from it. Every judgment must be read as applicable to particular facts proved or assumed to be proved. 8. Though, in the application before the Tribunal for making reference to this Court for its opinion, there was no question with respect to the enquiry, but, suffice it to say, that the summary enquiry has been made and as the applicant-assessee has filed an affidavit and the medical certificate and the department did not choose to file any counter, the Tribunal, after considering the material, came to a finding that the appellant-assessee was negligent, there were no bona fides, there was no sufficient cause and rejected the application to condone delay. The Tribunal has considered the affidavit and the medical certificate and after considering the probabilities has rightly held that there was no sufficient cause to condone delay. In the circumstances of the case, the discretion exercised by the Tribunal does not call for any interference, as it does not constitute a question of law. 9. Hence, the question referred to this Court for its opinion is answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. 10. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly. .