JUDGMENT : H.H. Kantharia, J. (Oral) - By this writ petition under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-workman challenges the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra State, Thane, in reference (IT) No. 45 of 1978, on 31st January, 1983. 2. The petitioner was employed by the second respondent-company, Billion Plastics Private Limited, having their office at the 9th floor, Tulsiani Chambers, Nariman Point, Bombay-400 021, as a draughtsman since the year 1966 on a monthly salary of Rs. 125/-. In 1967, he was taken up as a member of the staff and was designated as supervisor-cum-operator which reduced his salary to Rs. 100/- per month. According to him, he was the seniormost workman in the category of the supervisor-cum-operator. He contended that he was ill from 15th September, 1974 to 15th December, 1975 and was, therefore, absent from duties. He was, however, sending medical certificates by hand delivery. And he resumed his duties, after his illness from 19th December, 1975. But the company wrongfully and illegally retrenched him on 6th June, 1977 in contravention of the provisions of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') without following the doctrine of 'last come first go'. He also contended that his retrenchment was bad in law and void ab-initio since it was done in violation of the provisions of Section 25F(b) of the Act in as much as he was not paid retrenchment compensation for every completed year of continuous service. 3. The contention of the company was that the petitioner was in their services from 1966 to 1974. Thereafter he remained absent for a period of 15 months and had neither reported sick not had taken leave and as such his services had come to an end. However, on his request he was reemployed all afresh from 15th December, 1975 and when his services were terminated by a letter dated 6th June, 1977 he was correctly paid retrenchment compensation for a period of one year's completed and continuous service and as such they had not violated the provisions of Section 25F(b) of the Act. However, on his request he was reemployed all afresh from 15th December, 1975 and when his services were terminated by a letter dated 6th June, 1977 he was correctly paid retrenchment compensation for a period of one year's completed and continuous service and as such they had not violated the provisions of Section 25F(b) of the Act. It was also contended on behalf of the company that the petitioner having been reemployed all afresh he had become junior to his erstwhile colleagues and, therefore, in retrenching him the provisions of Section 25G were not violated as the doctrine of 'last come first go' would not be applicable in this case. 4. Before the Labour Court, the workman examined himself and also adduced the evidence of one of his colleagues, by name Narsingh Shankar Puppala, to prove that it was through the said Puppala that he had sent the medical certificates to the company. On behalf of the company, the evidence of Production Supervisor D. B. Ganatra, Production-in-Charge Madhukar Anant Acharya and the Director Culabrai Brijdas Gandhi was adduced The parties also relied upon documentary evidence. On appreciation of the evidence adduced before it, the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the workman could not prove that he had worked continuously with the company from 1966 to 6th June 1977 and that he was not well from August, 1974 to 15th December, 1975. While dealing with the contention of the company that they had reemployed the workman all afresh on 15th December, 1975, the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the said fact was not proved by the company but there was a break in the service of the petitioner from August, 1974 to 15th December 1975 which was condoned. It appears that the Tribunal had framed an issue whether the petitioner proved that the retrenchment effected by the company was mala fide and gave a finding that the petitioner could not prove it but a perusal of the impugned award shows that the Tribunal had given absolutely no reasons for coming to such a conclusion. It appears that the Tribunal had framed an issue whether the petitioner proved that the retrenchment effected by the company was mala fide and gave a finding that the petitioner could not prove it but a perusal of the impugned award shows that the Tribunal had given absolutely no reasons for coming to such a conclusion. In the ultimate analysis of the evidence, the Tribunal was of the view that the petitioner was neither entitled to reinstatement nor full back wages but curiously enough granted to the petitioner retrenchment compensation for his continuous service from 1966 to 6th June, 1977 along with the notice pay and in this manner disposed of the reference. 5. We have been taken through the entire record and the impugned award. We are at pains to note that the Tribunal not only gave inconsistent and contradictory findings but gave no reasons for coming to a certain conclusion and passed the award with total non-application of mind. It can be seen from an answer to issue No. 1 framed by the Tribunal that the petitioner could not prove that he was in continuous service from 1966 to 6th June, 1977 and that he was sick from August, 1974 to 15th December, 1975 and in the same breath while answering issue No. 2 the Tribunal held that the company could not prove that the petitioner was re-employed all afresh on and from 15th December, 1975. Therefore, on the face of it the finding on issue Nos. 1 and 2 are self-contradictory. It is painful to note here that the finding of the Tribunal on issue No. 3 is that the petitioner could not prove that his retrenchment was male fide which would mean that the company could prove that the retrenchment was bona fide but a perusal of the impugned award does not show that the Tribunal had dealt with this aspect of the matter because there is total absence of discussion in the award on this point which shows that the impugned award was passed with total non-application of mind. Ordinarily while exercising jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 227 and 226, we would not have re-appreciated the evidence as if we were exercising jurisdiction of an appellate Court but the findings given by the Tribunal, as stated hereinabove, are so perverse that the same shocked the conscience of the Court and we are, therefore, left with no alternative but to go into the merits of the entire matter and that is how, with the assistance of the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of both sides, we went through the evidence and are obliged to reappreciate the same. 6. The evidence of petitioner shows that he was employed by the company in the year 1966 as a draughtsman on a monthly salary of Rs. 125/-. In 1967 he was taken up as a staff member as Supervisor-cum-Operator on account of which his salary was reduced by Rs. 25/- per month. His evidence thereafter shows that at the time of his retrenchment his salary was Rs. 650/- per month. He deposed that he was the seniormost Supervisor-cum-Operator at the time of his retrenchment and he even named the workmen who were junior to him. According to him, he was ill from 17th August, 1974 and resumed duties on 19th December, 1975. He had submitted medical certificates from time to time through one of his colleagues by name N. S. Puppala. At the time of resuming duty he himself submitted the fitness certificate to Time-Keeper Deshpande. He also deposed that when he was retrenched, no seniority list was displayed on the notice-board of the company. He was searchingly cross-examined on behalf of the company. But a careful perusal of the evidence that has come on the record in his cross-examination does not show that he had been in any way shaken in the cross-examination. No material has been brought on the record in the cross-examination to show that the evidence of the petitioner is in any way deficient so as to hold that he was not in continuous service right from the year 1966 till the day he was retrenched. There are no reasons to disbelieve his evidence that during the sick period from 17th August, 1974 to 19th December, 1975 he had sent medical certificates to the company. His evidence stands fully corroborated by an independent witness Narsingh Shankar Puppala. There are no reasons to disbelieve his evidence that during the sick period from 17th August, 1974 to 19th December, 1975 he had sent medical certificates to the company. His evidence stands fully corroborated by an independent witness Narsingh Shankar Puppala. He deposed that he was in the employment of the company for the last 10 years and even at the time when he gave evidence in the month of March, 1981 he was in the employment of the company. He deposed that the present petitioner had given him medical certificates from time to time to be delivered to Time-Keeper Deshpande which he had done. Puppala was also cross-examined on behalf of the company at quite some length but once again nothing is brought out in his cross-examination to show that he had given false evidence before the Industrial Tribunal. This witness, in our opinion, was disinterested and independent witness as there is nothing in his evidence to show that he was either interested in the petitioner or had any age to grind against the company. As a matter of fact, Puppala could not afford to give false evidence against the company more especially when he was at the relevant time in the employment of the company. No workman can afford to take such a risk. We are, therefore, more that convinced that the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner establishes the fact that the workman had sent medical certificates during the period when he was ill from 17th August, 1974 to December 1975. It may be mentioned here that the evidence adduced on behalf of the company in this respect through their three witnesses merely shows that the petitioner had not produced medical certificates when he was ill. We are not inclined to accept this evidence of the witnesses of the company firstly for the reason that they are all interested witnesses and secondly for the fact that the other circumstances, which we shall presently deal with, do not show that the petitioner had abandoned his employment with the Company. 7. Although the evidence of the three witnesses of the company shows that the petitioner did not attend duty from August, 1974 till December, 1975, and submitted no medical certificates or leave application we are of the opinion that the evidence of these interested witnesses is difficult to be relied upon. 7. Although the evidence of the three witnesses of the company shows that the petitioner did not attend duty from August, 1974 till December, 1975, and submitted no medical certificates or leave application we are of the opinion that the evidence of these interested witnesses is difficult to be relied upon. The Director of the company Chulabrai Gandhi emphatically deposed in his evidence that from August, 1974, the petitioner went away and cam back somewhere in November or December, 1975 and told him that during the intervening period he was doing some sundry job outside and did not think it necessary to be in the services of the company and that he was now not getting any work outside and wanted the job in the company upon which he told him that he would be taken all afresh in the employment and was accordingly re-employed. On the preponderance of probability we feel that such a situation is not possible because it is first of all hard to believe that a workman would just leave his job of eight years merely because he was getting sundry job outside the company. If the petitioner really wanted to sever his connection with the company and wanted to bring about cessation of the relationship of master and servant one expects him to be atleast interested in his terminal benefits of eight years of service. If the petitioner was really interested in doing some sundry job outside on and from August, 1974 he would have certainly tendered his resignation and would have taken all the terminal benefits from the company. It is unreasonable to accept that he gives up all his claims of terminal benefits and engages himself in some sundry job the getting of which was most uncertain. Then it is also unreasonable to believe that the company would take no action whatsoever when the petitioner did not report for duty from the month of August, 1974 for a period of nearly 15 months. In such a situation one expects the company to write a letter to the workman or to give him a notice that he has been not reporting for work and that he should resume his duties by a certain stipulated period and if he does not do so it would be taken for granted that he had abandoned the services. In such a situation one expects the company to write a letter to the workman or to give him a notice that he has been not reporting for work and that he should resume his duties by a certain stipulated period and if he does not do so it would be taken for granted that he had abandoned the services. In such a case the company would also offer the terminal benefits to the workman and finally bring an end to the relationship of master and servant. Nothing of the sort was done by the company which also goes to show that neither party had an intention to bring about an end of relationship of master and servant. It is pertinent to note here that if the company had really re-employed the petitioner all afresh in the month of December, 1975 they should have certainly given a letter of re-employment on fresh terms of service conditions. No such letter of re-employment is brought on the record by the company. All this goes to show that the evidence tendered on behalf of the company is not only an after-thought but also frivolous. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal also held that the company had condoned the absence of the petitioner for the period from August, 1974 to December, 1975. In these facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the petitioner was in the continuous employment of the company from 1966 to 6th June, 1977 when he was retrenched because as per the provisions of Section 25B of the Act he is said to be in continuous service despite the interruption of about 15 months which was on account of his sickness. 8. Having come to the conclusion that the petitioner was in the continuous employment of the company from the year 1966 to 6th June, 1977 when he was retrenched, under the provisions of Section 25F(b) of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to the retrenchment compensation for his 10 years of continuous service. Admittedly he was not given such retrenchment compensation when he was retrenched on 6th June, 1977. Therefore, the retrenchment effected by the company was void ab initio. And that being so, the workman remains in continuous service of the company. In other words, his services had never come to an end. Admittedly he was not given such retrenchment compensation when he was retrenched on 6th June, 1977. Therefore, the retrenchment effected by the company was void ab initio. And that being so, the workman remains in continuous service of the company. In other words, his services had never come to an end. The retrenchment being illegal right from its inception the usual relief would be reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. 9. In our judgment, this is a case where the workman is entitled to not only reinstatement but also full back wages and continuity of service. We say so because although the Tribunal has observed that the retrenchment was not mala fide, we are of the opinion that in fact it was so and that the petitioner was not retrenched bona fide. In this connection, we may point out that the retrenchment letter dated 6th June, 1977 does not show as to for what reasons or on what account the petitioner was retrenched. One can understand the retrenchment if the petitioner had become surplus or that some of the departments of the company were closed down on account of which there was not work for him or that the financial position of the company had become so bad that it was not economically viable to keep all the workmen in employment and a necessity arose to retrench some of the workmen. There was no such contingency in this case. Atleast we do not find anything from the letter of retrenchment. But the mala fide intentions of the company are crystal clear from the evidence of the Director Culabrai Gandhi who deposed in the examination-in-chief itself that while retrenching the petitioner, the fact that he was irregular in attendance and was absent for a long time were taken into consideration. In other words, the company sought to retrench the petitioner not for genuine reasons but as and by way of punishment that the petitioner was irregular in his attendance and was absent from duty for long time. If the company wanted to inflict such punishment on the petitioner on account of his so-called misconduct of being irregular and absent from duties for long time, the petitioner should have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before such a drastic action of removing the petitioner from the employment was taken by the company. If the company wanted to inflict such punishment on the petitioner on account of his so-called misconduct of being irregular and absent from duties for long time, the petitioner should have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before such a drastic action of removing the petitioner from the employment was taken by the company. The petitioner here was condemned without being heard which goes to show that the action of the company was not bona fide. 10. In this view of the matter, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is quashed and set aside. It is substituted by a direction to the company that it shall reinstate petitioner-workman in his original position forthwith. The Respondent No. 2-company is further directed to pay full back wages to the petitioner-workman right from the day he was illegally retrenched till the day he is reinstated. Respondent No. 2-company is further directed to pay the entire amount of back wages to the petitioner-workman on 1st April, 1988 or soon thereafter along with the salary of the petitioner for the month of March, 1988 failing which the company shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum on such accumulated amount of back wages due to the petitioner. Rule is accordingly made absolute but with no order as to costs. 11. Mr. Puri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent-company, submits at this stage that the operation of this judgment be stayed for a period of 15 days. The indulgence craved for by Mr. Puri is granted.